Should CA, TX, OK, and LA merge into a giant swing state, just for elections?

post by Thomas Kwa (thomas-kwa) · 2024-11-06T23:01:48.992Z · LW · GW · 35 comments

Contents

35 comments

As Americans know, the electoral college gives disproportionate influence to swing states, which means a vote in the extremely blue state of California was basically wasted in the 2024 election, as are votes in extremely red states like Texas, Oklahoma, and Louisiana. State legislatures have the Constitutional power to assign their state's electoral votes. So why don't the four states sign a compact to assign all their electoral votes in 2028 and future presidential elections to the winner of the aggregate popular vote in those four states? Would this even be legal?

The population of CA is 39.0M (54 electoral votes), and the population of the three red states is 38.6M (55 electoral votes). The combined bloc would control a massive 109 electoral votes, and would have gone for Biden in 2020 and Trump in 2024. Every state has an incentive to sign to increase their voters' influence in the national election.

There has been one similar proposal before: a National Popular Vote Interstate Compact which would go into effect when states controlling >50% of electoral votes sign it. It is only popular with blue states-- swing states don't want to reduce their influence, and red states don't want to give up the Republican electoral college advantage. Merging states would be far superior incentive-wise, as the influence of every signatory would increase and there would be essentially no expected net shift in the election results.

The compact should only go into effect once all 4 states sign, of course. But even then, there is another potential problem: Say that polls suggest the combined bloc is trending blue in 2028. The Louisiana legislature has an incentive to pull out at the last minute, and the other red states will follow. To prevent this, there must be a provision that once signed by all 4 states, the compact can't be repealed by any state until after the next election.

Smaller states have an even greater incentive to merge, e.g. Rhode Island with Montana. With only two states in the compact, there are fewer difficulties in getting all the states to sign at once. And due to their slightly higher electoral vote counts per voter, these small states' voters would quickly go from among the least important in the election to the most important.

35 comments

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comment by Eric Neyman (UnexpectedValues) · 2024-11-07T00:20:04.401Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

An interesting thing about this proposal is that it would make every state besides CA, TX, OK, and LA pretty much irrelevant for the outcome of the presidential election. E.g. in this election, whichever candidate won CATXOKLA would have enough electoral votes to win the election, even if the other candidate won every swing state.

 

...which of course would be unfair to the non-CATXOKLA states, but like, not any more unfair than the current system?

Replies from: thomas-kwa, adam-scherlis
comment by Thomas Kwa (thomas-kwa) · 2024-11-07T02:07:00.817Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The CATXOKLA population is higher than the current swing state population, so it would arguably be a little less unfair overall. Also there's the potential for a catchy pronunciation like /kæ'tʃoʊklə/.

comment by Adam Scherlis (adam-scherlis) · 2024-11-07T04:17:38.589Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The non-CATXOKLA swing states can merge with each other and a few red and blue states to form an even bigger bloc :)

I think there's a range of stable equilibria here, depending on the sequence of merges, with the largest bloc being a majority of any size. I think they all disenfranchise someone, though.

So you can't ever get to a national popular vote, without relying on things like the NPVIC which shortsightedly miss the obvious dominating strategy of a 51% attack against American democracy.

Replies from: kjz
comment by kjz · 2024-11-07T23:28:53.537Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I could imagine this turning into a flexible system of alliances similar to the conference system in NCAA college football and other sports (see here for a nice illustrated history of the many changes over time). Just as conferences and schools negotiate membership based on the changing quality of their sports programs, ability to generate revenue, and so on, states could form coalitions that could be renegotiated based on changing populations or voter preferences.

Thinking from that perspective, one potential Schelling point could be a "Northwest" coalition of WA/OR/ID/MT/WY/ND/SD/NE. This is quite well-balanced, as these states combined to give 21 EV to each candidate. And although the state populations are higher in WA/OR (12.0M) than the six red states (7.4M), the combined vote totals actually show a small lead for Trump (4.1M vs 3.9M, with more votes remaining to be counted in the blue states likely to close the gap).

After this, maybe the remaining "Southwest" states (NV, UT, CO, AZ, NM) decide to join forces? Here a state by state analysis is less useful, especially since two of them still haven't been called, but the current combined vote count is a very narrow Trump lead of 4.07M to 4.05M. 

The eastern half of the country seems harder to predict - clearly there are large potential blocs of blue states in the northeast and red states in the southeast, but it's harder to see clear geographical groupings that make sense.

Unlikely any of this happens of course, but fun to think about.

comment by jbash · 2024-11-07T15:04:59.486Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

To prevent this, there must be a provision that once signed by all 4 states, the compact can't be repealed by any state until after the next election.

It's not obvious that state legislatures have the authority, under their own constitutions, to bind themselves that way. Especially not across their own election cycles.

Replies from: lcmgcd, mr-hire
comment by lemonhope (lcmgcd) · 2024-11-08T07:39:08.266Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The opposing states in the coalition will simply declare war against the defectors. It's surely worth keeping your own army to keep being a swing bloc.

comment by Matt Goldenberg (mr-hire) · 2024-11-08T19:30:15.082Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

A real life use for smart contracts 😆

comment by Arjun Panickssery (arjun-panickssery) · 2024-11-07T11:42:30.362Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So why don't the four states sign a compact to assign all their electoral votes in 2028 and future presidential elections to the winner of the aggregate popular vote in those four states? Would this even be legal?

It would be legal to make an agreement like this (states are authorized to appoint electors and direct their votes however they like; see Chiafalo v. Washington) but it's not enforceable in the sense that if one of the states reneges, the outcome of the presidential election won't be reversed.

Replies from: AnthonyC
comment by AnthonyC · 2024-11-10T03:40:52.154Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yeah. As I understand it, state legislatures aren't really restricted in how they assign electoral votes. As in, if it wanted, the TX state legislature could probably say, "We're not holding a 2024 presidential election. Our electoral votes automatically go to whiever the R candidate is." What in the Constitution could stop them? It would most likely be political suicide for the state legislators. But within their authority.

Replies from: ChristianKl
comment by ChristianKl · 2024-11-11T07:56:30.143Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Given that the Supreme Court upheld the Voting Rights Act of 1965, state legislatures aren't able to do just whatever they want without limits. 

What those limits would be in a particular case, is something you will only find out when had a few legal battles. 

Replies from: AnthonyC
comment by AnthonyC · 2024-11-11T14:05:05.308Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yes, but I don't see what VRA provisions the cases I listed could violate? Unless you can show state level election discrimination. And the standard for VRA violation is apparently much higher than I think it should be, given the difficulty of stopping or reducing gerrymandering.

Section 2 of the 14th amendment might apply, but it's at best unclear whether it means there have to be popular elections for choosing electors at all. At the time it passed there were still plenty of people around who remembered when most state legislatures chose electors directly.

TBH, with the current court I think it's more likely such a case would get the VRA gutted. The constitution explicitly gives state legislatures authority to apportion electors.

Note: this is not the same as trying to overrule popular vote results after an election happens. That got talked about a lot in 2020, I agree it would not be allowed.

comment by lemonhope (lcmgcd) · 2024-11-08T07:28:53.667Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I want this to be a board game

comment by notfnofn · 2024-11-07T17:25:37.789Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Merging states would be far superior incentive-wise, as the influence of every signatory would increase and there would be essentially no expected net shift in the election results.

Suppose I am an Okalahoman who will always vote for the farther right candidate or a Californian who will always vote for the farther left candidate. Wouldn't I only support this if my odds on this increasing the chance of the farther right (resp. farther left) candidate winning was at least 50%? Wouldn't most people fall in one of these two categories?

Replies from: Measure
comment by Measure · 2024-11-08T13:41:50.959Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The advantage comes from having the parties care about your particular issues rather than those of the current swing states. This would look like both candidates being more favorable to you even if it's still 50-50 which of them wins (and even if they're still in roughly the same places on the left-right axis).

Replies from: Measure
comment by Measure · 2024-11-08T13:43:54.167Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Although possibly the red candidate would care more about CATXOKLA red issues and the blue about CATXOKLA blue issues, so it just increases variance rather than expected satisfaction?

comment by lemonhope (lcmgcd) · 2024-11-08T07:26:55.158Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't know if this would be good for the country, but it would certainly be good political entertainment.

Replies from: AnthonyC
comment by AnthonyC · 2024-11-10T03:45:40.680Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I like it. Every four years, instead of running ads, people spend billions lobbying state legislatures to sign weird rules for how they will assign electoral votes. No one knows who the swing states will be until Election Day. Maybe not even until December 17. That would be a fun supreme court case - what happens when Florida passes a law that changes electoral vote assignments, after the election is held but before the electors meet?

Replies from: AnthonyC
comment by AnthonyC · 2024-11-11T14:06:24.869Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Edit to add: please ignore my last sentence. @ChristianKI reminded me we definitely know that would not be allowed.

comment by deepthoughtlife · 2024-11-08T05:33:29.396Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think it would be a bad idea to actually do (there are so many problems with it in practice), but it is a bit of an interesting thing to note how being a swing state helps convince everyone to try to cater to you, and not just a little. This would be the swing state to end all swing states, I suppose.

The way to get this done that might actually work is probably to make it an amendment to each state's constitution that can only be repealed for future elections and not the one the constitutional change reverting this would be voted on in. (If necessary, you can always amend how the state constitution is amended to make this doable.)

Replies from: lcmgcd
comment by lemonhope (lcmgcd) · 2024-11-08T07:40:56.470Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I am impressed with how far you thought this through. Amend the constitution, including the constitution amendment section

Replies from: deepthoughtlife
comment by deepthoughtlife · 2024-11-08T22:11:54.455Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It does of course raise the difficulty level for the political maneuvering, but would make things far more credible which means that people could actually rely on it. It really is quite difficult to precommit to things you might not like, so structures that make it work seem interesting to me.

comment by Ninety-Three · 2024-11-08T02:57:57.698Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This proposal increases the influence of the states, in the sense of "how much does it matter that any given person bothered to vote?", but does it increase their preference satisfaction? If the 4 states each conceive of themselves as red or blue states, then each of them will be thinking "under the current system I estimate an X% chance that we'll elect my party's president while under the new system I estimate a Y% chance we'll elect my party's president". If both sides are perfect predictors then one will conclude that Y<X so they should not do the deal. If both sides are imperfect predictors such that they both think Y>X, then the outside view still tells them it's equally likely that they're the sucker here and shouldn't participate.

Replies from: avancil
comment by avancil · 2024-11-08T03:15:38.574Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Except there's more at play than just winning the election. If you're a voter in a swing state, the candidates are paying more attention to you, and making more promises catering to you. The parties are picking candidates they think will appeal to you. Even if your odds of winning stay the same, the prize for winning gets bigger.

It was exiting a few elections ago when Colorado was in play by both parties. We even got to host the Democratic convention in Denver. Now, they just ignore us.

comment by ZY (AliceZ) · 2024-11-07T03:18:55.525Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That would be interesting; on the other hand, why not just merge all the states? I guess it would be a more dramatic change and may be harder to execute and unnecessary in this case.

Replies from: adam-scherlis
comment by Adam Scherlis (adam-scherlis) · 2024-11-07T04:19:56.926Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It stops being in the interests of CATXOKLA to invite more states once they're already big enough to dominate national electoral politics.

Replies from: AliceZ
comment by ZY (AliceZ) · 2024-11-07T04:54:10.795Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

True; and they would only need to merge up to they reach a "swing state" type of voting distribution.

comment by lemonhope (lcmgcd) · 2024-11-09T00:56:56.318Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I wonder if anybody has tried to quantify how much it's worth to be a swing voter. I imagine if you are the government contractor up for renewal then it's worth quite a lot, but I wonder how much of the money/benefits the average Joe sees.

I don't know much about swing state benefits except that Milwaukee, Wisconsin got their lead pipes replaced by the fed and the workers were required to be local and they say they were paid quite well https://youtube.com/watch?v=4VpwgG0P8VU

comment by false · 2024-11-08T12:00:25.813Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I feel that the goal here is to reproduce the effects of choosing a president by popular vote without abolishing the electoral college. Wouldn't an electoral reform to abolish the electoral college be a more realistic goal?

Replies from: AnthonyC
comment by AnthonyC · 2024-11-10T03:55:44.654Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Realistic in what sense?

This proposal requires a majority vote by four state legislatures, and increases each state's influence in presidential politics.

A constitutional amendment requires a 2/3 majority of both houses of Congress and a majority in the legislatures of 3/4 of the states, and reduces the influence of about 20 of the states who are currently overrepresented in the electoral college.

comment by Foyle (robert-lynn) · 2024-11-07T04:47:18.324Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Are any of the socio-economic-political-demographic problems of the world actually fixable or improvable in the time before the imminent singularity renders them all moot anyway?  It all feels like bread-and-circuses to me.

The pressing political issues of today are unlikely to even be in the top-10 in a decade.

Replies from: thomas-kwa, Kaj_Sotala
comment by Thomas Kwa (thomas-kwa) · 2024-11-07T20:17:15.214Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yes, lots of socioeconomic problems have been solved on a 5 to 10 year timescale.

I also disagree that problems will become moot after the singularity unless it kills everyone-- the US has a good chance of continuing to exist, and improving democracy will probably make AI go slightly better.

comment by Kaj_Sotala · 2024-11-08T10:54:34.736Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

As far as I know, the latest representative expert survey on the topic is "Thousands of AI Authors on the Future of AI", in which the median time for a 50% chance of AGI was either in 23 or 92 years, depending on how the question was phrased:

If science continues undisrupted, the chance of unaided machines outperforming humans in every possible task was estimated at 10% by 2027, and 50% by 2047. [...] However, the chance of all human occupations becoming fully automatable was forecast to reach 10% by 2037, and 50% as late as 2116 (compared to 2164 in the 2022 survey).

Not that these numbers would mean much because AI experts aren't experts on forecasting, but it still suggests a substantial possibility for AGI to take quite a while yet.

comment by RamblinDash · 2024-11-07T15:46:55.218Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Many states have already passed something like this, which only takes effect once enough states sign on. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/National_Popular_Vote_Interstate_Compact

 

However, I think it's unlikely that this will get over the 270 hump anytime soon, because right now GOP-run states (correctly) perceive that the EC has a pro-GOP tilt (for now at least); and the swing states benefit a lot from swing status.

Replies from: thomas-kwa
comment by Thomas Kwa (thomas-kwa) · 2024-11-07T19:12:11.346Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I mention exactly this in paragraph 3.

Replies from: RamblinDash
comment by RamblinDash · 2024-11-08T11:49:07.532Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Sorry