Free will as an appearance to others

In this theory, free will becomes a property that is not possessed by creatures themselves, but by creatures interacting with other creatures.

I agree (and had mention here multiple times before) that free will and agency is observer-dependent, and not an objective feature of reality. Also see the concept of intentional stance.

This also works on yourself. If your best model of yourself is as an agent making choices based on their beliefs, then you will seem to have free well to yourself.

So a flipped coin has free will? I fear this is an attempt to dissolve a question which has gone the wrong way: instead of tabooing the word and looking for predictions that can be made conditional on some unambiguous feature, you're looking for an easier-to-use definition that you can force the word into.

Are you familiar with Dennett’s three stances? You’ve mostly reinvented that idea, I think; and your notion of what constitutes free will is also very similar to Dennett’s account of consciousness.

I think the use of the word "psychopathic" is distracting here. The attention to "others as machines" is relevant but psyhopathy has important meanings elsewhere which really don't apply here. In a proper prediction domination it's more like judo in that you are using the the agents own power towards your needs. You never ask for something that would be opposed except when confrontation is exactly what you want out of the system (and therefore it's not true opposition but cooperation).

In general standard gripes about free will apply. Natural laws are descriptive and not normative. Thus they can't be oppressive. If somebody develops a theory of what ice scream flavour you like it just means you have tastes and it doesn't limit your taste formation in any way. Having "free icecream taste" would mean you would not have any taste (that is you can not like any particular flavour). Having "free will" would mean there is no choice that could be attributed to your character, you have no "decision taste". As processed here there is an enourmous difference between "agent X can't attribute a particular decision that agent Y will do" vs "there is no function from the state of the world and state of agent Y that would output agent Ys decision".

If the universe is deterministic then something else has to be responsible for (the illusion of libertarian) free will. But you don't know that the universe is deterministic.

For me it may appears too that apparent agents become apparent machines if the observer has strong prediction power.

As an adult I remember my mind states as a teenager during an aha moment on simple euclidian geometry poofs. The recall efforts, the checks, the sight, the comparisons, the size of the A4 sheet where the figures had to fit in with a margin for the written demo, the colors of my pens and the choices of coloring some figures or use a pencil instead etc.

Well, strong prediction power includes stonger understanding of causes and outcomes, I mean the birth, life and death of the event is well connnected to well defined internal and external values.

So, if a powerful predictor reads the mind of a teenager making the same euclidian geometry that i did, i think the predictor would know before and better than the teenager the outcomes of the efforts, checks, sight, comparisons, agency, results and aha.

The problem is the internal and external values, are they valued before the teenager's birth ? Or are they real time values like for weather forecast or obervation of quantum state ?

Maybe the internal and external values or finite sets of possible values nearest to the event are known sufficiently in advance to call the teenager an apparent machine for a predictor with faster real time.

But if the complete causal chain defines what the teenager is then the predictor is just wit-nicknaming in real time to satisfy its hurry agenda.

So free will is an appearence to others' perspective. If the CIA gets mechanically answers from humans 1,2 and asks itself if techniques for n works for n+1 then since all sapiens are the same, we are all machines in this perspective. But if the question is "would you have worked for the CIA if you were born in America" then all is undecidable because the machines flip sides with the predictors, it's like the famous Gödel prequel "The Cretans, always liars" by Epimenides, Cretica.

In this theory, free will becomes a property that is not possessed by creatures themselves, but by creatures interacting with other creatures.

That would seem to imply that Robinson Crusoe lost his free will when he was marooned, and regained it on encountering Friday. Or that when I arrive home and shut my front door, I stop having free will until I go out again.