dirk's Shortform

I mean, yeah, but it is nice test field. If you can't remove ability to generate porn, you are very unlikely to remove ability to kill you.

By “NSFW” do you mean pornography? Or are you also including Gore?

These are LLM generated labels, there are no "real" labels (because they're expensive!). Especially in our demo, Neuronpedia made them with gpt 3.5 which is kinda dumb.

I mostly think they're much better than nothing, but shouldn't be trusted, and I'm glad our demo makes this apparent to people! I'm excited about work to improve autointerp, though unfortunately the easiest way is to use a better model, which gets expensive

One can think of this as cases where auto-interp exhibits a precision-recall trade-off. At one extreme, you can generate super broad annotations like "all English text" to capture a a lot, which would overkill; and at the other end, you can generate very specific ones like "Slurs targeting sexual orientation" which would risk mislabeling, say, racial slurs. 

Section 4.3 of the OpenAI SEA paper also discusses this point.

Yeah. It's possible to give quite accurate definitions of some vague concepts, because the words used in such definitions also express vague concepts. E.g. "cygnet" - "a young swan".

I would say that if a concept is imprecise, more words [but good and precise words] have to be dedicated to faithfully representing the diffuse nature of the topic. If this larger faithful representation is compressed down to fewer words, that can lead to vague phrasing. I would therefore often view vauge phrasing as a compression artefact, rather than a necessary outcome of translating certain types of concepts to words. 

Something that sounds patronizing is not a social reward. It's not necessarily possible to formulate in a way that avoids this problem, without doing something significantly indirect. Right now this is upvoting for unspecified reasons.

I agree. This is unfortunately often done in various fields of research where familiar terms are reused as technical terms.

For example, in ordinary language "organic" means "of biological origin", while in chemistry "organic" describes a type of carbon compound. Those two definitions mostly coincide on Earth (most such compounds are of biological origin), but when astronomers announce they have found "organic" material on an asteroid this leads to confusion.

How often is signalling a high degree of precision without the reader understanding the meaning of the term more important than conveying a imprecise but broadly within the subject matter understanding of the content?

Specific examples would be nice. Not sure if I understand correctly, but I imagine something like this:

You always choose A over B. You have been doing it for such long time that you forgot why. Without reflecting about this directly, it just seems like there probably is a rational reason or something. But recently, either accidentally or by experiment, you chose B... and realized that experiencing B (or expecting to experience B) creates unpleasant emotions. So now you know that the emotions were the real cause of choosing A over B all that time.

(This is probably wrong, but hey, people say that the best way to elicit answer is to provide a wrong one.)

Meta/object level is one possible mixup but it doesn't need to be that. Alternative example, is/ought: Cedar objects to thing Y. Dusk explains that it happens because Z. Cedar reiterates that it shouldn't happen, Dusk clarifies that in fact it is the natural outcome of Z, and we're off once more.

I'm always much more interested in "conditional on an LLM being conscious, what would we be able to infer about what it's like to be it?" than the process of establishing the basic fact. This is related to me thinking there's a straightforward thing-it's-like-to-be a dog, duck, plant, light bulb, bacteria, internet router, fire, etc... if it interacts, then there's a subjective experience of the interaction in the interacting physical elements. Panpsychism of hard problem, compute dependence of easy problem. If one already holds this belief, then no LLM-specific evidence is needed to establish hard problem, and understanding the flavor of the easy problem is the interesting part.