"Moral progress" vs. the simple passage of time

In contrast to these positions, I would label myself as a "moral quasi-realist": I don't think morality is objective, but I still care greatly about what a future Holden - one who has reflected more, learned more, etc. - would think about the ethical choices I'm making today.

I worry that you might end up conflating future holden with holden-who-has-reflected-more-learned-more-etc. Future you won't necessarily be better you. Maybe future you will be brainwashed or mind-controlled; maybe the stuff you'll have learned will be biased propaganda and the reflections you've undergone will be self-serving rationalizations.

But probably not! I think that if you are just thinking about what you in the future will think, it's probably a reasonable assumption that present you should defer to future you.

HOWEVER, when we move from the individual to all of society, I think the parallel assumption is no longer reasonable. I'm a quasi-realist like you, but I think it's not at all obvious that the way social norms evolve in gigantic populations of people over many decades are in general good, such that we should in general defer to what people in the future think. For example, insofar as there is a conflict between "what sounds good to say & feels good to believe" and "what's actually conducive to flourishing in the long run" we should expect there to be many conditions under which society drifts systematically towards the former and away from the latter.

The main counterargument is "Empirically there does seem to be a trend of moral and epistemic progress."

But this argument is flawed (at least in the case of morality) because even if societal morals were a total random walk over time, it would still look like progress from our perspective:

This is a graph of some random walks in n-dimensional spaces, with the y-axis being "distance from the t=10000 point."

To be clear I'm not claiming that morality/norms evolve randomly over time. There's definitely rhyme and reason in how they evolve. What I'm saying is that we have no good reason so far to think that the rhyme and reason is systematically good, systematically such that we should defer to future societies. (By mild contrast with the individual case where generally speaking you can expect to have reflected more and experienced more in good ways like doing philosophy rather than bad ways like being brainwashed by propaganda.)

For example, suppose that the underlying driver of moral changes over time is "What memes prevail in a population is a function of how much selection pressure there is for (A) looking good and feeling good to believe, (B) causing you to do things that help you solve physical problems in the real world such as how to grow crops or survive the winter or build a spaceship or prevent a recession, (C) causing you to do things that are conducive to the general happiness of people influenced by your decisons, and (D) causing you to pass on your genes." (Realistically there is also the very important (S): causing you to gain status.  But usually S is a function of A, B, C, and D.) And suppose that in the past, with most people living in small farming villages, selection pressure for B and C and D was much stronger than selection pressure for A. But over the course of history the balance of selection pressures shifted and (A) became a lot stronger, and (D) became a lot weaker.

I literally just now pulled this toy model out of my ass, it's probably wrong in a bunch of ways and there are lots of ways to improve on it no doubt. But it'll do to illustrate the point I'm trying to make. 

Suppose that this toy model is roughly right; that's the underlying driver of societal norms; the reason why e.g. gay people are accepted now and not in the past is that with the abundant wealth of modern economies status comes from more from saying things that sound good rather than from passing on your genes, and so anti-gayness memes (that sound bad but solved the problem of getting your relatives to have more kids, thereby helping spread your genes) have been relatively disfavored.

Then we quasi-realists should not defer to the moral judgment of future societies. The memes that flourish in them will be better in some ways and worse in other ways than the memes that flourish now. (Unless we have a good argument that 'what sounds good and feels good' isn't Goodhartable, i.e. is such a good proxy for the quasi-realist moral truth that it'll continue to be a good proxy even as society optimizes significantly harder and harder for it.)

(Thanks to Nico Mace for making the graph in an earlier conversation)
 

The progress vs. drift framing neglects the possibility that moral decay can exist from a quasi-realist perspective: that people in the past got some things right that people today are getting wrong. I don't think this should be a particularly out-there hypothesis in the current year?

"I don't care what future people think of my morality, I just care what's moral by the arbitrary standards of the time I live in."

As a moral super-anti-realist ("Morality is a product of evolutionary game theory shaping our brains plus arbitrary social input") this doesn't represent my view. 

I care about morality the same way I care about aesthetics: "I guess brutalism, rock music and prosocial behaviour are just what my brain happens to be fond of, I should go experience those if I want to be happy." I think this is heavily influenced by the standards of the time, but not exactly equal to those standards, probably because brains are noisy machines that don't learn standards perfectly. For instance, I happen to think jaywalking is not immoral so I do it without regard for how local standards view jaywalking.

Concisely, I'd phrase it as "I don't care what future people think of my morality, I just care what's moral by the arbitrary standards of my own brain."

I boringly agree with Holden, and with the old-hat views expressed in By Which It May Be Judged [? · GW], Morality as Fixed Computation [LW · GW], Pluralistic Moral Reductionism [LW · GW], The Hidden Complexity of Wishes [LW · GW], and Value is Fragile [LW · GW].

There's a particular logical object my brain is trying to point at when it talks about morality. (At least, this is true for some fraction of my moral thinking, and true if we allow that my brain may leave some moral questions indeterminate, so that the logical object is more like a class of moralities that are all equally good by my lights.)

Just as we can do good math without committing ourselves to a view about mathematical Platonism, we can do good morality without committing ourselves to a view about whether this logical object is 'really real'. And I can use this object as a reference point to say that, yes, there has been some moral progress relative to the past; and also some moral decay. And since value is complex, there isn't a super simple summary I can give of the object, or of moral progress; we can talk about various examples, but the outcomes depend a lot on object-level details.

The logical object my brain is pointing at may not be exactly the same one your brain is pointing at; but there's enough overlap among humans in general that we can usefully communicate about this 'morality' thing, much as it's possible to communicate about theorems even though (e.g.) some mathematicians are intuitionists and others aren't. We just focus on the areas of greatest overlap, or clarify which version of 'morality' we're talking about as needed.

Chalk me down as a regular-ol' moral anti-realist then. Future Charlie will have made some choices and learned things that will also suit me, and I'm fine with that, but I don't expect it to be too predictable ahead of time - that future me will have done thought and life-living that's not easily shortcutted.

Where future moral changes seem predictable, that's where I think they're the most suspect - cliches or social pressure masquerading as predictions about our future thought processes. Or skills - things I already desire but am bad at - masquerading as values.

I don't think differing attitudes toward moral realism are important here. People mostly agree on a variety of basic goals such as being happy, safe, and healthy. Moral rules seem to be mostly attempts at generating societies that people want to live in.

Some moral progress is due to increased wisdom, but most of what we label as moral progress results from changing conditions and/or tastes.

E.g. for homosexuality, I don't see much evidence that people a century ago were unfamiliar with the reasons why we might want to accept homosexuality. Here are my guesses as to what changed:

• a shift to romantic relations oriented around love and sex, as compared to marriage as an institution that focused on economic support and raising children. People used to depend on children to support them in old age, and on a life-long commitment of support from a spouse. Those needs decreased with increasing wealth and the welfare state, and were somewhat replaced by ambitious expectations about sexual and emotional compatibility.
• better medicine, reducing the costs of STDs.
• increased mobility, enabling gay men to form large enough social groups in big cities to overcome ostracism enough to form gay-friendly cultures.

Let's look at an example where we have less pressure to signal our disapproval of an outgroup: intolerance toward marriage between cousins has increased, at least over the past century or so.

Patterns in the US suggest that the trend is due to beliefs (likely overstated) about the genetic costs. So it could fit the model of increasing wisdom causing moral progress, although it looks a bit more like scientific progress than progress at being moral.

But worldwide patterns say something different. Muslim culture continues to accept, maybe even encourage, marriage between cousins, to an extent that seems unlikely to be due to ignorance of the genetic costs. Some authors suggest this is due to the benefits [LW · GW] of strong family bonds [LW · GW]. A person living in the year 1500 might well have been justified in believing that those bonds produced better cultures than the alternative. That might still be true today in regions where it's hard to create trusted connections between unrelated people.

I expect that there are moral rules that deserve to be considered universal. But most of the rules we're using are better described as heuristics that are well adapted to our current needs.

Imagine health realists vs anti realists arguing over whether it makes sense to think of there being an objective measure of health. The stance that most appeals to me is also a quasi realist one in which a healthy organism is one whose capabilities extend to taking into account its own inputs and outputs such that it is not burning any resources that imply that it can't continue to exist in the future or generating any unaccounted for externalities that overwhelm it. The same can be said for moral stances.

Does anyone know the moral philosophy term for this stance?

Nice post! I share your meta-ethical stance, but I don't think you should call it 'moral quasi-realism'. 'Quasi-realism' already names a position in meta-ethics, and it's different to the position you describe.

Very roughly, quasi-realism agrees with anti-realism in stating:

(1) Nothing is objectively right or wrong.

(2) Moral judgments don't express beliefs.

But, in contrast to anti-realism, quasi-realism also states:

(3) It's nevertheless legitimate to describe certain moral judgments as true.

The conjunction of (1)-(3) defines quasi-realism.

What you call 'quasi-realism' might be compatible with (2) and (3), but its defining features seem to be (1) plus something like:

(4) Our aim is to abide by the principles that we'd embrace if we were more thoughtful, informed, etc.

(1) plus (4)  could point you towards two different positions in meta-ethics. It depends whether you think it's appropriate to describe the principles we'd embrace if we were more thoughtful, etc., as true. 

If you think it is appropriate to describe these principles as true, then that counts as an ideal observer theory.

If you think it isn't appropriate to describe these principles as true, then your position is just anti-realism plus the claim that you do in fact  try to abide by the principles that you'd embrace if you were more thoughtful, etc.

Some of the changes over time are neither moral progress nor moral drift, because some ethical claims are about worldlines, not world states. For example, killing someone and replacing them with a different person is worse than doing nothing, even if the new person holds similar moral worth to the original, and if the externalities don't matter (no friends/relatives/etc.).

So even given an unchanging morality, moral attitudes about the present are influenced by (non-moral) facts of the past, and will change in complicated ways over time.

I don't think morality is objective, but I still care greatly about what a future Holden - one who has reflected more, learned more, etc. - would think about the ethical choices I'm making today.

I think that an ethical theory that doesn't believe baby torture is objectively wrong is flawed. If there is no objective morality, then reflection and learning information cannot guide us toward any sort of "correct" evaluation of our past actions. I don't think preferences should change realist to quasi-realist. Is it any less realist to think murder is okay, but avoid it because we are worried about judgement from others? It seems like anti-realism + a preference. There already is a definition of quasi-realist which seems different from yours unless I'm misunderstanding yours [1].

I mean specifically to point to the changes that you (whoever is reading this) consider to be progress, whether because they are honing in on objective truth or resulting from better knowledge and reasoning or for any other good reason. Future-proof ethics is about making ethical choices that will still look good after your and/or society's ethics have "improved" (not just "changed").

Reasoning helps us reach truth better. If there are no moral facts, then it is not really reasoning and the knowledge is useless. Imagine I said that I do not believe ghosts exist, but I want to be sure that I look back on my past opinions on ghosts and hope they are correct. I want this because I expect to learn much more about the qualities and nature of ghosts and I will be a much more knowledgable person. The problem is that ghosts have no qualities or nature because they do not exist. 

You wanted to use future-proof ethics as a meta-ethical justification for selecting an ethical system, if I recall your original post correctly. My point about circularity was that if I'm using the meta-ethical justification of future proof to pick my ethical system, I can't justify future proofing with the very same ethical system. The whole concept of progress, whether it be individual, societal or objective relies on a measure of morality to determine progress. I don't have that ethical system if I haven't used future proofing to justify it. I don't have future proofing, unless I've got some ethical truths already.

Imagine I want to come up with a good way of determining if I am good at math. I could use my roommate to check my math. How do I know my roommate is good at math? Well, in the past, I checked his math and it was good.

I am a moral realist. I believe there are moral facts. I believe that through examination of evidence and our intuitions, we become a more moral society generally speaking. I therefore think that the future will be more ethical. Future proof choices and ethical choices will correlate somewhat. I believe this because I believe that I can, in the present, determine ethical truths via my intuition. This is better than future proof because it gets at the heart of what I want.

How would you justify your "quasi realist" position. You want future Holden to look back on you. Why? Should others hold this preference? What if I wanted past Parrhesia to respect future Parrhesia. Should I weigh this more than future Parrhesia respecting past Parrhesia? I don't think this is meta-ethically justified. Can you really say there is nothing objectively wrong with torturing a baby for sadistic pleasure?

[1] see: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quasi-realism