The violinist

Original:

1. We should save the violinist
2. Fetuses are like violinists
3. Therefore we should save fetuses

Reverse:

1. We don't care about fetuses
2. Violinists are like fetuses
3. Therefore we don't care about violinists (metaphorically)

I would like to know which other ethical thought experiments have this pattern...

Isn't the answer just "all of them"?  The contrapositive of an implication is always true.

If (if X then Y) then (if ~Y then ~X).  Any intuitive dissonance between X and Y is preserved by negating them into ~X and ~Y.

Many of these calculations get more consistent if you bite just one fairly large bullet: sub-linear scaling (I generally go with logarithmic) of value.  Saving a marginal person at the cost of ruining a marginal suit is a value comparison, and the value of both people and suits can vary pretty widely based on context.  

The hardest part of this acceptance is that human lives are not infinite nor incomparable in value.  I also recommend accepting that value is personal and relative (each agent has a different utility function, with different coefficients for the value of categories and individual others), but that may not be fully necessary to resolve the simple examples you've given so far.

Infanticide

Original:

1. We don't care about killing a baby before birth
2. A baby 1 minutes after birth is almost the same as a baby 1 minute before birth
3. Therefore we don't care about killing a 1 minute-old baby

Reversed:

1. We care about killing a 1 minute-old baby
2. A baby 1 minutes after birth is almost the same as a baby 1 minute before birth
3. Therefore we care about killing a baby before birth

The Non-identity problem

Original:

1. We only care about things if they are bad/good for someone
2. Using a lot of resources isn't bad for people in the future, it just changes who lives in the future
3. Therefore we don't mind that people in the future are having a bad time because of our consumption

Reversed:

1. We care that people in the future are having a bad time because of our consumption
2. Consuming isn't bad for specific people in the future, it just changes who lives in the future
3. Therefore we don't only care about thing if they are bad/good* for someone, but also about what kind of lives we bring into existence

Dust specs vs torture

I feel like this one was presented as a clash of 2 intuitions, so both the "reversed" is also in the original presentation.

Original:

1. We prefer X people experiencing Y pain than 1,000 people experiencing 2*Y pain AND this preference is true for all X, Y element of the real numbers
2. This can be chained together multiple times
3. We prefer 1 person experiencing 50 years of torture to a googolplex people having specs of dust in their eyes

Reversed:

1. We prefer a googolplex people having specs of dust in their eyes to 1 person experiencing 50 years of torture
2. There's some threshold of pain for which we care lexically more about
3. We can more about 1 person experiencing slightly more pain than this threshold than a large number of people experiencing slightly less pain than this threshold

keyword to search: lexical threshold negative hedonistic utilitarianism

Experience machine

Original:

1. We only care about our happiness
2. An hypothetical happiness machine could bring us the most happiness
3. Therefore we want to live in happiness machine

Reversed:

1. We don't want to live in an happiness machine
2. An happiness machine only brings us happiness
3. Therefore we care about other things than happiness

Trolley problem / transplant

Original:

1. We want to take actions to save more people
2. Survival lotteries save more people just like pulling the lever does
3. Therefore we support survival lotteries

Reversed:

1. We don't support survival lotteries
2. Pushing the lever is an action that changes who dies just like the survival lotteries does
3. Therefore we don't support pulling the lever

Could do the same with pulling a lever vs pushing a person

Utility monster

Original:

1. We care about increasing happiness
2. If there was a being that had by far the highest capacity for happiness, they might be the best way to increase happiness even at the cost of everyone else
3. We care about utility monsters the most (which violates the egalitarian intuition)

Reversed:

1. We care about each beings equally
2. If there was a being that had by far the highest capacity for happiness, we still wouldn't give them more resources
3. We don't care about increasing total happiness