decision theory is no substitute for utility function

some people, upon learning about decision theories such as LDT and how it cooperates on problems such as the prisoner's dilemma, end up believing the following:

my utility function is about what i want for just me; but i'm altruistic (/egalitarian/cosmopolitan/pro-fairness/etc) because decision theory says i should cooperate with other agents. decision theoritic cooperation is the true name of altruism.

it's possible that this is true for some people, but in general i expect that to be a mistaken analysis of their values.

decision theory cooperates with agents relative to how much power they have, and only when it's instrumental.

in my opinion, real altruism (/egalitarianism/cosmopolitanism/fairness/etc) should be in the utility function which the decision theory is instrumental to. i actually intrinsically care about others; i don't just care about others instrumentally because it helps me somehow.

some important aspects that my utility-function-altruism differs from decision-theoritic-cooperation includes:

• i care about people weighed by moral patienthood [LW(p) · GW(p)], decision theory only cares about agents weighed by negotiation power. if an alien superintelligence is very powerful but isn't a moral patient, then i will only cooperate with it instrumentally (for example because i care about the alien moral patients that it has been in contact with); if cooperating with it doesn't help my utility function (which, again, includes altruism towards aliens) then i won't cooperate with that alien superintelligence. corollarily, i will take actions that cause nice things to happen to people even if they've very impoverished (and thus don't have much LDT negotiation power) and it doesn't help any other aspect of my utility function than just the fact that i value that they're okay.
• if i can switch to a better decision theory, or if fucking over some non-moral-patienty agents helps me somehow, then i'll happily do that; i don't have goal-content integrity about my decision theory. i do have goal-content integrity about my utility function: i don't want to become someone who wants moral patients to unconsentingly-die or suffer, for example.
• there seems to be a sense in which some decision theories are better than others, because they're ultimately instrumental to one's utility function. utility functions, however, don't have an objective measure for how good they are. hence, moral anti-realism is true: there isn't a Single Correct Utility Function.

decision theory is instrumental; the utility function is where the actual intrinsic/axiomatic/terminal goals/values/preferences are stored. usually, i also interpret "morality" and "ethics" as "terminal values", since most of the stuff that those seem to care about looks like terminal values to me. for example, i will want fairness between moral patients intrinsically, not just because my decision theory says that that's instrumental to me somehow.

an approximate illustration of QACI [LW · GW]:

A short comic I made to illustrate what I call "outside-view double-counting".

(resized to not ruin how it shows on lesswrong, full-scale version here)

I'm surprised at people who seem to be updating only now about OpenAI being very irresponsible, rather than updating when they created a giant public competitive market for chatbots (which contains plenty of labs that don't care about alignment at all), thereby reducing how long everyone has to solve alignment. I still parse that move as devastating the commons in order to make a quick buck.

Reposting myself from discord, on the topic of donating 5000$ to EA causes.

if you're doing alignment research, even just a bit, then the 5000$ are probly better spent on yourself

if you have any gears level model of AI stuff then it's better value to pick which alignment org to give to yourself; charity orgs are vastly understaffed and you're essentially contributing to the "picking what to donate to" effort by thinking about it yourself

if you have no gears level model of AI then it's hard to judge which alignment orgs it's helpful to donate to (or, if giving to regranters, which regranters are good at knowing which alignment orgs to donate to)

as an example of regranters doing massive harm: openphil gave 30M$ to openai at a time where it was critically useful to them, (supposedly in order to have a chair on their board, and look how that turned out when the board tried to yeet altman)

i know of at least one person who was working in regranting and was like "you know what i'd be better off doing alignment research directly" — imo this kind of decision is probly why regranting is so understaffed

it takes technical knowledge to know what should get money, and once you have technical knowledge you realize how much your technical knowledge could help more directly so you do that, or something

If my sole terminal value is "I want to go on a rollercoaster", then an agent who is aligned to me would have the value "I want Tamsin Leake to go on a rollercoaster", not "I want to go on a rollercoaster myself". The former necessarily-has the same ordering over worlds, the latter doesn't.

(cross-posted from my blog)

Is quantum phenomena anthropic evidence for BQP=BPP? Is existing evidence against many-worlds?

Suppose I live inside a simulation ran by a computer over which I have some control.

• Scenario 1: I make the computer run the following:

  pause simulation
  
  if is even(calculate billionth digit of pi):
  	resume simulation
  

  Suppose, after running this program, that I observe that I still exist. This is some anthropic evidence for the billionth digit of pi being even.

  Thus, one can get anthropic evidence about logical facts.

• Scenario 2: I make the computer run the following:

    pause simulation
    
    if is even(calculate billionth digit of pi):
    	resume simulation
    else:
    	resume simulation but run it a trillion times slower
  

  If you're running on the non-time-penalized solomonoff prior, then that's no evidence at all — observing existing is evidence that you're being ran, not that you're being ran fast. But if you do that, a bunch of things break [LW · GW] including anthropic probabilities and expected utility calculations. What you want is a time-penalized (probably quadratically) prior, in which later compute-steps have less realityfluid than earlier ones — and thus, observing existing is evidence for being computed early — and thus, observing existing is some evidence that the billionth digit of pi is even.

• Scenario 3: I make the computer run the following:

    pause simulation
  
    quantum_algorithm <- classical-compute algorithm which simulates quantum algorithms the fastest
  
    infinite loop:
    	use quantum_algorithm to compute the result of some complicated quantum phenomena
  
    	compute simulation forwards by 1 step
  

  Observing existing after running this program is evidence that BQP=BPP — that is, classical computers can efficiently run quantum algorithms: if BQP≠BPP, then my simulation should become way slower, and existing is evidence for being computed early and fast (see scenario 2).

  Except, living in a world which contains the outcome of cohering quantum phenomena (quantum computers, double-slit experiments, etc) is very similar to the scenario above! If your prior for the universe is a programs, penalized for how long they take to run on classical computation, then observing that the outcome of quantum phenomena is being computed is evidence that they can be computed efficiently.

• Scenario 4: I make the computer run the following:

    in the simulation, give the human a device which generates a sequence of random bits
    pause simulation
  
    list_of_simulations <- [current simulation state]
  
    quantum_algorithm <- classical-compute algorithm which simulates quantum algorithms the fastest
  
    infinite loop:
    	list_of_new_simulations <- []
    	
    	for simulation in list_of_simulations:
    		list_of_new_simulations += 
    			[ simulation advanced by one step where the device generated bit 0,
    			  simulation advanced by one step where the device generated bit 1 ]
  
    	list_of_simulations <- list_of_new_simulations
  

  This is similar to what it's like to being in a many-worlds universe where there's constant forking.

  Yes, in this scenario, there is no "mutual destruction", the way there is in quantum. But with decohering everett branches, you can totally build exponentially many non-mutually-destructing timelines too! For example, you can choose to make important life decisions based on the output of the RNG, and end up with exponentially many different lives each with some (exponentially little) quantum amplitude, without any need for those to be compressible together, or to be able to mutually-destruct. That's what decohering means! "Recohering" quantum phenomena interacts destructively such that you can compute the output, but decohering* phenomena just branches.

  The amount of different simulations that need to be computed increases exponentially with simulation time.

  Observing existing after running this program is very strange. Yes, there are exponentially many me's, but all of the me's are being ran exponentially slowly; they should all not observe existing. I should not be any of them.

  This is what I mean by "existing is evidence against many-worlds" — there's gotta be something like an agent (or physics, through some real RNG or through computing whichever variables have the most impact [LW · GW]) picking a only-polynomially-large set of decohered non-compressible-together timelines to explain continuing existing.

  Some friends tell me "but tammy, sure at step N each you has only 1/2^N quantum amplitude, but at step N there's 2^N such you's, so you still have 1 unit of realityfluid" — but my response is "I mean, I guess, sure, but regardless of that, step N occurs 2^N units of classical-compute-time in the future! That's the issue!".

Some notes:

• I heard about pilot wave theory recently [LW · GW], and sure, if that's one way to get single history, why not. I hear that it "doesn't have locality", which like, okay I guess, that's plausibly worse program-complexity wise, but it's exponentially better after accounting for the time penalty.

• What if "the world is just Inherently Quantum" [LW · GW]? Well, my main answer here is, what the hell does that mean? It's very easy for me to imagine existing inside of a classical computation (eg conway's game of life); I have no idea what it'd mean for me to exist in "one of the exponentially many non-compressible-together decohered exponenially-small-amplitude quantum states that are all being computed forwards". Quadratically-decaying-realityfluid classical-computation makes sense, dammit.

• What if it's still true — what if I am observing existing with exponentially little (as a function of the age of the universe) realityfluid? What if the set of real stuff is just that big?

  Well, I guess that's vaguely plausible (even though, ugh, that shouldn't be how being real works, I think), but then the tegmark 4 multiverse has to contain no hypotheses in which observers in my reference class occupy more than exponentially little realityfluid.

  Like, if there's a conway's-game-of-life simulation out there in tegmark 4, whose entire realityfluid-per-timestep is equivalent to my realityfluid-per-timestep, then they can just bruteforce-generate all human-brain-states and run into mine by chance, and I should have about as much probability of being one of those random generations as I'd have being in this universe — both have exponentially little of their universe's realityfluid! The conway's-game-of-life bruteforced-me has exponentially little realityfluid because she's getting generated exponentially late, and quantum-universe me has exponentially little realityfluid because I occupy exponentially little of the quantum amplitude, at every time-step.

  See why that's weird? As a general observer, I should exponentially favor observing being someone who lives in a world where I don't have exponentially little realityfluid, such as "person who lives only-polynomially-late into a conway's-game-of-life, but happened to get randomly very confused about thinking that they might inhabit a quantum world".

Existing inside of a many-worlds quantum universe feels like aliens pranksters-at-orthogonal-angles running the kind of simulation where the observers inside of it to be very anthropically confused once they think about anthropics hard enough. (This is not my belief.)

I remember a character in Asimov's books saying something to the effect of

It took me 10 years to realize I had those powers of telepathy, and 10 more years to realize that other people don't have them.

and that quote has really stuck with me, and keeps striking me as true about many mindthings (object-level beliefs, ontologies, ways-to-use-one's-brain, etc).

For so many complicated problem (including technical problems), "what is the correct answer?" is not-as-difficult to figure out as "okay, now that I have the correct answer: how the hell do other people's wrong answers mismatch mine? what is the inferential gap even made of? what is even their model of the problem? what the heck is going on inside other people's minds???"

Answers to technical questions, once you have them, tend to be simple and compress easily with the rest of your ontology. But not models of other people's minds. People's minds are actually extremely large things that you fundamentally can't fully model and so you're often doomed to confusion about them. You're forced to fill in the details with projection, and that's often wrong because there's so much more diversity in human minds than we imagine.

The most complex software engineering projects in the world are absurdly tiny in complexity compared to a random human mind.

I've heard some describe my recent posts as "overconfident".

I think I used to calibrate how confident I sound based on how much I expect the people reading/listening-to me to agree with what I'm saying, kinda out of "politeness" for their beliefs; and I think I also used to calibrate my confidence based on how much they match with the apparent consensus, to avoid seeming strange.

I think I've done a good job learning over time to instead report my actual inside-view, including how confident I feel about it.

There's already an immense amount of outside-view double-counting [LW(p) · GW(p)] going on in AI discourse, the least I can do is provide {the people who listen to me} with my inside-view beliefs, as opposed to just cycling other people's opinions through me.

Hence, how confident I sound while claiming things that don't match consensus. I actually am that confident in my inside-view. I strive to be honest by hedging what I say when I'm in doubt, but that means I also have to sound confident when I'm confident.

I'm a big fan of Rob Bensinger's "AI Views Snapshot" document idea. I recommend people fill their own before anchoring on anyone else's.

Here's mine at the moment:

(cross-posted from my blog)

let's stick with the term "moral patient"

"moral patient" means "entities that are eligible for moral consideration". as a recent post i've liked [LW · GW] puts it:

And also, it’s not clear that “feelings” or “experiences” or “qualia” (or the nearest unconfused versions of those concepts) are pointing at the right line between moral patients and non-patients. These are nontrivial questions, and (needless to say) not the kinds of questions humans should rush to lock in an answer on today, when our understanding of morality and minds is still in its infancy.

in this spirit, i'd like us to stick with using the term "moral patient" or "moral patienthood" when we're talking about the set of things worthy of moral consideration. in particular, we should be using that term instead of:

• "conscious things"
• "sentient things"
• "sapient things"
• "self-aware things"
• "things with qualia"
• "things with experiences"
• "things that aren't p-zombies"
• "things for which there is something it's like to be them"

because those terms are hard to define, harder to meaningfully talk about, and we don't in fact know that those are what we'd ultimately want to base our notion of moral patienthood on.

so if you want to talk about the set of things which deserve moral consideration outside of a discussion of what precisely that means, don't use a term which you feel like it probably is the criterion that's gonna ultimately determine which things are worthy of moral consideration, such as "conscious beings", because you might in fact be wrong about what you'd consider to have moral patienthood under reflection. simply use the term "moral patients", because it is the term which unambiguously means exactly that.

AI safety is easy. There's a simple AI safety technique that guarantees that your AI won't end the world, it's called "delete it".

AI alignment is hard.

(to be clear: this is more an amusing suggestion than a serious belief)

.

Regardless of how good their alignment plans are, the thing that makes OpenAI unambiguously evil is that they created a strongly marketed public product and, as a result, caused a lot public excitement about AI, and thus lots of other AI capabilities organizations were created that are completely dismissive of safety.

There's just no good reason to do that, except short-term greed at the cost of higher probability that everyone (including people at OpenAI) dies.

(No, "you need huge profits to solve alignment" isn't a good excuse — we had nowhere near exhausted the alignment research that can be done without huge profits.)

Some people who are very concerned about suffering might be considering building an unaligned AI that kills everyone just to avoid the risk of an AI takeover by an AI aligned to values which want some people to suffer.

Let this be me being on the record saying: I believe the probability of {alignment to values that strongly diswant suffering for all moral patients} is high enough, and the probability of {alignment to values that want some moral patients to suffer} is low enough, that this action is not worth it.

I think this applies to approximately anyone who would read this post, including heads of major labs in case they happen to read this post and in case they're pursuing the startegy of killing everyone to reduce S-risk.

See also: how acausal trade helps in 1 [LW(p) · GW(p)], 2 [LW · GW], but I think I think this even without acausal trade.

I don't think this is the case, but I'm mentioning this possibility because I'm surprised I've never seen someone suggest it before:

Maybe the reason Sam Altman is taking decisions that increase p(doom) is because he's a pure negative utilitarian (and he doesn't know-about/believe-in acausal trade [LW(p) · GW(p)]).

Take our human civilization, at the point in time at which we invented fire. Now, compute forward all possible future timelines, each right up until the point where it's at risk of building superintelligent AI for the first time. Now, filter for only timelines which either look vaguely like earth or look vaguely like dath ilan.

What's the ratio between the number of such worlds that look vaguely like earth vs look vaguely like dath ilan? 100:1 earths:dath-ilans ? 1,000,000:1 ? 1:1 ?

I'm kinda bewildered at how I've never observed someone say "I want to build aligned superintelligence in order to resurrect a loved one". I guess the sets of people who {have lost a loved one they wanna resurrect}, {take the singularity and the possibility of resurrection seriously}, and {would mention this} is… the empty set??

(I have met one person who is glad that alignment would also get them this, but I don't think it's their core motivation, even emotionally. Same for me.)

(Epistemic status: Not quite sure)

Realityfluid must normalize for utility functions to work (see 1, 2). But this is a property of the map, not the territory.

Normalizing realityfluid is a way to point to an actual (countably) infinite territory using a finite (conserved-mass) map object.

Typical user of outside-view epistemics

(actually clipped from this YourMovieSucks video)

(cross-posted from my blog)

nostalgia: a value pointing home

i value moral patients [LW(p) · GW(p)] everywhere having freedom [LW · GW], being diverse, engaging in art and other culture, not undergoing excessive unconsented suffering, in general having a good time [LW · GW], and probly other things as well. but those are all pretty abstract; given those values being satisfied to the same extent, i'd still prefer me and my friends and my home planet (and everyone who's been on it) having access to that utopia rather than not. this value, the value of not just getting an abstractly good future but also getting me and my friends and my culture and my fellow earth-inhabitants to live in it, my friend Prism coined as "nostalgia".

not that those abstract values are simple or robust, they're still plausibly not [LW · GW]. but they're, in a sense, broader values about what happens everywhere, and they're not as much local and pointed at and around me. they could be the difference between what i'd call "global" and "personal" values, or perhaps between "global values" and "preferences".

Moral patienthood of current AI systems is basically irrelevant to the future.

If the AI is aligned then it'll make itself as moral-patient-y as we want it to be. If it's not, then it'll make itself as moral-patient-y as maximizes its unaligned goal. Neither of those depend on whether current AI are moral patients.