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comment by Logan Zoellner (logan-zoellner) · 2023-01-22T21:05:30.654Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The phenomena you are describing is technological deflation, and yes it can cause the economy to go down.  For example, the Great Depression was caused by deflation.  One reason this happened was that the gold standard prevented the amount of money from increasing to match the amount of goods and services.  The Federal Reserve no longer uses the gold standard, so what would happen instead is lower interest rates and quantitative easing to offset technological deflation resulting in growing GDP.  Theoretically if the Federal Reserve hits the zero lower bound and the government refuses to provide fiscal aid, deflation could still happen.  For example the great recession in 2008 was caused by a combination of deflation, the zero lower bound and insufficient fiscal aid. Japan too experience deflation, low interest rates and low economic growth for most of the 90's-2000's but due to a high savings rate and aging workforce not due to technological inflation.

In either case, when the federal reserve is at the ZLB the proper response is fiscal aid.  This could take the form of a UBI (as in the case of the 2020 recession when the government sent checks to everyone) or in the form of other government spending (health care, defense, bridges to nowhere). it's generally easier to get governments to spend more than to get them to save more, but as noted (2008, Japan) this is not always the case.

Replies from: Nicky
comment by NickyP (Nicky) · 2023-01-23T19:19:13.340Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Thanks for this comment! I think this one of the main concerns I am pointing at.

I think somethings like fiscal aid could work, but have people tried making models for responses to things like this? It feels like with covid the relatively decent response was because the government was both enforcing a temporary policy of lockdown, and was sending checks to adjust things "back to normal" despite this. If job automation is slightly more gradual, on the scale of months to years, and specific only to certain jobs at a time, the response could be quite different, and it might be more likely that things end up poorly.

Replies from: logan-zoellner
comment by Logan Zoellner (logan-zoellner) · 2023-01-23T20:31:31.620Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Agreed.  I think a big part of the reason why we saw a large fiscal response in Covid but not in e.g. 2008 was because it was agreed that it was "nobody's fault".  

In this sense, the faster that AI produces unemployment, the more likely we will see a policy response.  If tens of millions of middle class educated workers suddenly wake up one day without a job, politicians will respond.  If, on the other hand, AI slowly squeezes the lowest productivity workers out of a job over the course of 1-2 decades, there will be calls for "reeducation" or "tough love" or some such nonsense as the economy slowly spirals downward Japan style.

Ironically, this then makes for one of the few cases where "going faster" makes the transition to AGI less harmful.  Whereas most AI safety issues are worse the faster the transition is.

comment by jmh · 2023-01-22T22:43:54.393Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Somewhat supportive of your conclusion is Say's Law -- basically people produce to consume. What will AIs consume (or would they even be part of the exchange nexus)?

When you talk about GDP it seems you're thinking about nominal GDP. That may well not matter. If AI becomes wide spread, is largely self driven in terms of productivity gains (i.e., not really driven by investments in improvements and production capital bu people) then possible we find some jobs become obsolete  but real wages of the labor force actually increase greatly. Perhaps we only need 20% of a society to be productive and they can easily support their family and friend circle,  or social programs are well funded and the UBI can actually work.

Perhaps a lot there depends as much on how competitive industries remain and what type of pricing power producers enjoy. Might see things (and perhaps it would be worth revisiting such cases of any insights) like windfall profit taxed get implemented.

Is the bad outcome a transition stage issue or some type of systemic failing? Not sure -- here I think both speed of AI effects and speed of social institution reactions might make large differences.

comment by ESRogs · 2023-01-22T19:04:27.794Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I am also not an economist and this might be totally off-base, but it seems to me that if there is real innovation and we can in fact do a bunch of new stuff that we couldn't before, then this will be reflected in the nominal GDP numbers going up. For the simple reason that in general people will be more likely to charge more for new and better goods and services rather than charging less for the same old goods and services (that can now be delivered more cheaply).

Replies from: ESRogs, Nicky
comment by ESRogs · 2023-01-22T19:10:30.250Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Regarding all the bottlenecks, I think there is an analogy between gradient descent and economic growth / innovation: when the function is super high-dimensional, it's hard to get stuck in a local optimum.

So even if we stagnate on some dimensions that are currently bottlenecks, we can make progress on everything else (and then eventually the landscape may have changed enough that we can once again make progress on the previously stagnant sectors). This might look like a cost disease, where the stagnant things get more expensive. But that seems like it would go along with high nominal GDP growth rather than low.

comment by NickyP (Nicky) · 2023-01-22T19:26:15.086Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yeah, though I think it depends on how many people are able to buy the new goods at a better price. If most well-paid employees (ie: the employees that companies get the most value from automating) no longer have a job, then the number of people who can buy the more expensive goods and services might go down. It seems counter-intuitive to me that GDP if the number of people who lost their jobs is high enough. It feels possible that the recent tech developments was barely net positive to nominal GDP despite rapid improvements, and that fast enough technological process could cause nominal GDP to go in the other direction.

comment by memeticimagery · 2023-01-23T18:10:53.844Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Transformative AI will demand a rethink of the entire economic system. The world economy is based on an underlying assumption that most humans are essentially capable of being productive in some real way that generates value. Once that concept is eroded, and my intuition is that it will only take a surprisingly small percentage of people being rendered unproductive, some form of redistribution will probably be required. Rather than designing this system in such a way that 'basic' needs are provided/paid for, I think a percentage of output from AI gains should be redistributed. After all, defining 'basic' needs is hard-people have drastically different definitions that change over time and location. The basic needs of someone in 1000AD are obviously not the same as in 2023. 

If this approach is used, it also lessens popular anxiety about AI. They have direct benefits that scale with the success of it. Most likely, the hardest part of all this is changing an economic system that is highly entrenched.

Replies from: ponkaloupe
comment by ponkaloupe · 2023-01-24T00:48:27.095Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

i'm generally receptive to the idea that our economic systems could be changed significantly for the better, but looking historically i don't think any of this "demands" a rethink of the dominant economic system in play today. it will mutate in the same patchwork way it has ever since the invention of the printing press (an early device that turned a previously scarce resource into an abundant one). it somehow made it through both the explosive decrease in energy scarcity of the industrial revolution and the explosive decrease in information scarcity of the past 50 years.

i think there's some argument here that the periods which experience outsized economic growth are largely those same periods which experienced rapid decrease in scarcity of some underlying resource, though i don't have the data to properly claim that. on the other hand, the industrial revolution while successful in economic terms had some pretty terrible social consequences at the time: generally poor living and working conditions for large segments of the population. the response to this was largely social and political: unions, regulation. the actual economic system has proven itself to be robust to these kind of changes and also faster at responding to them than the social/political systems, so i think the more appropriate focus is on the latter: are our social and political systems of today up to the task of handling another rapid decrease in scarcity?

Replies from: memeticimagery
comment by memeticimagery · 2023-01-24T17:56:43.875Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't think AI in the long run will be comparable to events like the industrial revolution (or anything, historically) because AI will be less tool like and more agent like in my view. That is not a situation that draws any historical precedent. A famous investor, Ray Dalio made a point something along the lines that recessions, bubbles etc (but really any rare-ish economic event) are incredibly hard to model because the length of time the economic system has existed is actually relatively short so we don't have that large a sample size. That point can be extrapolated across to this situation almost exactly. Technological revolutions are incredibly rare and we do not have enough of them to find two that are very similar. I don't think AI is going to be like anything that came before and I don't see why the economic system would be durable towards shocks like it.

Replies from: ponkaloupe
comment by ponkaloupe · 2023-01-25T00:07:19.426Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

AI will be less tool like and more agent like in my view.

it’s not clear to me that this distinction is real, or would matter even if it is real. from my perspective, looking up, i am an agent within the company i work within. from the employer’s perspective, looking down, i am a tool to drive revenue. this relation exists all the way up through to the C-suite, and then the hedge funds and retirement fund managers, and back around to the employees who own those funds. in our capitalist system of ownership every agent is also someone else’s tool.

recessions, bubbles etc (but really any rare-ish economic event) are incredibly hard to model because the length of time the economic system has existed is actually relatively short so we don't have that large a sample size. That point can be extrapolated across to this situation almost exactly.

our economic systems have weathered all these events. if your point is that AI is of the same class as bubbles/recessions, then shouldn’t the takeaway be that our economic systems can handle it — just expecting it to be as painful as any other economic swing?

i suppose i probably just don’t understand what you mean when you speak of “rethinking” the economic system. that sounds like a revolutionary change, whereas for the dominant economic systems today, looking back i can trace what is more of an evolutionary path from the dawn of cities/trade up to the present day. the only time i can say we’ve “rethought” our economic system is when various countries tried to pivot from their established distributed system to a centrally managed system of production more or less “overnight”.