prediction after seeing the 2009 graph:

15-20% True
8-12% Weakly True
8-12% Undecided
20-25% Weakly False
35-45% False

This was basically taking the 2009 graph and skewing it to the right, pivoting on Undecided. It was still too optimistic.

True: 15-20% vs 12%
Weakly True: 8-12% vs 12%
Undecided: 8-12% vs 10%
Weakly False: 20-25% vs 15%
False: 35-45% vs 50%

Looking at the discrepancy, it doesn't seem like any systematic skewing adjustment, i.e. adjusting for overconfidence, would have gotten good results. (The closest would be one that pivoted on 'Weakly False'.) A better model would be assuming that all predictions had a modest chance of being other-than-totally-false which was uniformly distributed over degree of truth, and most were totally false.

Therefore, I predict that if these predictions are examined again in 10 or 20 year's time, they will still have this uniform distribution over degree of truth property, though presumably a higher chance of not being totally false.

Curated.

I think "futurism with good epistemics" is pretty hard, and pretty important. The LessWrong zeitgeist is sort of "Post Kurzweil" – his predictions aren't the ones that we'll personally be graded on. But, I think the act of methodically looking over his predictions helps us orient on the predictions we're making. 

I think a) it offers a cautionary tale of mistakes we might be making, and b) I think the act of having a strong tradition of evaluating long-past predictions (hopefully?) helps ward off bullshit. (i.e. many pundits make predictions which skew towards 'locally sound exciting and impressive' because they don't expect to be called on it later)

It's also interesting to note how much disagreement there was over some predictions.

One question I came away with:

It's been suggested that Kurzweil's predictions for 2009 are mostly correct in 2019.

Is this well established? Is there a previous writeup that argues this, or just a general feel? I'd be interested in applying the same methology to the old 2009 predictions and check if they're true.

The hypothesis that Kurzweil is basically right but off by 10 years (and thus, that these predictions will be mostly true in 2029) seems less plausible to me than the hypothesis that Kurzweil is basically right but thinks everything will happen twice as fast as it does (and thus, that these predictions will be mostly true in 2039). I'd give the first hypothesis about 15% credence and the second about 25%.

I tried doing a PCA of the judgments, to see if there was any pattern in how the predictions were judged. However, the variance of the principal components did not decline fast. The first component explains just 14% of the variance, the next ones 11%, 9%, 8%... It is not like there are some very dominant low-dimensional or clustering explanation for the pattern of good or bad predictions.

No clear patterns when I plotted the predictions in PCA-space: https://www.dropbox.com/s/1jvhzcn6ngsw67a/kurzweilpredict2019.png?dl=0 (In this plot colour denotes mean assessor view of correctness, with red being incorrect, and size the standard deviation of assessor views, with large corresponding to more agreement). Some higher order components may correspond to particular correlated batches of questions like the VR ones.

(Or maybe I used the Matlab PCA routine wrong).

I predicted the graph would be similar; and I was indeed much too optimistic. In fact, I was so wrong it reminded me of this exact issue, where your predictive ability becomes more and more impossibly difficult every decade or so off you go. It may also be getting even more difficult given our progress as a large unit of populations, but the underlying humanistic predictions may still well be possible, since that variable never quite leaves us.

If anyone has read 'Where To?' by Robert Heinlein, he makes predictions in 1950 and then updated his predictions in 1965 and 1980. Here is an excerpt on an alternative site since I don't have a direct link to the book itself, but if one is interested in the predictive ability of a well-educated individual, it is a very intriguing read, and archiving perspectives lets us understand just how absurd one idea could be, and yet how much further than it we got in a much shorter time frame than assumed. It focuses on technology; and the potential of certain science fiction possibilities, some of which were undershot, but most overshot. On average, he was almost entirely wrong, but only by some degrees of relevancy. Here is the excerpt of the book, and since it only extends to 1980, you can insert your own realizations of how the predictions went for 2000, and now 2020. There are many optimistic predictions made, and a few pessimistic ones. Being an aeronautical engineer and author, Heinlein possibly saw too much potential in our ability to progress that science; the same flaw would probably be present in any predictions made, since we know most well our favored subjects, and want to believe in their potentials.

I recall Alan Watts made some very interesting comments that essentially predicted a lot of our current access to phones, internet, information, etc. It isn't difficult to imagine how far we may come or how easy it may be when progress is not impeded. What is likely absurdly difficult to predict is how Google loading in four seconds instead of two can make someone upset to the point they may seethe or clench their fists. And yet, I have done that more than once, or seen that small red x icon, and then gotten similarly upset in private. The entire world is available to me, and two seconds or so of inconvenience, or possibly a modem reset, being an antagonizing factor is only context-driven. At what point does the time saving become unnoticeable; perhaps the exponential growth of a factor of our lives shouldn't be considered, or the understanding and availability of it, but the brand new frustrations and reasons for emotion they bring. Roadrage is a common example, and that comes from the novel nature of driving wearing off from monotony. It was great to drive the first few weeks and the freedom was liberating, until that freedom was stripped because I'm sitting on the I-5 and no one is dying, it's just 5PM and everyone is going home.

An optimistic prediction would be made to 'ease' that frustration- flying cars, better infrastructure, etc- but what about the new frustrations of those predictions? Having to deal with the FAA instead of the police every time you want to go eat? The city becoming sprawling and difficult to navigate, but very streamlined and without 'stops', or even simply every trip becoming much longer as the concept of not slowing down is pushed? Although contradictory, going faster when you're taking a longer route is not always favorable, but to an impatient crowd, it may solve the more pressing issue: no one will be able to get out of the car to yell at the guy behind them!

Here's a vastly longer and more detailed analysis of how accurate Ray Kurzweil's 2019 predictions were: https://www.militantfuturist.com/how-ray-kurzweils-2019-predictions-are-faring/

Also see this: 
https://www.militantfuturist.com/will-kurzweils-2019-be-our-2029/

And this: 
https://www.militantfuturist.com/the-kurzweil-predictions-that-dont-matter/ 

Another review of Kurzweil's 2019 predictions: [1, 2, 3, 4].

"It is now fully recognized that the brain comprises many specialized regions, each with its own topology and architecture of interneuronal connections."

Is this really a prediction? I would call it "A blindingly obvious fact." This page says "Herophilus not only distinguished the cerebrum and the cerebellum, but provided the first clear description of the ventricles", and the putamen and corpus callosum were discovered in the 16th century, etc. etc. Sorry if I'm misunderstanding, I don't know the context.

ETA: Maybe I should be more specific and nuanced. I think it's uncontroversial and known for hundreds if not thousands of years that the brain comprises many regions which look different—for example, the cerebellum, the putamen, etc. I think it's also widely agreed for 100+ years that each is "specialized", at least in the sense that different regions have different functions, although the term is kinda vague. The idea that "each [has] its own topology and architecture of interneuronal connections" is I think the default assumption ... if they had the same topology and architecture, why would they look different? And now that we know what neurons are and have good microscopes, this is no longer just a default assumption, but an (I think) uncontroversial observation.

It looks like two of the predictions, that the majority of teacher-student interactions would be remote and that the majority of meetings would be remote, have flipped from false to true between 2019 and 2020, but because of a global pandemic rather than directly proceeding from advancements in technology.

Browsing Wikipedia, a similar effort was the 1985 book Tools for thought, (available here), though I haven't read it.