If all trade is voluntary, then what is "exploitation?"
post by Darmani · 2024-12-27T11:21:30.036Z · LW · GW · 61 commentsContents
An Actually-Exploitative Corporation Exploitation is using a superior negotiating position to inflict great costs on someone else, at small benefit to yourself. More forms of Exploitation Update: None 61 comments
Capitalism is a force that has lifted billions out of poverty, where even poor remote villagers enjoy luxuries that would have been unimaginable to medieval kings. When someone takes a job, even the worst job, it’s because both parties expect mutual gain. And yet companies routinely get accused of exploiting their workers for offering low pay and bad conditions, even if the pay and conditions are far better than the other available jobs. This sometimes results in protectionist laws that prevent those businesses from existing in the first place, making everyone worse off.
Given this, is there any meaningful concept that could be called “exploitation?”
I think there is.
In fact, I claim, it routinely happens that someone will voluntarily and rationally submit to a circumstance that should very rightfully be called “exploitation.”
An Actually-Exploitative Corporation
Consider this dialogue, taken from here [LW · GW]:
Steve: Acme exploits its workers by paying them too little!
Liron: Can you help me paint a specific mental picture of a worker being exploited by Acme?
Steve: Ok… A single dad who works at Acme and never gets to spend time with his kids because he works so much. He's living paycheck to paycheck and he doesn't get any paid vacation days. The next time his car breaks down, he won’t even be able to fix it because he barely makes minimum wage. You should try living on minimum wage so you can see how hard it is!
Liron: You’re saying Acme should be blamed for this specific person’s unpleasant life circumstances, right?
Steve: Yes, because they have thousands of workers in these kinds of circumstances, and meanwhile their stock is worth $80 billion.
In this case, Steve has provided no reason to believe that this worker — let’s call him “Bob” — is being exploited, for any reasonable sense of the word.
But sometimes there are extra details that reveal that, actually, yeah, Acme really is responsible for Bob’s life circumstances.
Let’s make up some more details. Why doesn’t Bob have time to see his kids? He would on Monday evenings, except that the company requires him to drive an hour for a weekly city-wide meeting, where he raises his hand to prove that he worked the past week, and listens to some information that would be better communicated in an E-mail.
Other people in his circumstance manage to save money – why is Bob living paycheck to paycheck? Because the company required him to wear a tuxedo once a month — everyone must wear the same brand, and it costs at least $5000 – and he’s on a payment plan for it.
The company has many more ways to make him miserable. He’s not allowed to use his phone on the job, even when there are no customers around and he’s just sitting doing nothing. He wants to bring his own chair to help his back pain, but he’s not allowed. If he’s late by a minute, he loses half a day’s wages. His boss yells at him, and the higher-ups praise the boss for being tough and motivating. There’s a ritual where, every morning, any worker who made a mistake the previous day gets their mistake read out in front of everyone, and gets shamed for it.
In each of these cases, the company is inflicting massive cost on Bob, with at most a very small benefit to themselves.
And in each case, Bob takes it, because his alternative is to be fired and have no job whatsoever.
Bob is being exploited.
This motivates my working definition of exploitation:
Exploitation is using a superior negotiating position to inflict great costs on someone else, at small benefit to yourself.
More forms of Exploitation
Here are some more examples:
- A parent sits down for tea, but their kid is running around. “Absolutely no noise while I’m having tea, or no Nintendo for the next month.” Every time the parent pulls this card, the kid accepts.
- A factory pays $5/hour for dangerous but air-conditioned indoor work, in a region where most other jobs are $2/hour farm labor in the hot sun. There is a piece of equipment they could install that would cost $1000 but would reduce the risk of injury by 10%. They don’t install it.
- A shy, nerdy programmer is dating a very attractive, nerdy woman, in an area dominated by many nerdy men seeking few nerdy women. She knows that she’ll have a far easier time finding a new partner than he would were they to break up. She begins using this position to change the relationship — telling him he doesn’t love her if he doesn’t pick her up from the airport, asking to open the relationship and hinting that him not wanting to is being controlling. Every time, he accepts, until he’s a shell of his former self.
In each of these cases, one person has the power to casually inflict severe losses on the other — punishment of a child, loss of a job, loss of a relationship. And so whenever they can gain $1 by making the other person pay $10, they do so. That’s exploitation.
This view of exploitation impacts what policies you should demand of companies. And it affects what kind of behavior you can morally request from others – and from yourself.
The Fair Trade movement seeks to pressure companies into providing their foreign laborers working conditions and pay closer to American standards. This lens suggests that neither the naive employer-provider view (“Make them treat their workers fairly!”) or the Econ 101 view (“They are providing jobs that the workers happily accept, and we should respect that”) are a complete way to evaluate what would produce the globally optimum policy. We should instead ask: are there small things the companies should be doing that would make a big difference in the workers’ lives?
This lens also suggests a personal code of conduct. Whenever you make a request from someone you have power over, ask yourself just how hard it would be for them compared to the benefit you get. And when you want to evaluate someone for ethics, ask them about when they took a small sacrifice in order to make a big difference for someone else.
Related: Eliezer’s Parable of Anoxistan
Update:
Two commenters piped in with useful additional content.
First from Villiam:
Let's say a company demands that a worker buy a suit worth $10, and gains $1 from it. Then the worker could offer to work for $1.05 less, but without the suit, and that would be more profitable for both the company and the worker.
And the company could simply say no, knowing that the worker has more to lose, relatively, and therefore will be likely to give up and accept the original deal.Seems to me that at least a part of the intuition behind "exploitation" is that the person with greater negotiation power can precommit to reject even the win/win deals if they are not unbalanced enough in their favor.
To use the metaphor of a growing pie, imagine that there is a button that will magically summon a pie for both of us to share, but only if we both press the button simultaneously. Problem is, you are starving but I am not. So I say that unless you give me 90% of the pie, I refuse to press the button. I will lose some good pie, but I can live with that, and you can't.
Furthermore, this is an iterated game. If you accept to take 10% of the pie and let me take 90%, what happens when we find a similar button tomorrow? Yeah, you will be starving again, and I will be not.
(And this can get even more unfair, when the stronger party can use their advantage to lobby for making the environment even worse for the weaker party. Not sure what would be the proper metaphor here. Making it illegal to eat things other than pies? Making it illegal for two people to press the magical button unless one of them is me?)
Second, from Ben:
I don't think the framing "Is behaviour X exploitation?" is the right framing. It takes what (should be) an argument about morality and instead turns it into an argument about the definition of the word "exploitation" (where we take it as given that, whatever the hell we decide exploitation "actually means" it is a bad thing). For example see this post: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yCWPkLi8wJvewPbEp/the-noncentral-fallacy-the-worst-argument-in-the-world [LW · GW]. Once we have a definition of "exploitation" their might be some weird edge cases that are technically exploitation but are obviously fine.
The substantial argument (I think) is that when two parties have unequal bargaining positions, is it OK for the stronger party to get the best deal it can? A full-widget is worth a million dollars. I possess the only left half of a widget in the world. Ten million people each possess a right half that could doc with my left half. Those not used to make widgets are worthless. What is the ethical split for me to offer for a right half in this case?
[This is maybe kind of equivalent to the dating example you give. At least in my view the "bad thing" in the dating example is the phrase "She begins using this position to change the relationship". The word "change" is the one that sets the alarms for me. If they both went in knowing what was going on then, to me, that's Ok. Its the "trap" that is not. I think most of the things we would object to are like this, those Monday meetings and that expensive suit are implied to be surprises jumped onto poor Bob.]
I would add that my framing of exploitation in this post seems to presuppose a default bargain, either a natural split (as in the pie example), typical expectations (violated by the the odd conditions in Bob's job), or a previous agreement (as the dating example). When I talk of one party using their bargaining position to inflict losses on the other, it is losses relative to that default bargain. The trade has to still be a net positive, otherwise even the weakest party would walk away.
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comment by Thane Ruthenis · 2024-12-27T15:10:14.506Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Exploitation is when one rational economic agent violates the validity of another rational economic agent's abstraction layer, using non-economic side-channels to make the latter accept an economically unfair division of gains from trade. Examples:
- Violence.
- Psychological manipulations. (Exerting psychological pressure that leads to bad, emotion-driven choices; gaslighting someone into thinking their work is less valuable than it is.)
- "Frogboiling" is a subset of this to which many of your examples apply, where an agent inflicts costs on another agent that are dramatically smaller than terminating the economic relationship, but which add up. (Exploits e. g. hyperbolic discounting.)
- Deception. (Lying about the meaning of the terms of the contract until the counterparty already commits to it; reneging on the contract; misrepresenting or concealing the actual state of the economy.)
- Cultivating irrationality. (E. g., propagandizing CDT over FDT, so that other agents accept blackmail.)
- Cultural influences. (Creating a culture in which e. g. working for Company A is seen as its own reward.)
- Destroying the interfaces other economic agents can use to coordinate against you. (E. g., destroying communications, making agents (/employees) distrust each other, etc.)
Roughly speaking, exploitation can target one of the following:
- Algorithms. (Make an economic agent behave not as an economic agent, but as some entirely different type of system; make a set of rational economic agents unable to act as a set of rational economic agents.)
- Values. (Modify a self-interested agent into an agent that wants to pursue something other than its interests.)
- Rationality. (Warp the target agent's world-model into an incorrect but beneficial-to-you state, making it unable to make correctly-informed choices.)
↑ comment by Viliam · 2024-12-27T17:40:09.612Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
After reading your and FlorianH [LW(p) · GW(p)]'s comments, it seems to me that Econ 101 leaves it underspecified what it means to be an economical agent, and that those parts missing from the specification are the ones that matter here.
Naively, an economical agent is someone who accepts deals that increase the value they get. There seems to be nothing wrong with that; if we all become economical agents, our values will increase, which is a good thing.
But this is not the entire story. No agent accepts all hypothetical deals that would increase their value. Our attention and time are limited. We pick the seemingly best deals we are aware of. And there are probably other heuristics that successful agents follow, such as increasing their power, even if it does not increase the value in short term, because it will allow them to take more value in future.
People who insist on taking the Econ 101 perspective of "if the deal is not good for you, then simply don't take it, duh" seem willfully blind to how the power is strategically gained and used.
This reminds me of Ayn Rand's novels. Both the heroes and the villains could be called "economical agents" from certain perspective, but clearly they used different strategies. There is a difference between someone trying to get good deals without simultaneously crippling their trade partners, and someone for whom crippling their trade partners is an important component of how they get the good deals. Both of them are agents participating in the economy.
comment by ChristianKl · 2024-12-27T13:01:26.018Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Exploitation is using a superior negotiating position to inflict great costs on someone else, at small cost to yourself.
I think the word exploitation as it's generally used, is about one party getting a benefit at the expense of another party. It's not about one party getting nothing/pays a small cost while the other party suffers a lot.
Promoting an alternative definition of what it means to exploit is likely going to make reasoning harder. Google suggests as definition for exploit "make use of (a situation) in a way considered unfair or underhand".
Wage theft is a clear example of exploitation. For many jobs, there's information asymmetry where the person seeking the job does not get informed fully about how his job will be before they accept the job, that's also clearly exploitation. Multiple-level marketing companies like Amway are exploitative because they mislead people about the likely results of working for them.
In general, there's value created through trade. If one party captures nearly all of the surplus value of the trade, many people consider that unfair and thus exploitative.
A key aspect of your examples is further that total utility might not be maximized and because one party has little power, utility maximizing trades don't happen. That's a different issue from how the trade surplus is distributed.
If people complain about Amazon, to my knowledge most of the people complain that while Amazon runs very efficient and is run to maximize total utility, they capture most of the generated value and don´t pay their employees very much.
Maybe, economists do have a term for the case where one party being powerless leads to utility not being maximized?
comment by cousin_it · 2024-12-27T12:18:46.966Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
It seems to me that by Econ 101 standards the problem still remains. Let's say a company demands that a worker buy a suit worth $10, and gains $1 from it. Then the worker could offer to work for $1.05 less, but without the suit, and that would be more profitable for both the company and the worker. Same for your other example with the sweatshop refusing to install the safety equipment: if workers' loss is truly greater than the company's gain, then the sweatshop could "split the difference" by offering lower wages and installing the safety equipment, making everyone better off. (Or another sweatshop down the road could do it and the workers would flock to it.) So it seems like negative-sum demands are only possible if bargaining isn't free (e.g. there's a minimum wage) or entry and exit aren't free (e.g. the child can't leave the parents).
Replies from: Viliam, Darmani↑ comment by Viliam · 2024-12-27T17:10:33.301Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Let's say a company demands that a worker buy a suit worth $10, and gains $1 from it. Then the worker could offer to work for $1.05 less, but without the suit, and that would be more profitable for both the company and the worker.
And the company could simply say no, knowing that the worker has more to lose, relatively, and therefore will be likely to give up and accept the original deal.
Seems to me that at least a part of the intuition behind "exploitation" is that the person with greater negotiation power can precommit to reject even the win/win deals if they are not unbalanced enough in their favor.
To use the metaphor of a growing pie, imagine that there is a button that will magically summon a pie for both of us to share, but only if we both press the button simultaneously. Problem is, you are starving but I am not. So I say that unless you give me 90% of the pie, I refuse to press the button. I will lose some good pie, but I can live with that, and you can't.
Furthermore, this is an iterated game. If you accept to take 10% of the pie and let me take 90%, what happens when we find a similar button tomorrow? Yeah, you will be starving again, and I will be not.
(And this can get even more unfair, when the stronger party can use their advantage to lobby for making the environment even worse for the weaker party. Not sure what would be the proper metaphor here. Making it illegal to eat things other than pies? Making it illegal for two people to press the magical button unless one of them is me?)
Replies from: D0TheMath, cousin_it↑ comment by Garrett Baker (D0TheMath) · 2024-12-27T20:00:49.555Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Then the company is just being stupid, and the previous definition of exploitation doesn't apply. The company is imposing large costs for a large cost to itself. If the company does refuse the deal, its likely because it doesn't have the right kinds of internal communication channels to do negotiations like this, and so this is indeed a kind of stupidity.
Why the distinction between exploitation and stupidity? Well they require different solutions. Maybe we solve exploitation (if indeed it is a problem) via collective action outside of the company. But we would have to solve stupidity via better information channels & flexibility inside the company. There is also a competitive pressure to solve such stupidity problems where there may not be in an exploitation problem. Eg if a different company or a different department allowed that sort of deal, then the problem would be solved.
Replies from: AnthonyC, Viliam↑ comment by AnthonyC · 2024-12-28T13:19:31.227Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Then the company is just being stupid
Maybe they are, but I think the word "just" assumes that not being stupid is much easier than it actually is. Often the company is stupid without any individual employees/managers/executives being stupid or being empowered to fix the stupidity, in a context where no one has the convening power to bring together a sufficient set of stakeholders in some larger system to fix the problem without that costing much more than it is worth.
Some company stupidity comes from individual executives and managers not being capable (because they're human) of absorbing all information about what's going on in different branches of the company and finding ways to make positive-sum trades that seem obvious to outsiders (this is especially common in large conglomerates). I encounter this all the time as a consultant, and the amount of inertia that needs to be overcome to improve it can be huge.
Some comes from having to comply with all kinds of stupid and outdated and confusing laws (e.g. "The meeting is required because this is how the tax code is written because that's how they did it before email and before we moved the factory away from the head offices, and good luck getting the government to change that), sometimes while also trying to be even-handed to employees living in different jurisdictions with different laws (e.g. "Oh, well, the meeting is mandatory in city A and we like to have a unified policy about meetings across the company, but we're not allowed to provide or reimburse for the tuxedos in country B, and state C has a law that if we raised country B's wages to pay for the tuxedo we'd have to do it for everyone, and we can't afford that").
Replies from: Jiro↑ comment by Viliam · 2024-12-27T21:11:35.865Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Sometimes what seems like stupidity locally, can be a part of a greater strategy. Other examples: Newcomb's paradox, strategic ignorance.
In the example of a magical pie, if we agree to share the pie fairly, I can get 0.5 pie. But if I insist on getting 90% of the pie, and based on my previous experience with exploiting starving people I can predict that there is let's say a 70% chance of you accepting the unfair deal, then I can get 0.63 pie on average. Getting 0.63 pie instead of 0.5 pie seems like a smart thing to do for an economical agent.
It is not a problem to lose some value, if more value is gained in turn. This is true even if things work probabilistically. Let's say that today was one of those 30% unlucky days when a starving stranger refused my offer to split the pie 90:10. From the short-term perspective, I have gambled and lost a half of the pie; stupid me! From the long-term perspective, I am still getting more pies than if I kept offering 50:50 deals instead.
In companies, it is not unusual that some kind of internal inflexibility imposes "stupid" losses in short term, but generates profits in long term as everyone accepts the fact that the company is "stupid" and inflexible, and gives up trying to negotiate a better deal. (It is truly stupid only if it also generates losses in long term. Which is difficult to estimate, and I have seen many companies doing seemingly stupid things and staying profitable in long term, so I became skeptical of my feelings when they tell me that something is obviously stupid.)
Replies from: D0TheMath, dylan-xu↑ comment by Garrett Baker (D0TheMath) · 2024-12-27T21:46:36.262Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Can you show how a repeated version of this game results in overall better deals for the company? I agree this can happen, but I disagree for this particular circumstance.
Replies from: Darmani, Viliam↑ comment by dx26 (dylan-xu) · 2024-12-28T08:51:29.120Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
In this case, the starving person presumably has to press the button or else starve to death, and thus has no bargaining power. The other person only has to offer the bare minimum beyond what the starving person needs to survive, and the starving person must take the deal. In Econ 101 (assuming away monopolies, information asymmetry, etc.), exploited workers do have bargaining power by being able to work for other companies, hence why companies can’t just do stupid, spiteful actions in the long term.
Replies from: Viliam↑ comment by Viliam · 2025-01-07T09:11:14.185Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
In Econ 101 (assuming away monopolies, information asymmetry, etc.), exploited workers do have bargaining power by being able to work for other companies
I guess this is the part where the real life often differs from the simplified model. Information asymmetry seems to be the norm. In small cities, big companies can become local monopolies on providing job opportunities of a certain kind (yes, you could choose to work for a different company, but that could be 3 extra hours of commute). Companies providing rare kinds of job opportunities love to have NDAs, non-poaching agreements, etc.
↑ comment by cousin_it · 2024-12-27T20:32:35.157Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Agree with Garrett Baker's reply - if the company prefers the original deal to a better deal, it's being stupid and giving an opening to competitors.
Maybe another reason why people talk about exploitation a lot is because they expect markets to reward the deserving, but markets don't do that. Like, the boyfriend in the dating example from the post isn't getting much out of the relationship, but that's just due to the market - there isn't enough demand for what he's offering. Even if he's spending a lot of effort, but the demand isn't there, his effort is irrelevant. And that feels bad, and makes him want to talk about exploitation.
comment by Karl Krueger (karl-krueger) · 2024-12-29T06:33:36.627Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Capitalism is a force that has lifted billions out of poverty, where even poor remote villagers enjoy luxuries that would have been unimaginable to medieval kings. When someone takes a job, even the worst job, it’s because both parties expect mutual gain.
We often treat capitalism, freedom of labor, and free trade as inevitably going along with one another, but I'm not sure that's correct. In this post you're mostly talking about labor, not capital or trade. It may be worth looking into ways that these don't always go together.
(By "capitalism" I mean the allocation of capital to firms through markets. By "freedom of labor" I mean the allocation of jobs through voluntary arrangements; as opposed to jobs being assigned through slavery, government command, family trades, caste, etc.)
For example: Some of the historically earliest firms to be traded in capital markets — colonial ventures like the East India Companies, Hudson's Bay Company, etc. — employed slave labor and enjoyed legal monopolies on trade. So in those cases there was capitalism without either freedom of labor (for some, anyway) or freedom of trade.
Another example: Free-trade agreements such as NAFTA enable the free movement of goods and capital across borders, but not the free movement of labor. In contrast, political unions such as the European Union (or the US itself) enable the movement of labor as well as goods and capital among member states. So, similar policies on goods and capital can coexist with dissimilar policies on labor.
On our planet, free trade is only really possible with some military might defending it, because otherwise we get pirates or bandits taxing our trade and then it's not free anymore. Similarly, we can only ensure freedom of labor by actually enforcing rules against employers who might otherwise use unfree labor.
There are gradations of unfreedom of labor, too. If you can't leave a bad job because you don't have savings or credit to tide you over till you find a new job, that's a little bit of labor unfreedom. It makes the job market less efficient, because you can't switch jobs to one that's a better fit due to not being able to pay the search cost. If you can't take a day off from your current job to interview for a new job, that's a little bit of labor unfreedom. If the jobs available to you are strictly limited by your race, caste, or nationality, that's quite a bit of labor unfreedom. If the only way to get a job that you otherwise fit, is to tolerate violations of your human rights by your employer (like sexual assault), that's pretty significant labor unfreedom. If you are shackled in a basement and beaten for not peeling potatoes fast enough, that's a lot of labor unfreedom.
One kind of thing we might want to describe as "exploitation" is using someone's current form and degree of unfreedom to reduce their freedom even further; to deepen and maintain an asymmetry where you get more power and they get less and less. Making it hard for someone to seek a new job, in order to keep them in a job as it gets worse. Punishing workers for "disloyalty" if they try to negotiate for a raise or organize for collective bargaining. Blackballing through employer collusion ("you'll never work in this town again!"). Debt-slavery.
Replies from: Darmani↑ comment by Darmani · 2024-12-29T07:57:30.780Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I really like this thinking. I don't necessarily like the assignment of labels to concepts in this post. E.g.: I use capitalism in a manner mutually exclusive with slave labor because it requires self-ownership. And I don't think a definition of "exploitation" should require a strategic element; I would say that not allowing an employee to read mystery novels when customers aren't around is exploitative. But this idea of using an asymmetry of power to deepen the asymmetry is a clearly useful concept.
Replies from: karl-krueger↑ comment by Karl Krueger (karl-krueger) · 2024-12-30T21:27:53.234Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I use capitalism in a manner mutually exclusive with slave labor because it requires self-ownership.
This seems like a sort of definitional gimbal lock; it makes it harder to describe the world because two potentially-separate degrees of freedom are collapsed into one. While I'm reluctant to argue definitions [LW · GW], I think it's worth using terms in ways that allow us to describe the world in more detail rather than ones that collapse distinctions.
I expect to see this usage of "capitalism" not in history or economics, but in the sort of political doctrine where it's intended to lock those concepts together; to imply that capital markets and individual freedom are either the same thing, or closely related — more closely, I think, than history and contemporary events really support.
It would seem weird to me, for instance, to claim that a publicly-traded company that is discovered to have done something to violate individual freedom is thereby no longer a participant in a capitalist economy. The New York Stock Exchange doesn't ask "does this company infringe individual freedoms anywhere in the world?" before letting a company be listed. (To be clear, I'm not proposing that it should; I'm saying that it's useful to talk about "participation in a capital market economy" and "fully respecting some set of individual freedoms" as distinct axes.)
(For what it's worth, I think "self-ownership" is a pretty odd expression, because one of the central traits of ownership is that it can be transferred, and one of the central traits of selfhood is that it cannot. Your relation to yourself is distinct from property ownership in that you can sell any piece of your property, but you cannot sell your self; no matter what obligations you may have signed up for, you always retain possession of your self.)
↑ comment by Darmani · 2024-12-31T02:38:32.836Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
definitional gimbal lock
I really like this phrase. :)
Mostly agreed with what you say about the word "capitalism." But with the NYSE example, I think it would be natural to say that the company did something not particularly capitalist. Is the CCP-owned Air China a capitalist entity? It's certainly less capitalist than Southwest.
I think there's at least two ways meanings can be combined. The easy one is words with multiple meanings. For example, "capitalist" has two meanings: someone who believes in free markets, and someone who owns a lot of capital. Some rhetorical tricks are played by trying to dance from one to the other, usually by denouncing libertarians as greedy corporates who benefit from the system. The second is concepts that include multiple constituents. For example, "capitalism" is a major concept that includes the things you brought up.
Inasmuch that capitalism is a centuries-old concept with a lot of philosophy behind it, I think it's worth keeping "capitalism," in its sense as an organization of political economy, to its broader meaning which contains both freedom of labor and market-based allocation. They are correlated enough to be a sensible cluster. We can use other terms for the constituents.
For comparison, "security" contains many concepts, such as integrity (untruster party can't influence trusted output) and confidentiality (untrusted party can't read input from trusted party). But we can talk about security as a whole, with other terms for its individual dimensions.
Replies from: Viliam↑ comment by Viliam · 2025-01-07T09:18:44.560Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
For example, "capitalist" has two meanings: someone who believes in free markets, and someone who owns a lot of capital.
Examples:
- capitalist pro-capitalist: Ayn Rand
- capitalist anti-capitalist: Friedrich Engels
- non-capitalist pro-capitalist: Adam Smith
- non-capitalist anti-capitalist: Karl Marx
↑ comment by quetzal_rainbow · 2025-01-07T09:23:59.779Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
You mixed pro-capitalists: Adam Smith actually made a lot of capital from investment, while Ayn Rand never had much money.
Replies from: Viliam↑ comment by Viliam · 2025-01-07T09:35:34.652Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Perhaps it was a mistake to trust ChatGPT, but (my short summary of) its opinion is that Ayn Rand always gained her money by writing, i.e. selling her products directly to the market, while Adam Smith was employed at a university, in addition to gaining money from his books (especially the Wealth of Nations), and only gained a passive income from investing later in life.
(It's not important; I am just sharing my data.)
EDIT:
I guess we need to distinguish between even more meanings of "capitalist". Consider the following examples:
Person X buys a lottery ticket on their 18th birthday, wins a few millions, puts all the money in passively managed index funds, and spends the rest of life collecting generous passive income, watching anime, and debating online.
Person Y builds a small company and hires a few employees... the business is so-so, it pays the bills but is often at the verge of bankruptcy, fifty years later it finally goes bankrupt.
Which one of these is more of a "capitalist"? The latter spent more effort capitalisting, but the former had more capital and more profit.
Replies from: karl-krueger↑ comment by Karl Krueger (karl-krueger) · 2025-01-07T20:39:13.543Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
A major sense of "capitalism" is the historical economic sense; the sense in which we can say that there was a pre-capitalist period of human history; that most agree that we now live in a capitalist period; and we can speculate about a possible future post-capitalist period. The characteristic of capitalism in this sense is that capital is allocated to ventures via capital markets, rather than (for instance) by the decision of a monarch, workers' council, or AI singleton.
Selling products in markets is much older than capitalism in this sense. The butcher and baker and candlestick-maker did that in the pre-capitalist period. Eā-naṡir was selling dubious copper a long time before capitalism; he just wasn't doing it to please the shareholders with a pepped-up quarterly earnings report.
Replies from: Viliam↑ comment by Viliam · 2025-01-07T21:12:18.352Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Great point!
I wondered, what if you don't use other people's money. Are you not a capitalist then? Even if you build dozens of factories and employ thousands of people, as long as you started with your personal savings, and then grew without ever taking a loan.
But I guess the answer is that in such case, you are still using your own capital. Capital doesn't necessarily mean other people's money -- that's just the popular way to get started.
The fundamental difference compared to a successful pre-capitalist baker is that... he couldn't expand his business? Like, he probably could build a bigger bakery, hire more people, bake more bread, but he couldn't... what exactly? Separate ownership from management? Like, he couldn't retire and hire someone else to manage the bakery, paying them a salary but keeping the rest. Or start a second bakery in another city, without personally overseeing it.
(I suspect, more realistically, if the bakery got too big, the local feudal simply found a way to take his money, so that was the practical limit: don't stick out. Or maybe I'm too pessimistic about the property rights in the past.)
Replies from: karl-krueger↑ comment by Karl Krueger (karl-krueger) · 2025-01-08T17:06:47.584Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Well, the pre-capitalist baker can't go IPO, that's for sure. They can take out a loan from a local moneylender if they want to put in a bigger oven and don't have savings to do it. How well the terms of that loan will be enforced might depend on how the local duke is feeling about moneylenders lately; q.v. The Merchant of Venice.
In our time, the makers of Twinkies and Wonder Bread are traded on the NYSE; while smaller local bakers are still typically privately held. But I bet that the local bakers' retirement savings are invested in mutual funds.
comment by Yair Halberstadt (yair-halberstadt) · 2024-12-27T14:03:00.044Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Note this requires market failure by definition - otherwise if an action provides me a a small gain for a huge loss to you, you would be willing to pay me some amount of money not to take that action, benefiting us both.
As a concrete example of how this plays out in practice. If you require Bob to wear a tuxedo costing 5000 dollars, and other similar companies don't, in a perfect market for labour you would need to pay Bob 5000 dollars more than other companies to cover the tuxedo or he'd just work for them himself.
The fact that he doesn't suggests that other things are going on - for example finding an alternative job might haven take more than the amount of time it takes to earn 5000 dollars, or he didn't know when he signed the contract that a tuxedo was required, and the contract makes it difficult for him to switch.
Replies from: Viliam↑ comment by Viliam · 2024-12-27T17:19:22.870Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Seems to me that there is always some friction, some lack of information, etc., so "this requires market failure by definition" basically means "this happens in the real world".
Replies from: localdeity↑ comment by localdeity · 2024-12-27T19:41:55.406Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I'd point out that the magnitude of the "exploitation" is the magnitude of the incentive for market players to find the better solution. If Bob is the one guy for whom making him wear a tuxedo isn't worthwhile, and if it's close to worthwhile—e.g. him wearing it produces $4000 of value to the company over the time he wears it—then that's $1000 being left on the table. If there are 100 employees being "exploited" like Bob, for whom making them wear tuxedos is extremely wasteful—say it produces only $100 of value for them to wear tuxedos—then there is $490,000 being left on the table, which may be enough to justify making a new company if the existing one is for some reason stubborn about the issue. (Also, the more employees there are in that situation, the more likely it is that someone will complain and someone else will notice the opportunity.)
Replies from: Viliam↑ comment by Viliam · 2024-12-27T21:26:39.047Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The problem with words like "better" and "left on the table" is that better globally is not necessarily better for me, and leaving value on the table is not a problem for me if it all comes from your part.
Option A: I get 5 units of utility, you get 5 units of utility.
Option B: I get 6 units of utility, you get 3 units of utility, 1 unit of utility gets burned.
Option A is clearly better for me out of these two.
It seems like there should be an option C: 6.5 units of utility for me, 3.5 units of utility for you. But maybe there isn't . Maybe it actually costs me 1 unit of utility to keep a gun pointing at your head. And without the gun, you might turn the table and demand 5 units of utility or bust.
In theory, if you were a robot, you could commit to act as if the gun is pointed at your head, even if there is none, and then we could split the money I saved by not having to buy the gun. In practice, humans don't seem to work that way sufficiently reliably.
comment by Ben (ben-lang) · 2025-01-03T11:25:00.272Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I don't think the framing "Is behaviour X exploitation?" is the right framing. It takes what (should be) an argument about morality and instead turns it into an argument about the definition of the word "exploitation" (where we take it as given that, whatever the hell we decide exploitation "actually means" it is a bad thing). For example see this post: https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/yCWPkLi8wJvewPbEp/the-noncentral-fallacy-the-worst-argument-in-the-world [LW · GW]. Once we have a definition of "exploitation" their might be some weird edge cases that are technically exploitation but are obviously fine.
The substantial argument (I think) is that when two parties have unequal bargaining positions, is it OK for the stronger party to get the best deal it can? A full-widget is worth a million dollars. I possess the only left half of a widget in the world. Ten million people each possess a right half that could doc with my left half. Those not used to make widgets are worthless. What is the ethical split for me to offer for a right half in this case?
[This is maybe kind of equivalent to the dating example you give. At least in my view the "bad thing" in the dating example is the phrase "She begins using this position to change the relationship". The word "change" is the one that sets the alarms for me. If they both went in knowing what was going on then, to me, that's Ok. Its the "trap" that is not. I think most of the things we would object to are like this, those Monday meetings and that expensive suit are implied to be surprises jumped onto poor Bob.]
Replies from: Darmani↑ comment by Darmani · 2025-01-03T15:50:55.891Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I made the grave error of framing this post in a way that invites a definition debate. While we are well familiar that a definition debate is similar to a debate over natural categories, which is a perfectly fine discussion to have, the discussion here has suffered because several people came in with competing categories.
I strongly endorse Ben's post, and will edit the top post to incorporate it.
comment by FlorianH (florian-habermacher) · 2024-12-27T14:45:50.177Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Your post introduces a thoughtful definition of exploitation, but I don’t think narrowing the definition is necessary. The common understanding — say "gaining disproportionate benefit from someone’s work because their alternatives are poor" or so — is already clear and widely accepted. The real confusion lies in how exploitation can coexist with voluntary, mutually beneficial trade. This coexistence is entirely natural and doesn’t require resolution — they are simply two different questions. Yet neither Econ 101 nor its critics seem to recognize this.
Econ 101 focuses entirely on the mutual benefit of trade, treating it as a clear win-win, and dismisses concerns about exploitation as irrelevant. Critics, by contrast, are so appalled by the exploitative aspect of such relationships that they often deny the mutual benefit altogether. Both sides fail to see that trade can improve lives while still being exploitative. These are not contradictions; they are two truths operating simultaneously.
For (stylized) example, when rich countries (or thus their companies) offshore to places like Bangladesh or earlier South Korea, they often offer wages that are slightly better than local alternatives — a clear improvement for workers. However, those same companies leverage their stronger bargaining position to offer the bare minimum necessary to secure labor, stopping far short of providing what might be considered fair compensation. This is both a win-win in economic terms and exploitative in a moral sense. Recognizing this duality doesn’t require redefining exploitation — it simply requires acknowledging it.
This misunderstanding leads to counterproductive responses. Economists too quickly dismiss concerns about exploitation, while critics focus on measures like boycotts or buying expensive domestic products, which may (net) harm poor offshore workers. I think also Will MacAskill noted in Doing Good Better this issue, and that the elephant in the room is that the rich should help the poor independently of the question of the labor exchange itself, i.e. that the overwhelming moral point is that, if we care, we should simply donate some of our resources.
Exploitation isn’t about minor adjustments to working conditions or wages. It’s about recognizing how voluntary trade, while beneficial, can still be exploitative if the party with the excessively limited outside options has to put in unjustifiably much while gaining unjustifiably little. This applies to sweatshop factories just as much as to surrogate mother-ship or mineral resource mining - and maybe to Bob in your example, independently of they phone call details.
Replies from: jimmy↑ comment by jimmy · 2024-12-27T19:31:26.441Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
that the elephant in the room is that the rich should help the poor independently of the question of the labor exchange itself, i.e. that the overwhelming moral point is that, if we care, we should simply donate some of our resources.
"Should" is a red flag word, which serves to hide the facets of reality that generate sense of obligation. It helps to taboo it, and find out what's left.
If a rich person wants to help the poor, it will be more effective so simply help the poor -- i.e. with some of their own resources. Trying to distort the market leads to smaller gains from trade which could be used to help the poor. So far so good.
If someone else want's the rich person to help the poor with the rich person's resources, then with what will this rich person be motivated? If the goodness of their own hearts is enough, then this "someone else" is irrelevant, and not in the picture. If the rich person is to be motivated by gains from trade with someone else, then great. However, this is equivalent to the trade partners demanding more of the surplus and then donating it themselves, so again we're out of luck.
If we're talking about obligating the rich person to spend their resources on poor people, then they're de facto not the rich person's resources anymore, and we're distorting the market by force in order to get there. Now we have to deal with unfree trade and the lack of gains from trade that we could have had.
We can't just say "they coexist, no problem!", because to the extent that they're different frameworks we can't have both. You can have free trade and acknowledge exploitation only if you accept that exploitation is totally fine and fair -- at which point you're redefining the word "exploitation". The moment you try to stop someone from a kind of exploitation that can coexist with free trade, you're trying to stop free trade, with all the consequences of that.
That's not to say we have to give up on caring about all exploitation and just do free trade, but it does mean that if we want to have both we have to figure out how to update our understanding of exploitation/economics until the two fit.
↑ comment by FlorianH (florian-habermacher) · 2024-12-29T14:54:12.257Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
If a rich person wants to help the poor, it will be more effective so simply help the poor -- i.e. with some of their own resources. Trying to distort the market leads to smaller gains from trade which could be used to help the poor. So far so good.
I think we agree on at least one of the main points thus.
Regarding
"Should" is a red flag word
I did not mean to invoke a particularly heavy philosophical absolutist 'ought' or anything like that, with my "should". It was instead simply a sloppy shortcut - and you're right to call that out - to say the banal: the rich considering whether she's exploiting the poor and/or whether it's a win win, might want to consider - what tends to be surprisingly often overseen - that the exploitation vs. beneficial trade may have no easily satisfying solution as long as she keeps the bulk of her riches to herself vis a vis the sheer poverty of her potential poor interlocutant.
But with regards to having to (I add the emphasis):
That's not to say we have to give up on caring about all exploitation and just do free trade, but it does mean that if we want to have both we have to figure out how to update our understanding of exploitation/economics until the two fit.
I think there's not much to update. "Exploitation" is a shortcut for a particular, negative feeling we humans tend to naturally get from certain type of situation, and as I tried to explain, it is a rather simple thing. We cannot just define that general aversion away just to square everything we like in a simple way. 'Exploitation' simply is exploitation even if it is (e.g. slightly) better for the poor than one other unfair counterfactual (non-exploitation without sharing the unfairly* distributed riches), nothing can change that. Only bulk sharing of our resources may lead to a situation we may wholeheartedly embrace with regards to (i) exploitation and (ii) economics. So if we're not willing to bite the bullet of bulk-sharing of resources, we're stuck with either being unhappy about exploitation or about foregoing gains of trade (unless we've imbibed econ 101 so strongly that we've grown insensitive to 'exploitation' at least as long as we don't use simple thought experiments to remind ourselves how exploitative even some win-win trades can be).
*Before you red-flag 'unfair' as well: Again, I'm simply referring to the way people tend to perceive things, on average or so.
Replies from: jimmy↑ comment by jimmy · 2024-12-30T01:27:46.428Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I think there's not much to update. "Exploitation" is a shortcut for a particular, negative feeling we humans tend to naturally get from certain type of situation, and as I tried to explain, it is a rather simple thing. [...] *Before you red-flag 'unfair' as well: Again, I'm simply referring to the way people tend to perceive things, on average or so.
This is where I disagree. I don't think it is simple, partly because I don't think "unfair" is simple. People's perceptions of what is "unfair", like people's perceptions of anything else that means anything at all, can be wrong. If you better inform people and notice that their perceptions of what is "fair" changes, then you have to start keeping track of the distinction between "people's econ101 illiterate conceptions of fairness" and "the actual underlying thing that doesn't dissolve upon clear seeing".
For example, if we have a pie and we ask someone to judge if it's fair to split it two ways and give the third person no pie, then that person might say it's an unfair distribution because the fair distribution is 1/3,1/3,1/3. But then if we inform the judge that the third person was invited to help make the pie and declined to do so while the other people did all the work, then all of a sudden that 1/3,1/3,1/3 distribution starts to look less fair and more like a naïve person's view of what fairness is. The aversion isn't defined away, it dissolves once you realize that it was predicated on nonsense.
Another reason I don't think it's simple is because I don't think "exploitation" is just something people are just "unhappy about". It's a blaming thing. If I say you're exploiting me, that's an accusation of wrongdoing, and a threat of getting you lynched if people side with me strongly enough and you don't cave to the threats. I claim that if you say "exploitation is happening, but it's no one's fault and the employers aren't doing anything morally wrong" then you're doing something very different than what other people are doing when they talk about exploitation.
If there's a situation where a bunch of poor orphans are employed for 50c per grueling 16 hour work day plus room and board, then the fact that it might be better than starving to death on the street doesn't mean it's as great as we might wish for them. We might be sad about that, and wish they weren't forced to take such a deal. Does that make it "exploitation?" in the mind of a lot of people, yeah. Because a lot of people never make it further than "I want them to have a better deal, so you have to give it to them" -- even if it turns out they're only creating 50.01c/day worth of value, the employer got into the business out of the goodness of his heart, and not one of the people crying "exploitation!" cares enough about the orphans to give them a better deal or even make they're not voting them out of a living. I'd argue that this just isn't exploitation, and anyone thinking it is just hasn't thought things through.
On the other hand, if an employer demands sexual favors from his poor young woman employees, that rubs us the wrong way morally in a way that is easier to square with Econ 101. For one, if he's not demanding sexual favors from his male or ugly female employees, it suggests that maybe the work they do is enough to pay them for, and if we collectively say "Hey knock it off. You can't demand sexual favors from your employees" he might keep employing them and giving them a better deal. Maybe "this guy is doing something wrong by demanding sexual favors" actually holds up in a way that "this guy is doing something morally wrong by paying market wages" does not.
I think "what validity is left in our concept of 'exploitation' once we realize that people can't be obligated to pay whatever wage we'd like to close our eyes and believe is fair?" is a nontrivial question.
Replies from: Viliam, florian-habermacher↑ comment by Viliam · 2025-01-07T09:26:55.942Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Interestingly, armchair Econ-101 reasoning could easily lead us to conclusion that the situation with demanding sexual favors could never possibly happen in real life, because if the employees do not wish to provide sexual favors, and they are productive enough to deserve their wage, they can... simply go work somewhere else, right?
(But I guess we have some evidence that such things sometimes happen in real life, especially when they are not illegal, which means that we should be suspicious about the armchair reasoning.)
Replies from: jimmy↑ comment by jimmy · 2025-01-08T18:17:20.404Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The problem there isn't the Econ-101, it's the fool in the arm chair.
You can't just say "I have a simple armchair argument that no one could ever demand sexual favors", because that's not even a valid prediction of Econ-101. Maybe the person does want to provide sexual favors. Maybe they even want to provide sexual favors and then also claim purity and victimhood status to gullible people. That's entirely consistent with Econ-101.
Or maybe they aren't productive enough to earn their wage otherwise, and their job is better conceptualized as half prostitute. That's also entirely consistent with Econ-101.
If we have situations that look like "This person didn't want it"+"this person is productive enough to earn their wage", then if we also have Econ-101 we notice a contradiction. We can't just assume the bottom line that Econ-101 is somehow wrong without finding an identifiable error and be justified in our assumptions. Neither can we assume people will necessarily do what's in their best interest and assume "This person wanted it, actually", without finding an identifiable error in the perception that they didn't.
There's an actual puzzle to be solved here, and we can't write the bottom line first and also get to the right answer on anything but chance.
↑ comment by FlorianH (florian-habermacher) · 2025-01-01T06:38:55.236Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
If there's a situation where a bunch of poor orphans are employed for 50c per grueling 16 hour work day plus room and board, then the fact that it might be better than starving to death on the street doesn't mean it's as great as we might wish for them. We might be sad about that, and wish they weren't forced to take such a deal. Does that make it "exploitation?" in the mind of a lot of people, yeah. Because a lot of people never make it further than "I want them to have a better deal, so you have to give it to them" -- even if it turns out they're only creating 50.01c/day worth of value, the employer got into the business out of the goodness of his heart, and not one of the people crying "exploitation!" cares enough about the orphans to give them a better deal or even make they're not voting them out of a living. I'd argue that this just isn't exploitation, and anyone thinking it is just hasn't thought things through.
Notice how you had to create a strawman of what people commonsensically call exploitation. The person you describe does exactly NOT seem to be employing the workers merely to "gaining disproportionate benefit from someone’s work because their alternatives are poor". In your example, informed about the situation, with about 0 sec of reflection, people would understand him to NOT be exploitative. Of course, people usually would NOT blame Mother Theresa for having poor people work in her facilities and earning little, IF Mother Theresa did so just out of good heart, without ulterior motives, without deriving disproportionate benefit, and while paying 99.98% of receipts to staff, even if that was little.
Note, me saying exploitation is 'simple' and is just what it is even if there is a sort of tension with econ 101, doesn't mean every report about supposed exploitation would be correct, and I never maintained it wouldn't be easy - with usual one paragraph newspaper reports - to mislead the superficial mob into seeing something as exploitation even when it isn't.
It remains really easy to make sense of usual usage of 'exploitation' vis a vis econ 101 also in your example:
- The guy is how you describe? No hint of exploitation, and indeed a good deal for the poor.
- The situation is slightly different, the guy would earn more and does it such as to merely to get as rich as possible? He's an exploitative business man. Yes, the world is better off with him doing his thing, but of course he's not a good* man. He'd have to e.g. share his wealth one way or another in a useful way if he really wanted to be. Basta. (*usual disclaimer about the term..)
↑ comment by FlorianH (florian-habermacher) · 2025-01-01T06:52:07.446Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Btw, imho a more interesting, but not really much more challenging, extension of your case is, if overall what the orphans produce is actually very valuable, say creating utility of 500 $/day for ultimate consumers, but mere market forces, competition between the firms or businessmen, means market prices for the goods produced become still only 50.01c/day, while the labor market clearing wage for the destitute orphans is 50c/day.
Even in this situation, commonsense 'exploitation' is straightforward applicable and +- intelligible a concept:
- To a degree, the firms or businessmen become a bit irrelevant intermediaries. One refuses to do the trade? Another one will jump in anyway... Are they exploitative or not? Depends a bit on subtle details, but individually they have little leeway to change anything in the system.
- The rich society as an aggregate who enjoys the 500 $/day worth items as consumers, while having, via their firms, had them produced for 50.01c/day by the poor orphans with no outside options, is of course an exploitative society in common usage of the term. Yes, the orphans may be better off than without it, but commoners do have an uneasy feeling if they see our society doing that, and I don't see any surprise in it; indeed, we're a 'bad' society if we just leave it like that and don't think about doing something more to improve the situation.
- The fact that some in society take the wrong conclusion from the feeling of unease about exploitation, and think we ought to stop buying the stuff from the orphans, is really not the 'fault' of the exploitation concept, it is the failure of us to imagine (or be willing to bite the bullet of) a beyond-the-market solution, namely the bulk sharing of riches with those destitute orphan workers or what have you. (I actually now wonder whether that may be where the confusion that imho underlies the OP's article is coming from: Yes, people do take weird econ-101-igoring conclusions when they detect exploitation, but this doesn't mean they interpret the wrong things as exploitation. It means their feel-good 'solution' might backfire; instead they should track consequences of alternatives and see that the real solution to the indeed existing exploitation problem isn't as simple as to go to the next, overpriced pseudo-local pseudo-sustainable hipster shop, but is to start doing something more directly about the sheer poverty of their fellow beings far or near).
comment by mako yass (MakoYass) · 2024-12-27T22:38:17.118Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I'd just define exploitation to be precisely the opposite of shapley bargaining [LW · GW], situations where a person is not being compensated in proportion to their bargaining power.
This definition encompasses any situation where a person has grievances and it makes sense for them to complain about them and take a stand, or, where striking could reasonably be expected to lead to a stable bargaining equilibrium with higher net utility (not all strikes fall into this category).
This definition also doesn't fully capture the common sense meaning of exploitation, but I don't think a useful concept can.
Replies from: MakoYass↑ comment by mako yass (MakoYass) · 2024-12-28T04:09:19.662Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
We could back-define "ploitation" as "getting shapley-paid".
comment by TsviBT · 2024-12-27T12:29:26.790Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I think exploitation is an important thing and should be understood better. (At least by us; maybe it's well understood academically.)
Exploitation is using a superior negotiating position to inflict great costs on someone else, at small cost to yourself.
I think this is way too broad. Elements of a more narrow definition:
- The exploited is in a satisficing-hole; they'd need more slack to get out (e.g. to find / train for another job).
- The exploited is in a reference class that can't easily cohere for negotiation purposes, the exploiter isn't. (E.g. workers vs. large corporations; workers unions are supposed to address this.)
- The exploiter might specifically harm the exploited, in order to keep zer in the satisficing-hole. (E.g. abusive partner insults the abused to keep zer pessimistic about prospects outside the relationship. E.g. union busting.)
- The exploiter sets trade conditions to be near the minimum satisficing amount for the exploited.
- The exploiter is much further from zer minimum satisficing amount, compared to the exploited, in absolute terms. (E.g. an employer can eat deficit long enough to train a new worker; the worker can't eat deficit long enough to find a new job.)
↑ comment by Darmani · 2024-12-28T01:44:27.418Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Can you give some examplse of something contained by my definition which you think shouldn't be considered exploitation?
Replies from: TsviBT↑ comment by TsviBT · 2024-12-28T01:56:39.455Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Exploitation is using a superior negotiating position to inflict great costs on someone else, at small cost to yourself.
Actually, it isn't strictly too broad; it also excludes things that should be included. E.g. it doesn't have to be a negotiation. I would say that something that tries to trap your attention in short, high-intensity, unfulfilling activity is exploitative. E.g. casinos, social media. Or, simple fraud would be exploitative.
A way it's too broad is that it doesn't mention the motive, or the benefit to the exploiter. (Well actually I'm not exactly sure what you meant by "at small cost to yourself".) Some examples you gave are like "why didn't the employer do this thing that would have been nice for the employee, that wouldn't have cost too much". But like, they might just suck, or they might rationally not view it as worthwhile.
Your example
A parent sits down for tea, but their kid is running around. “Absolutely no noise while I’m having tea, or no Nintendo for the next month.” Every time the parent pulls this card, the kid accepts.
doesn't seem to me like exploitation.
Replies from: Darmani↑ comment by Darmani · 2024-12-28T01:58:54.821Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
We have different intuitons about this term then.
I was very surprised after posting this then some commenters considered things like wage theft and outright fraud to be exploitation, whereas I consider such illegal behavior to be in a different category.
↑ comment by TsviBT · 2024-12-28T02:05:54.056Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I think the simple throughline is something like:
Replies from: DarmaniThe exploiter extracts about as much value from the exploiter as they can while still retaining the relationship (employee, romantic, customer, con mark), regardless of harm (e.g. including by lying, or by making it harder for the exploited to leave the relationship).
↑ comment by Darmani · 2024-12-28T02:21:47.327Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
An interesting proposal that I'll have to think about. I'm still uneasy with throwing lying in with uses of power.
Also, this one clearly does include the parenting example I gave, and is strictly broader than my proposed definition.
Replies from: TsviBT↑ comment by TsviBT · 2024-12-28T08:23:45.234Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
does include the parenting example I gave
A normal and/or healthy parent-child relationship doesn't have the parent extracting as much value as possible from the child regardless of ethics or harm!
is strictly broader than my proposed definition.
Therefore not.
Replies from: Darmani↑ comment by Darmani · 2024-12-28T10:15:49.864Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I see. So the maximalization is important to the definition. I think then, under this definition, using Villiam's pie example from another thread, the person taking 90% of the pie would not be exploiting the other person if he knew they could survive with 9%.
I think this definition would also say that a McDonald's employee who puts me into a hard upsell is exploiting me so long as they never physically handle my credit card and don't have the capacity to trap me or otherwise do more than upselling. But if they handle my credit card and don't steal the number, then they're no longer an exploiter.
That is to say:
1. The maximization criteria is unstable
2. There needs to be some condition about the manner in which they extract value; otherwise, plenty of ordinary business transactions in which one side does its best would be considered "exploitation"
↑ comment by TsviBT · 2024-12-28T16:52:32.520Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I don't think McDonald's example quite makes sense; if they were doing credit card fraud, that would probably destroy the relationship, so failing to do that fraud doesn't absolve them of being an exploiter. But anyway, you're probably right that "maximal" is too strong.
comment by James Camacho (james-camacho) · 2024-12-28T03:28:57.206Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Exploitation is using a superior negotiating position to inflict great costs on someone else, at small benefit to yourself.
If someone is inflicting any cost on me for their own benefit, that is not a mutually beneficial trade, so your definition doesn't solve the problem. You cannot just look at subtrades either—after all, you can always break up every trade into two transactions where you first only pay a cost, and then only get a benefit at someone else's expense.
My definition is closer to this:
A trade is exploitative when it decreases a society's wealth generating ability.
When people are paid less, they are less able to invest in the future. This includes upskilling, finding more promising ventures, starting their own business, or raising children. Some people are better at this than others, and an efficient market would give them control of more money to show this (roughly exponential). For example, if you are twice as good at wealth-creating than me, you should have about seven times as many dollars. If I make a trade with you, I should keep about 12% of the wealth created. Of course, this has to be after costs are taken into account.
The cost of subsistence is pretty negligible—maybe a few thousand dollars per year in the rural United States. Any other costs a company imposes on you should be paid before you distribute the pie you created. So, if they ask you to live in San Francisco and drive a car, that is easily $50,000/yr in before-earnings costs. Now, suppose your work as a developer nets them $500,000/yr. You should be making about $100,000/yr after taxes, which would be around $200,000/yr before taxes. If you are making less, there are three scenarios:
- Your company is more than twice as good as you at wealth generation.
- You are creating less than $500,000/yr of value.
- You are being exploited!
↑ comment by Darmani · 2024-12-28T10:30:09.349Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
My intended meaning of the wording is that the "infliction" is relative to a more Pareto-optimal trade. E.g.: in the ultimatum game, us splitting a dollar with 99 cents to me and 1 cent to you is a positive-benefit trade, but is still inflicting a cost if you assume the negotation begins at 50/50.
The idea of the subtrade is an interesting thought, but I think any trade needs to be considered an atomic agreement. E.g.: while I might physically hand the convenience store clerk a dollar before they give me the candy bar, it can't be broken down into two trades, because the full agreement is there from the outset.
But if they demand an extra $1 bribe in the middle, giving me the choice "Pay another $1 and get candy bar, call authorities and waste a lot of time, or pay $0 and get no candy bar," then that's a new trade
A trade is exploitative when it decreases a society's wealth generating ability.
Suppose my son really wants to be a circus performer, but I want him to go to college; he says that, if he couldn't be a circus performer, he'd be a doctor. My son is about to enter a big circus competition, and I tell him that, if he wins, I'll give my full blessing and financial support for him to attend circus academy instead.
By that definition, it sounds like my offer to let him pursue his dream is actually exploitative!
if you are twice as good at wealth-creating than me, you should have about seven times as many dollars
This is for me the most interesting part of your comment. I want to know how this was derived.
Replies from: Jiro, james-camacho↑ comment by Jiro · 2024-12-31T01:50:31.850Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Suppose my son really wants to be a circus performer, but I want him to go to college; he says that, if he couldn’t be a circus performer, he’d be a doctor. My son is about to enter a big circus competition, and I tell him that, if he wins, I’ll give my full blessing and financial support for him to attend circus academy instead.
By that definition, it sounds like my offer to let him pursue his dream is actually exploitative!
The normal context of something like that is that you don't believe he'll win and are doing it to shut him up. If he has no chance of winning, offering to do X if he wins doesn't reduce wealth, so is not exploitative.
Replies from: Darmani↑ comment by Darmani · 2024-12-31T02:25:00.698Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I had the movie version in my mind, where the disbelieving parent comes around on seeing the kid's success (c.f.: October Sky, Billy Elliott). I myself felt a version: my parents were very against me applying for the Thiel Fellowship, up until it became clear that I might (and did) win.
↑ comment by James Camacho (james-camacho) · 2024-12-28T15:12:40.787Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Dollars are essentially energy from physics, and trades are state transitions. So, in expectation entropy will increase. Suppose person controls a proportion of the dollars. In an efficient market, entropy will be maximal, so we want to find the distribution
For a given Total Societal Wealth Generation, this is the Boltzmann distribution
where is the temperature (frequency of trades). I subsumed as a single constant in my earlier comment to simplify matters. I was incorrect in my earlier statement; if my is two higher than yours (not twice as large), I should control times as many dollars. I suspect some of the rise in CEO-to-worker compensation comes from increasing, some from a less conscientious society, and some from exploitation.
Replies from: cooljoseph1↑ comment by joseph_c (cooljoseph1) · 2024-12-28T21:36:02.087Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Isn't $\beta$ proportional to the inverse temperature, and so should be smaller now (with easier, more frequent trading)?
comment by quiet_NaN · 2024-12-29T19:08:46.866Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Let us assume that the utility of personal wealth is logarithmic, which is intuitive enough: 10k$ matter a lot more to you if you are broke than if your net worth is 1M$.
Then by your definition of exploitation, every transaction where a poor person pays a rich person and enhances their personal wealth in the process is exploitive. The worker surely needs the rent money more than the landlord, so the landlord should cut the rent to the point where he does not make a profit. Likewise the physician providing aid to the poor, or the CEO selling smartphones to the middle class.
Classifying most of capitalism as "exploitive" (per se) is of course not helpful. You can add epicycles to your definition by considering money rather than its subjective utilitarian value, but under that definition all financial transactions would be 'fair': the poor person values 1k$ more than his kidney, while the rich person values the kidney more than 1k$, so they trade and everyone is better off (even though we would likely consider this trade exploitative).
More generally, to have a definition of fairness, we need some unit of inter-personal utility. Consider the Ultimatum game. If both participants are of similar wealth and with similar needs and have worked a similar amount for the gains, then a 50:50 split seems fair. But if we don't have a common frame of utility, perhaps because one of them is a peasant and the other is a feudal king, then objectively determining what is a fair split seems impossible.
Replies from: Darmani↑ comment by Darmani · 2024-12-30T04:19:48.579Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
A gap in the proposed definition of exploitation is that it assumes some natural starting point of negotiation, and only evaluates divergence from that natural starting point.
In the landlord case, fair-market value of rent is a natural starting point, and landlords don't have enough of a superior negotiating position to force rent upwards. (If they did by means of supply scarcity, then that higher point would definitionally be the new FMV.) Ergo, no exploitation.
On the other hand, if the landlord tried to increase the rent on a renewing tenant much more than is typical precisely because they know the tenant has circumstances (e.g.: physical injury) that make moving out much harder than normal, then that would be exploitative per this definition.
comment by Cheese Mann (cheese-mann) · 2024-12-31T05:24:06.967Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Trade is not voluntary, nothing is voluntary, we do everything without a choice