The Athena Rationality Workshop - June 7th-10th at EA Hotel
2019-05-11T01:01:01.973Z · score: 28 (9 votes)The Athena Rationality Workshop - June 7th-10th at EA Hotel
2019-05-10T22:08:03.600Z · score: 5 (3 votes)I would decompose that in to a value trade + a blackmail.
The default for me would be to take the action that gives me 1 utility. But you can offer me a trade where you give me something better in return for me not taking that action. This would be a value trade.
Lets now take me agreeing to your proposition as the default. If I then choose to threaten to call the deal off, unless you pay me a even higher amount, than this is blackmail.
I don't think that these parts (the value trade and the blackmail) should be viewed as sequential. I wrote it that way for illustrative purposes. However, I do think that any value trade has a Game of Chicken component, where each player can threaten to call of the trade if they don't get the more favorable deal.
I did not mean to imply that the choices had to be made simultaneous, or in any other particular order, just that this is the type of payoff matrix. But I also think that "simultaneous choice" v.s. "sequential game" is a false dichotomy. If both players are UDT, every game is a game simultaneous choice game (where the choices are over complete policies).
I know that according to what I describe, the blackmailers threat is not credible in the game theory sense of the word. Sow what? It is still possible to make credible threats in the common-use meaning of the word, which is what matters.
The Game Theory of Blackmail
2019-03-22T17:44:36.545Z · score: 22 (11 votes)Hi, approximately when will it be decided who gets funding this round?
Optimization Regularization through Time Penalty
2019-01-01T13:05:33.131Z · score: 12 (6 votes)Generalized Kelly betting
2018-07-19T01:38:21.311Z · score: 16 (7 votes)I agree that "want" is not the correct word exactly. What I mean by prior is an agents actual a priori beliefs, so by definition there will be no mis-match there. I am not trying to say that you choose your prior exactly.
What I am gesturing at is that no prior is wrong, as long as it does not assign zero probability to the true outcome. And I think that much of the confusion in atrophic situation comes from trying to solve an under-constrained system.
I agree.
An even simpler example: If the agents are reward learners, both of them will optimize for their own reward signal, which are two different things in the physical world.
Non-resolve as Resolve
2018-07-10T23:31:15.932Z · score: 14 (5 votes)Repeated (and improved) Sleeping Beauty problem
2018-07-10T22:32:56.191Z · score: 13 (5 votes)Probability is fake, frequency is real
2018-07-10T22:32:29.692Z · score: 12 (9 votes)>it seems that in order to be worthwhile the person would most likely have to be co-located with the team
My conclusion was the opposite. For this to work well the bread winner should be in a high earning location (which typically high cost living) and the rest of the team should be in a low cost location (which typically have low earning potential).
Being the only one in the team that is i a separate lotion, is not optimal for inclusion. But many teams are spread out anyway. I am pretty sure RAISE is not all in one location. As an other example, the organizers of AI Safety Camp is spread out all over Europe.
>Also, if the organisation later receives funding, the amount of prestige/influence of those taking this role will seem to drop or they might even become completely obsolete.
This might actually be feature, not a bug. When the new organisation has grown up and are receiving all the grants they need, then it is time for the funder to move on, to the next project, brining with them knowledge and experience from the first project.
The Mad Scientist Decision Problem
2017-11-29T11:41:33.640Z · score: 14 (5 votes)Basically, if I change the title, it can go on the front page?
Better?
Extensive and Reflexive Personhood Definition
2017-09-29T21:50:35.324Z · score: 3 (2 votes)Yes, that is correct.
I wrote the text and asked people to cosign if the agreed, for signaling value.
Do you have a good idea on how to make this clearer?
Recent talk by Stuart Armstrong related to this topic: