What a 20-year-lead in military tech might look like

post by Daniel Kokotajlo (daniel-kokotajlo) · 2020-07-29T20:10:09.303Z · LW · GW · 44 comments

Contents

    spent way too much time speculating about near-future military technology. Here is a list of technologies I think are likely to be important to a conventional war in, say, 2040.
  Better command-and-control capabilities (incl. Cyber and intel)
  Aimbots
  Battle bots
  Starships
  3D printers
  Laser weapons
  Exoskeletons
None
44 comments

I've spent way too much time speculating about near-future military technology. Here is a list of technologies I think are likely to be important to a conventional war in, say, 2040.

If you think this list shouldn't be taken seriously because I don't have official expertise, you are probably right. I think that if I became an expert I’d probably end up deleting a third of the things on this list and adding a similar number of new things. (I did run this draft past three people with relevant expertise, though!) I look forward to critiques in the comments.

If you are wondering why these speculations are relevant to LessWrong… well, it was requested, and also it’s relevant to a point I want to make later about AI. You see, the technologies on this list could probably be quickly achieved with the help of advanced-but-not-godlike-AI. The gap between these technologies and present-day military tech is an example of a “small” gap; a “merely” 20-year-by-human-standards gap. So, for example, suppose some corporation or nation gets AI systems which are good but not godlike at designing new technologies. They vastly speed up the process but don’t do anything human engineers couldn’t do in 20 years. Or, suppose there are lots of AI systems in the world but one faction has systems which are the equivalent of 20-years-by-human-standards ahead. In either case, I think, the gap would translate to an extremely large advantage, possibly enough to enable a small group to take over the world [LW · GW], conquistador-style [LW · GW].

(To be clear, while I do think AI takeover is probable, I think persuasion/politics/ideology is by far the most likely method.)

Better command-and-control capabilities (incl. Cyber and intel)

Command & control technologies are very important. Wars are won or lost on the basis of how well each side is able to observe, predict, plan, organize, and outmaneuver the other. I think the advancements in command and control tech that are likely to happen in the next 20 years are more important than everything else on this list combined. In case this isn’t obvious, I’ll say a few things below by way of justification.

Long-ranged guided weaponry already makes it easy to blow up targets if you know where they will be when your attack arrives. Winning is all about finding the enemy before they find you. Now more than ever, being able to quickly gather loads of information and integrate it and communicate the resulting orders to your forces is super important, as is being able to disrupt your enemies’ attempts to do the same.

There’s lots of room for new technologies in this space, or much more advanced versions of already existing tech: Satellites, spy drones, advanced sensors of various kinds, more robust communication networks (e.g. cloud computing), AI to integrate all the data, draw some interesting conclusions, and instantly make some of the relevant decisions. Already the US military collects way too much data for teams of human analysts to examine, and anyhow human analysts take too much time. Better to have a computer say “Odds of imminent attack in sector 7 have spiked to 11%” as soon it notices some unusual patterns. (A version of this might be useful at the tactical level, e.g. “The sniper who shot that bullet is probably in this window; the mortar shell was probably fired from the alley at coordinates XY.”)

What would it look like to have a significant advantage in C&C+intel+cyber tech? The enemy would be swinging blind punches, firing missiles at locations where your troops aren’t, or marching forwards in the hopes of making contact while your forces quietly dodge around them or set up an ambush. Your aircraft would fly low over their country, slipping through gaps in air defenses exposed by your satellites, destroying key nodes of communication and transport. In regions you occupy, insurgency would be impossible, as everything that moves (at least in important regions) would be tracked by your cameras. In regions the enemy occupies, your insurgents (probably local allies supplied with weapons and guidance) would be a real threat. Meanwhile, you might have all sorts of electronic spies in their network, due to superior cyber capabilities. You might even be able to shut down some of their systems at crucial moments.

Persuasion tools might also be possible. Propaganda is already a thing, but personalized propaganda powered by big data and machine learning will be much more potent. Moreover, it is useful in peacetime also, and useful to many non-military actors, so it will be heavily invested in and rapidly developed. This is another reason why having an advantage in this sort of tech will help suppress enemy insurgencies (and supercharge your own). It might also help with “turning” key enemy personnel (such as a captured leader, or even a leader you have communication access to via a spy or hack or parlay). At the very least it will help keep your own troops' morale and loyalty high, which has always been and still is extremely important.

Aimbots

Aimbots are guns that aim and fire automatically. A simple version would be a camera and computer hooked up to the trigger of an infantry rifle, such that the rifle fires when the computer calculates that the bullet would hit the target. The software involved would be a bit of image recognition, maybe a bit of physics, etc. The user would point the gun at the target and the bullet would fire at precisely the right moment, increasing accuracy while decreasing aiming time. These aimbots already exist and are being tested by the US military.

A more complex version would have some way of pointing the gun. For example, a canister of compressed gas as an under-barrel attachment, with multiple nozzles pointing in different directions. The computer selectively opens the nozzles for split-seconds, emitting jets of gas that jerk the barrel in such a way as to line it up with the target, at least momentarily, during which the computer fires the bullet. Perhaps the camera would also be connected to a cell phone screen, so that the soldier holding the rifle can stick it out from behind a wall while his buddy looks through the camera screen and clicks on targets.

Anyone who has played a first-person shooter with an auto-aim hack or ability will already think this is powerful. A rifle attachment that quickens your reaction times and makes almost every shot hit? Amazing! However on a real battlefield the effect would be much more powerful than it is in video games. Here is why:

The vast majority of bullets fired in war are not aimed, but sprayed in the general direction of the enemy. This is called "suppressing fire;" it keeps the enemy pinned in place and prevents them from shooting back at you. Suppressing fire is mostly not a phenomenon in video games because players don’t die in real life if they get hit by a single video game bullet. In fact in most games a single bullet doesn’t even kill your video-game character, and if your character does die he simply respawns. In real war, however, suppressing fire is the primary way to deal with enemy infantry. They are usually in cover, so you can’t just shoot them; however, you can suppress them, so that your own forces have freedom to maneuver safely. Then, your own forces can flank the enemy position, or close with it and lob grenades, or whatever. Of course, they’ll be trying to prevent you from doing this by suppressing you; you “win the firefight” when they are suppressed and you are not.

Now suppose that one side has aimbots on their rifles. They can now shoot their rifles without poking their heads out of cover (the point-and-click method mentioned above). This means they can provide suppressing fire without endangering themselves. This means you can’t win the firefight against them, at least not in the normal sense. Meanwhile, their shots are way more accurate, and their reaction speed is instantaneous--meaning they don’t have to spray bullets in your general direction, they can just wait, silently, and shoot a single bullet at you when you poke your head around the corner. The bullet will hit you before you can react to whatever it is you’ve seen. What this means is that (1) your forces will be suppressed extremely quickly, even if you outnumber the enemy and start shooting at them before they start shooting at you, (2) you’ll lose a few men before you realize what is happening and hunker down, (3) their ammunition will last much longer because they make every bullet count, and (4) after the enemy leaves you might still be suppressed because you won’t know when they are gone because you are afraid to look. (With ordinary human-caused suppressing fire, the shots are being sprayed at you and are unlikely to hit, so if you are brave you can peek for a second at relatively small risk. Problem #4 can be solved to some extent by countermeasures like using your own cell phone or a mirror to peek around the corner, assuming their AI isn’t good enough to shoot it too.)

What this means is that an infantry force equipped with aimbots would be not only much more deadly, but also much harder to kill or stop. It would move through the battlefield like a basilisk, paralyzing and/or destroying anyone who comes within line of sight. Of course, if both sides have aimbots, the fight would be much more fair.

Aimbots would help enormously against drones. See next section. Aimbots might also lower the amount of training needed before a recruit becomes better than useless.

Instead of an attachment to an infantry rifle, an aimbot could be implemented as a portable autoturret. It’s on a tripod or something, you plop it on the ground and it can aim and fire automatically, autonomous or remote-controlled. I think this would be less efficient than the rifle implementation but it would have its advantages too. For example, you could attach them to your vehicles. This already exists and has been quite effective, see e.g. Trophy.

Battle bots

These are machines which propel themselves around the battlefield, identifying and attacking targets. Early versions are mostly remote-controlled by humans, later versions are more and more autonomous. There are many varieties, and related concepts. The core idea is that battle bots are cheaper than human soldiers; for the price, hassle, and transportation cost of one human soldier you can deliver dozens if not hundreds or even thousands of battle bots to the field. There are other advantages too. For example, they don’t have morale problems, and they always obey orders. On the other hand, they lack initiative and creativity and lose more of their effectiveness when communication with command is cut off. But these disadvantages will lessen as the technology improves.

Drone swarms are perhaps the most important kind of battle bot. Kamikaze drones fly into the enemy and explode. Gun drones shoot bullets. Utility drones can transport cargo, open doors, recharge other drones, drag huge nets through the sky to catch other drones, scout with bigger cameras and computers, drop bombs, and many more things, depending on how they are equipped. (All of the above would come as modules that can be attached or detached easily by a human handler). I’m not sure whether kamikaze or gun drones would be more prevalent. Currently kamikaze drones are. (Note: I the previous links I found after writing this. It’s nice to see my predictions confirmed.)

Drone swarms, since they can fly, can close with the enemy very quickly. Since they are cheap and small, you can have very large swarms and transport them to the battlefield easily. (You can even just drop them out the back of an airplane!) Say a drone carrying an explosive charge the size of a grenade costs $10,000 — a conservative estimate considering that the computer on the drone is probably the most expensive component, and wouldn’t be more than $2,000. Then you can drop 1,000 of them on the battlefield for about the price of a tank (crew not included). Or 200 for the price of a cruise missile. Swarms this big would be very hard to kill. They are just a bunch of dots in the sky moving very fast and maybe wiggling erratically. With aimbots you could shoot them down, but even an autoturret would probably only be able to take out 10 or so before they closed in on it and blew it up. And depending on how dense the terrain was, maybe that number would be more like 1. So the swarm would just steamroll over everything in its path until it ran out of battery, or was stopped by a force of aimbots or battlebots of similar size. (Ordinary human infantry would be much less effective. Even if you have good aim and good reflexes, you probably won’t be able to shoot more than 1 kamikaze drone out of the sky before the swarm is upon you.) Hiding in buildings or under cars or under camoflauge would be an effective tactic against drone swarms, but not super effective — after all, while you are hiding you can’t contribute to winning the battle, and moreover the drones can just land like locusts, conserving battery and waiting for targets to come out of hiding. (This is what makes drone swarms better than artillery barrages or massive airstrikes. That, and the ability to distinguish friend from foe from civilian. And the ability to redirect to somewhere else, or even come home, if the enemy turns out to no longer be in the target location. And the ability to sweep a broad area looking for enemies.) Moreover, some kinds of drones (quadcopters) might be able to follow you indoors. See the Slaughterbots video, which has some large kamikaze drones for taking out doors and windows, and then small kamikaze drones for killing humans. You could hang beads and cloth in doorways and hallways to impede drone movement, but utility drones with attachments could get around that.

So far we’ve been discussing swarms of small drones. But swarms of big drones will happen too. Air-to-air combat in the age of autonomous vehicles is very much a numbers thing. How many missiles can you bring to the battle? How many distinct aircraft do you have, so that the enemy needs to bring at least that many missiles? How much range do your missiles have? We already have big Predator and Reaper drones, fitted with various kinds of missiles. Just make loads more of them. In world war 2 the biggest air raids had thousands of planes. Nowadays we could probably make at least that many big drones, and probably many more. (Spot check: Predator costs $4M, so the Pentagon could easily afford to buy 10,000 of them per year, even without accounting for economies of scale.) “Air raid” will probably be a misnomer; “Air occupation” more like it. A stormfront of drones smashes into enemy territory, exchanging missiles with enemy aircraft and anti-air defenses, losing many drones in the process but not nearly enough. Drones that get low on fuel or ammo go home, and are replaced by reinforcements. Enemy territory is paralyzed due to constant circling drones overhead, ready to drop missiles on any suspicious activity.

Minitanks are autoturrets with wheels. Maybe they have some armor too, maybe not. They are much less mobile than drones, even less mobile than human infantry. Why build them? Well, if you need lots of auto-aimed guns in a certain location, maybe you don’t have enough human legs to carry them. Or maybe your humans are too valuable and fragile. Why not just build drones instead? Well, maybe one minitank can shoot fast enough and is armored enough to be worth 10 drones in most fights, but costs only as much as 3. Ground travel is more energy-efficient than air, and it can afford to have armor. Multiple militaries are already experimenting with these.

Drone submarines are to naval warfare what large drones in the sky are to aerial warfare. They’ll be much smaller and cheaper than ordinary submarines; maybe they won’t even launch torpedos, maybe they’ll be kamikazes instead. Swarms of them will blockade enemy coastlines, ruin enemy trade routes, etc. The US military is already experimenting with this.

Balloon bombs are a special kind of drone swarm. In World War Two, Japan made about 10,000 balloons that carried bombs, and sent them up into the jet stream to drift over the USA and drop their bombs. At the time they didn’t have any sort of ability to aim the bombs or the balloons, so very little damage was done. However, project Loon has demonstrated that modern technology can steer balloons pretty much anywhere you want them to go. It just takes a while for them to get there. Once there, the bombs they drop can be smart bombs, that identify targets using cameras and GPS and glide right to them. A glide bomb could hit a target within about 70 miles of the balloon it drops from. They could also carry air-to-air missiles. Balloon bombs are like large drone swarms, except that they are much much cheaper. It might even cost more to shoot them down than to make them! If Japan could make 10,000 eighty years ago with a tiny fraction of their war effort, a modern nation with a bigger economy could be motivated to make millions.

Drone carriers are to tanks and artillery what aircraft carriers are to battleships. A drone carrier could be a civilian pickup truck or trailer truck, with crates of drones, maybe a generator, loads of charging cables and spare batteries, and a few people in the back. Someone drives, maybe someone else is on their laptop giving commands to the drones, and the people in the back unpack drones from crates and launch them on strikes and then grab returning drones out of the air and swap out their batteries. By military standards civilian trucks are practically free, so a drone carrier is basically as expensive as the people and drones it carries. And the people need not be highly skilled. And the drones are cheap. Just as battleships became obsolete, so too will tanks and maybe even artillery become obsolete. Drone carriers will be just as mobile, but longer-ranged and hit with more striking power. And they’ll be much much cheaper as well. They’ll also be easier to hide since they can pretend to be civilian trucks and easier to deploy because they aren’t as heavy or bulky and also the truck can potentially be stolen from the local population after you arrive.

Finally, this technically doesn’t count as a battle bot because it doesn’t fight, but… currently advanced militaries use a small portion of their soldiers to shoot at the enemy; most have some sort of job repairing and maintaining vehicles, driving transport vehicles, loading and unloading things, etc. Many of those jobs could be automated away by self-driving vehicles or boston-dynamics-style robots, making military logistics faster and cheaper and freeing up more troops for other tasks. This would be especially useful if you need to maintain a swarm of thousands of big drones.

Starships

Starships are vehicles like the SpaceX Starship. Access to space will be very important in a future war. Being able to view in real-time every inch of their territory, while they are stuck guessing what is happening in yours, is a humongous advantage. If you can launch things into space more cheaply than they can, you can destroy their satellites and put up swarms of your own. Starships will plausibly be at least one order of magnitude cheaper for delivering stuff into orbit than legacy rockets, possibly two or more. (Caveat: In space, it is generally easier to destroy than to create. So even if one nation can put up 10x as many kilograms than another, the other nation might be able to render space unusable, e.g. by creating a sort of man-made Kessler Syndrome. However, with Starships it would become so cheap to put things into space that this difficulty might be overcome, e.g. by putting up swarms of armored satellites that can last half an hour before all being destroyed, but during that time give you the valuable information you need. I’m not sure about this and would love to see an analysis of the effectiveness of numbers and/or armor vs. tons of tiny bits of metal polluting LEO)

More excitingly, Starship is supposedly going to be capable of transporting cargo and humans across large fractions of earth’s surface in mere minutes. SpaceX is in talks with the US military about this; they claim that eventually their costs will be low enough that a Starship trip will cost about as much as a Globemaster (military cargo plane) trip. It can carry about as much cargo, but does so much faster and without the need of a runway on the end. If this is true, it might make cargo planes obsolete, or at least substantially improve logistical capabilities, especially for nations who don’t have very powerful navies or air forces.

The most interesting (and also most speculative) potential use is for delivering troops and other payloads into battle. Because the starship would probably not be reusable after getting shot at, and would not have access to refueling facilities in battle anyway, this would be an expensive strategy. However, the benefits might be worth it--I’ll try to make the case for that below.

(You could use Starships that normally serve as cargo ships, thus you still get to amortize the cost over several flights before you throw them away in the attack. Or, you could custom-build single-use Starships that use a two-stage design to save all the expensive bits for reuse.)

A SpaceX Starship can carry 100 tons. 50 tons of drones is plausibly 50,000 drones of varying sizes. That’s enough to paralyze a small city; drones everywhere, blaring on tinny speakers for everyone to lie on the ground with their hands on their heads. You’d have 50 tons of cargo space remaining for troops and miscellaneous equipment.

Or, you might use 99 tons to carry extra fuel, so that when you land you could immediately take off again, perhaps after having picked up or dropped off a few very important passengers. You wouldn’t be able to fly all the way home, but maybe you could fly somewhere safe.

You could strike anywhere in the enemy country, at any time, and they’d only have twenty minutes of warning at best. So, you could e.g. land at all major power stations simultaneously, or all major cities, or all major airports. (Seizing airports is especially important because you can use them to land reinforcements; see the airborn invasion of Crete) You could land wherever their forces are not, if you have good enough intel, which you probably would since you have starships. Without actually attacking, but merely by threatening to, you could force them to keep much of their military at home, spread out over the country, defending various important installations. This particular advantage scales with the size of the country you are fighting; larger nations have higher area-to-perimeter ratios, so forcing them to defend their whole area rather than just their perimeter is a big deal.

Being able to strike anywhere at any time on very short notice is more valuable than it sounds. It’s easy to underestimate the importance of speed, surprise, and reaction time in military conflict. For example, say a country friendly to you is surprised by a coup. If you don’t act quickly, it will switch over to your enemy’s camp. Fortunately, you can load and fuel a squadron of Starships in a few hours, and then it takes only twenty minutes to arrive on scene. Or, maybe you are launching a big attack at dawn. Simultaneously with the attack you can assault the airbases, anti-air facilities, and transportation hubs behind enemy lines with drone swarms packed into starships. The drones could potentially be launched while the starship is still high in the sky, making mission success still possible even if the starship is shot down.

One problem with attack starships is that they might be hard to distinguish from nukes, and thus might trigger MAD. This problem could potentially be solved by using them against non-nuclear enemies, or by using them one by one instead of all at once. (Launch one starship every fifteen minutes; that way if they are secretly nukes the enemy will still have enough nukes left to massively retaliate; that way they won’t massively retaliate until they see whether they are nukes or not.)

3D printers

I am of the opinion that 3D printers will be a big deal in ten years or so. Currently 3D printers are expensive to buy, expensive to operate, and the parts they build are crappy. So they are great for rapid prototyping, but not good for being part of a factory that makes a finished product. However, the parts they build are rapidly getting better--in some ways they are better than any other manufacturing method. Meanwhile the cost of 3D printers is falling pretty fast. Already I know of some products (cars, rockets) that have some important 3D-printed parts. As the price falls and quality improves, more and more parts will be made with 3D printers.

Anyhow, having lots of 3D printers lying around is valuable militarily, I think. Three reasons. First, military vehicles break down constantly and being able to print replacement parts is nice. Especially since some vehicles will no longer be in production so parts will be scarce, and other vehicles may be captured from the enemy and thus have no spare parts at all.

Second, insurgencies have supply chain problems. They need to buy weapons abroad and smuggle them in somehow. Being able to print what they need is a game-changer. Even major nations may have supply chain problems if their enemies have destroyed your most important factories and supply depots with long-range missiles or airstrikes; it sure would be nice to have a “virtual factory” consisting of hundreds of thousands of 3D printers distributed throughout your nation.

Third, a future war will involve rapidly changing and evolving technologies and tactics. World War Two was already like this; the weapons and tactics used at the end of the war were substantially better than those used in the middle, which were substantially better than those used at the beginning. 3D printers speed up the design/prototyping process by, like, an order of magnitude or more. If you have enough of them, they can also speed up the mass-production process as well; instead of taking three months to build a factory that produces 1,000 of the new widgets per day, you can command 10,000 of your nation’s 3D printers to immediately produce one widget per day each. Example: Your enemies have countered your drones by putting up nets everywhere. Response: Design a net-cutter attachment for your drones, and patch their software so they know how to use it. Thanks to 3D printing you can be testing out 1,000 different designs within five hours of seeing the enemy nets. In a day you have settled on a design that works, having collected enough data to train/program your drones to use it. It’s a hacky solution, sure, but that’s OK since you’ll be working on a better solution soon. By the next morning you’ve printed a million net-clippers in various facilities around the country and are already shipping them off to the front to be affixed to your drones. Another example: Your eggheads come up with a complex 3D pattern that works as an adversarial example for the enemy aimbots, when viewed from a variety of angles and lighting conditions. You print out a bajillion of them and distribute them to your troops for the next assault, before the enemy realizes the problem and patches it. And when you find a new way to fool their aimbots, your printers will be ready again.

Laser weapons

Their main application is for defense against incoming drones and missiles (and balloons?). They are bulky and require a lot of power, but they might still turn out to be better than the CIWS and other autoturret systems available. They could also potentially be used as better sniper weapons, since light travels much faster than bullets. They also can and already are being used as “dazzlers” to temporarily (or, if you are willing to violate treaties, permanently) blind humans and cameras. However I am not sure laser technology will ever be good enough to outcompete more mundane alternatives, and even if they do, they probably won’t be that useful compared to conventional alternatives. I might be wrong though.

Exoskeletons

Exoskeletons are definitely a thing. Moreover I am fairly confident that given enough R&D, a version could be designed that includes enough armor to enable the wearer to smash through doors and storm an enemy-occupied building, invulnerable to ordinary bullets. However, by the time this is designed, it will be mostly obsolete, as battle bots can do the same stuff but better and cheaper and without risking your soldier’s life. At least, so I predict. Perhaps a lighter exoskeleton will be built that goes over the soldier’s legs, and allows him to walk longer and carry heavier loads without getting tired. Even if this happens, I doubt it will be a game-changer. Similarly, I expect exoskeletons might see some use for logistical purposes, helping troops load and unload cargo, or arm and repair aircraft. But not a game-changer, especially since robots might get good enough to do those tasks as well.

44 comments

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comment by Mykhailo Gumen (mykhailo-gumen) · 2020-07-30T14:59:01.290Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This looks very similar to predictions made in 2000, about military in 2020. In fact, there were few changes. I think it will be even less difference between 2020 and 2040.

comment by Daniel Kokotajlo (daniel-kokotajlo) · 2020-07-30T16:22:44.038Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Interesting, could you provide a link?

Another interpretation is that the predictions were right about what was possible, but wrong about how long it would take. For example, Kurzweil's 1999 predictions of what 2009 would look like were mostly wrong, but if instead you pretend they are predictions about 2019 they are almost entirely correct.

comment by ioannes_shade · 2020-09-27T18:01:31.987Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

For example, Kurzweil's 1999 predictions of what 2009 would look like were mostly wrong, but if instead you pretend they are predictions about 2019 they are almost entirely correct.

This isn't right. 

See Assessing Kurzweil predictions about 2019: the results [LW · GW] – "So, did more time allow for more perspective or more ways to go wrong? Well, Kurzweil's predictions for 2019 were considerably worse than those for 2009, with more than half strongly wrong"

comment by Daniel Kokotajlo (daniel-kokotajlo) · 2020-09-27T21:59:02.043Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Nope, I'm right. I think you misunderstood what I was saying, given the quote you pull as evidence for your claim, which is about a different set of predictions than the one I'm talking about.

(In case there was an error of communication on my part, I'll spell it out: Kurzweil made predictions for 2009 and for 2019. His predictions for 2009 were wrong and his predictions for 2019 were wronger. However, if you take his predictions for 2009 and pretend that they were predictions for 2019, they were mostly right.)

(See e.g. this comment on the post you linked https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/NcGBmDEe5qXB7dFBF/assessing-kurzweil-predictions-about-2019-the-results?commentId=H6ATdcezYzti8nsiK#comments [LW · GW])

comment by ioannes_shade · 2020-09-28T23:08:35.070Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Got it, thanks for clarifying

comment by Linch · 2020-07-30T06:55:34.678Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Information request: How large are leads in military tech for wars historically? My naive impression was that there was a >20 year lead for, eg, US-Vietnam, USSR-Afghanistan, both the first and second Italy-Ethiopian wars, great emu war etc.

I'm also curious how much of a lead the US currently has over, e.g., other permanent members of the UN Security Council.

comment by Daniel Kokotajlo (daniel-kokotajlo) · 2020-07-30T11:25:21.295Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Good question. I think Johnswentworths' comment is an excellent explanation of why so many high-tech nations have lost to lower-tech insurgencies in recent decades. I think the standard distinction is between "conventional" and "unconventional" warfare. If I were to write a list of near-future military tech focused on unconventional warfare, the sorts of things I would emphasize would be different (e.g. I'd emphasize persuasion tools, command and control, intel, and maybe battle bots.).

I'm not sure the X-year-lead idea is useful for describing vietnam, afghanistan, etc. In those cases at least the insurgency was heavily supported by a technologically advanced superpower. So they were technologically behind in most areas, but in some of the areas that were most important, they were totally up to date. And then also they were a different kind of war entirely, one focused almost entirely on winning hearts and minds rather than on killing and blowing up stuff.

I know less about the Italy-Ethiopia conflicts.

Another thing worth saying is that a 20-year lead today is a much bigger deal than a 20-year lead in, say, 1500. Probably also a bigger deal than a 20-year lead in 1900.

comment by maximkazhenkov · 2020-07-30T20:45:12.088Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If you buy into the Great Stagnation theory then a 20-year lead today should be a lesser deal than in 1900.

comment by maximkazhenkov · 2020-07-30T20:50:44.457Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The US has gained a lot of experience in asymmetric warfare in the last few decades, but due to the Long Peace no one can be sure of which military technologies actually work well in the context of a symmetric war between major powers; none of it has really been validated. So the "lead" the US has over the rest is somewhat theoretical.

comment by Davidmanheim · 2020-07-31T12:02:13.273Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It probably would have been good to do a basic search for what has been done on this topic by experts.

https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR2849z1.html

https://publicintelligence.net/usarmy-tradoc-cyber-2050/

https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/concepts/joe_2035_july16.pdf?ver=2017-12-28-162059-917

comment by Daniel Kokotajlo (daniel-kokotajlo) · 2020-07-31T12:30:47.426Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I did.

comment by Davidmanheim · 2020-08-02T09:33:02.341Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Great - I was just surprised that nothing in that vein was cited, and you missed a few issues that are heavily discussed, including area denial tech, multipolarity, or the reduced value of land warfare compared to economic impacts and destruction or compromise of matériel.

comment by Daniel Kokotajlo (daniel-kokotajlo) · 2020-08-02T14:44:03.461Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Thanks for the constructive criticism. I didn't cite things because this isn't research, just a dump of my thoughts. Now that you mention it, yeah I probably should have talked about area denial tech. I had considered saying something about EMP/jamming/etc., I don't know why I didn't...

For the other stuff you mention, well, I didn't think that fit the purpose of the post. The title is "What a 20-year lead in military tech might look like," not "What military conflicts will look like in 20 years."

comment by Dustin · 2020-07-29T22:39:03.843Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

With aimbots you could shoot them down, but even an autoturret would probably only be able to take out 10 or so before they closed in on it and blew it up.

It doesn't seem unlikely to me, dependent upon terrain, that an aimbotted CIWS-esque system would easily take out a 1000 unit swarm of drones. I'm curious about your reasoning that leads you to conclude otherwise.

comment by Daniel Kokotajlo (daniel-kokotajlo) · 2020-07-29T22:42:57.041Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Good point; I should think more about this. I think the key here is the terrain. I was imagining a drone swarm flying down city streets, maybe hopping over a building or two, and thereby becoming visible to the aimbot only a few seconds or less before making impact. If instead we imagine a big open field, such that the aimbot can start shooting, say, two miles out, then yeah probably it could kill far more than 10. One of the nice things about these drone swarms is that they'll be able to hug the terrain closely when needed. This is why I compare them more to infantry than to airplanes.

comment by Dagon · 2020-07-31T23:11:54.345Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Stationary drones (autonomous turrets/aimbots) will always be cheaper and/or more powerful than mobile ones, AND more adapted for the particular terrain they're installed in. A "swarm" of drones attacking an area that's defended by equal cost of installed turrets and anti-drone devices is doomed to failure.

City streets will be defended by lasers or miniguns on every streetlamp, _AND_ by a force of good-guy drones that can be rapidly dispatched to areas that need additional force.

But really, our modeling starts to break down when we extrapolate this far. What does "winning" mean for attacking drones?

comment by Daniel Kokotajlo (daniel-kokotajlo) · 2020-08-01T14:06:16.648Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I mean, I did say as much in the OP basically. Defense is always more cost-efficient than offense; the problem is that when you sacrifice your mobility you have to spread out your forces whereas the enemy can concentrate theirs.

For attacking drones, winning means the same thing it usually does. I don't see how it would be different.

comment by maximkazhenkov · 2020-07-30T21:07:09.067Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

In the limit of large swarms of cheap, small drones, the attacker always has an intrinsic advantage. The attacking drones are trying to hit large, relatively slow moving targets while the defender is trying to "hit a bullet with another bullet". The only scalable countermeasure in my mind are directed energy weapons; you can't get faster or smaller than elementary particles. If a laser is fast and accurate enough to shoot down mosquitoes out of the air, it can probably shoot down drones, too.

comment by Dagon · 2020-07-30T14:59:03.014Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think the type of tech imbalance that matters will vary quite widely based on the type of conflict. Full-scale conflicts between large countries are probably out - deterrence and MAD still apply. For interceding in civil wars, or small-scale conflicts, it seems likely that the personal/targetted (surveillance, info-systems, automated and assisted weapons, area exclusion mechanisms (mines that are selective and temporary enough to be usable), etc. are likely to be the more important technology. This includes satellite and high-altitude surveillance, but probably not space or aerial combat.

I'm not sure the gap can be measured in years, though. For this kind of tech, there's enough black- and grey-market, and active support by various superpowers, that the gap is primarily money, not research or production capacity.

I suspect such conflicts will continue to be decided more by the participants' determination and willingness to kill and die for their respective causes, and by amount of support from the local non-combatants (ability to ever extract any value at all from the area, aka "hearts and minds") than by actual technology availability.

Edit: for guerrilla and "police action" conflicts, the key technical advantage will be specificity and information. For small-scale control of a populace, it would go a long way to kill only the leaders of a fight, allowing the followers (aka "workers") to go home safely so they don't miss a day of tax-paying.

comment by johnswentworth · 2020-07-30T02:20:04.976Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think the advancements in command and control tech that are likely to happen in the next 20 years are more important than everything else on this list combined.

Understatement.

comment by Daniel Kokotajlo (daniel-kokotajlo) · 2020-07-30T02:28:09.546Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'd be interested to hear more about what you have in mind!

comment by johnswentworth · 2020-07-30T03:00:03.149Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This is definitely an area where I'm not an expert at all and I'm just armchair speculating, so take it all with an awful lot of salt. That said, if I were going to write an essay on the subject, here's some rough notes on what it would be.

War is combat between groups. A large majority of the commentary on the subject focuses on the "combat" part, and applies in principle even to individuals trying to hurt/kill each other. But looking at the outcomes of major wars over the past ~50 years, it's the "groups" part which really matters. The enemy is not a single monolithic agent, they're a whole bunch of agents who have varying incentives/goals and may or may not coordinate well.

With that in mind, here's a key strategic consideration: assuming we win the war, how will our desired objective be enforced upon the individuals who comprise the enemy? How will the enemy coordinate internally in surrender, in negotiations, and especially in enforcement of concessions? What ensures that each of the individual enemy agents actually does what we want? I see three main classes of answer to that question:

  • Answer 1: extinction-style outcomes. We may not kill the entire enemy force, but we will at least end their ability to wage war. This is sometimes sufficient to achieve a goal, especially in defense. However, note that whatever underlying socioeconomic circumstances originally gave rise to the enemy will likely persist; the problem will likely recur later on. If the cost of the war is low enough, paying it regularly may still be acceptable.
  • Answer 2: centralized negotiation-style outcomes. The pre-existing leadership/coordination machinery of the enemy will enforce concessions - e.g. the enemy government formally surrenders and accepts terms, then enforces those terms on its own members/populace, or enemy government leadership is replaced by our own representatives while keeping the machinery intact (as in a coup). Key point: if we want this outcome, then preservation of the enemy leadership/coordination machinery, their legitimacy and their internal enforcement capabilities is a strategic priority for us.
  • Answer 3: colonization-style outcomes. We will impose a new governing structure of our own upon our enemies. If the enemy has some existing governing structure, we will destroy it in the course of the war. In this case, we cannot expect a coordinated surrender from our enemies - we must achieve victory over smaller units (possibly even individuals) on a one-by-one basis. This means clear announcement and enforcement of our rules, policing, distributed combat against decentralized opposition, and ultimately state-building or the equivalent thereof.

One of the major problems that Western nations have run into in the past half century is that we're in wars where (a) we don't just want to kill everyone, and (b) there is no strong central control of the opposition (or at least none we want to preserve), so we're effectively forced into the last scenario above. If we want to enforce our will on the enemy, we effectively need to build a state de novo. In some sense, that sort of war has more in common with policing and propaganda than with "war" as it's usually imagined, i.e. clashes between nations.

When we picture things that way, fancy weapons just aren't all that relevant. The hard part of modern war is the policing and eventual nation-building. For that project, tools like personalized propaganda or technological omniscience are huge, whereas aimbots/battlebots or supply-chain superiority serve little role besides looking intimidating - an important role, to be sure, but not one which will determine the end result of the war.

In bottleneck terms [LW · GW]: the limiting factor in achieving objectives in modern war is not destroying the enemy, but building stable nations de novo.

comment by maximkazhenkov · 2020-07-30T21:25:27.920Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
One of the major problems that Western nations have run into in the past half century is that we're in wars where (a) we don't just want to kill everyone, and (b) there is no strong central control of the opposition (or at least none we want to preserve), so we're effectively forced into the last scenario above.

This argument is only supportive of your main point "command and control by far most important" insofar future wars will also be exclusively asymmetric. That assumption, though, is problematic even today. The US isn't spending billions of dollars on stealth fighters and bombers to fight the Taliban.

comment by Dagon · 2020-07-31T23:04:15.545Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The US isn't spending billions of dollars on stealth fighters and bombers to fight the Taliban.

The US is spending billions of dollars on stealth fighters and bombers for the dual purposes of funneling money to friends and supporters, and for signaling to prevent any symmetric war.

comment by maximkazhenkov · 2020-08-01T01:39:06.097Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Fighting the Taliban also fulfills the purpose of funneling money to friends and supporters.

comment by Daniel Kokotajlo (daniel-kokotajlo) · 2020-07-30T10:53:41.741Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Mmmm, yes. I think it's too quick to say that all modern war is like this; I think type 2 is definitely still possible and type 1 shouldn't be completely ruled out either, especially if we are thinking about crazy future AI scenarios. But other than that I agree, and found your trichotomy insightful. Thanks!

comment by Jay · 2020-07-30T10:59:48.459Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Don't forget major problem (c), which is that we're not willing to make the decades-long investment that statebuilding takes. A good rule of thumb is 50 occupiers per subject-nation citizen; our recent occupations have had nowhere near that number. They have to stay long enough become fully integrated with the local culture so that they can change it, violently when necessary (think British Raj or 1945 occupation of Japan). The US military is not designed to do this, and our politicians are not willing to redesign it as an occupying force (e.g. by making postings semi-permanent instead of brief rotations and teaching all our troops the local language). Therefore our attempts at colonization-style outcomes consistently fail.

The short version is that we already have the technology to destroy anything, but the resulting power vacuum consistently leads to civil war.

comment by Douglas_Knight · 2020-07-31T02:53:54.143Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The British Raj had 125k colonists at the beginning in 1861 and 166k near the end in 1921, so about one per 2,000 subjects.

comment by Jay · 2020-07-31T10:56:02.508Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I honestly don't know much about the British conquest of India, although I'm pretty sure that the power differential between the West and the rest at that point in time was near its peak. Does anyone know how they did it?

comment by Douglas_Knight · 2020-07-31T19:08:44.870Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think phrasing this in terms of "power" is not so helpful. Cortes and Pizarro brought only a few hundred men to destroy empires. But they didn't nuke them; rather, they allied with existing armies. Similarly, most of the Indian Army was native. Most of the administrators were Indians, too. The British had better weapons and social technology of training, but in creating the Indian Army, they gave up that advantage. The key was some tacit social technology of hierarchy, to keep command of army and country. At the beginning, the Empire had 80k British soldiers, but the East India company tried to get away with using only 40k. It failed in the Sepoy Mutiny, which is why it was replaced by the Empire, but the units with more British were more likely to rebel, so it's not a matter of pure numbers, but of how they were deployed. (Specifically, units with more British had segregation and racism, while the units with fewer British had camaraderie. And probably responsiveness to specific concerns, like the tallow bullets.)

comment by Jay · 2020-08-05T22:52:55.322Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I get your points, but I think you may be underestimating the sheer technological advantage enjoyed by the British at that time. This was the age of "we have the Maxim gun and they have not". Between the power of its guns and the wealth of its factories, Britain at the time had nigh-insurmountable advantages; its war against the Zanzibar Sultanate brought decisive British victory within 45 minutes.

comment by Douglas_Knight · 2020-08-06T02:03:10.564Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

OK, if you change the topic from occupation to conquest, then technology matters. Cortes and Pizarro didn't equip and train their allies. Maybe in the beginning, say, 1680-1750, the East India Company acted like Cortes and Pizarro, allying with armies that they didn't train or equip and maybe their advantages were a reason to side with them. But starting in 1750 they trained and equipped native armies and lost all their advantages.

I explicitly addressed this: the British had no advantage of guns. The Sepoy mutiny was sparked by the beef fat in the cutting-edge rifles that the British gave to the Indians.

For that matter, your wikipedia link says that the Sultan of Zanzibar did have a Maxim gun. Technology travels fast! It was more a battle of artillery. The British Raj did respond to the Sepoy Mutiny by moving artillery out of the hands of natives, but the Company had managed 50-100 years trusting artillery to Indians.

comment by Jay · 2020-08-06T10:32:55.034Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

My question was mostly about the transition from conquest to occupation. How did they get from the point where native armies had been defeated to the point where natives would accept their rule? That's the transition we've failed spectacularly at in Iraq and Afghanistan, so it's a matter of considerable practical importance.

comment by johnswentworth · 2020-07-30T15:14:42.335Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

A good rule of thumb is 50 occupiers per subject-nation citizen

Do you have a source on this? I'd be interested to read more on the subject, but don't really know where to look.

comment by Jay · 2020-07-30T21:37:30.523Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2004/05/09/a-proven-formula-for-how-many-troops-we-need/5c6dbfc9-33f8-4648-bd07-40d244a1daa4/

Epistemic status: probably not as reliable as it claims to be, but a useful rule of thumb for planning purposes.

comment by johnswentworth · 2020-07-30T23:24:04.315Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think this is the RAND study cited there.

comment by shminux · 2020-07-29T21:14:52.715Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I agree that we already have the makings of removing humans from the battlefield. Fighters, bombers, drones, all can be controlled remotely (especially once the starlink-like constellations are up) or semi-autonomously. General Dynamics-like robots can certainly be deployed as a substitute for boots on the ground, not too far down the road. And, given the unexpected advances in AI through GPT text/image generators, this tech becomes uncomfortably close to the Terminator-like scenarios.

comment by Daniel Kokotajlo (daniel-kokotajlo) · 2020-07-29T21:46:04.134Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Funnily enough, the terminator scenario (in which an AI repurposes existing military tech to fight humans) didn't even occur to me. Instead I had been thinking about a scenario where some human+AI faction (either humans with an AI servant, or humans with an AI leader) gets access to this technology before the rest of the world does. I do think this is substantially more likely than the terminator scenario, but maybe I should revisit that view.

comment by maximkazhenkov · 2020-07-30T20:42:10.750Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Drones, yes, Terminators less so. It depends on whether AI technology can thread the needle of being powerful enough to navigate a very complex environment but not general enough to be a superintelligence. I kinda doubt that such a gap even exists.

comment by HunterJay · 2020-07-30T02:12:24.404Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I really enjoy'd this writeup! I'd probably even go a little bit on the pessimistic (optimistic?) side, and bet that almost all of this technology would be possible with only a few years of development from today -- though I suppose it might be 20 if development doesn't start/ramp up in earnest.

comment by Daniel Kokotajlo (daniel-kokotajlo) · 2020-07-30T02:25:59.360Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If we put Elon Musk in charge of making it happen and gave him a hundred billion dollars, I think it could all be achieved in 5 - 10 years. If we had advanced-but-not-godlike AI, it would take less than a year. That's my prediction anyway.

comment by maximkazhenkov · 2020-07-30T21:16:11.442Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

How can an AI that is 10 times as smart and innovative as Elon Musk not be godlike? xD

But seriously, if an AI is really capable of making such great headway in weapons technology, it is then surely capable of bootstrapping itself to superintelligence.

comment by Daniel Kokotajlo (daniel-kokotajlo) · 2020-07-31T00:01:00.182Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I was imagining an AI that is less smart and innovative than Elon Musk, but thinks faster and can be copied arbitrarily many times. Elon is limited to one brain thinking eighteen hours a day or so; the vast majority of the thought-work is done by the other humans he commands. If we had AI that could think as well as a pretty good engineer, but significantly faster, and we could make lots of copies fairly cheaply, then we'd be able to do things much faster than Elon can with his teams of humans.

comment by Chilton Webb (chilton-webb) · 2020-08-01T03:51:09.216Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

A 5 year advancement in AI might include the ability to identify enemy combatants, track their personal info online, and send communications to the military on the behalf of their family suggesting anything from marital infidelity at home, to the loss of a loved one, to questions about one's beliefs, that would ultimately affect the soldier's ability to fight effectively.

A simple misinformation campaign could disrupt an entire operation. Is this particular conflict a political stunt? Is it a show of force for financial gain? Is it part of a conspiracy to get a leader killed? By attacking the psychological side of the enemy, you can weaken their ability to fight effectively.

Laser dogs not required.