LessWrong 2.0 Reader

the main arguments for the programmers including all of [current?] humanity in the CEV "extrapolation base" […] apply symmetrically to AIs-we're-sharing-the-world-with at the time

I think timeless values might possibly help resolve this; if some {AIs that are around at the time} are moral patients, then sure, just like other moral patients around they should get a fair share of the future.

If an AI grabs more resources than is fair, you do the exact same thing as if a human grabs more resources than is fair: satisfy the values of moral patients (including ones who are no longer around) not weighed by how much leverage they current have over the future, but how much leverage they would have over the future if things had gone more fairly/if abuse/powergrab/etc wasn't the kind of thing that gets your more control of the future.

"Sorry clippy, we do want you to get some paperclips, we just don't want you to get as many paperclips as you could if you could murder/brainhack/etc all humans, because that doesn't seem to be a very fair way to allocate the future." — and in the same breath, "Sorry Putin, we do want you to get some of whatever-intrinsic-values-you're-trying-to-satisfy, we just don't want you to get as much as ruthlessly ruling Russia can get you, because that doesn't seem to be a very fair way to allocate the future."

And this can apply regardless of how much of clippy already exists by the time you're doing CEV.

It's an interesting question, but its a different, more complex problem than simply not knowing googolth digit of pi and trying to estimate whether it's even or odd.

trying to solve morality by themselves

It doesn't have to be by themselves; they can defer to others inside CEV, or come up with better schemes that their initial CEV inside CEV and then defer to that. Whatever other solutions than "solve everything on your own inside CEV" might exist, they can figure those out and defer to them from inside CEV. At least that's the case in my own attempts at implementing CEV in math (eg QACI).

If mechanistic interpretability is the AI equivalent of finding tiny organisms in a microscope, what is the AI equivalent of the tiny organisms?

You mention 'warp' when talking about cross ontology mapping which seems like your best summary of a complicated intuition. I'd be curious to hear more (I recognize this might not be practical). My own intuition surfaced 'introducing degrees of freedom' a la indeterminacy of translation.

While true, that doesn't apply to the years in question, post-2001.

"I've never had issue before" is not a legal argument. This has gone to the supreme court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 1971 and the use of IQ tests for employment was found in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The military, post office, and other government agencies get away with it under the doctrine of sovereign immunity. The rest are playing with fire.

If one were to distingush between "behavioral simulators" and "procedural simulators", the problem wouold vanish. Behavioral simulators imitate the outputs of some generative process; procedural simulators imitate the details of the generative process itself. When they're working well, base models clearly do the former, even as I suspect they don't do the latter.

The main asymmetries I see are:

1. Other people not trusting the group to not be corrupted by power and to reflect correctly on their values, or not trusting that they'll decide to share power even after reflecting correctly. Thus "programmers" who decide to not share power from the start invite a lot of conflict. (In other words, CEV is partly just trying to not take power away from people, whereas I think you've been talking about giving AIs more power than they already have. "the sort of influence we imagine intentionally giving to AIs-with-different-values that we end up sharing the world with")
2. The "programmers" not trusting themselves. I note that individuals or small groups trying to solve morality by themselves don't have very good track records. They seem to too easily become wildly overconfident and/or get stuck in intellectual dead-ends. Arguably the only group that we have evidence for being able to make sustained philosophical progress is humanity as a whole.

To the extent that these considerations don't justify giving every human equal power/weight in CEV, I may just disagree with Eliezer about that. (See also Hacking the CEV for Fun and Profit [LW · GW].)

The original post was a summary of the model, as it's still in development and far from complete. That’s often the case with new models—they evolve over time. The gap between the Standard Model (SM) and the Dark Domain (DD) is as much philosophical as it is physical. The reasoning behind it is there, but in a summary, it might not come across as clearly as in a full, detailed presentation.

What I’m really looking for is feedback on the specifics within the model, rather than a critique of the overall presentation. I’m hoping to refine the model by addressing particular elements and ensuring they stand up to scrutiny.

Here's a sample of some of the underlying mathematics:

Basic equation for photon-photon interaction energy:

E_γγ = ħ(ω₁ + ω₂) + E_Γ

Where:

• E_γγ​ is the total energy from the photon-photon interaction,
• ℏ is the reduced Planck constant,
• ω1 and ω2​ are the angular frequencies of the photons,
• E_Γ​represents the energy contribution from the 1Γ gluon.

In the Γ Framework, Γ is the fundamental unit of energy that arises from photon-photon interactions. When we say:

Eγγ​=Γ,

it means that the total energy from any photon interaction (E_γγ) simplifies to Γ, representing the baseline, unified energy state of the system. This makes Γ the key constant governing all photon and particle interactions, encapsulating the entire energy exchange in the framework.

Thus, Γ is both the result and the fundamental driver of all interactions.