Comment by philh on You Have About Five Words · 2019-03-18T07:58:21.794Z · score: 2 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I had been under the impression that Hillary's was "I'm with her"? But I think I mostly heard that in the context of people saying it was a bad slogan.

Comment by philh on Graceful Shutdown · 2019-02-22T14:28:05.994Z · score: 2 (1 votes) · LW · GW

The point I am try­ing to make here is that while hard-can­cel sig­nal trav­els nec­es­sar­ily out-of-band, the grace­ful shut­down sig­nal must be, equally nec­es­sar­ily, passed in-band.

Minor, but in band vs out of band isn't really a firm distinction. Like, there's a sense in which SIGINT is in band and SIGKILL is out of band, but I think that most of the time, that's not the natural way to think of it.

Comment by philh on Graceful Shutdown · 2019-02-21T14:54:58.039Z · score: 2 (1 votes) · LW · GW

It's true that you need to be able to handle hard disconnects, but sometimes a graceful shutdown will give a better experience than a hard one is capable of. E.g. "close all connections, flush, then shutdown" might avoid an expensive "restore from journal" when you next start up.

Comment by philh on Why is this utilitarian calculus wrong? Or is it? · 2019-01-30T14:55:54.404Z · score: 3 (2 votes) · LW · GW

My intuition here is: Giving someone money moves wealth around. Creating a widget (at $20 cost, which at least one person values at $30), produces wealth. So [the world where a widget gets created] has more total wealth than [the one where it doesn't], and so it's not surprising if your moral calculus values it more highly.

Comment by philh on The Very Repugnant Conclusion · 2019-01-24T15:52:25.681Z · score: 2 (1 votes) · LW · GW

That doesn't fix it, it just means you need bigger numbers before you run into the problem.

Maybe if you have an asymtote, but I fully expect that you still run into problems then.

Comment by philh on What are the open problems in Human Rationality? · 2019-01-20T14:42:36.263Z · score: 5 (3 votes) · LW · GW

Are those comparable, though? My model of open source is that it prototypically looks like someone building something that's useful for themselves, then other people also find it useful and help to work on it (with code, bug reports, feature requests). But that first step doesn't really exist for LW2, because until you're ready to migrate the whole site, the software has very little value to anyone.

Can you think of any open source projects where the first useful version seems comparable in effort to LW2, and that had no financial backing for the first useful version?

Edit: some plausible candidates come to mind, though I wouldn't bet on any of them. Operating systems (e.g. Linux kernel, haiku, menuetOS); programming languages and compliers for them (e.g. gcc, Perl, python, Ruby); and database engines (e.g. postgres, mongo, neo4j).

(Notably, I'd exclude something like elm from the languages list because I think it was a masters or PhD project so funded by a university.)

Comment by philh on Why Don't Creators Switch to their Own Platforms? · 2018-12-26T19:41:58.067Z · score: 2 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Another example would be rooster teeth. They have a bunch of stuff on YouTube, but at least some content that's exclusive to their site. (I'm specifically thinking of the latest season of RWBY, I doubt know if there's other examples.)

Comment by philh on Player vs. Character: A Two-Level Model of Ethics · 2018-12-20T16:03:13.241Z · score: 2 (1 votes) · LW · GW

To the con­trary, this does not get you one iota closer to “ought”.

This is true, but I do think there's something being pointed at that deserves acknowledging.

I think I'd describe it as: you don't get an ought, but you do get to predict what oughts are likely to be acknowledged. (In future/in other parts of the world/from behind a veil of ignorance.)

That is, an agent who commits suicide is unlikely to propagate; so agents who hold suicide as an ought are unlikely to propagate; so you don't expect to see many agents with suicide as an ought.

And agents with cooperative tendencies do tend to propagate (among other agents with cooperative tendencies); so agents who hold cooperation as an ought tend to propagate (among...); so you expect to see agents who hold cooperation as an ought (but only in groups).

And for someone who acknowledges suicide as an ought, this can't convince them not to; and for someone who doesn't acknowledge cooperation, it doesn't convince them to. So I wouldn't describe it as "getting an ought from an is". But I'd say you're at least getting something of the same type as an ought?

Comment by philh on What podcasts does the community listen to? · 2018-12-18T19:29:28.428Z · score: 3 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Curious why this was dovnvoted? It's not a literal answer to the question, but it seems reasonably likely to satisfy the intent of the question.

Comment by philh on Who's welcome to our LessWrong meetups? · 2018-12-13T21:40:13.830Z · score: 8 (5 votes) · LW · GW

For the London meetups I write this:

We're a fortnightly London-based meetup for members of the rationalist diaspora. The diaspora includes, but is not limited to, LessWrong, Slate Star Codex, rationalist tumblrsphere, and parts of the Effective Altruism movement.

You don't have to identify as a rationalist to attend: basically, if you think we seem like interesting people you'd like to hang out with, welcome! You are invited. You do not need to think you are clever enough, or interesting enough, or similar enough to the rest of us, to attend. You are invited.

Comment by philh on Is cognitive load a factor in community decline? · 2018-12-12T20:14:59.963Z · score: 6 (3 votes) · LW · GW

The quote doesn't say explicitly, so just to make sure we're on the same page: I take from this that yes, when more looms were tended, each loom required less attention. Do you agree?

Comment by philh on LW Update 2018-12-06 – Table of Contents and Q&A · 2018-12-11T07:58:47.402Z · score: 10 (2 votes) · LW · GW

I’m cu­ri­ous to know why you would ever not want to fol­low the head­ing syn­tax, if what you want to pro­duce is a head­ing?

I've sometimes used regular bold for headings, I think mostly because it's lower friction. I don't need to think about what level of heading I should use semantically, or how that level actually renders.

Comment by philh on Is cognitive load a factor in community decline? · 2018-12-10T15:49:18.932Z · score: 7 (4 votes) · LW · GW

over the course of the 19th cen­tury the av­er­age Lan­cashire op­er­a­tive roughly dou­bled the num­ber of ma­chines tended

ap­prox­i­mately 1⁄4 of the 50-fold in­crease in cloth out­put per worker-hour be­tween 1800 and 1900 was due to each weaver sim­ply op­er­at­ing more looms than they had done ini­tially.

A question jumps out to me: did each individual machine and loom require equal effort at the beginning and end of these periods? It could be that more machines were tended because each machine required less tending.

Comment by philh on Act of Charity · 2018-11-20T15:29:47.174Z · score: 3 (2 votes) · LW · GW

You quoted the conclusion, not the argument. The argument is based on skepticism that rocking the boat will do much good.

Comment by philh on Rationality Is Not Systematized Winning · 2018-11-15T15:29:03.933Z · score: 8 (5 votes) · LW · GW

Saying rationality is systematized winning is ridiculous. It ignores that systematized winning is the default, you need to do more than that to be attractive. I think the strongest frame you can use to start really exploring the benefits of rationality is to ask yourself what advantage it has over societal defaults.

I don't think systematized winning is the default. Some people follow societal defaults and win systematically, but I think that more people follow societal defaults and just do pretty okay.

Comment by philh on Octopath Traveler: Spoiler-Free Review · 2018-11-11T12:13:38.962Z · score: 2 (1 votes) · LW · GW

It is great to have the flexibility to go where you feel like going, and do what you feel like doing, in any order, and even bypass things entirely if you are so inclined.

It sounds like someone who enjoyed the first half of Final Fantasy VI, but not so much the second half, might not be a good fit for Octopath Traveler. Does that seem accurate to you?

Comment by philh on Mark Eichenlaub: How to develop scientific intuition · 2018-10-28T13:33:04.644Z · score: 3 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Thanks! "It's nonequilibrium" feels like it points at my specific mistake. Apparently my intuitions don't currently always remember to consider that question.

Comment by philh on Mark Eichenlaub: How to develop scientific intuition · 2018-10-27T11:58:02.021Z · score: 4 (2 votes) · LW · GW

One solution to that problem is that when the rock is on the bottom of the lake, it exerts more force on that part of the bottom of the lake than is exerted at other places. By contrast, when the rock is still in the boat, the only thing touching the bottom of the lake is water, and the water pressure is the same everywhere, so the weight of the rock is distributed evenly across the entire lake.

This confuses me because it sounds like the situation "rock is fully submerged and sinking but still near the top of the lake" would be analysed like the situation "rock is on boat", not "rock is on bottom of lake". But that would give the wrong answer.

What am I missing?

Comment by philh on Why do we like stories? · 2018-10-26T21:47:08.550Z · score: 4 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Aristotle, the philosopher and one of the first story analyzers, recognized that every story contains a three-act structure: Beginning, Middle, and End. The structure roughly corresponds to Olson’s "And", "But" and "Therefore".

That doesn't seem true to me? If I split the Wizard of Oz into three acts, your ABT covers acts 1 (Kansas) and 2 (traveling to the Emerald City) but not 3 (challenging the Wicked Witch of the West).

If I gave an ABT for Harry Potter and the Philosopher's Stone, I think it would do the same. ("...But he's actually a wizard, therefore he goes off to magic school". Versus act 1 with the Dursleys, act 2 in Hogwarts, act 3 when they go down the corridor.)

Of course you could split them in other places. Perhaps the beginning is until Dorothy runs away, the middle is until she returns and gets sucked into a twister, and then end is all of her time in Oz. But I don't think anyone would naturally choose to split it that way, and if you choose a split to make the correspondence work, then the correspondence says nothing at all.

Upon returning to the tribe, the savage starts relating the experience, including the location and time he met the tiger. This describes the introduction to the problem which is the "AND". After this, he describes what he did to avoid the danger: He escaped to a secure cave. This is the stage when he is trying to find a solution to the problem: the "BUT". Finally, he explains how he solved the problem by entering a cave to avoid danger: the “Therefore”.

It sounds like the story would be something like "I was walking through the forest AND I saw a tiger BUT I ran into a cave THEREFORE I escaped"? But here the AND introduces conflict, while earlier you said the BUT did that.

Comment by philh on case study: iterative drawing · 2018-10-21T19:12:04.769Z · score: 2 (1 votes) · LW · GW

It looks like a large chunk of this post is missing? I see four footnotes but only a reference to one of them.

Comment by philh on "Now here's why I'm punching you..." · 2018-10-19T09:38:52.276Z · score: 4 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Thanks.

Comment by philh on "Now here's why I'm punching you..." · 2018-10-18T13:57:05.098Z · score: 9 (5 votes) · LW · GW

When I saw Gurkenglas' comment, I had a quick think for "a name for the class of things that "punching" is a metaphor for", and didn't come up with anything. But I agree that "sanctions" fits, so thanks for supplying that word.

Still, I'm basically going to ignore this criticism. Not that it's necessarily unfair or incorrect or anything. (It doesn't strike me as particularly salient. But I may be atypical, or I may be too close to be objective.)

But I'm not confident I could have reliably anticipated it without also anticipating a bunch of other potential criticisms that would seem similarly important. And I have a hard enough time writing something that satisfies myself. I don't want to add more prune.

As an aside: I assume it's just an oversight, but I would prefer if you link your copy back to the original, since it's publicly listed.

Comment by philh on "Now here's why I'm punching you..." · 2018-10-18T11:07:34.119Z · score: 2 (1 votes) · LW · GW

I was thinking of actions, not motivations. If Alice wants to convince people to punch Bob, then her motivations (punishment, protection, deterrence, restoration) will be relevant to what sort of arguments she makes and whether other people are likely to agree. But I don't think they're particularly relevant to the contents of this post.

Comment by philh on "Now here's why I'm punching you..." · 2018-10-17T22:40:21.905Z · score: 2 (1 votes) · LW · GW

that’s very different from the decisions philh is talking about.

So, I've had the feeling from all of your comments on this thread that you think I'm talking about something different from what I think I'm taking about. I've not felt like going to the effort of teasing out the confusion, and I still don't. But I would like to make it clear that I do not endorse this statement.

Comment by philh on "Now here's why I'm punching you..." · 2018-10-17T13:46:42.556Z · score: 2 (1 votes) · LW · GW

To be clear, I think this is a good (prosocial) way for individuals to act. I'm not trying to advocate that we should make it a community norm.

But I'm unconvinced by this particular failure mode.

if there is a norm like this in place, Alice always has a strong incentive to pretend that she is punching based on some generally accepted theory, and that the only thing that needs arguing is the application of this theory to Bob (point 2).

Surely this incentive exists anyway for Alice? There's no existing norm against what I propose.

she will almost certainly be able to convincingly pass it off as such.

I don't see why this would be. At least not any general principle that her readers will be familiar with and agree with, which is what would be required.

I'm not suggesting that after Alice publishes part (2), people who don't think "punching Bob is better than the alternatives" should punch Bob. Alice doesn't just need to convince people that there is an argument for punching Bob, she needs to convince people to punch Bob.

Comment by philh on "Now here's why I'm punching you..." · 2018-10-17T11:54:30.434Z · score: 5 (2 votes) · LW · GW

I agree with Raemon here. It would be good to think about ambiguous cases in advance, and I like the idea that fiction is one way of doing so.

But ambiguous cases are still going to come up, and you need to have some way of dealing with them. (And if you deal with them by never punching anyone, then you're encouraging bad actors to seek them out.)

"Now here's why I'm punching you..."

2018-10-16T21:30:01.723Z · score: 32 (19 votes)
Comment by philh on Why don’t we treat geniuses like professional athletes? · 2018-10-15T18:31:42.789Z · score: 5 (3 votes) · LW · GW

Something I don't think anyone's said explicitly is that athletic performance is more legible than intellectual performance. If a new breakfast food makes you 1% faster or slower, that's not necessarily easy to notice, but it's easier than noticing if it makes you 1% "better at thinking".

Comment by philh on Modes of Petrov Day · 2018-09-24T13:53:43.048Z · score: 4 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Hm. I'd been thinking the whole thing would work better if each party could perform some small negative-sum defection against the other. Along the likes of, each party commits to destroy $10, and has the ability to restore $1 to themselves while increasing the other party's obligation by $2 up to a max of $30. (And after either party gets nuked, the money values remain fixed.)

I think that would be a good thing for us to practice, but I agree the "just don't press the button that you have no reason to press anyway" variant is also good to practice.

Comment by philh on Formal vs. Effective Pre-Commitment · 2018-09-04T08:11:47.492Z · score: 2 (1 votes) · LW · GW

it’s fine with even 1% accuracy with 1000:1 payout difference.

Well, if 1% accuracy means 99% of one-boxers are predicted to two-box, and 99% of two-boxers are expected to one-box, you should two-box. The prediction needs to at least be correlated with reality.

Comment by philh on Preliminary thoughts on moral weight · 2018-08-18T22:05:47.746Z · score: 4 (2 votes) · LW · GW

There's nothing wrong with using relative measurements, and using absolute measurements doesn't resolve the problem. (It hides from the problem, but that's not the same thing.)

The actual resolution is explained in the wiki article better than I could.

I agree that the naive version of the elephants problem is isomorphic to the envelopes problem. But the envelopes problem doesn't reveal an actual difficulty with choosing between two envelopes, and the naive elephants problem as described doesn't reveal an actual difficulty with choosing between humans and elephants. They just reveal a particular math error that humans are bad at noticing.

Comment by philh on The ever expanding moral circle · 2018-08-17T21:03:45.898Z · score: 4 (2 votes) · LW · GW

I think from a wide-circle perspective, the things you're talking about don't look like a cost of a wide circle, so much as just reasons the problem is hard. From a wide-circle perspective, the cost of a narrow circle is that you try to solve a problem that's easier than the real problem, and you don't solve the real problem, and children in Africa continue to die of malaria. It sounds like you're telling me that I shouldn't care about children dying of malaria because they're far away and can't do anything for me and I could spend that money on myself and people close to me... and my reaction is that none of that stops children from dying of malaria, which is really actually a thing I care about and don't want to stop caring about

There is yet another cost to a wide circle of moral concern, and that is the discrepancy with people who have a smaller circle. If you’re my compatriot or family member or fellow present human being, and you have a small circle of concern, I can expect you to allocate more of your agency to my benefit. If you have a wide circle of concern that includes all kinds of entities who can’t reciprocate, I benefit less from having you as an ally.

To be precise, this seems like a cost to Alice of Bob having a wide circle, if Alice and Bob are close. If they aren't, and especially if we bring in a veil of ignorance, then Alice is likely to benefit somewhat from Bob having a wide circle. Not definite, but this still seems like a thing to note.

Comment by philh on Trust Me I'm Lying: A Summary and Review · 2018-08-17T20:41:13.484Z · score: 16 (5 votes) · LW · GW

Separate from my other comment:

He then targeted those blogs with a series of provocative actions, such as buying billboards promoting the movie and then vandalizing them himself, calling feminist groups to protest showings of the movie, arranging for provocative advertisements on buses, and other acts designed to go viral on social media.

It occurs to me that his relationship with these feminist groups may not have been entirely adversarial.

That is, my first inclination is to read a situation like this as: he wants people to see the movie, the feminist groups want people not to see the movie, and he slyly manipulates them into doing things that achieve what he wants and not what they want.

And maybe this should have been obvious, but - of course that's not the only thing feminist groups want. They might also want members; newspaper coverage; a highly-visible thing to rally around and point people at. (And if someone is the sort of person who would see the movie if they heard about it, maybe the feminist groups don't even really care if they do happen to hear about it and see it.) Perhaps "all publicity is good publicity" applies to both sides, here.

And if that's right, then this problem seems harder to solve.

Comment by philh on Preliminary thoughts on moral weight · 2018-08-17T20:18:09.180Z · score: 7 (4 votes) · LW · GW

Regardless of whether the problem can be resolved, I confess that I don't see how it's related to the original two-envelopes problem, which is a case of doing incorrect expected-value calculations with sensible numbers. (The contents of the envelopes are entirely comparable and can't be rescaled.)

Meanwhile, it seems to me that the elephants problem just comes about because the numbers are fake. You can do sensible EV calculations, get (a + b/4) for saving two elephants versus (a/2 + b/2) for saving one human, but because a and b are mostly-unconstrained (they just have to be positive), you can't go anywhere from there.

These strike me as just completely unrelated problems.

Comment by philh on Trust Me I'm Lying: A Summary and Review · 2018-08-17T13:28:46.228Z · score: 12 (5 votes) · LW · GW
A concrete example of this is work he did for the movie I Hope They Serve Beer In Hell, starring Tucker Max.

I think it's important to note that the movie was a box office failure. That's not the only thing that counts, Max was probably glad to be interviewed by the Post regardless, but it does seem like Holiday's approach failed at its main goal. Or if the Post coverage really was the main goal, then it's less obvious why we should care.

Does Holiday ever address this?

(Unimportant nitpick: Max wrote the book and cowrote the film, but didn't star in it.)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I_Hope_They_Serve_Beer_in_Hell_%28film%29

Comment by philh on Tactical vs. Strategic Cooperation · 2018-08-15T14:43:40.490Z · score: 5 (3 votes) · LW · GW

I suggest that you only make comments like this for people who've opted in.

Regardless of that, I request that you not make comments like this on anything I post.

(I had written reasons for these, but on the spirit of the post, I'm defaulting to not including them.)

Comment by philh on Decisions are not about changing the world, they are about learning what world you live in · 2018-08-01T09:50:48.166Z · score: 2 (1 votes) · LW · GW

enumerates the worlds seen as possible by every agent, no matter what their decision theory is

Can you clarify this?

One interpretation is that you're talking about an agent who enumerates every world that any agent sees as possible. But your post further down seems to contradict this, "the unpunched world is not a possible one for the world enumerator". And it's not obvious to me that this agent can exist.

Another is that the agent enumerates only the worlds that every agent sees as possible, but that agent doesn't seem likely to get good results. And it's not obvious to me that there are guaranteed to be any worlds at all in this intersection.

Am I missing an interpretation?

Comment by philh on Two agents can have the same source code and optimise different utility functions · 2018-07-15T20:44:59.419Z · score: 2 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Using the definitions from the post, those agents would be optimising the same utility functions, just by taking different actions.

Comment by philh on Open Thread July 2018 · 2018-07-15T12:22:26.280Z · score: 3 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Note that it wouldn't mean that, since there are various other factors that might affect it. E.g. people might set their fonts larger. It might mean that almost everyone has line breaks in the same place. Though even then you're assuming that phone browsers are wide enough or uncommon enough, and that greater wrong is uncommon.

Comment by philh on LW Update 2018-07-01 – Default Weak Upvotes · 2018-07-05T12:53:31.633Z · score: 3 (2 votes) · LW · GW

I like looking at my total karma too, partly because I like knowing about votes on my comments and if total karma hasn't changed then I assume I haven't received any votes recently.

Comment by philh on Last Chance to Fund the Berkeley REACH · 2018-07-03T23:47:52.516Z · score: 11 (3 votes) · LW · GW

Some of this feels like a kind of criticism that's inevitably going to apply to a project like REACH, whether it succeeds or not. Like, there's basically no way to avoid it being very expensive. There may be a path to "not cash-strapped", but it seems like basically any such path is going to go via "cash-strapped store front", because it's going to be much easier to get money after it's seen to be successful.

(Perhaps it would be nice if we could raise money for these things without someone like Sarah needing to fund their initial success, and then maybe we could avoid them being both cash-strapped and highly public. But if so, that's more a criticism of the community than of REACH.)

That doesn't make your criticisms false, but if I'm right, this seems like a property of them that's important to note and engage with.

Separately, I'm not convinced that the signaling properties of clothes exchanges are what you say. I have no evidence here, just intuition.

Comment by philh on Book Review: Why Honor Matters · 2018-07-03T10:29:16.820Z · score: 2 (1 votes) · LW · GW

Geras was the physical rewards indicating contribution to the group—in the division of plunder after the battle, more plunder went to the warriors who fought most bravely. Time was the group’s estimation of your worth—this determined how one person was treated relative to another, and consequently how they thought of themselves. Kleos is usually translated as “glory”—the poets will tell your story and so your deeds will live on after your death

If these are separate components, then someone could have had e.g. high Geras but middling or low Time and Kleos? I'd be curious to hear more about such people.

Part of me wants tell a story relating these to employees of a company: Geras is receiving a high salary, Time is people being friendly and respectful and inviting you to after-work drinks, and Kleos is when people talking about your projects make a point of giving you credit.

Comment by philh on Order from Randomness: Ordering the Universe of Random Numbers · 2018-06-21T14:31:28.339Z · score: 9 (2 votes) · LW · GW

It feels weird to me to set time as "index of the current observation in the sorted order" rather than as "magnitude of the current observation".

Like, I feel like whatever an observer perceives as "the passage of time" must be something in the physical universe, something that changes from one state to the "next". But here there's nothing to distinguish states except their magnitude, so it feels like cheating to say that the same amount of time passes regardless of the magnitude gap.

Comment by philh on Why Destructive Value Capture? · 2018-06-21T13:36:35.623Z · score: 7 (1 votes) · LW · GW

They don’t cost the theater ANYTHING to keep

This may be approximately true, but I don't think it's obvious and uncomplicated.

According to the googling I did on the last post, the price to the theatre of showing a film goes up with the number of seats. It's banded, so unless they're near the bottom of a band, removing those seats will have no marginal effect on that. And we'd expect them to cluster near the tops of bands.

But I can imagine other things it might have an effect on: ad revenue, trailer prices (I think they have to pay to show them, but I'm not sure), insurance prices, weird corporate manoeuvring (if we increase our seat count by 5%, we'll be able to negotiate a better deal).

Comment by philh on We Agree: Speeches All Around! · 2018-06-18T14:05:12.642Z · score: 20 (4 votes) · LW · GW

It may also be relevant that: if a group of five people agrees on something, then any individual group member need not agree. A member may keep their disagreement to themselves.

But if someone speaks at length about why this is the right decision, they're more committed than "I'm willing to passively go along with this". It's a minor form of how a Mafioso is required to have carried out a hit.

Suppose the invasion of Mallorca goes badly. Do you want a merchant, a general, an aristocrat and a bishop to be able to say "that was a bad idea all along, those with power are unfit to wield it"?

Comment by philh on Open Thread June 2018 · 2018-06-17T10:50:57.343Z · score: 8 (2 votes) · LW · GW

I have. I like having the app better than not having an app. It's likely that a better app exists, but finding it is higher activation energy.

Comment by philh on Front Row Center · 2018-06-14T10:35:01.167Z · score: 10 (3 votes) · LW · GW

Though this doesn't explain why they don't simply remove the ads and keep the trailers, which have most of the same benefits plus I think many people enjoy watching them plus they bring people back.

Comment by philh on Front Row Center · 2018-06-13T13:55:28.879Z · score: 12 (2 votes) · LW · GW

The ads give people time to arrive late and still buy snacks. And people who find them sufficiently aversive can just show up late, except for sold-out screenings. (Which are the ones the theatre least needs to intice people in for.)

From a quick google, it does look like the ads themselves don't make much money, which surprises me a bit.

Comment by philh on Front Row Center · 2018-06-13T13:40:37.124Z · score: 8 (2 votes) · LW · GW

Not all theaters have the front seats too close.

(Incidentally, how much does "too close" vary from person to person?)

Comment by philh on Prisoners' Dilemma with Costs to Modeling · 2018-06-07T07:24:38.911Z · score: 16 (8 votes) · LW · GW

This is great.

It looked to me like PrudentBot could be done in depth 1 - "(proof that X(PB) cooperates) AND (proof that X(DB) defects)". https://www.lesswrong.com/posts/iQWk5jYeDg5ACCmpx/robust-cooperation-in-the-prisoner-s-dilemma (and the paper that's about) tells me that's wrong, if you only have the one layer of provability then PB doesn't cooperate with itself. It also had an introduction to the math here that I found helpful.

Comment by philh on Open Thread June 2018 · 2018-06-04T14:22:09.120Z · score: 10 (3 votes) · LW · GW

I feel like you missed what I was getting at. (Either that, or I missed what you're getting at.) Context is noticing the taste of lotus.

It kind of sounds like you think that I'm lying because I lack willpower, or something along those lines. But that's not it. The point of lying is to decouple the lotus from whether I'm actually exercising, so that I exercise when I choose to, not when the app thinks I should. (I think I should probably exercise more than I currently choose to, but less than the app thinks I should.)

With that in mind, I'm not really sure why "only get lotus when I tell the truth" is something I would want.

That said, it would be kind of nice if I could tag my lies and have the app show me only truthful workouts. As it is I can't tell how often I'm actually exercising. (It occurs to me I can get some of that benefit by creating a custom workout named "fake".)

Pareto improvements are rarer than they seem

2018-01-27T22:23:24.206Z · score: 58 (21 votes)

2017-10-08 - London Rationalish meetup

2017-10-04T14:46:50.514Z · score: 9 (2 votes)

Authenticity vs. factual accuracy

2016-11-10T22:24:38.810Z · score: 5 (9 votes)

Costs are not benefits

2016-11-03T21:32:07.811Z · score: 5 (6 votes)

GiveWell: A case study in effective altruism, part 1

2016-10-14T10:46:23.303Z · score: 0 (1 votes)

Six principles of a truth-friendly discourse

2016-10-08T16:56:59.994Z · score: 4 (7 votes)

Diaspora roundup thread, 23rd June 2016

2016-06-23T14:03:32.105Z · score: 5 (6 votes)

Diaspora roundup thread, 15th June 2016

2016-06-15T09:36:09.466Z · score: 24 (27 votes)

The Sally-Anne fallacy

2016-04-11T13:06:10.345Z · score: 27 (28 votes)

Meetup : London rationalish meetup - 2016-03-20

2016-03-16T14:39:40.949Z · score: 0 (1 votes)

Meetup : London rationalish meetup - 2016-03-06

2016-03-04T12:52:35.279Z · score: 0 (1 votes)

Meetup : London rationalish meetup, 2016-02-21

2016-02-20T14:09:42.635Z · score: 0 (1 votes)

Meetup : London Rationalish meetup, 7/2/16

2016-02-04T16:34:13.317Z · score: 1 (2 votes)

Meetup : London diaspora meetup: weird foods - 24/01/2016

2016-01-21T16:45:10.166Z · score: 1 (2 votes)

Meetup : London diaspora meetup, 10/01/2016

2016-01-02T20:41:05.950Z · score: 2 (3 votes)

Stupid questions thread, October 2015

2015-10-13T19:39:52.114Z · score: 3 (4 votes)

Bragging thread August 2015

2015-08-01T19:46:45.529Z · score: 3 (4 votes)

Meetup : London meetup

2015-05-14T17:35:18.467Z · score: 2 (3 votes)

Group rationality diary, May 5th - 23rd

2015-05-04T23:59:39.601Z · score: 7 (8 votes)

Meetup : London meetup

2015-05-01T17:16:12.085Z · score: 1 (2 votes)

Cooperative conversational threading

2015-04-15T18:40:50.820Z · score: 25 (26 votes)

Open Thread, Apr. 06 - Apr. 12, 2015

2015-04-06T14:18:34.872Z · score: 4 (5 votes)

[LINK] Interview with "Ex Machina" director Alex Garland

2015-04-02T13:46:56.324Z · score: 6 (7 votes)

[Link] Eric S. Raymond - Me and Less Wrong

2014-12-05T23:44:57.913Z · score: 23 (23 votes)

Meetup : London social meetup in my flat

2014-11-19T23:55:37.211Z · score: 2 (2 votes)

Meetup : London social meetup

2014-09-25T16:35:18.705Z · score: 2 (2 votes)

Meetup : London social meetup

2014-09-07T11:26:52.626Z · score: 2 (2 votes)

Meetup : London social meetup - possibly in a park

2014-07-22T17:20:28.288Z · score: 2 (2 votes)

Meetup : London social meetup - possibly in a park

2014-07-04T23:22:56.836Z · score: 2 (2 votes)

How has technology changed social skills?

2014-06-08T12:41:29.581Z · score: 16 (16 votes)

Meetup : London social meetup - possibly in a park

2014-05-21T13:54:16.372Z · score: 2 (2 votes)

Meetup : London social meetup - possibly in a park

2014-05-14T13:27:30.586Z · score: 2 (2 votes)

Meetup : London social meetup - possibly in a park

2014-05-09T13:37:19.129Z · score: 1 (2 votes)

May Monthly Bragging Thread

2014-05-04T08:21:17.681Z · score: 10 (10 votes)

Meetup : London social meetup

2014-04-30T13:34:43.181Z · score: 2 (2 votes)

Why don't you attend your local LessWrong meetup? / General meetup feedback

2014-04-27T22:17:01.129Z · score: 25 (25 votes)

Meetup report: London LW paranoid debating session

2014-02-16T23:46:40.591Z · score: 11 (11 votes)

Meetup : London VOI meetup 16/2, plus socials 9/2 and 23/2

2014-02-07T19:17:55.841Z · score: 4 (4 votes)

[LINK] Cliffs Notes: "Probability Theory: The Logic of Science", part 1

2014-02-05T23:03:10.533Z · score: 6 (6 votes)

Meetup : Meetup : London - Paranoid Debating 2nd Feb, plus social 9th Feb

2014-01-27T15:01:16.132Z · score: 6 (6 votes)

Fascists and Rakes

2014-01-05T00:41:00.257Z · score: 41 (53 votes)

London LW CoZE exercise report

2013-11-19T00:34:21.950Z · score: 14 (14 votes)

Meetup : London social meetup - New venue

2013-11-12T14:39:13.441Z · score: 4 (4 votes)

Meetup : London social meetup, 10/11/13

2013-11-03T17:27:18.049Z · score: 2 (2 votes)

Open thread, August 26 - September 1, 2013

2013-08-26T21:00:41.560Z · score: 5 (5 votes)

Meetup : Comfort Zone Expansion outing - London

2013-08-23T13:59:04.896Z · score: 5 (5 votes)

Meetup : London Social - The Unwelcome but Probable Decline and Fall of Direct Sunlight

2013-08-08T14:08:17.043Z · score: 8 (8 votes)

Meetup : London Meetup, 28th April

2013-04-18T23:48:03.973Z · score: 2 (2 votes)

Meetup : London Meetup, 14th April: Hedonic hacks

2013-04-06T19:35:42.067Z · score: 3 (3 votes)