Undiscriminating Skepticism

post by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-14T23:23:25.539Z · LW · GW · Legacy · 1361 comments

Contents

1361 comments

Tl;dr:  Since it can be cheap and easy to attack everything your tribe doesn't believe, you shouldn't trust the rationality of just anyone who slams astrology and creationism; these beliefs aren't just false, they're also non-tribal among educated audiences.  Test what happens when a "skeptic" argues for a non-tribal belief, or argues against a tribal belief, before you decide they're good general rationalists.  This post is intended to be reasonably accessible to outside audiences.

I don't believe in UFOs.  I don't believe in astrology.  I don't believe in homeopathy.  I don't believe in creationism.  I don't believe there were explosives planted in the World Trade Center.  I don't believe in haunted houses.  I don't believe in perpetual motion machines.  I believe that all these beliefs are not only wrong but visibly insane.

If you know nothing else about me but this, how much credit should you give me for general rationality?

Certainly anyone who was skillful at adding up evidence, considering alternative explanations, and assessing prior probabilities, would end up disbelieving in all of these.

But there would also be a simpler explanation for my views, a less rare factor that could explain it:  I could just be anti-non-mainstream.  I could be in the habit of hanging out in moderately educated circles, and know that astrology and homeopathy are not accepted beliefs of my tribe.  Or just perceptually recognize them, on a wordless level, as "sounding weird".  And I could mock anything that sounds weird and that my fellow tribesfolk don't believe, much as creationists who hang out with fellow creationists mock evolution for its ludicrous assertion that apes give birth to human beings.

You can get cheap credit for rationality by mocking wrong beliefs that everyone in your social circle already believes to be wrong.  It wouldn't mean that I have any ability at all to notice a wrong belief that the people around me believe to be right, or vice versa - to further discriminate truth from falsity, beyond the fact that my social circle doesn't already believe in something.

Back in the good old days, there was a simple test for this syndrome that would get quite a lot of mileage:  You could just ask me what I thought about God.  If I treated the idea with deeper respect than I treated astrology, holding it worthy of serious debate even if I said I disbelieved in it, then you knew that I was taking my cues from my social surroundings - that if the people around me treated a belief as high-prestige, high-status, I wouldn't start mocking it no matter what the state of evidence.

On the other hand suppose I said without hesitation that my epistemic state on God was similar to my epistemic state on psychic powers: no positive evidence, lots of failed tests, highly unfavorable prior, and if you believe it under those circumstances then something is wrong with your mind.  Then you would have heard a bit of skepticism that might cost me something socially, and that not everyone around me would have endorsed, even in educated circles.  You would know it wasn't just a cheap way of picking up cheap points.

Today the God-test no longer works, because some people realized that the taking-it-seriously aura of religion is in fact the main thing left which prevents people from noticing the epistemic awfulness; there has been a concerted and, I think, well-advised effort to mock religion and strip it of its respectability.  The upshot is that there are now quite wide social circles in which God is just another stupid belief that we all know we don't believe in, on the same list with astrology.  You could be dealing with an adept rationalist, or you could just be dealing with someone who reads Reddit.

And of course I could easily go on to name some beliefs that others think are wrong and that I think are right, or vice versa, but would inevitably lose some of my audience at each step along the way - just as, a couple of decades ago, I would have lost a lot of my audience by saying that religion was unworthy of serious debate.  (Thankfully, today this outright dismissal is at least considered a respectable, mainstream position even if not everyone holds it.)

I probably won't lose much by citing anti-Artificial-Intelligence views as an example of undiscriminating skepticism.  I think a majority among educated circles are sympathetic to the argument that brains are not magic and so there is no obstacle in principle to building machines that think.  But there are others, albeit in the minority, who recognize Artificial Intelligence as "weird-sounding" and "sci-fi", a belief in something that has never yet been demonstrated, hence unscientific - the same epistemic reference class as believing in aliens or homeopathy.

(This is technically a demand for unobtainable evidence.  The asymmetry with homeopathy can be summed up as follows:  First:  If we learn that Artificial Intelligence is definitely impossible, we must have learned some new fact unknown to modern science - everything we currently know about neurons and the evolution of intelligence suggests that no magic was involved.  On the other hand, if we learn that homeopathy is possible, we must have learned some new fact unknown to modern science; if everything else we believe about physics is true, homeopathy shouldn't work.  Second:  If homeopathy works, we can expect double-blind medical studies to demonstrate its efficacy right now; the absence of this evidence is very strong evidence of absence.  If Artificial Intelligence is possible in theory and in practice, we can't necessarily expect its creation to be demonstrated using current knowledge - this absence of evidence is only weak evidence of absence.)

I'm using Artificial Intelligence as an example, because it's a case where you can see some "skeptics" directing their skepticism at a belief that is very popular in educated circles, that is, the nonmysteriousness and ultimate reverse-engineerability of mind.  You can even see two skeptical principles brought into conflict - does a good skeptic disbelieve in Artificial Intelligence because it's a load of sci-fi which has never been demonstrated?  Or does a good skeptic disbelieve in human exceptionalism, since it would require some mysterious, unanalyzable essence-of-mind unknown to modern science?

It's on questions like these where we find the frontiers of knowledge, and everything now in the settled lands was once on the frontier.  It might seem like a matter of little importance to debate weird non-mainstream beliefs; a matter for easy dismissals and open scorn.  But if this policy is implemented in full generality, progress goes down the tubes.  The mainstream is not completely right, and future science will not just consist of things that sound reasonable to everyone today - there will be at least some things in it that sound weird to us.  (This is certainly the case if something along the lines of Artificial Intelligence is considered weird!)  And yes, eventually such scientific truths will be established by experiment, but somewhere along the line - before they are definitely established and everyone already believes in them - the testers will need funding.

Being skeptical about some non-mainstream beliefs is not a fringe project of little importance, not always a slam-dunk, not a bit of occasional pointless drudgery - though I can certainly understand why it feels that way to argue with creationists.  Skepticism is just the converse of acceptance, and so to be skeptical of a non-mainstream belief is to try to contribute to the project of advancing the borders of the known - to stake an additional epistemic claim that the borders should not expand in this direction, and should advance in some other direction instead.

This is high and difficult work - certainly much more difficult than the work of mocking everything that sounds weird and that the people in your social circle don't already seem to believe.

To put it more formally, before I believe that someone is performing useful cognitive work, I want to know that their skepticism discriminates truth from falsehood, making a contribution over and above the contribution of this-sounds-weird-and-is-not-a-tribal-belief.  In Bayesian terms, I want to know that p(mockery|belief false & not a tribal belief) > p(mockery|belief true & not a tribal belief).

If I recall correctly, the US Air Force's Project Blue Book, on UFOs, explained away as a sighting of the planet Venus what turned out to actually be an experimental aircraft.  No, I don't believe in UFOs either; but if you're going to explain away experimental aircraft as Venus, then nothing else you say provides further Bayesian evidence against UFOs either.  You are merely an undiscriminating skeptic.  I don't believe in UFOs, but in order to credit Project Blue Book with additional help in establishing this, I would have to believe that if there were UFOs then Project Blue Book would have turned in a different report.

And so if you're just as skeptical of a weird, non-tribal belief that turns out to have pretty good support, you just blew the whole deal - that is, if I pay any extra attention to your skepticism, it ought to be because I believe you wouldn't mock a weird non-tribal belief that was worthy of debate.

Personally, I think that Michael Shermer blew it by mocking molecular nanotechnology, and Penn and Teller blew it by mocking cryonics (justification: more or less exactly the same reasons I gave for Artificial Intelligence).  Conversely, Richard Dawkins scooped up a huge truckload of actual-discriminating-skeptic points, at least in my book, for not making fun of the many-worlds interpretation when he was asked about in an interview; indeed, Dawkins noted (correctly) that the traditional collapse postulate pretty much has to be incorrect.  The many-worlds interpretation isn't just the formally simplest explanation that fits the facts, it also sounds weird and is not yet a tribal belief of the educated crowd; so whether someone makes fun of MWI is indeed a good test of whether they understand Occam's Razor or are just mocking everything that's not a tribal belief.

Of course you may not trust me about any of that.  And so my purpose today is not to propose a new litmus test to replace atheism.

But I do propose that before you give anyone credit for being a smart, rational skeptic, that you ask them to defend some non-mainstream belief.  And no, atheism doesn't count as non-mainstream anymore, no matter what the polls show.  It has to be something that most of their social circle doesn't believe, or something that most of their social circle does believe which they think is wrong.  Dawkins endorsing many-worlds still counts for now, although its usefulness as an indicator is fading fast... but the point is not to endorse many-worlds, but to see them take some sort of positive stance on where the frontiers of knowledge should change.

Don't get me wrong, there's a whole crazy world out there, and when Richard Dawkins starts whaling on astrology in "The Enemies of Reason" documentary, he is doing good and necessary work. But it's dangerous to let people pick up too much credit just for slamming astrology and homeopathy and UFOs and God.  What if they become famous skeptics by picking off the cheap targets, and then use that prestige and credibility to go after nanotechnology?  Who will dare to consider cryonics now that it's been featured on an episode of Penn and Teller's "Bullshit"?  On the current system you can gain high prestige in the educated circle just by targeting beliefs like astrology that are widely believed to be uneducated; but then the same guns can be turned on new ideas like the many-worlds interpretation, even though it's being actively debated by physicists.  And that's why I suggest, not any particular litmus test, but just that you ought to have to stick your neck out and say something a little less usual - say where you are not skeptical (and most of your tribemates are) or where you are skeptical (and most of the people in your tribe are not).

I am minded to pay attention to Robyn Dawes as a skillful rationalist, not because Dawes has slammed easy targets like astrology, but because he also took the lead in assembling and popularizing the total lack of experimental evidence for nearly all schools of psychotherapy and the persistence of multiple superstitions such as Rorschach ink-blot interpretation in the face of literally hundreds of experiments trying and failing to find any evidence for it.  It's not that psychotherapy seemed like a difficult target after Dawes got through with it, but that, at the time he attacked it, people in educated circles still thought of it as something that educated people believed in.  It's not quite as useful today, but back when Richard Feynman published "Surely You're Joking, Mr. Feynman" you could pick up evidence that he was actually thinking from the fact that he disrespected psychotherapists as well as psychics.

I'll conclude with some simple and non-trustworthy indicators that the skeptic is just filling in a cheap and largely automatic mockery template:

I'll conclude the conclusion by observing that poor skepticism can just as easily exist in a case where a belief is wrong as when a belief is right, so pointing out these flaws in someone's skepticism can hardly serve to establish a positive belief about where the frontiers of knowledge should move.

1361 comments

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comment by orthonormal · 2010-03-16T01:12:41.572Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think we've achieved a new record for "most distinct subthreads that would be flamewars anywhere else on the Internet, but somehow aren't yet".

The previous recordholder, I'm pretty sure, is also on Less Wrong.

Replies from: Jack, simplicio
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T01:57:13.284Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

A partial list to compare to future record breaking attempts: Global Warming, Meredith Kercher's murder, atheism, gun control, race and IQ, Pick-up artists, cryonics, Scandinavian social welfare, nuclear deterence, sweatshops, industry bailouts, immigration, UFOs, homosexuality, polyamory, bisexuality, pedophilia, necrophilia, cannibalism, rape, 2 girls 1 cup, sex change, generalizations about promiscuity, straight men like lesbians, masochism, incest, people getting off to cartoons, people getting off to cartoons of pre-teen girls, 9/11 was an inside job, and Communism.

Replies from: BenAlbahari, Bill_McGrath, ciphergoth
comment by BenAlbahari · 2010-03-16T02:09:16.177Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Don't forget the biggest of them all: "questioning our raison d'etre"; i.e. we debated the value of rationality, whilst remaining civil and keeping the discussion meaningful. For comparison, imagine suggesting that "tennis isn't all that great" on a tennis forum.

comment by Bill_McGrath · 2011-09-26T10:44:29.756Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Eugenics; that ought to be a fun one as well.

Replies from: Laoch
comment by Laoch · 2013-11-14T10:30:26.196Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This reminds of the supposed spectre of "designer babies".

Non-sceptic rationalist: "Oh don't do that scientific research it'll end in designer babies!!!!"

Rationalist: "So what if it does?"

comment by Paul Crowley (ciphergoth) · 2010-03-24T12:50:30.035Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

We should try gun control some time...

comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T01:22:59.015Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That is so true. & that is why I bloody love this site.

Still, I think to get the perfect compendium, somebody ought to mention fascism.

Replies from: CronoDAS, Nick_Tarleton
comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-16T02:16:49.066Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Fascism was never a well-defined political philosophy, as far as I can tell. It seems that, today, it seems to be a synonym for "non-Communist government I don't like".

Replies from: Jack, simplicio
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T02:28:20.458Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'd say it became increasingly less well-defined after it's creation.

comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T02:54:44.492Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I always thought of it as basically a reaction to communism, wherein the state takes control of industry but sort of for the benefit of industry rather than labour. But yeah, definitely a pretty amorphous thing.

Anyway, it's mentioned now! Hurrah!

Replies from: CronoDAS, RobinZ
comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-16T02:59:28.684Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I've seen it defined, perhaps ironically, as "When the government takes over the corporations, that's called communism. When the corporations take over the government, that's called fascism."

comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-16T03:03:30.401Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I always thought of it as basically a reaction to communism [...]

From Jack's link in the previous comment:

By the time Mussolini returned from Allied service in World War I, he had decided that socialism as a doctrine had largely been a failure. In 1917, Mussolini got his start in politics with the help of a £100 weekly wage from MI5, the British Security Service; this help was authorised by Sir Samuel Hoare. In early 1918, Mussolini called for the emergence of a man "ruthless and energetic enough to make a clean sweep" to revive the Italian nation. Much later in life Mussolini said he felt by 1919 "Socialism as a doctrine was already dead; it continued to exist only as a grudge". On 23 March 1919, Mussolini reformed the Milan fascio as the Fasci Italiani di Combattimento (Italian Combat Squad), consisting of 200 members.

No further comment. :)

comment by Scott Alexander (Yvain) · 2010-03-16T21:28:00.250Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Two more non-trustworthy indicators:

  • Ask the person in question which of the several ridiculous ideas they reject they find least ridiculous - for example "Which do you think is more likely to be true - astrology, or UFOs?" I've found people trying to signal affiliation have a hard time with this sort of question and will even be flustered by it, saying something along the lines of "They're both stupid" or "Is this some sort of trick to make me sound like I believe a crazy idea?". A rationalist will say something more like "Well, I don't believe either, but UFOs at least make sense with our idea of the universe, whereas astrology is just plain crazytalk" (or ze may refuse to answer on the grounds that you're wasting zir time; it's not a perfect test).

  • Observe the circumstances in which the person involved brings up the belief. If they just go to atheist forums and say "Man, those religious people sure are stupid," higher probability of signaller. If they actively talk to religious people, try to use atheism as a starting point for building new ideas, and don't bring it up much when it's not relevant, higher probability they believe it for the right reasons.

Replies from: goodside, MichaelVassar, Strange7
comment by goodside · 2010-03-17T12:44:37.214Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I wouldn't answer the astrology/UFO question. Extraterrestrials visiting in flying human-vehicle-sized ships from human-visible distances is so horribly anthropomorphic as to make it immeasurably improbable. Both propositions are far less likely than me winning the lottery, and that's the best I can get from my wetware. Anything further is like asking, "Which are you more certain is a European country, France or Spain?"

Also, I'm inclined to avoid questions of this form on principle. It's like Yudkowsky's "blue tentacle" in Technical Explanation: Being able to find outs for a theory that doesn't fit evidence is anti-knowledge, and the more practice you get at it the crazier you become.

Replies from: RobinZ, jhuffman, RobbBB
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-17T12:50:07.017Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Spain is more Middle-Eastern than France and France was on the European front of both World Wars, so France. I can see your point, though.

comment by jhuffman · 2011-09-26T21:03:43.785Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

UFOs are possible given what we know of the universe. Unlikely, yes, but its possible to have them without us learning much new about the universe. Astrology, not so much. Astrology means we have totally whiffed on science and have to integrate all the contradictory information we have in ways that are unimaginable.

comment by Rob Bensinger (RobbBB) · 2013-04-24T10:26:14.982Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm not quite sure what you mean by 'anthropomorphic' here. One way to think about framing the comparison is to note that if intelligent extraterrestrials have visited us, we have to update strongly in favor of their intelligence playing an important role in our intelligence. In any universe that isn't completely teeming with intelligent life, this will hold for anthropic reasons; two intelligences are immeasurably more likely to encounter each other if one had a causal role in the other's coming to existence (via panspermia and/or guided evolution). So some of the bizarre anthropomorphism here can be dispensed with.

But note that if we want to pull a similar trick regarding astrology -- and I think there's several orders of magnitude more reason to be inclined to do this in the astrology case than in the UFO case -- then we'll need to posit an intelligent designer for our entire universe, not just for our species. In the one case our understanding of the origin of life on Earth is wrong; that's not surprising as these things go, since most scientists have already noted their current and ongoing confusion about the timeline for life on Earth's origination. In the other case, however, our understanding of the fabric of the universe is completely wrong. We are not in the least bit confused, at this point, about how it is that our psychological dispositions sometimes correlate with astronomical phenomena. To discover that there is a causal connection would mean that Approximately Everything You Know Is A Lie. That's a bigger deal, I think.

comment by MichaelVassar · 2010-03-17T20:36:47.280Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

A sufficiently good rationalist should probably decompose astrology and UFOs into different possible definitions and discuss both priors and the nature of the processes that probably produce the two beliefs.

comment by Strange7 · 2011-06-27T06:15:12.747Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'd be willing to seriously consider astrology in the sense that what time of year someone was born, and thus the weather and food their mother was exposed to in utero or that they had to deal with during some early developmental window, could have consistent effects on personality.

I've heard enough conflicting explanations for "UFOs" that I think there probably is some real phenomenon to explain, even if it's just neurological.

Replies from: DanielLC
comment by DanielLC · 2012-03-19T00:11:13.867Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I've heard enough conflicting explanations for "UFOs" that I think there probably is some real phenomenon to explain, even if it's just neurological.

What makes you think there's only one?

comment by Emile · 2010-03-15T10:56:45.016Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Another good indicator (as djbc said) is the level of certitude : if someone expresses more certitude on a complex topic like gun control than on a slamdunk like God - then I won't trust their confidence much.

Does that mean only hardcore atheists are worth listening to? Maybe, but some claims about religion are not that obvious - for example, is religion good or bad for society in terms of enforcing moral behaviour, facilitating cooperation, raising children, etc. ? I don't consider that question a slamdunk.

Another red flag for me is "clannish" language, presenting issues in terms of "group A vs group B" ("this is a victory for us", "hah, that shows them", etc.). It's a sign that the wrong part of the brain is being used.

Replies from: aausch
comment by aausch · 2010-03-15T21:24:44.323Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I wonder what you mean by "hardcore atheists"?

I'm guessing you don't mean hardcore as in "signaling group membership loudly", and Eliezer already argued the point that atheism is no longer a valid synonym for reliable, rational thought.

Replies from: Emile, Psychohistorian
comment by Emile · 2010-03-15T22:03:09.678Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm not quite sure myself :D

I mostly meant "as opposed to agnostic" ("strong atheist" would be a better word then), but wanted to point out (as Eliezer had indeed already done) that extreme commitment (for example, blaming religion for all evils) was not necessarily a good signal.

Replies from: aausch
comment by aausch · 2010-03-16T14:22:03.328Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I get it now, thank you.

You would expect rational thought to lead to a higher level of commitment on decisions about religion than gun control, but higher level of commitment on the topics is not a good signal for rational thought.

comment by Psychohistorian · 2010-03-15T22:16:29.008Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think "hardcore atheist" generally means, "atheist who actively and loudly antagonizes religion." That is not consistent with the poster's usage, but I don't think any adjective would be - the point is that people who are not atheists may be worth listening to, not that some "not-hardcore" atheists are also worth listening to in addition to the hardcore atheists.

Replies from: aausch
comment by aausch · 2010-03-16T14:15:26.866Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I assume we agree that atheism is not a signal for rational thought anymore - if that's true, are you getting any additional useful information by looking at how loudly someone antagonizes religion?

Replies from: Psychohistorian
comment by Psychohistorian · 2010-03-16T17:59:36.570Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I would think that higher levels of overt religious antagonism indicate low agreeableness. It may be an indicator not so much of irrationality as of a sort of intellectual laziness or poor judgement, as it's an unconstructive behaviour that generates a great deal of self-satisfaction for not doing anything particularly difficult.

That said, I was rather closer to that kind of atheism when I was younger, so I'm decidedly biased.

Replies from: aausch
comment by aausch · 2010-03-16T20:03:14.687Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think I have a similar point of view to yours, on this.

comment by simplicio · 2010-03-15T04:02:40.970Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'll bite the bullet and say global warming is the perfect example here. It's pretty clear to me that many people hold their positions on this issue - pro and contra - for political/social reasons rather than evidential ones.

Unfortunately that often seems to be the case when there are vested interests in the answer going one way or the other.

The impact of genetics on behaviour is another example. Most of the educated people I know are ultra-behaviorists, so if I see somebody argue that genes matter (but aren't everything), they definitely get brownie points. Especially since such a view tends to be seen as vaguely quasi-racist.

Replies from: jimmy, AlexMennen, Nick_Tarleton, FAWS, wedrifid, taw, Roko, aausch, PhilGoetz, brazil84
comment by jimmy · 2010-03-16T03:45:58.943Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The problem with asking race related questions is that there's a much stronger social pressure to shut up if you believe something that comes off as racist.

If you support cryonics, the worst that happens is that you come off as having strange beliefs. Take most any factual claim about race and you're an asshole for even thinking about it.

Of course, once the person is confident that you won't attack them for holding politically incorrect views, you can start to get some information flow, but that takes time to develop comfort. That's actually my litmus test for how comfortable someone is with me- whether they'll actually say something that is really unPC.

Replies from: simplicio
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T04:09:40.163Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The problem with asking race related questions is that there's a much stronger social pressure to shut up if you believe something that comes off as racist.

I'm at a loss as to what to do about that, because I do get where that pressure is coming from. In presenting such data, you can hedge and qualify all you want, but what many people are going to hear is just a lot of wonderful reasons why their prejudices were right all along, and how science proved it. What can anybody do? A remedial course in ethics ("moral equality does not require literal sameness")?

Sometimes I do think discussions of race and gender-related fact questions are best not done "in front of the goyim." It's a vexing question.

Replies from: NancyLebovitz
comment by NancyLebovitz · 2010-03-16T12:15:06.068Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There's an additional problem-- there's a social circle where the consensus is that believing in race and gender differences in ability is proof of rationality, so if you're trying to do a counter-tribe rationality check, you'd need to know which tribe has a stronger influence on a person.

If Africa has the most genetic variation for humans, does that imply it's likely that the smartest human subgroup is likely to be African?

Replies from: Strange7
comment by Strange7 · 2011-06-27T08:00:54.450Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

All else being equal, yes. However, many regions of Africa have ongoing problems with public health, availability of education, etc. that would wash out any advantages in genetic predisposition for intelligence.

comment by AlexMennen · 2010-03-16T03:21:15.606Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"I'll bite the bullet and say global warming is the perfect example here. It's pretty clear to me that many people hold their positions on this issue - pro and contra - for political/social reasons rather than evidential ones."

I used to think that global warming was a poor example of this because while the right wing has plenty of reasons to oppose actions to fight global warming, and thus irrational reasons to force themselves to believe that global warming does not exist, the left wing does not have any reasons to support actions to fight global warming aside from evidence that global warming is a threat. Then it occurred to me that many people on the left actually do have alternate motives for pushing anti-global warming actions: other people on the left support it too (see Eliezer's The Sky is Green/Blue parable, and this article too, I suppose). This is even more irrational, but due to the stunning level of irrationality among humans on all sides of the political spectrum, is probably a factor for some.

Replies from: Jack, Larks, Nick_Tarleton, simplicio
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T03:40:59.442Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

the left wing does not have any reasons to support actions to fight global warming aside from evidence that global warming is a threat.

The story conservatives usually tell here is that the left wants to fight global warming as a way to further their economic agenda and narrative: corporations are bad and the government needs to stop them and control them. You see slogans like "Green is the new red".

comment by Larks · 2010-03-19T11:15:46.925Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Fighting global warming can be used to justify the creation of 'green' jobs, in a new spin on the old keynesian make work ideas.

Alternatively, it can be used to provide justification for 'green protectionism'.

comment by Nick_Tarleton · 2010-03-18T17:38:40.093Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

the left wing does not have any reasons to support actions to fight global warming aside from evidence that global warming is a threat.

However, someone who believes that global warming is a threat, and who has a poor grasp of ethics, has a motive to exaggerate the evidence, to compensate for others having too strict evidential standards or not doing cost-benefit analysis correctly.

Also, the image of oneself as on the vanguard of saving the world is a strong motivation to believe the world is endangered (overlapping with but distinct from group identity).

(Disclaimer: I don't think this is most of what's going on with AGW believers. Not having studied the issue, I default (albeit tentatively) to believing the scientific consensus.)

This is even more irrational, but due to the stunning level of irrationality among humans on all sides of the political spectrum, is probably a factor for some.

It's absolutely a factor. People are crazy, the world is mad, you shouldn't be surprised by this or hesitant in calling it as you see it.

comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T03:27:32.368Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Then it occurred to me that many people on the left actually do have alternate motives for pushing anti-global warming actions: other people on the left support it too

Bingo. The Michael Moore-style crowd is engaged in nothing less than an immense progressive circle-jerk, if you'll excuse my Klatchian. It's too bad we can't just throw them at the Limbaughistas and liberate gamma rays.

comment by Nick_Tarleton · 2010-03-15T17:26:27.145Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Most of the educated people I know are ultra-behaviorists

I'm pretty sure you're misusing the word "behaviorist".

Replies from: simplicio
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-15T17:32:45.307Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

On reflection, you're right. It's a pars pro toto thing I guess, since behaviourism is associated with the idea that personality comes from the environment alone.

"Nurturist" is probably a better term.

Replies from: johnlawrenceaspden
comment by johnlawrenceaspden · 2012-10-03T01:46:45.637Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

And has "Naturist" as a convenient antonym...

comment by FAWS · 2010-03-15T11:35:13.260Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'll bite the bullet and say global warming is the perfect example here. It's pretty clear to me that many people hold their positions on this issue - pro and contra - for political/social reasons rather than evidential ones.

There seems to be plenty of motivated arguing on both sides. But even though climate science is complicated the basic mechanism for CO2 raising temperatures is really simple and well supported by basic science. No one is disputing CO2's absorption spectrum (that I know of). It's possible that CO2 might not have any such effect on aggregate in a complicated system, but that would be quite remarkable and I don't think any mechanism has been proposed (other than that global warming is miraculously balancing out a coming ice age).

Replies from: Hook, taw, BenAlbahari
comment by Hook · 2010-03-15T12:46:20.111Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

My litmus test for whether someone even has the basic knowledge that might entitle them to the opinion that anthropogenic climate change isn't happening is: "All other things being equal, does adding CO2 to the atmosphere make the world warmer?"

The answer is of course "yes." Now, if a climate change non-skeptic answers "yes" the follow up question to see if they are entitled to their opinion that anthropogenic climate change is happening: "How could a climate change skeptic answer 'yes' to that question?" The correct answer to that is left as an exercise for the reader.

Replies from: FAWS
comment by FAWS · 2010-03-15T13:16:35.055Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

For example like this:

  • Yes, but the behavior of one component of the system doesn't necessarily determine the behavior of the system as a whole. It's the responsibility of those who propose an anthropogenic climate change to prove that it's happening, not the other way round.

Most of the actual scientific debate seems to be centered around the reliability of the temperature record (and of different proxies) and of climate models (I consider it very likely that the skeptics are right on many of these issues), not around the question whether an anthropogenic climate change of some level is happening at all. At least I'm not aware of any climate scientist making the argument that no anthropogenic warming effect could possibly exist due to X (where X is some [proposed] physical reality, not something of the sort "that would be human hubris").

Replies from: Hook
comment by Hook · 2010-03-15T13:29:02.001Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Richard Lindzen is a nut, but he's also an MIT professor of meteorology who has made arguments from physical reality (mostly) that AGW isn't real.

Replies from: FAWS
comment by FAWS · 2010-03-15T13:54:07.863Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The closest thing I could find on that page and the the most promising looking links was the water vapor argument (which is more of an argument that AGW should be smaller than expected rather than non-existent) and he apparently doesn't subscribe to that anymore. Other than that he seems content to cast doubts and make accusations against the other side. If he has a new X, is there any good summary anywhere?

Just out of interest, what would have been the correct answer to the test (rot13 if you don't want to spoil it)?

Replies from: Morendil
comment by Morendil · 2010-03-15T14:08:24.715Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The position of "sane" climate skeptics appears to be that rising CO2 levels' effects on temperature will be dampened by other regulatory causal effects; the evidence for the existence of such regulatory feedback is the overall stability of climate over long periods of time.

My main concern with that position is that it is whistling in the dark.

Replies from: Hook, FAWS
comment by Hook · 2010-03-15T14:24:05.229Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That's just about what I was thinking. Anything that pointed out that the "all other things being equal" clause doesn't describe reality would be sufficient.

comment by FAWS · 2010-03-15T14:18:04.164Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That's what I meant with argument about climate models, different models suggest different mixes of positive and negative feedback.

Actually I'd be much more worried about CO2 emissions if I was convinced there was a strong dampening effect of unknown origin. That suggests the system might potentially be stressed to the breaking point, and afterwards a runaway process might result in vesusification. Even a very small risk of that would dominate all other climate related risks.

comment by taw · 2010-03-15T16:00:17.086Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It's possible that CO2 might not have any such effect on aggregate in a complicated system, but that would be quite remarkable

Not particularly remarkable. Homeostatic systems are the norm in the world, not the exception; and there are plenty of negative feedback mechanisms for CO2, starting from the most trivial one of more CO2 -> more photosynthesis -> (hopefully) more biomass not biodegraded back into carbon circulation.

I think it's widely accepted such mechanism will bring CO2 levels back to their original equilibrium once anthropogenic emissions end, unfortunately over thousands of years. But - similar mechanisms for methane and CFCs are far faster and we might be already past peak atmospheric methane/CFC.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2011-09-26T06:07:15.873Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

more CO2 -> more photosynthesis -> (hopefully) more biomass not biodegraded back into carbon circulation.

The upper bound for photosynthesis is constrained by plant populations and the area they cover, not atmospheric CO2 -- adding more CO2 to the air doesn't necessarily increase photosynthetic activity. Human metabolism doesn't increase in step with the number of calories you consume; there's a limit to the base rate at which those biological processes can operate, independent of how much of their base inputs are lying around. Biology is more complicated than that.

Replies from: taw
comment by taw · 2011-09-26T16:43:35.405Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

RuBisCO activity is usually the limiting step in photosynthesis, and it depends on CO2 concentrations (or CO2 to O2 ratios). Adding more CO2 to the air will increase photosynthetic activity, there's no doubt about it.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2011-09-26T17:10:31.795Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

RuBisCO is the rate-limiting factor for plants, yes. But there's more CO2 in the air naturally than they can adjust upward to compensate for, even before we factor in human-generated sources. The RuBisCO reaction is not maximally-efficient, which is why attempts to increase the rate of enzymatic activity are at the forefront of genetic engineering research into carbon sequestration. Additionally, the two relevant parameters (carbon dioxide fixing and oxygen incorporation) may already have struck a maximally-efficient tradeoff balance in many species of plants; self-modifying to favor increased CO2 fixation is not a trivial step; the gains here can be translated to losses over there, elsewhere in the biosystem. The organism is not its parts.

Anyway, if tomorrow we come up with plants that have a higher efficiency rate of carbon dioxide fixing, and they start pulling more CO2 from the air per unit time, that won't fundamentally change that the population of plants and the room for them to grow is the determining factor in how much photosynthesis gets conducted -- the RuBisCO reaction occurs in plants and protists such as algae when we're talking about the macroscale, and basically nothing else.

Posit an artificial photosynthetic cell that can pack greater efficiency than the best of plants into the same surface area, and things are different. But we don't have any such thing as yet.

comment by BenAlbahari · 2010-03-15T13:55:10.503Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It's a good habit to avoid the Appeal To Ignorance of an opposing view.

  1. Some skeptics do actually dispute the absorption effect of CO2.
  2. The proposed mechanism by which CO2 does not cause overall warming is a negative feedback loop.

I actually agree with your conclusion, but here's the evidence you need to back up the specific cases you brought up:

Does atmospheric CO2 cause significant global warming?
Do negative feedback loops mostly cushion the effect of atmospheric CO2 increases?

Replies from: FAWS
comment by FAWS · 2010-03-15T14:33:12.408Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Some skeptics do actually dispute the absorption effect of CO2.

That is, they claim that the spectrum of CO2 has been faked? Or deny that there is such a thing as a spectrum?

The proposed mechanism by which CO2 does not cause overall warming is a negative feedback loop.

I was aware of feedback loop proposals, but they seem to amount to arguing for a weaker AGW effect rather than none. I tend to mentally file them under squabbling about the exact models rather than AGW denial. Are there any such proposed loops that would result in zero or effectively zero warming? ITSM that all feedback loops that involve actual warming as a step would not qualify because to result in effectively zero warming the effect would have to be strong enough to drown out temperature changes from all other causes unless overwhelmingly strong.

Replies from: BenAlbahari
comment by BenAlbahari · 2010-03-15T15:20:00.256Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The leading skeptics (e.g. Roy Spencer) claim that negative feedback loops (due to clouds that reflect heat back into space) will reduce the warming effect of CO2 to be within the fluctuations Earth naturally experiences. So it's a serious denial, rather than a minor squabble. And the views of the opposing experts (also in the link I sent) strongly indicate Spencer and his colleagues are mistaken (one such reason is that without a positive feedback, it's very hard to explain the rapid shift in temperatures we know occurred between glacials and interglacials).

The skeptics who deny CO2 actually has an effect at all are fringe. The link I sent has the most qualified expert I could find (Gerhard Gerlich) who holds that view. Given that even the NIPCC (Non-Governmental International Panel on Climate Change) hasn't subscribed to this position, I disregard its importance.

The arguments and experts are all summarized here (it's a wiki, so you can add to it yourself if you find something new):
http://www.takeonit.com/question/5.aspx

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2011-09-26T06:01:56.259Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The leading skeptics (e.g. Roy Spencer) claim that negative feedback loops (due to clouds that reflect heat > back into space) will reduce the warming effect of CO2 to be within the fluctuations Earth naturally experiences.

I don't know as I'd find that comforting, considering that the Cretaceous climate was within fluctuations the Earth naturally experiences, and transitioning to that in such a short time would still be a pretty darn significant systemic shock to economy and ecology alike...

EDIT: To be clear, I'm not saying we're headed for a new Cretaceous, just that "fluctuations the Earth naturally experiences" could still allow for some pretty steep gradients between the last century and any plausible, randomly-selected point within the known range.

comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-15T04:40:55.501Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The impact of genetics on behaviour is another example. Most of the educated people I know are ultra-behaviorists, so if I see somebody argue that genes matter (but aren't everything), they definitely get brownie points. Especially since such a view tends to be seen as vaguely quasi-racist.

Are educated people really that badly informed? I would believe it but sometimes I overestimate how much my own knowledge is representative.

Replies from: CronoDAS, Psychohistorian, simplicio
comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-15T20:46:16.492Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I've found that, in general, yes, people really are that badly informed about basically everything.

comment by Psychohistorian · 2010-03-15T22:20:01.608Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm not sure people are that badly informed, so much as people are unwilling to admit beliefs that contradict the beliefs they are "supposed" to have.

comment by simplicio · 2010-03-15T04:51:50.390Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I went looking for polls to answer your question; the only one I could find was this outdated one. So on the basis of that one, I'm wrong. But there's no breakdown there for level of education.

However, I suspect based on my anecdotal experience that educated people might be worse than the general public.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-15T05:05:17.919Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

However, I suspect based on my anecdotal experience that educated people might be worse than the general public.

That wouldn't surprise me. Ignorance of bad information can be a good thing. There are political reasons to neglect genetic influence (easier to blame people while avoiding charges of racism and sexism). There are are also ideological motivations for such a preference (see pjeby's emphasis on learned responses rather than genetic influences).

Replies from: simplicio
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-15T05:57:42.803Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Ignorance of bad information can be a good thing.

True. In that respect I think part of the problem might also be the Science News Cycle as it applies to genetics. The geneticists know what they mean by "a gene for X" - merely a shorthand, that the presence of the gene affects the expression of X along with umpteen other factors. But inevitably the news media report a "gene for intelligence" as though the gene was a switch to turn intelligence on or off. Probably that type of thing has undermined any & all innatist ideas.

Replies from: CarlShulman
comment by CarlShulman · 2010-03-15T10:08:13.599Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That's primarily an issue in the titles (often set by editors). The body of the text usually has the standard litany of basic caveats.

comment by taw · 2010-03-15T15:46:47.444Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Here's explanation of my pro-ultra-behaviorist position.

First, I haven't seen any convincing evidence against ultra-behaviorism, but plenty against ultra-innatism. Look at Flynn effect for example. There's absolutely no way a universe in which ultra-innatism is true is compatible with Flynn effect. There has been so many drastic shifts in behavior without slightest shift in underlying genetic makeup of population - abandonment of violence, shift from large families and low offspring investment to small families and high offspring investment, shift from agricultural to urban lifestyle etc. - these are vastly greater than any of the proposed genetic variations. And not a single kind of proposed genetically-based behavioral variation had a convincing genetic marker found for it (yes, there are heredity studies on twins etc. but I find they highly unconvincing). So my estimate of the truth is far closer to ultra-behaviorist end than ultra-innatist end, so much closer than ultra-behaviorism might be a good "tl;dr" version, even if not 100% accurate.

And second, I find ultra-behaviorism instrumentally useful. Overestimating how much you can change your life leads to better outcomes than underestimating it and just giving up.

Replies from: simplicio, ChristianKl, DonGeddis, dripgrind, knb
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-15T16:41:14.490Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There's absolutely no way a universe in which ultra-innatism is true is compatible with Flynn effect

Just to clarify, in arguing against ultra-behaviourism I am not touting the opposite stupidity of ultra-innatism instead. So yeah, I agree. The 40-0-60 heuristic is closer to my view (40% of variance due to genes, 0-10% upbringing, 60% other environmental).

There has been so many drastic shifts in behavior without slightest shift in underlying genetic makeup of population

Yup. Culture and language is an incredible thing. Still, many traits are partially heritable, some strongly so. I refer you to Bouchard's meta-analysis. Why do you find twin/sibling/adopted sibling studies unconvincing?

ultra-behaviorism might be a good "tl;dr" version, even if not 100% accurate.

That is exactly where we stand now. The problem is, genetics is getting important in public policy. The tl;dr version needs to lose the tl;d if educated people are going to make policy decisions based on it (which they are).

And second, I find ultra-behaviorism instrumentally useful. Overestimating how much you can change your life leads to better outcomes than underestimating it and just giving up.

Mm... maybe. On the other hand knowing genes matter might prevent one taking needless risks. For example, my family is swarming with alcoholics going back 3 generations. Maybe if I wasn't a teetotaler I'd be fine... on the other hand, there's no good reason to fire a gun at your head even if you're pretty sure it's not loaded.

I'm very wary of this "instrumental usefulness" of beliefs though. It seems a slippery slope.

comment by ChristianKl · 2010-03-15T19:32:53.021Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Arguing that the flynn effect shows that someone else should have a different opinion on the question of how much intelligence is heritable just shows misunderstanding of the meaning of the term of heritablity.

Otherwise it would be logical to say that all of intelligence is due to culture. Why? Let's say all individuals with IQ > 300 happen to be born past the singularity. Past singularity we have the technology to make people intelligent and therefore intelligence can't be truly innate.

Therefore modern biology defines heritability as the variance of a trait within a given population that's due to genetics. In it's essence the question of heritability doesn't only depend on genes but it also depends on the environment.

There nothing wrong with saying that the heritability changes over time. A society where every child can eat as much as it wants has probably a different heritability for IQ than a society where some children don't have enough food and other children who have wealthy parents do have enough food.

Replies from: taw
comment by taw · 2010-03-15T21:40:37.717Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Past singularity we have the technology to make people intelligent and therefore intelligence can't be truly innate.

And it would be correct.

variance of a trait within a given population that's due to genetics

which is a completely meaningless concept and cannot be measured.

Replies from: FAWS
comment by FAWS · 2010-03-15T21:44:25.830Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Past singularity we have the technology to make people intelligent and therefore intelligence can't be truly innate.

And it would be correct.

Is hair color innate?

variance of a trait within a given population that's due to genetics

which is a completely meaningless concept and cannot be measured.

Twin studies etc?

comment by DonGeddis · 2010-03-15T23:55:17.937Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Do you have the same opinion about gender-linked "genetically-based behavioral variation"?

Not to open a can of worms here, but the pickup-artist (PUA) community is all about how the innate behavior of (generally heterosexual) men and women differ, in dating scenarios. And, in particular, how those real behaviors differ from the behavior that is taught and reinforced by society and culture.

You can have an opinion that all behavior is changeable, and that it is shaped by society and culture. But that would lead you to one model of how men and women act during dating. (In particular, to a mostly gender-neutral model.) The PUA community has a different model of human dating behavior ... and I would say that theirs is a good deal more accurate at predicting actual observed behavior in the field.

Replies from: Jack, wnoise
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T00:04:47.500Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

(generally heterosexual) men and women differ, in dating scenarios

True story: My lesbian roommate runs mad game with remarkable success.

Replies from: simplicio, Cyan
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T01:40:39.876Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I may be setting myself up for ridicule, but: mad game?

Do you mean she gets a lot of dates?

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T02:06:17.534Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

No worries, it's a colloquialism that is probably limited to American youth culture. I mean she does basically the kinds of things the Pick-Up Artist community would recommend men do to date and sleep with women. The remarkable success consists of her sleeping with different women multiple times a week.

comment by Cyan · 2010-03-27T23:56:41.780Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Is she a natural or a self-taught unnatural (or something else)?

comment by wnoise · 2010-03-16T00:16:20.280Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You can have an opinion that all behavior is changeable, and that it is shaped by society and culture. But that would lead you to one model of how men and women act during dating. (In particular, to a mostly gender-neutral model.)

That only follows if the societal pressures on men and women are mostly gender-neutral. This does not appear to be the case.

Replies from: jimmy
comment by jimmy · 2010-03-16T04:00:51.265Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That's completely true, but you gotta wonder where the asymmetry comes from in the first place.

comment by dripgrind · 2010-03-16T14:29:15.301Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It's not true to say that those shifts took place without any "shift in underlying genetic makeup of population" - there has been significant human evolution over the last 6,000 years during the "shift from agricultural to urban lifestyle".

Of course, this isn't an argument for innatism, since evolution didn't cause the changes in lifestyle, but the common meme that human population genetics are exactly the same today as they were on the savannah isn't true.

comment by knb · 2010-03-18T01:32:45.734Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Radical Behaviorism has been conclusively proven false. Read about the Garcia Effect, Harry Harlowe's monkey experiments, etc. Garcia demonstrated that animals come "preprogrammed" with the ability to associate taste aversions with certain negative stimuli. This is old research, behaviorism is long dead.

Also, can you explain how you find twin studies "unconvincing"!?

And second, I find ultra-behaviorism instrumentally useful. Overestimating how much you can change your life leads to better outcomes than underestimating it and just giving up.

Similarly, religion is useful because it deludes people into believing they'll be punished for all misbehavior.

Replies from: taw
comment by taw · 2010-03-18T13:04:40.253Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You seem to be referring to entirely different thing also called "behaviorism". One I talk about answers nature-vs-nurture by siding almost totally on the nurture side - it says virtually all variety of human behavior comes from different environments humans live in, not from them having different genes. The one you refer to is a particular theory of learning which is completely unrelated. It's not the only case of unrelated things having the same name.

Also, can you explain how you find twin studies "unconvincing"!?

Culture acts on genetic cues in arbitrary way. Let's say culture considers light skin higher status than dark skin. Then skin color genes will correlate ridiculously high with outcomes - and yet not a tiniest bit of this is genetic, it's 100% cultural effect. I see no value of any kind in such studies.

Similarly, religion is useful because it deludes people into believing they'll be punished for all misbehavior.

... and money is useful because it deludes people into believing they should work even though they could survive just fine with a lot less effort without working.

Our civilization is built upon such shared delusions.

Replies from: knb
comment by knb · 2010-03-18T15:52:29.646Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There are single nucleotide polymorphisms which have a drastic impact on aggression in humans. For example one MAO-A gene type leads to hyper-aggressive behavior in humans and macaque monkeys. I doubt it is culture causing this behavior in monkeys and humans.

comment by Roko · 2010-03-15T11:31:19.399Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Seconded. And I'll add that asking whether people support the renewal of the nuclear deterrent was a good one for centre/left people here in the uk.

For right-wingers, something like getting them to admit that Scandinavia is doing something right with its high tax system and consequent high happiness.

Replies from: Jack, Nick_Tarleton, BenAlbahari, simplicio, taw
comment by Jack · 2010-03-15T19:32:14.451Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It isn't topical anymore but a couple years ago getting an American liberal's take on the Dubai Ports World controversy worked pretty well. Also, progressive criticisms of the Bush administration for not implementing more aggressive cargo inspections and airplane security were pretty much just about getting in shots at the administration and not based on evidence.

Last year's debates on bailouts for the automobile and banking sectors struck me as mostly consisting of political signaling with only a handful of people who actually had any idea what they were talking about. You'd see people arguing either side without actually making any reference to any of the economics involved. I.e. "We need to make sure these people don't lose their jobs!" versus "You're just trying to help out your fat cat friends!".

Getting someone on the center-left to admit certain advantages of free trade and market economies probably works as well. The brute opposition to "sweatshops" without offering any constructive policy to provide the people who work in such places with alternatives strikes me as another good example.

It's a little harder for me to do this for the American right-wing since a sizeable portion (definitely not all of it, just an especially vocal part) of it appears to hold their positions for exclusively non-evidential reasons. Some of these reasons don't event appear to have propositional content. (Maybe conservatives see the left this way, though. It might just be that I'm too far away from the right-wing to see this clearly).

A conservative's position on industry subsides- agriculture, textile, sugar etc. is a probably a decent indicator, though. I'd say immigration but the people who oppose it might have good reasons given their terminal values.

A lot of times you can tell when someone holds a position for political reasons just by their diction. It is a really bad sign If someone is using the same phrases and buzzwords as the candidates they support. This reminds me: A little over a year ago the college Democrats here held a debate for the Democratic Presidential Primary. Each candidate was represented by a student who was supporting that candidate. I thought it had potential since being unofficial representatives the students would be comfortable leveling some harsh criticisms and really diving into their reasons for supporting their candidate. The actual candidates are always too afraid of screwing up or alienating someone to diverge from their talking points. What actually happened isn't surprising once you think about the kind of people who are heavily involved in the college branches of political parties (especially at my university). If you haven't guessed it, what happened was this: Every student representative sat on the stage reciting the very same talking points their candidate was already using to dodge criticisms and spin issues in the real debates. It was like a horrifying training session where students learn to ignore evidence, reason in favor of political hackery and bullshit.

Replies from: simplicio, Emile
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T01:55:17.286Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It was like a horrifying training session where students learn to ignore evidence, reason in favor of political hackery and bullshit.

I can't quite summon up all the splenetic juices I need to hate that sort of thing the way it needs to be hated. I live in Canada, and crikey are our politicians langues-du-bois. You should have seen the candidates debate at the last election. Every one of them just hit their keywords, as I recall. The Conservative Harper tinkled the ivories about "tough on crime," "fiscal responsibility" and "liberal corruption" (mercifully not "family values"). The Liberal Dion played a crab canon about "environment" and "recession." And the NDP (Social-Democratic) Layton just did a sort of Ambrosian chant incorporating every word that has ever made a progressive feel warm and fuzzy inside: "rights" "working families" "aboriginals" "choice" "fat cats" and "social spending." It made me want to elect Silvio Berlusconi.

Replies from: magfrump, Jack
comment by magfrump · 2010-03-16T03:46:19.956Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I did not understand any of this post, but I enjoyed all of it.

ETA: I am now envisioning a Canadian man just chanting those phrases, over and over, clapping his hands and stomping his feet.

Replies from: simplicio
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T03:55:07.234Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I endeavour to give satisfaction. =)

Anything I can clarify? Probably did overdo the classical music metaphors a little...

Replies from: Jack, magfrump
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T04:10:38.206Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Looking over your comments, the breadth of your vocabulary really is splendid. Do words like "splenetic" just come to your tongue or are you commenting away with a thesaurus open?

Replies from: simplicio
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T04:26:57.770Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Heh, it's kind of you to say. Basically, I grew up on a steady diet of shows like Black Adder, Jeeves and Wooster, Fawlty Towers... and authors like Douglas Adams, Rex Stout & Terry Pratchett. So my way of expressing myself has become more than a bit idiosyncratic.

comment by magfrump · 2010-03-16T13:59:14.087Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Mostly I just didn't recognize any of the names, but I did recognize what you were talking about. I don't think clarification is what is really necessary here; since the purpose of your post seems to be more anecdotal evidence and venting than a fountain of new ideas.

If your post WAS supposed to be a fountain of new ideas, then it could use a little extra explanation.

I feel like that came off as a little more negative than I wanted it to so I'd like to note that I did enjoy and vote up your post.

comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T03:57:15.349Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Do you Canadians use liberal like we Americans use it or like Europeans use it?

Replies from: simplicio
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T04:15:20.550Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

More the European way. It definitely does not have the strong negative connotations, even among conservatives. Also worth noting that one of our two main political parties is actually called the Liberal Party of Canada.

Another fun fact: Liberals are also affectionately known as Grits, and Conservatives as Tories.

Replies from: komponisto
comment by komponisto · 2010-03-16T18:25:30.281Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Do you Canadians use liberal like we Americans use it or like Europeans use it?

More the European way...Also worth noting that one of our two main political parties is actually called the Liberal Party of Canada.

My understanding is that that party is roughly the equivalent of the U.S. Democrats or U.K. Labour -- which would make the usage of "liberal" much more like the American usage (meaning "left-wing") than the European usage (meaning "opposed to high levels of economic regulation").

Replies from: taryneast, simplicio
comment by taryneast · 2011-06-27T11:24:34.800Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

uh - interesting. Thanks for pointing that out.

In Australia the Liberal party is right-wing (liberal on free trade policies, not on social policies), so I tend to get confused about discussions of "liberals" in the US unless I remember to switch definitions before reading.

comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T19:29:44.322Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There is that. I thought Jack was getting at the negative connotation aspect.

The Liberal party here is basically centre-left.

comment by Emile · 2010-03-15T21:51:04.025Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

A lot of times you can tell when someone holds a position for political reasons just by their diction.

Very true. When I was fourteen years old, there were presidential elections after Mitterand's two terms (Did I tell you I was French? I'm French.). I remember a friend saying we needed change "after fourteen years of socialism", and at the time I thought there was no way that was his opinion, and that he was merely repeating what (most likely) his father said.

I guess it's even easier to recognize talking points in kids, because it's things they would never spontaneously say. I also remember my mom pointing out that a "letter to the editor" in a Children's newspaper was probably just the kid parroting a parent, because no child would write things like that - and I was mildly embarrassed because I hadn't noticed at first. Hmm, I'll have to point that kind of stuff to my kids too.

comment by Nick_Tarleton · 2010-03-15T17:33:53.955Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

For right-wingers, something like getting them to admit that Scandinavia is doing something right with its high tax system and consequent high happiness.

Is the causation really that clear?

Replies from: simplyeric
comment by simplyeric · 2010-03-15T21:24:47.343Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The phrasing might be better in a different direction:

"...getting them to admit that Scandinavia is not doing something inherently wrong with it's high tax system, given that they have relatively high happiness and quality of life."

(in that right-wing conservatives state that high taxes inherently will cause reduction of standard of living/happiness)

Replies from: jt4242
comment by jt4242 · 2013-04-21T14:37:57.484Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"...getting them to admit that Scandinavia is not doing something inherently wrong with it's high tax system, given that they have relatively high happiness and quality of life."

There is another conservative argument against this: To acknowledge that it might actually be true that the average happiness is increased, but to reject the morality of it.

Too see why someone might think that, imagine the following scenario: You find scientific evidence for the fact that if one forces the minority of the best-looking young women of a society at gunpoint to be of sexual service to whomever wishes to be pleased (there will be a government office regulating this) increases the average happiness of the country.

In other words, my argument questions that the happiness (needs/wishes/etc.) of a majority is at all relevant. This position is also known as individualism and at the root of (American) conservatism.

Replies from: MugaSofer, PrawnOfFate
comment by MugaSofer · 2013-04-26T12:46:28.459Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Even better, we could imagine that torturing Jews to death increases average happiness, because of all the happy racists.

Or removing Freedom would end all wars and poverty

Or [insert sacred value tradeoff here] would result in positive net utility.

IOW, that seems like a mindkilling example.

comment by PrawnOfFate · 2013-04-21T15:13:36.532Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Too see why someone might think that, imagine the following scenario: You find scientific evidence for the fact that if one forces the minority of the best-looking young women of a society at gunpoint to be of sexual service to whomever wishes to be pleased (there will be a government office regulating this) increases the average happiness of the country.

If you disregard the happiness of the women, anyway

In other words, my argument questions that the happiness (needs/wishes/etc.) of a majority is at all relevant. This position is also known as individualism and at the root of (American) conservatism.

This can be looked at as a form of deontology: govts don't have the right to tax anybody, and the outcomes of wisely spent taxation don't affect that.

Replies from: jt4242
comment by jt4242 · 2013-04-25T16:13:16.554Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If you disregard the happiness of the women, anyway

No, it suffices if less women's happiness sacrificed are needed than the amount of men whose happiness will be increased (assuming the "amount of happiness" - whatever that is to mean in the first place - is equal per individual). Then you can regard the happiness of women and still score a net increase in happiness. That's the whole point of the argument.

I don't understand what you were saying in the second sentence.

Replies from: hesperidia, MugaSofer
comment by hesperidia · 2014-01-02T06:30:29.485Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Although I accept this argument in the abstract, I oppose anyone actually trying to propose a policy like this in the real world because, historically, men have overvalued their feelings/utilons as compared to women's feelings/utilons. It's a simple ingroup bias, but similar biases in "amount of happiness"-evaluation have historically resulted in the stable maintenance of large pockets of unhappiness in societies (see also: slavery).

Replies from: Mestroyer
comment by Mestroyer · 2014-01-02T08:05:52.182Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

historically, men have overvalued their feelings/utilons as compared to women's feelings/utilons.

I can't see why this kind of behavior would be adaptive, and experiments don't seem to bear this hypothesis out. It seems that (as should be expected) men favor women. Also, in-group bias is much weaker in men in general.

I'm not sure why women would have evolved to favor women too though.

Replies from: k_ebel, hairyfigment
comment by k_ebel · 2014-09-25T20:07:58.199Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I can't see why this kind of behavior would be adaptive, and experiments don't seem to bear this hypothesis out.

Perhaps I am missing something, but I didn't see how the study or the wiki article you linked to addressed specifically how men value "their feelings/utilons as compared to women's feelings/utilons" ? Both the experiment and the article mention prefering mothers over fathers and attributing a higher level of violence to men, neither of which I see as intrinsically linked to what I understood the previous poster to be saying. (I could be not-seeing the link, and/or I could be misinterpreting what point hesperidia was trying to make).

Related, but not entirely the same - I'm also not clear on how the "women are wonderful" effect is in any way correlated with "taking actions and/or advocating policies that benefit women as much as or more than men." History (and religion) is full of rhetoric that waxes eloquent about the wonderful nature of women, even while there is much debate as to the "sexist" nature of these societies/religions.

It's also entirely possible that I'm misinterpreting the point you're trying to make. If that's so, I'd be interested in clarifying that further.

comment by hairyfigment · 2014-09-25T21:06:26.944Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So, I was especially confused by the claim that "in-group bias is much weaker in men in general." I knew that in fact, when asked to play a job interviewer or evaluator, men punished women more often than other men for trying to negotiate salary, whereas women punished everyone equally.

But I do see other evidence that calling this "in-group bias" gives the wrong idea. Maybe women tend to have a greater belief in 'gender roles,' while disagreeing with men on what those roles require/allow for men specifically. This however seems kind of odd when we see that participants in the first study (both male and female) were less likely to ask for more money from a female evaluator. I guess the women there may have a false picture of men's motives if they think men will punish them more than another women would (I don't know the exact numbers). Except, what can the men be thinking if they know that 1. women would treat them the same as everyone would treat women, and 2. the men would treat themselves more leniently than they would treat women?

ETA: actually, it seems unclear from the abstract if men did behave differently with a female evaluator!

comment by MugaSofer · 2013-04-26T12:48:12.050Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

No, it suffices if less women's happiness sacrificed are needed than the amount of men whose happiness will be increased (assuming the "amount of happiness" - whatever that is to mean in the first place - is equal per individual). Then you can regard the happiness of women and still score a net increase in happiness. That's the whole point of the argument.

^ Upvoted for this.

I don't understand what you were saying in the second sentence.

If you reject deals with positive expected outcomes because they violate some sort of ethical law, you're a deontologist. That's what deontology is.

comment by BenAlbahari · 2010-03-15T14:24:23.298Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

For right-wingers, something like getting them to admit that Scandinavia is doing something right with its high tax system and consequent high happiness.

In reality you can make the bar even lower. Just ask the right wingers if they're even aware of an empirical study comparing the relative happiness of Scandinavians to others.

Replies from: NancyLebovitz
comment by NancyLebovitz · 2011-09-26T09:53:10.217Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Here's something I believe-- I might as well toss it in as a possible rationality test. I think immigration/emigration flows are a good rough test for ranking how good places are to live in. There are barriers to moving, so it's only a rough estimate. Any place which people are willing to take a high risk of dying to leave is a bad place.

However, the fact that there isn't a significant number of people moving from the US to western/northern Europe or vice versa suggests that they're roughly on a par.

Replies from: Baughn
comment by Baughn · 2012-01-27T00:05:54.425Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It suggests they believe they're on par. All else being equal, you're right.

With Scandinavia in particular, there's an issue in that immigrating is really hard. Which is to say, we require you to learn our language and culture. Terrible taskmasters, we are.

Replies from: MixedNuts
comment by MixedNuts · 2012-01-27T01:54:55.266Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It's really easy to emigrate from a country in the European Union to Sweden (presumably also Denmark, but not Norway because it's not in the union). I mean, I'm doing it at 3 AM while browsing the web! Is there a legal requirement to learn the language for immigrants from outside the EU, or did you mean you can't make it in practice without speaking the language? I would expect that sitting around in a country for five years automatically teaches you its culture.

Replies from: Baughn
comment by Baughn · 2012-01-28T03:02:11.475Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The second, mostly.

The first, with Norway, in practice. If you have particularly valuable skills they'll overlook it, and being western helps, but immigration has pretty much had it with third-world immigrants lately.

I believe (I'm an expat, so haven't followed that closely) that we just added a requirement to join some natives on cultural trips of various kinds, too. Going hiking, that kind of thing...

We do take our hiking seriously.

Replies from: army1987
comment by A1987dM (army1987) · 2012-01-28T11:32:43.055Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Is there a legal requirement to learn the language for immigrants from outside the EU, or did you mean you can't make it in practice without speaking the language?

The second, mostly.

Are there any countries to which that doesn't apply?

Replies from: Baughn
comment by Baughn · 2012-01-28T11:43:06.306Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yes, most notably the USA.

Replies from: army1987
comment by A1987dM (army1987) · 2012-01-28T12:24:32.546Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You're saying it wouldn't be that hard to live in the US without speaking English? That doesn't sound very likely to me (though I've never been there).

(Or do you think that all people who might consider moving to the US because they think that's a better place to live in already speak decent English?)

Replies from: gwern
comment by gwern · 2012-01-28T16:18:45.322Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You're saying it wouldn't be that hard to live in the US without speaking English? That doesn't sound very likely to me (though I've never been there).

Ethnic conclaves are probably what Baughn is thinking of. I have the impression that this could be true in the China and Koreatowns in the biggest cities, and there are probably places where you can live happily knowing only Spanish. (I gather from Amy Chua's World on Fire that there are many such conclaves throughout the world; it helps to be a wealthier minority.)

comment by simplicio · 2010-03-15T13:43:59.596Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

And I'll add that asking whether people support the renewal of the nuclear deterrent was a good one for centre/left people here in the uk.

Now this I would not have thought of. Nuclear energy perhaps...

Do you think the nuclear deterrent should be renewed or should not, & why is it a litmus test?

Replies from: Nick_Tarleton
comment by Nick_Tarleton · 2010-03-15T17:29:00.718Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Whether or not the nuclear deterrent should in fact be renewed, inability to see the point of (as opposed to mere considered disagreement with) "if you want peace, prepare for war" seems like valid proof of political derangement.

Replies from: simplicio
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-15T17:38:29.046Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Oh, I see! You mean that a deranged liberal is likely to say "nuclear armament cannot possibly be a solution for anything in principle?" Yeah, that makes sense.

Come to think of it, the fear of anything nuclear, period, is probably a good predictor of irrationality on the left, as is a knee-jerk negative response to, i.a., GE crops.

Replies from: sketerpot
comment by sketerpot · 2010-03-15T23:55:54.823Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Come to think of it, the fear of anything nuclear, period, is probably a good predictor of irrationality on the left, as is a knee-jerk negative response to, i.a., GE crops.

Simple ignorance can confuse the issue; the real indicator is how they deal with argument (assuming you really know your stuff and can present a compelling argument).

comment by taw · 2010-03-15T16:07:44.944Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

And I'll add that asking whether people support the renewal of the nuclear deterrent was a good one for centre/left people here in the uk.

The overwhelming evidence for it being...?

For right-wingers, something like getting them to admit that Scandinavia is doing something right with its high tax system and consequent high happiness.

The only thing happiness research has shown so far is that it's far more complicated than "tl;dr" summaries like that.

comment by aausch · 2010-03-15T21:34:33.228Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Most of the educated people I know are ultra-behaviorists

I like that qualification. It's hard to make these calls out of the group context.

comment by PhilGoetz · 2010-03-15T15:05:35.971Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You can tell someone is irrational if they don't believe global warming is happening. You can't conclude much if they believe it is caused by human action, as this is now de rigeur for any one democratic/liberal/educated/cosmopolitan. I don't know what you can conclude if they believe it is happening but aren't convinced that it's caused by human action; but this is a small enough percentage of cases that you don't really need to classify them.

Replies from: taw, Aurini
comment by taw · 2010-03-15T15:53:56.084Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You can tell someone is irrational if they don't believe global warming is happening.

It's not like a normal person can observe such changes - we're talking fraction of a degree over lifetime so far (Wikipedia says 0.74 ± 0.18 °C over entire 20th century).

It's a matter of your level of trust in "mainstream" scientists, and there's nothing particularly irrational about not having terribly much trust here.

And even global warming is real, it's still instrumentally rational to be wrong - let other people limit their carbon emissions, the world in which you drive SUV and everyone else overpays for Priuses is the optimal world for you to live in. (it would be even better to believe correctly in global warming, but be cynical enough to not give a shit about it, but many people have some sort of cynicism limit...)

Replies from: Jack, simplicio, PhilGoetz, RobinZ
comment by Jack · 2010-03-15T16:51:34.506Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

it would be even better to believe correctly in global warming, but be cynical enough to not give a shit about it, but many people have some sort of cynicism limit...)

You don't have to be especially cynical, just recognize the situation as the collective action problem that it is. I'm not that cynical but I'm also not a dupe.

Also, not believing in global warming, if global warming is real, is likely to lead you to do stupid things like accepting certain bets on global mean temperature fifty years out and purchasing coastal properties. So I don't think it is instrumentally rational, either.

comment by simplicio · 2010-03-15T16:08:33.731Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

it's still instrumentally rational to be wrong - let other people limit their carbon emissions

I'd describe that as a rationalization of egoism, wouldn't you?

Replies from: taw
comment by taw · 2010-03-15T16:14:56.412Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What do you mean by egoism?

Replies from: simplicio
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-15T16:48:45.164Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Key word there was rationalization. If terminology is the problem, replace "egoism" by "selfishness" and my point remains the same.

I don't buy rational egoism. What is rational is whatever advances one's goals - goals which may or may not be selfish. Considering our inbuilt empathy & love for our families, the general case is that our goals will not be purely selfish.

Even if I was a rational egoist, though, actually believing something against evidence (as distinct from declaring belief or not caring) is utterly irrational.

comment by PhilGoetz · 2010-03-15T16:39:22.580Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think we can agree that "instrumentally rational" is irrational.

Replies from: taw
comment by taw · 2010-03-15T16:56:17.158Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It is irrational in a way that it recognized limitations of human rationality, and decides that sometimes you're better off not knowing. Perfect rational being would not need it - human being sometimes might.

Replies from: simplicio, PhilGoetz
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-15T17:10:47.136Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"Oh all right," said the old man. "Here's a prayer for you. Got a pencil?"

"Yes," said Arthur.

"It goes like this. Let's see now: 'Protect me from knowing what I don't need to know. Protect me from even knowing that there are things to know that I don't know. Protect me from knowing that I decided not to know about the things that I decide not to know about. Amen.' That's it. It's what you pray silently inside yourself anyway, so you may as well have it out in the open."

"Hmmm," said Arthur. "Well thank you --"

"There's another prayer that goes with it that's very important," said the old man, "so you'd better jot this down, too."

"Okay."

"It goes, 'Lord, lord, lord...' It's best to put that bit in just in case. You can never be too sure. 'Lord, lord, lord. Protect me from the consequences of the above prayer. Amen.' And that's it. Most of the trouble people get into in life comes from leaving out that last part."


In all seriousness, ignorance may sometimes be bliss, but conscious, willful ignorance is reprehensible. Let's actually make an effort to be all right with the way the world is, before we throw up our hands.

Replies from: taw
comment by taw · 2010-03-15T17:55:16.632Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I choose to be ignorant about certain things all the time - every moment of my life spent on anything except reading Wikipedia is a choice of selective ignorance.

How much does your life improve by having more accurate view of global warming research, as opposed to being vaguely aware of it but fairly skeptical either way like most educated people? I'd guess improvement will be tiny, and the risk of such knowledge triggering your world-saving instincts is not worth it.

Replies from: simplicio
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-15T18:15:51.390Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I choose to be ignorant about certain things all the time - every moment of my life spent on anything except reading Wikipedia is a choice of selective ignorance.

True, but that is ignorance-of-omission. You seemed to be advocating a conscious decision to keep yourself ignorant of certain well-defined areas of knowledge. Apologies if this is not so.

How much does your life improve by having more accurate view of global warming research...?

Well, here's the hedonistic vs. goal-oriented view of rationality again. Not everything I do is directly related to satisfying immediate whims. I am a voter and also an engineer, as it happens. Both of these circumstances imply I have an ethical obligation to be at least somewhat conversant on questions of public policy & the environment.

I'd guess improvement will be tiny, and the risk of such knowledge triggering your world-saving instincts is not worth it.

If my "world-saving instincts" should be triggered, I want them triggered. Again, as a bare minimum, public policy depends on an informed public, and GW is a policy problem. But uninformed consent in a democracy is pointless, it doesn't count. We might just as well save money on ballot paper and install a grand Doge for all the functional difference it would entail.

Replies from: taw
comment by taw · 2010-03-15T19:11:50.362Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If democracy depended on informed voters, then we could as well give it up and set up a single party government.

Fortunately it does not.

comment by PhilGoetz · 2010-03-15T22:28:56.611Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I didn't say it was bad. I said it was irrational.

comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-15T16:36:08.881Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It's not like a normal person can observe such changes - we're talking fraction of a degree over lifetime so far (Wikipedia says 0.74 ± 0.18 °C over entire 20th century).

That's not necessarily true - first, the temperature change is not uniform everywhere, and second, the effects of such changes on weather may be noticeable in ways other than simple warming (e.g. more extreme weather events). Certainly day-to-day observations cannot support the kind of confidence that many scientists have in their conclusions about global warming, but they can lend slight credence to such statements.

Replies from: ChrisHibbert
comment by ChrisHibbert · 2010-03-16T03:20:39.428Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

the temperature change is not uniform everywhere

But it's non-uniform enough that some people are observing warming and some are observing cooling. So it seems clear from a perspective that accepts the terms of the claim that all purely local observations are uninformative.

second, the effects of such changes on weather may be noticeable in ways other than simple warming (e.g. more extreme weather events).

Tracking extreme weather events from a local perspective seems likely to give even less reliable results than looking for trends in your local climate.

If you accept the terms of the debate, you have to hope for non-biased global observations that are properly normed against a long baseline in order to make any decisions about what weather evidence counts for or against the positions. At this point, I'm having a hard time finding any non-biased observations.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-16T03:40:12.191Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Fair enough - I was quibbling, to a large part because:

  1. The weather in my home region has gotten weird compared to my childhood - many mild winters and summer droughts, for example.

  2. An Alaskan on DeviantArt a while ago wrote a prose piece about how she was always freezing, never warming enough in the summer to withstand the following winter ... and prefaced it with a matter-of-fact note about how that wasn't the case in recent years.

Hence, when you commented that "[i]t's not like a normal person, can observe such changes", that seemed to contradict my own experiences. But given the prior attitude effect, my experiences should probably be discounted a fair bit.

comment by Aurini · 2010-03-15T21:17:10.273Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't think this is a fair assessment. I was a global warming supporter up until I saw that awful movie by Al Gore; his inept, unscientific presentation drove me to start looking into the situation.

What I found was a great deal of controversy over the figures - some of the charts cited by Gore tended to suggest the opposite of his thesis (assuming he even had a thesis - that man's all over the place); that CO2 follows warming, rather than triggers it.

After looking into it further - and hearing a dozen different sets of conflicting data - I eventually gave up on understanding. I don't know enough about the subject matter to make an accurate judgement, and various sources on all sides of the debate have proved themselves to be biased or incompetent. Alcor I trust to lay out factual information on 'vitrification' - whatever the hell that is. The IPCC on the other hand has a political motivation, as (probably) do many of the scientific skeptics.

As a rough estimate, I'd assign a 60% chance that global warming is occuring, while maybe a 10% chance that the climate's cooling. This is completely ignoring the probabilities of it A) being man made, B) being catastrophic (or even bad), and C) of being correctable by current policies.

Unless if you're a climatologist or a meteorologist, I'd be very suspicious of strong stances on the matter. Perhaps a better test would be whether somebody supports A) cap-and-trade or B) using a 'science fiction' solar-umbrella satellite to cool off the earth.

Replies from: simplicio
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T07:41:25.542Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

After looking into it further - and hearing a dozen different sets of conflicting data - I eventually gave up on understanding. I don't know enough about the subject matter to make an accurate judgement, and various sources on all sides of the debate have proved themselves to be biased or incompetent.

I sympathize. Frankly, most of us don't know anywhere near enough (nor should we, realistically) about climate science to truly assess the evidence ourselves, particularly when the models necessary for prediction are so complex. What to do in this case? I think we should consider the weight of opinion of actual experts. If you do this, the balance tips markedly towards AGW.

What about vested interests, you say? Well they exist on both sides, but on one side we have the fossil fuel lobby and on the other... conflict of interest wrt research grants (which is not just a problem in the case of global warming!).

Bottom line: If you can't assess the evidence directly yourself, delegate wisely.

Replies from: Aurini
comment by Aurini · 2010-03-17T03:25:19.770Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I generally agree with your heuristic - eg: arguing "this light should be green for longer to improve traffic efficiency" is ridiculous - but when money or politics get involved it tends to break down. For money, "Red light cameras are there to improve traffic safety, not as cash cows, and the various municipal-funded studies can be relied upon." For politics, "We have to have a speed limit on the highway, even if it's irregularly enforced, because allowing people to drive whatever speed they want is just crazy - it'd never work! The cops ticketing speeders are just protecting us from ourselves."

A better corollary than the traffic issue however, would be medicine; while the majority of us on LW (I suspect) will blindly accept the broad-strokes declared by the medical community, while simultaneously distrusting the rationality of most doctors; when it comes to a specific treatment for a serious condition most of us would be researching it ourselves This goes doubly for the psychiatric field, and area as dominated by the politics of popular thought as it is by the pharma dollars.

This is why I remain dubious about AGW (let alone Catastrophic-AGW). On the one hand we've got the oil lobbyists, and living in oil country I hear constant anecdotes about how slimy they are; but on the other side you've got the IPCC, a group of technocrats with a prior commitment to big government who are in charge of directing the research. There's a political bias at work, which I find even more frightening than the oil companies' profit motive.

As for the rest of the scientists, which ones have actually done the research, and how many are just following the conventional wisdom? Medical doctors still recommend a diet which was created by George McGovern, and I'd be surprised if more than fifty percent of them actually understand evolution (rather than just believe it) - a ridiculously simple theory when you study it.

Several prominent candidates pop up when you consider the IPCC's bias - are they anti-1st world (Carbon Credit transfers to the 3rd)? Anti-free market (heavy regulation and monitoring for all)? Or - and I think this is a major component of most green activists - are they just simply anti-car? I can imagine the plastic hippies living in the University bubble hating people for driving, and what better way to justify that hatred than arguing that CO2 is a pollutant? We never hear anything about the effects of methane on the climate - except from the low-status vegans.

When things become this jumbled, I'd say it's better to point out a third way - say 'I don't know', and pre-emptively cut the legs off of the soldier-like arguments of both sides. I'm wary of picking one side of advocates, when both groups are known, as a matter of fact, to regularly molest baby animals before having their first cup of coffee in the morning - in a way it reminds me of voting.

comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-15T18:18:37.139Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I agree. Anyway, it's easy to talk about the God test now because you won't get burned at the stake or anything.

One modern equivalent to the God test is whether the person believes that genetics play a significant role in the black/white IQ difference. This has become an area where stating the (obvious) and rational truth will get you in a lot of social/career trouble.

Heck, it might even get you downvoted on Lesswrong :)

Replies from: Nick_Tarleton, CarlShulman, Alicorn, Sarokrae, Jack, Morendil, CronoDAS, Nick_Tarleton, byrnema
comment by Nick_Tarleton · 2010-03-15T19:40:01.066Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Obvious truth? Maybe it is given all available information — I don't know — but certainly not given the information most people have. (And "rational truth" is just a positive-affect type error.)

I would agree, if "believes" were replaced by "is willing to entertain the hypothesis" or "doesn't think one must be a racist to believe".

comment by CarlShulman · 2010-03-16T10:42:40.109Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Talk to the experts in psychometrics, and they'll tell you that this is still an open question. It was a plurality (not majority or consensus) view in psychometrics that there was some genetic influence (beyond the obvious, e.g. black skin attracting discrimination, etc) back in 1984, but since then there has been other work that changes the picture, e.g. that of James Flynn, Will Dickens, and Richard Nisbett. It's unclear what a poll done today would reveal.

The experiments that would give huge likelihood ratios just haven't been done. Transracial adoption studies have been very few, flawed in design, and delivered conflicting results. And so far, genomics has revealed almost nothing positive about the genetic architecture of intelligence in any ethnicity, much less differences between ethnicities. Cheap genome sequencing may well bring answers there in the next 5-7 years, pinning down this debate with utterly overwhelming evidence, but it hasn't done so yet.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-16T12:15:56.843Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I responded to this here:

http://fortaleza84.wordpress.com/2010/03/16/the-race-and-iq-question/

Replies from: Rain
comment by Rain · 2010-03-16T14:23:05.712Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Since you posted the link in two locations, I'll add that I responded to this downthread.

comment by Alicorn · 2010-03-15T18:33:11.169Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What makes you think this is obvious? While racial IQ differences certainly aren't ruled out a priori (Ashkenazi Jews are the quintessential example), Occamian reasoning about the black/white divide doesn't indicate that genetics is part of the best and most parsimonious explanation. There are adequate other factors at work - you can pick up a lot of data from studies on things like stereotype threat, for instance. And the fact that biracial children do better on IQ when the mother is the white parent than when the mother is black seems strong evidence to me that genetics are not the whole story, if they play any part at all.

Replies from: ciphergoth, None, jimrandomh, brazil84, brazil84
comment by Paul Crowley (ciphergoth) · 2010-03-16T11:33:21.178Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What sort of human variable doesn't correlate with race? Are any of weight, height, blood pressure, athletic ability, or any other more measurable characteristic uncorrelated? How about if we measure these at birth, to work around environmental effects?

Replies from: Hook, None
comment by Hook · 2010-03-16T12:02:07.779Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Athletic ability at birth isn't really all that variable. Besides, "at birth" doesn't eliminate in utero environmental effects.

Correlation with race does not mean genetic causation. Having 100% recent African ancestry correlates highly with living in Africa.

comment by [deleted] · 2011-09-26T05:48:12.435Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'd like to suggest you taboo "athletic ability", as it seems more like a reference to a common stereotype about black people than a well-defined trait (if nothing else, long-jumping, hockey, cross-country skiing, soccer, distance swimming and mountain climbing seem like very different tasks that nevertheless might get called "athletic")

Replies from: ciphergoth
comment by Paul Crowley (ciphergoth) · 2011-09-26T07:31:29.900Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The point holds if you focus on just one particular tests rather than generalizing across many sports.

comment by [deleted] · 2010-03-18T07:07:21.381Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

.

Replies from: Alicorn
comment by Alicorn · 2010-03-18T17:51:56.167Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This would predict that the difference would be seen in biracial boys, but not in biracial girls. I've never heard anything to that effect - have you?

Replies from: None, JoshuaZ
comment by [deleted] · 2010-03-18T23:47:33.020Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2010-03-18T23:51:08.584Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

.

Replies from: Alicorn
comment by Alicorn · 2010-03-19T00:08:43.006Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You can edit comments - there's a button to the right of the "parent" link at the bottom of each. That way you can make prompt additions like this without having to double-post.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2010-03-24T14:50:24.448Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2011-09-26T05:45:33.648Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Blacks have higher testosterone, a hormone that increases muscularity by decreases IQ(in large amounts) There is more testosterone in the uterine environment of a black women, and that may depress > IQ.

Citation please.

comment by JoshuaZ · 2011-09-26T02:16:03.306Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm confused by this prediction. Can you expand out your logic? Assuming these were X-linked wouldn't the races of the parents be what matters?

Replies from: Alicorn
comment by Alicorn · 2011-09-26T03:42:49.004Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

biracial children do better on IQ when the mother is the white parent than when the mother is black

.

Actually, there is some evidence that many intelligence genes are carried on the X chromosome.

So, there's four cases, which I will give names: boy with a black mom and white dad ("Joe"), boy with white mom and black dad ("Rob"), girl with black mom and white dad ("Sal"), and girl with white mom and black dad ("Eve").

Joe has a black X chromosome and a white Y chromosome.

Rob has a white X chromosome and a black Y chromosome.

Sal and Eve both have one black and one white X chromosome.

If X chromosomes have lots of intelligence-related genes, and if white parents contribute smarter chromosomes than black parents do, then there's no difference between Sals and Eves (they've both got one of each), but Robs should be smarter than Joes on average, because Rob has his g-loaded genes from a white parent and Joe doesn't.

Replies from: JoshuaZ
comment by JoshuaZ · 2011-09-26T03:55:53.283Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Ah. Ok. That makes sense. Thanks..

comment by jimrandomh · 2010-03-15T19:18:04.775Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

And the fact that biracial children do better on IQ when the mother is the white parent than when the mother is black seems strong evidence to me that genetics are not the whole story, if they play any part at all.

It is not evidence for that at all; an alternative explanation for the difference is that a child's intelligence depends to a significant degree on the prenatal environment, which is determined by the mother's genetics exclusively. I predict that the extra degree of correlation between a mother's and child's intelligence over the correlation between a father's and child's intelligence will be very close to equal to the degree of correlation between a genetically unrelated surrogate mother and child's intelligence.

Replies from: FAWS, Jack, Psychohistorian
comment by FAWS · 2010-03-15T19:52:54.586Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It is not evidence for that at all

It may not be proof, but it's certainly evidence.

renatal environment, which is determined by the mother's genetics exclusively.

Err, what? Smoking? Just to name the most obvious counter example.

Mitochondrial DNA would also be a possibility ("white" mitochondria being optimized for neurons, "black" mitochondria for muscle cells, say), but environmental factors seems by far the most obvious explanation.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2011-09-26T05:51:19.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't know as I'd call that a possibility, insofar as African populations have the widest variety of mitochondrial haplogroups (black vs white mitochondria? That's not biology, that's indulging the hypothesis so much you're willing to commit mental gymnastics on its behalf...)

Replies from: FAWS
comment by FAWS · 2011-09-26T08:39:10.093Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

African populations also have the greatest genetic variation in general. African Americans have somewhat less (but still a lot of) variation. African Americans also have considerable European ancestry, but little in the female line, and in so far as they have mtDNA of (recent) African origin they all have in common that they lack mtDNA of Euopean origin (which might have innovations that contribute to the effect observed). If you are willing to assume a genetic cause I don't see how you can a priori exclude a mitochondrial cause. I already made clear that it's not a hypothesis I'd ascribe much probability mass to.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2011-09-26T15:53:41.634Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm not ruling it out a priori, I'm ruling it out based on domain-specific knowledge. There is no reason from first principles of predicate logic to assume half the stuff that's true and important in biology, but it's no less critical to reasoning correctly in that domain.

Replies from: FAWS
comment by FAWS · 2011-09-26T16:53:24.693Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Ok, using the term a priori was imprecise. I'm not sure what I should have said instead, I can't think of anything that's both reasonably concise and meeting your apparent standards for precision. Maybe "it seems unreasonable that your prior for the hypothesis "a statistically traceable part of racial IQ variation is caused by mitochondrial DNA variation" should be so close to zero that the posterior probability assuming above evidence still is not even worth calling a possibility."?

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2011-09-26T17:33:00.591Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

My prior is based on the following:

-Mitochondrial DNA has 16,569 base pairs but only 13 of them code for protein (and most of those are dedicated to the electron transport chain, a pretty darn fundamental thing), so while the mutation rate of mtDNA is higher than nuclear DNA there's a limited number of possible variations that will have an effect. There's also a very constrained number of functional changes; most mutations of the protein-coding genes correspond to known mitochondrial diseases, which vary in their effects but do so on the basis of impaired mitochondrial activity globally. When mtDNA protein-coding regions shift, the result is usually one of the many known mitochondrial diseases, and it's under those conditions that you see a strong variance in the expressed protein-coding mtDNA between different organs of the body. When mitochondrial genetics produces varying effects between different tissues, it's not subtle -- you're basically talking about major, life-threatening illnesses or mosaic genetics here. Neither are common conditions; it's difficult to imagine a functional shift in protein-coding for this producing a subtle effect that remains undetectable for a long time.

-mtDNA recombines with itself during reproduction, so mutations along the mitochondrial line are very easily tracked (indeed, it's why we know what we do about human mitochondrial haplogroups, and why we can so readily understand which populations vary genetically by how much and when they seperated). Because one's mtDNA is not specific to the individual, there's a low effective population size for mtDNA changes While this does make it relatively easy for such changes to propagate upon mutation, it also makes them harder to miss when you go looking, and changes to protein-coding regions are even more obvious because there's only a few of them and mutations to those usually affect very fundamental elements of cytochemistry.. The suggestion that IQ differences stem from a mitochondrial DNA shift implies that it would be very, very easy to spot and isolate the character responsible. We know a lot about mtDNA and the limited number of functional changes it displays. There's nothing even vaguely like the proposed change sitting in the pool of known variations, and the pool of plausible unknown variations that just happen to look like that seems vanishingly small.

comment by Jack · 2010-03-15T19:44:50.238Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

the prenatal environment, which is determined by the mother's genetics exclusively.

I don't know about exclusively.

Replies from: jimrandomh
comment by jimrandomh · 2010-03-15T20:11:25.869Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You're right that that was too strong; I should have said it's determined largely by the mother's genetics (but also to lesser degrees by the father's genetics and environmental factors.) But note that the strongest known environmental factor, alcohol consumption, is at least somewhat genetic (http://psychiatry.healthse.com/psy/more/alcoholism), and other factors like susceptibility to smoking addiction probably are as well.

Replies from: NancyLebovitz, Hook
comment by Hook · 2010-03-16T14:41:22.438Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Any given chemical is not equally likely to cause pleasure for human beings, so of course alcohol and nicotine consumption have a genetic basis. It seems equally obvious that the availability of alcohol and nicotine are part of the environment. Additionally, they are parts of the environment where it is easy to imagine life being substantially similar without them (unlike environmental influences such as oxygen and gravity).

comment by Psychohistorian · 2010-03-15T22:54:12.413Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

As the mother is usually the more involved parent when it comes to raising the child, mother-based differences strongly suggest nurture-based differences, unless of course there is some specific and identifiable pathway by which the mother's genetic composition could play an outsized role. I'm not aware of any evidence that the prenatal environment provided by black women is systematically different from that of white women for any genetic reason. Though, in your defense, you were decent enough to make a falsifiable prediction based on this.

comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-16T10:36:39.245Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I briefly summarized my position here:

http://fortaleza84.wordpress.com/2010/03/16/the-race-and-iq-question/

I am happy to respond to questions, go into more detail, and respond to arguments if you wish.

comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-15T20:21:49.280Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What makes you think this is obvious?

Looking at the totality of facts without letting my wishes color my judgment.

Believing in "stereotype threat" as the main reason for the black/white IQ gap is like believing in Aquinas' arguments for the existence of God.

strong evidence to me that genetics are not the whole story,

Anyway, I'm going to try to avoid getting into the details of the debate, but this little snippet is worthy of note.

In my earlier comment, I talked about genetics "play[ing] a significant role" When you respond with evidence that "genetics are not the whole story," you are not contradicting me in the slightest.

Instead you are attacking a strawman. Why would a person who ordinarily thinks intelligently and logically make such a glaring error? Respectfully, I submit to you that it's because your thinking is muddled on this issue.

The problem is that people today are afraid to believe that genetics play a significant role in the black/white IQ gap. As Eliezer would say, it's not like going to school wearing black -- it's like going to school wearing a clown costume. It's like being an atheist back in the day.

Replies from: Jack, Psychohistorian, None, gwern, CaveJohnson, MixedNuts
comment by Jack · 2010-03-15T20:33:32.968Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What makes you think this is obvious?

Looking at the totality of facts without letting my wishes color my judgment.

The reasonable and helpful interpretation of Alicorn's question was "What evidence are you basing this strongly-held belief on?" Asserting that you are basing your belief on evidence is not an answer. We get that you think this position is tantamount to being an atheist in the past. You don't have to keep making that analogy. Instead, give us the evidence. We can handle the ugly truth if you're right.

Replies from: brazil84, brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-15T20:47:57.990Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Asserting that you are basing your belief on evidence is not an answer

Basically you are right. I tried to answer the question without saying anything which would invite a debate on the actual race/iq question.

Looking back at my response, I should have made it clear that I wasn't giving the answer Allicorn was looking for. But I admit it now.

I'm a bit torn, but I will try to put together a blog post which lays out my case and link to it.

comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-16T10:35:00.519Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Ok, I summarized my views here:

http://fortaleza84.wordpress.com/2010/03/16/the-race-and-iq-question/

I'm happy to go into more detail; to answer questions; and to respond to arguments if you wish.

Replies from: Rain
comment by Rain · 2010-03-16T12:28:00.392Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

From what I can tell of your blog post, you said, "there's evidence, it's so obvious, people have alternative explanations but they're bogus, there's evidence, I bet whites do better than blacks on tests, there's tons of evidence."

Where's the evidence?

Replies from: CarlShulman, brazil84
comment by CarlShulman · 2010-03-16T15:16:38.764Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Here's Rushton and Jensen making their best case for significant genetic influences on intergroup differences in a 2005 review article, and a critical response from Richard Nisbett, one of the leading proponents of the hypothesis that there are no significant B-W genetic differences. Taken together, they are much more informative than selective presentations by amateurs.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T19:36:00.564Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I find Nisbett's reply pretty convincing. How do others feel?

Brazil, would you like to reply to the Nisbett article?

Replies from: nazgulnarsil, brazil84
comment by nazgulnarsil · 2010-03-19T10:02:37.937Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Not to excuse the shoddy scholarship of rushton and jensen, but I'd just like to add that a cursory examination of the nisbett article indeed shows some highly dubious claims. In several places he assumes a hypothesis of the form "If the hereditary model is true, then we should see X". But for many of these it seems that X does not necessarily follow from the hereditary hypothesis. the hereditary hypothesis is not a monolithic structure. it is a spectrum of correlation from 0.0 to 1.0. both ends seem equally implausible to me.

Replies from: gwern
comment by gwern · 2012-12-09T02:01:57.331Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

My own encounter with Nisbett material: http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=4257220

comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-16T23:46:10.453Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Brazil, would you like to reply to the Nisbett article?

Yes, I took the look at the article. I agree that if it's a correct summary of the evidence, it undermines my position.

Obviously I don't have time to run down every reference in the article, so I looked at the very first section, went to the web site of the what the author referred to as the "largest study," and looked at the very first graph I could find showing the gap in scores.

I'm telling you this so that nobody can accuse me of cherry picking. The graph I pulled up was the only data I retrieved which is referenced in the paper. Here is the graph:

http://nationsreportcard.gov/ltt_2008/ltt0005.asp

Just eyeballing it, it does not appear to support Nisbett's claim. It appears to show a small narrowing of the black/white gap between 1973 and 1982 and a fairly consistent gap thereafter.

So to put it politely, I am skeptical of the entire article.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-17T02:36:53.599Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You appear to be referring to Nisbett's paragraph starting with

Hedges and Nowell (1998) found improvement on almost all tests for African American 12th graders compared with other 12th graders over the period 1965-1994.

A few sentences below that Nisbett refers to NAEP data to say that the reading score gap could be gone in 25 years and the science score gap in 75 years, if trends continue. [ETA: this is the 'largest study' that Nisbett cites. I'm sad Nisbett didn't give a more specific citation for it.]

The page you link appears to have data on the NAEP tests, but only for the mathematics tests. Clicking on the 'White-Black Gap' button, and then on the 'Age 17' tab (as Nisbett refers to 12th graders, so I am guessing that is what he and you are talking about...?) shows

  • a 1973 gap of 40 points
  • a 1982 gap of 32 points
  • a 1986 gap of 29 points
  • a 1990 gap of 21 points
  • then some fluctuations between 26 and 31 points until the most recent survey (2008), which has a 26 point gap

The data linked do not appear to bear strongly on Nisbett's claims about the NAEP data (because Nisbett refers to the reading and science NAEP scores, not math), and I am also having difficulty seeing the 'small narrowing of the black/white gap between 1973 and 1982 and a fairly consistent gap thereafter.' in the data linked.

All in all, I am having difficulty substantiating your claim that Nisbett's claim is unsubstantiated by the data. I suspect either I am not interpreting your comment correctly, or the link in it happens to point to a data set other than the one you intended. Could you clarify?

(About the bigger question of whether black-white IQ differences have narrowed recently, it may be informative to read William Dickens and James Flynn's 2006 paper, which takes IQ test norming data and shows a narrowing of the IQ gap between 1972 and 2002. (Rushton and Jensen disagreed with the conclusions of that paper, but I find Dickens and Flynn's rebuttal convincing.)

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-17T02:54:08.186Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The page you link appears to have data on the NAEP tests, but only for the mathematics tests.

I chose it at random and stopped with the first graph I found so nobody could accuse me of cherry picking. Looking more carefully at what Nisbett wrote, I see he did not specifically mention math scores.

I'm not sure if this makes a difference. If Nisbett was cherry-picking data, it doesn't really help his argument.

All in all, I am having difficulty substantiating your claim that Nisbett's claim is unsubstantiated by the data.

The one graph I looked at at random doesn't seem to support the claim that the gap (generally speaking) is narrowing and headed towards disappearing. Agreed?

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-17T14:44:54.061Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The one graph I looked at at random doesn't seem to support the claim that the gap (generally speaking) is narrowing and headed towards disappearing. Agreed?

When I see your random graph, I see the gap halving[!] from 1973 to 1990, widening through the 1990s, and maybe gradually shrunking since then. I see contradictory trends over the past 40 years, but it's more likely than not that the gap has resumed narrowing. So I'm not sure I do agree with you.

Since you write 'generally speaking' I guess you might be asking about the general trend as a whole from 1973 to now. I reckon that's an overall shrinking trend too.

To check my gut feeling more systematically, I did a quick regression of the score gap against year. (Not the best way to do it, but it beats eyeballing.) That gets me a .35 or .36 point shrinking per year depending on which assessment format I use for 2004. At that rate, the current gap (26 points in '08) would disappear in 70 to 75 years.

That's the same time period Nisbett gives for the disappearance of the science score gap, which I think is evidence against Nisbett 'cherry-picking' - if he cut out data because it had gaps that closed too slowly for his hypothesis, he would've left out the science data as well as the math data.

Summing up, I think I fundamentally disagree with you on the most likely interpretation of your graph.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-17T19:30:55.829Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

When I see your random graph, I see the gap halving[!] from 1973 to 1990, widening through the 1990s, and maybe gradually shrunking since then.

Say what? The gap is 35 points in 1973 and 27 points in 1990. How is this halving?

Replies from: cupholder, Jack
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-18T02:08:57.859Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Aha, I misunderstood which chart you had in mind. I thought that your link was intended to go to the data for 17 year olds, but that you were unable to link it directly because the page used Javascript to flip between the charts for different ages. I see now I'm wrong about that - one can link directly to the chart for each age, and it sounds like you were pointing to the age 9 data.

So I'll try this again with the 9 year olds. I've taken the liberty of looking at the black-white gap graph instead of the scale score graph so I don't have to do any mental arithmetic to get the gap size at each testing. Looks to me like the gap consistently narrowed from 1973 to 1986, and has fluctuated from 1986 so it's sometimes wider, sometimes thinner, but no overall trend since then.

Regressing gap size on year like I did before gives a shrinking of .24 or .25 points per year. So the picture is more mixed than for the older kids: there's an overall shrinking, but it's only two-thirds what you get for 17 year olds, and the trend looks like it's stalled since the late 80s.

Still, I am not sure that this means Nisbett is wrong. Looking at the bit of Nisbett you quote yourself downthread, Nisbett does not seem to say anything about the math scores, which means looking at the math scores would not tell us whether Nisbett is wrong or right.

It is possible that Nisbett cherry-picked by ignoring the math data, but I think a .25 point per year narrowing is still evidence against that idea. At a quarter point per year, the math gap would disappear in about a century, which isn't much longer than the 75 years Nisbett suggests for science.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-18T09:29:28.102Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Of course there are ways to interpret the graph to argue that the gap is narrowing and on track to disappear, but if you look at it and use your common sense, it's just not a reasonable conclusion.

The reasonable conclusion - as you allude to -- is that the gap has been pretty much stable for a number of years.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-18T23:28:48.696Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Of course there are ways to interpret the graph to argue that the gap is narrowing and on track to disappear, but if you look at it and use your common sense, it's just not a reasonable conclusion.

You put more trust in your common sense than I do. I try to avoid depending exclusively on what my common sense infers from eyeballing noisy time series - that way lies 'global warming stopped in 1998'esque error.

I find your preferred interpretation reasonable, but I don't see why it would be unreasonable to look at the entire data and see a net narrowing. (Especially if we lacked the 2008 data, as Nisbett did.)

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-19T00:44:44.826Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If the choice is between trusting your common sense and trusting someone with an agenda, I would say go with your common sense.

Here's a thought experiment: You show the graph I linked to to 10 statisticians, except you replace the labels with something less politically charged. For example, the price of winter wheat versus the price of summer wheat. And you ask them to interpret the graph as far as long term trends go. I'm pretty confident that 10 out of 10 would interpret the graph the same way I did.

Ditto for global surface temperatures. Take the temperature label off the graph and tell people it's the dollar to yen exchange rate. I bet 10 out of 10 statisticians will say the rate is basically flat for the last 10 years.

Replies from: RobinZ, cupholder
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-19T03:23:30.569Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Ditto for global surface temperatures. Take the temperature label off the graph and tell people it's the dollar to yen exchange rate. I bet 10 out of 10 statisticians will say the rate is basically flat for the last 10 years.

cupholder has the empirical data - which, you will note, is increasing in all cases - but do you really imagine that no-one's tried a blind test?

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-19T08:42:27.603Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

cupholder has the empirical data - which, you will note, is increasing in all cases - but do you really imagine that no-one's tried a blind test?

No I do not imagine so. But I'm a little confused. Are you saying that the absence of significant cooling is the same thing as the presence of significant warming?

PS: The empirical data is not "increasing in all cases." Indeed, by most accounts global surface temperatures have not met or exceeded the high reached 12 years ago.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-19T10:24:25.768Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
  1. Every 10-year trendline in cupholder's data was increasing.

  2. If you give a statistician the 30-year or 130-year data set with the y-axis label taken off, they will tell you that there is no sign of a levelling-off.

Replies from: cupholder, brazil84
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-19T22:56:11.421Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Every 10-year trendline in cupholder's data was increasing.

A quick clarification: for each of the data links I posted there, the trendline is calculated based on all of the data that's shown, i.e. for the post-1998 data the trendline is based on the last twelve years, for the post-1970s data the trendline is based on all of the post-1970s data, and so on. In other words, only the data for the last 10 years of data really have a 10-year trendline.

[ETA: Unless you mean you calculated 10-year trendlines for each data set yourself, in which case feel free to disregard this.]

comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-19T13:49:41.936Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Here's a plot of the UAH index from 1998 to 2009.

http://www.woodfortrees.org/plot/uah/from:1998/to:2009/plot/uah/from:1998/to:2009/trend

The linear trend is definitely decreasing for this particular plot.

If you give a statistician the 30-year or 130-year data set with the y-axis label taken off, they will tell you that there is no sign of a levelling-off.

I'm seriously skeptical of this.

P.S. Are you saying that the absence of significant cooling is the same thing as the presence of significant warming?

Replies from: wnoise, RobinZ
comment by wnoise · 2010-03-20T05:39:44.801Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Note that changing the beginning data point to either 1997 or 1999 makes the regression line have a positive slope. It's not at all surprising that there is enough variability that cherry-picking data is possible. Stuffing a positive outlier at the beginning will, of course, tend to do this.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-20T10:28:57.796Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Note that changing the beginning data point to either 1997 or 1999 makes the regression line have a positive slope.

Agreed. I cherry-picked 1998 as a starting point to counter the claim that the data was increasing "in all cases."

Still, I would also note that as I explain on my blog post, there is some significance to the observation that global surface temperatures still have not exceeded the 1998 high. (According to the majority of leading temperature measurements.)

comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-19T14:11:38.578Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Did you read the linked article?

In a blind test, the AP gave temperature data to four independent statisticians and asked them to look for trends, without telling them what the numbers represented. The experts found no true temperature declines over time.

"If you look at the data and sort of cherry-pick a micro-trend within a bigger trend, that technique is particularly suspect," said John Grego, a professor of statistics at the University of South Carolina.

[...]

The AP sent expert statisticians NOAA's year-to-year ground temperature changes over 130 years and the 30 years of satellite-measured temperatures preferred by skeptics and gathered by scientists at the University of Alabama in Huntsville.

Statisticians who analyzed the data found a distinct decades-long upward trend in the numbers, but could not find a significant drop in the past 10 years in either data set. The ups and downs during the last decade repeat random variability in data as far back as 1880.

Saying there's a downward trend since 1998 is not scientifically legitimate, said David Peterson, a retired Duke University statistics professor and one of those analyzing the numbers.

Identifying a downward trend is a case of "people coming at the data with preconceived notions," said Peterson, author of the book "Why Did They Do That? An Introduction to Forensic Decision Analysis."

1998 was a strong El Nino year - unusually high atmospheric temperatures that year in no way suggests that the earth has stopped heating.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-19T14:19:46.558Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Did you read the linked article?

Yes, and I'm not sure what your point is.

Are you claiming that the absence of a significant cooling trend is the same thing as the presence of a significant warming trend?

It's a very simple question. Why won't you answer it?

Incidentally, I wrote a blog post about the article in question which touches on these issues.

http://brazil84.wordpress.com/2009/10/27/more-on-global-cooling/

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-19T14:23:04.689Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm claiming that this one data set does not by itself support rejection of the body of theory that suggests global warming is occurring, and that it is intellectually dishonest to imply that it does.

Replies from: wedrifid, brazil84
comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-19T23:09:42.906Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Well answered (and I have downvoted brazil for trying to coerce you into making a stupid claim with the obvious intent of presenting a misleading dichotomy.)

Replies from: mattnewport
comment by mattnewport · 2010-03-19T23:18:56.206Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

In light of the spelling thread, dichotomy? This immediately jumped out at me in the manner that a few others describe for spelling mistakes.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-19T23:26:09.479Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Thankyou. It jumped out at me too upon rereading. I wonder why my browser has stopped spell checking for me.

comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-19T14:31:16.205Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm not sure what the claim "global warming is occuring" means so I can't really speak to that.

In any event, as I noted in the blog post, the warmists have made specific predictions. The temperature record for the past 10 or so years contradicts some of those predictions.

ETA: Can I take it that your answer to my question is "no"?

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-19T15:08:56.081Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm not saying the absence of a significant cooling trend is the same thing as the presence of a significant warming trend - that would be a stupid thing to say. As for the remainder: I don't trust your judgment, but the data you provided is interesting. I will examine the composite NOAA temperature data (ocean, land, and combined) and update accordingly.

(It should be noted, however, that if anthropogenic inputs are significant, as claimed by the climate scientists whose work we are discussing, predicting the climate would require predicting all anthropogenic climate forcings - and therefore we might expect the predictions to be worse than anticipated.)

Replies from: SilasBarta, brazil84
comment by SilasBarta · 2010-03-19T15:18:33.002Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It should be noted, however, that if anthropogenic inputs are significant, as claimed by the climate scientists whose work we are discussing, predicting the climate would require predicting all anthropogenic climate forcings - and therefore we might expect the predictions to be worse than anticipated.

They can get around this by expressing their predictions as a function of future anthropogenic emissions, thus removing this source of uncertainty.

Replies from: RobinZ, RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-19T15:27:56.622Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

From the papers I looked at today, a major problem appears to be measuring the forcings that go into the model.

comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-19T15:20:08.247Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I imagine they do - do we have a climatologist in the house?

Replies from: SilasBarta
comment by SilasBarta · 2010-03-19T15:23:33.359Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I imagine they do too; the question is whether they claim the right to (retroactively) "massage" their predictions, which would invalidate this test.

comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-19T16:11:45.710Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm not saying the absence of a significant cooling trend is the same thing as the presence of a significant warming trend - that would be a stupid thing to say

Correct. Which is why the article you linked to does not contradict the claim I made.

As for the remainder: I don't trust your judgment, but the data you provided is interesting

Well you shouldn't trust my judgment. What's the motto of the British science academy? Something like "Don't take my word for it."

comment by cupholder · 2010-03-19T01:36:52.962Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Here's a thought experiment: You show the graph I linked to to 10 statisticians, except you replace the labels with something less politically charged. For example, the price of winter wheat versus the price of summer wheat. And you ask them to interpret the graph as far as long term trends go. I'm pretty confident that 10 out of 10 would interpret the graph the same way I did.

I am far less confident.

Ditto for global surface temperatures. Take the temperature label off the graph and tell people it's the dollar to yen exchange rate. I bet 10 out of 10 statisticians will say the rate is basically flat for the last 10 years.

I bet it would depend on exactly which data set you gave them. Do you give them data for the past 10 years, data since 1998, the data since they started measuring temperatures with satellites as well as thermometers, or the longest-running data set, which runs from 1850 onwards? If you just give them the last decade of data, they might well just write it off as flat and noisy, but if you let them judge the recent numbers in the context of the entire time series, they might recognize them as flat-looking fuzz obscuring an ongoing linear trend.

If the choice is between trusting your common sense and trusting someone with an agenda, I would say go with your common sense.

That sounds nice, but I don't know how practical that would turn out to be, in this case or in general. In this particular case, how can I even tell with certainty whether you have 'an agenda' or not? And what if the key participants in a debate all have some agenda? It's very possible that Nisbett has a 'politically correct' (not that I like the phrase, but I can't think of a better way of putting it) agenda, and that Rushton and Jensen have a 'politically incorrect' agenda. How do I know, and what do I do if they do? And so on.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-19T08:53:31.365Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

In this particular case, how can I even tell with certainty whether you have 'an agenda' or not?

How can you tell anything with certainty? The fact is that you can't. Respectfully, it seems to me you are playing the "I'm such a skeptic" game.

Let me ask you this: Do you seriously doubt that Nisbett has an agenda?

Do you give them data for the past 10 years, data since 1998, the data since they started measuring temperatures with satellites as well as thermometers, or the longest-running data set, which runs from 1850 onwards

I would give them the data since the 1970s when sattelite measurement became possible.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-19T22:42:29.878Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

How can you tell anything with certainty? The fact is that you can't. Respectfully, it seems to me you are playing the "I'm such a skeptic" game.

Sorry. I was being sloppy in my earlier comment, and using 'certainty' as a shorthand for 'certainty enough for me to label you as Having An Agenda, and therefore to reject your interpretation of the data as Tainted With An Agenda.' It is of course true that you can't tell anything inductive with cast-iron 100% certainty, but what I'm getting at is the question of how to get to what you or I would practically treat as certainty (like if I put a 95% probability on someone Having An Agenda).

Let me rephrase: in this particular case, how can I even tell whether you have 'an agenda' with sufficient certainty to disregard whatever you say about the data, and retreat to my own common sense gut feeling?

Let me ask you this: Do you seriously doubt that Nisbett has an agenda?

Do I doubt he has an agenda in the sense that he believes he's right? A tiny bit, but only in the sense that I am never completely sure of another person's motivation for stating something.

Do I doubt he has an agenda in the sense that he wants to convince other people of what he believes? Not really.

Do I doubt he has an agenda in the sense that he has an emotional investment in the argument as well as rational considerations? Only a little...but then again, who doesn't get emotionally invested in arguments?

Do I doubt he has an agenda in the sense that he has political motivations for his article as well as self-centered emotional and rational ones? Quite a lot, actually. I don't think I could reliably tell Nisbett's emotional motivations apart from those that spring from his political agenda (whatever that is - Nisbett sounds like a leftist to me, but how the hell do I really know? There were rightists who crapped on The Bell Curve too.) Does it even make sense to distinguish the two? I'm not sure. (I suddenly feel that these are good questions to think about. Thank you for prodding me into thinking of them.)

Also, for whatever it's worth, I am just as sure that Rushton and Jensen have 'an agenda,' however you want to define that, as Nisbett does. Do I throw all their papers out and just go with my common sense?

To clarify, this doesn't mean I can't get behind the idea of being alert to other people's biases on some subject, but I'm not willing to push that to the point of a dichotomy between my common sense vs. someone with an agenda. Taking the global warming example, I'm sure many climate scientists have 'an agenda,' but I'd still tend to accept their consensus interpretation of the data than my own common sense where the two differ, and I think that's reasonable if I don't have time to dig through all of the research myself.

I would give them the data since the 1970s when sattelite measurement became possible.

In that case I think I'm roughly 90% confident that fewer than '10 out of 10 statisticians will say the rate is basically flat for the last 10 years'. I am interpreting 'the rate is flat here' to mean that the net temperature trend is flat over time, as I believe we're talking about whether global warming is continuing and not whether global warming is accelerating. (Thought process here: I reckon a randomly selected statistician has at most a 4 in 5 chance of deciding that temperatures have been 'basically flat' for the last 10 years' based on the satellite data. Then the chance of 10 random statisticians all saying temperatures have been flat is 11%, so an 89% chance of at least one of them dissenting.)

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-20T02:23:07.068Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Do I doubt he has an agenda in the sense that he believes he's right?

By "having an agenda," I mean that Nisbett is emphasizing the facts that support a particular point of view and de-emphasizing the facts which undermine that point of view in order to persuade the reader.

So defined, one can ask whether Nisbett has an agenda. Do you have any doubt that Nisbett has an agenda?

I am interpreting 'the rate is flat here' to mean that the net temperature trend is flat over time,

So by your definition, the temperature trend is NOT basically flat between 1995 and the present, correct?

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-20T17:43:15.270Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

By "having an agenda," I mean that Nisbett is emphasizing the facts that support a particular point of view and de-emphasizing the facts which undermine that point of view in order to persuade the reader.

So defined, one can ask whether Nisbett has an agenda. Do you have any doubt that Nisbett has an agenda?

Not much. I think it is very likely that Nisbett suffers from confirmation bias about as much as everybody else.

So by your definition, the temperature trend is NOT basically flat between 1995 and the present, correct?

Eyeballing it I'd say it's much more likely that temperatures rose since 1995 than that they stayed flat, so I'd say you're pretty much correct. I wouldn't dogmatically say it's not flat in big capital letters, but I think the rising temperature hypothesis is a lot more likely than the flat temperature hypothesis.

I'd double check my intuition by running a regression, but that'd stack the deck because of autocorrelation, and I can't remember from the top of my head how to fit a linear model that accounts for that.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-20T18:04:42.354Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think it is very likely that Nisbett suffers from confirmation bias about as much as everybody else.

I'm not sure what this means. Are you saying that every piece of written material has an agenda behind it as I've defined the term?

Eyeballing it I'd say it's much more likely that temperatures rose since 1995 than that they stayed flat, so I'd say you're pretty much correct

And do you agree that according to Phil Jones, there has been no statistically significant warming between 1995 and the present?

Replies from: ciphergoth, cupholder
comment by Paul Crowley (ciphergoth) · 2010-03-20T19:09:34.518Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

And do you agree that according to Phil Jones, there has been no statistically significant warming between 1995 and the present?

The fact that you quote this doesn't help your credibility. The Economist: Journalistic malpractice on global warming

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-20T19:14:48.883Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The fact that you quote this doesn't help your credibility

I'm not sure what your point is. My argument does not depend on my credibility.

In any event, do you agree that "journalistic malpractice" works both ways? In other words, if it's malpractice to claim that there has been no warming since 1995, it's also malpractice to claim that there has been no cooling since 1998?

comment by cupholder · 2010-03-20T18:36:23.218Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm not sure what this means. Are you saying that every piece of written material has an agenda behind it as I've defined the term?

Not every piece of written material, but I'd bet that almost all lengthy pieces of writing intended to communicate a point to others have an agenda behind them, sure. There's always a temptation to round the numbers to your advantage, to leave out bits of data that might conflict with your hypothesis, to neglect to mention possible problems with your statistical tests, and so on.

Even ignoring that sort of thing, cognitive biases play an important role. Nisbett presumably had a half-formed opinion of the race and IQ argument even before he started researching it in depth. And that would in turn have affected which bits of relevant evidence got stuck in his mind. And that would in turn have hardened his opinion. You get positive feedbacks that push your opinion away from others that conflict with it. So even if Nisbett were consciously being as honest as possible, he could still be

emphasizing the facts that support a particular point of view and de-emphasizing the facts which undermine that point of view in order to persuade the reader

just because his mental database of facts is going to overrepresent the 1st kind of fact and underrepresent the 2nd - and precisely because of that, he is going to be sure that his point of view is obviously correct, and precisely because of that, he is going to be writing to persuade the reader of it - even though, as far as he knows, he is being completely honest!

(Tangent: it's somehow amusing and fitting that the person we're using to argue this point is the person whose most cited article is "Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental processes.")

And do you agree that according to Phil Jones, there has been no statistically significant warming between 1995 and the present?

That's what he said.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-20T18:50:03.261Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

but I'd bet that almost all lengthy pieces of writing intended to communicate a point to others have an agenda behind them, sure

Ok, and the stronger the agenda, the more you should trust your common sense over claims made by the person with the agenda.

That's what he said.

Ok, and presumably what he meant was that any warming which took place between 1995 and the present was less than some statistical minimum threshold. I'm not sophisticated enough to calculate such a limit, but that's what I meant when I said that temperatures have been basically flat for the last 10 years.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-20T19:12:04.054Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Ok, and the stronger the agenda, the more you should trust your common sense over claims made by the person with the agenda.

Cool. I feel more comfortable now that you've expressed this in continuous terms. There's still a catch, though: using your definition of having an agenda, I can't really tell whether someone has an agenda without also knowing the facts (because 'having an agenda' here is being used to mean that someone's making a slanted presentation of the facts), and if I know the facts already, I have little need for your has-an-agenda heuristic.

Ok, and presumably what he meant was that any warming which took place between 1995 and the present was less than some statistical minimum threshold.

Roughly speaking, I think that's about right.

I'm not sophisticated enough to calculate such a limit, but that's what I meant when I said that temperatures have been basically flat for the last 10 years.

I think I understand now. Alrighty...yeah, I would suspect that there's been no statistically significant warming trend in the last 10 years. I would however avoid using phrases like 'temperatures have been basically flat for the last 10 years' to describe this, as I nonetheless believe that if one considers the last 10 years of records in the context of unambiguous past warming, they are consistent with an ongoing, underlying warming trend.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-20T21:39:47.974Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I can't really tell whether someone has an agenda without also knowing the facts

I would suggest you practice. It also helps to read people who contradict eachother. It also helps if you learn some of the facts.

I would however avoid using phrases like 'temperatures have been basically flat for the last 10 years' to describe this, as I nonetheless believe that if one considers the last 10 years of records in the context of unambiguous past warming, they are consistent with an ongoing, underlying warming trend.

Lol, I guess that means American housing prices have been going up the last couple years too.

In any event, I think it's fair to say that temperatures have been basically flat because it contradicts many of the predictions of the warmists.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-20T22:14:28.947Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I would suggest you practice. It also helps to read people who contradict eachother. It also helps if you learn some of the facts.

I reckon the first two things only help in as much as they help you do the third. Learning the facts is what really matters - and in my experience, once I feel I know enough about an issue to decide who has an agenda (in your sense of the phrase), I typically feel I know enough to make my own judgement of the issue without having to tie my colours to the talking head I like the most.

Lol, I guess that means American housing prices have been going up the last couple years too.

I am not familiar enough with US house prices to be sure, but I suspect that's a poor analogy to the global warming data.

In any event, I think it's fair to say that temperatures have been basically flat because it contradicts many of the predictions of the warmists.

Here are two better criteria for judging your statement's fairness:

  • is the statement true?
  • is the statement liable to mislead people?
Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-21T11:05:57.481Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I am not familiar enough with US house prices to be sure, but I suspect that's a poor analogy to the global warming data.

How is it a poor analogy? The general for the last 50 years is upwards, but the trend over the last couple years is flat or downwards.

•is the statement liable to mislead people?

And how do I know if the statement is liable to mislead people?

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-21T21:29:44.061Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

How is it a poor analogy? The general for the last 50 years is upwards, but the trend over the last couple years is flat or downwards.

A quick Google for house price data led me to this graph of US house prices from 1970 up until what looks like last year. It is immediately clear to me that there is far less noise obscuring the changes in trends than in the global temperature data. The recent house price crash looks about an order of magnitude larger than the seasonal(?) fuzz, so it's easy to distinguish it from the earlier upward trend.

Compare the temperature data. It's quite clear that there's relatively a lot more noise and external forcing, which makes it harder to see a trend in the data. That's why it's reasonable to suppose that past upward trends in temperature are continuing, even though the most recent temperatures look flat in some of the data sets; the greater noise hurts your statistical power to detect a trend, which means that you can get the appearance of no trend whether or not the upward trend is continuing.

Hence why I see your analogy as a poor one: you're implying that arguing for an ongoing increase in temperature is as silly as arguing for an ongoing increase in house prices, but that ignores the far greater statistical power to detect a change in trend in recent house price data.

And how do I know if the statement is liable to mislead people?

Apply your rough mental model of how other people are likely to interpret your statement to decide whether your statement is likely to direct them to a misleading impression of the data.

For example, if I show someone this graph, it's fair to say that there's a significant chance they'll think it shows that US temperature increase per century has no practical significance. But that would of course be a fallacious inference: the fact that other temperature measurements can vary a lot is logically disconnected from the issue of whether the rise in US temperature has real importance. In that sense the graph is liable to mislead.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-23T01:32:57.423Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That's why it's reasonable to suppose that past upward trends in temperature are continuing, even though the most recent temperatures look flat in some of the data sets

It may be reasonable to suppose so, but it doesn't change the fact that temperatures have been basically flat for the last 10 (or 15) years.

In any event, it's quite possible -- even likely -- that the upward trend in housing prices is continuing in the same sense you believe that the upward trend in temperatures may be continuing; and that the recent housing bubble is the rough equivalent of an el nino

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-23T10:41:27.570Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It may be reasonable to suppose so, but it doesn't change the fact that temperatures have been basically flat for the last 10 (or 15) years.

I don't believe it is true that 'temperatures have been basically flat' for the last 15 years: I see a net gain of 0.1 to 0.2 Kelvin, depending on the data set (HadCRUT3 v. GISTEMP v. UAH v. RSS). And it looks to me like temperatures have only been 'flat' for the last 10 years in the sense that a short enough snippet of a noisy time series will always look 'flat.'

In any event, it's quite possible -- even likely -- that the upward trend in housing prices is continuing in the same sense you believe that the upward trend in temperatures may be continuing; and that the recent housing bubble is the rough equivalent of an el nino

And the accompanying crash would be a La Niña? I think the house price boom & crash is a little too big to characterize like that.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-23T12:36:45.746Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't believe it is true that 'temperatures have been basically flat' for the last 15 years: I see a net gain of 0.1 to 0.2 Kelvin, depending on the data set (HadCRUT3 v. GISTEMP v. UAH v. RSS).

So the standard is "net gain," and a net gain greater than (or less than) 0.1 Kelvin means not basically flat?

And it looks to me like temperatures have only been 'flat' for the last 10 years in the sense that a short enough snippet of a noisy time series will always look 'flat.'

That may be true, but so what? characterization of evidence != interpretation of evidence. Agreed?

I think the house price boom & crash is a little too big to characterize like that.

Why not? It's a short term detour in a larger overall trend. If you happened to buy a house at the top of the market, there is still an excellent chance that some day the market price will exceed your purchase price.

Replies from: cupholder, RobinZ
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-23T14:36:42.118Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So the standard is "net gain," and a net gain greater than (or less than) 0.1 Kelvin means not basically flat?

Any net gain (or net loss), however small, means not flat, if you are confident enough that it's not an artefact or noise. (Adding the adverb 'basically' muddies things a bit, because it implies that you're not interested in small deviations from flatness.) So: am I quite confident that there has been a deviation from flatness since 1995, and that the deviation is neither artefact nor noise? Yes. But you knew that already, so I'll go deeper.

You earlier referred to the Phil Jones interview where he stated that the warming since 1995 is 'only just' statistically insignificant. I don't know enough about testing autocorrelated time series to check that, but I'm willing to pretty much trust him on this point.

OK, so every so often on Less Wrong you see a snippet of Jaynes or a popular science article presented in the context of a frequentism vs. Bayesianism comparison. I've gone to bat before (see that first link's discussion) to explain why pitting the two against each other seems wrong-minded to me. I've yet to see an example where frequentist methods necessarily have to give a different result to Bayesian methods, just by virtue of being frequentist rather than Bayesian. I see the two as two sides of the same coin.

Still, there are certain techniques that are more associated with the frequentist school than the Bayesian. One of them is statistical significance testing. That particular technique gets a lot of heat from statisticians of all sorts (not just Bayesians!), and arguably rightly so. People are liable to equate statistical significance with practical significance, which is simply wrong, and to dogmatically reject any null hypothesis that doesn't clear a particular p-value bar. On this point, I have to agree with the critics. Far as I can tell, there are too many people who fundamentally misunderstand significance tests, and as someone who does understand them (or I think I do - maybe that's just the Dunning-Kruger effect talking) and finds them useful, that disappoints me.

In the end, you have to exercise judgment in interpreting significance tests, like any other tool. Just because a test limps over the magic significance level with a p-value of 0.049 doesn't mean you should immediately shitcan your null hypothesis, and just because your test falls a hair short with an 0.051 p-value doesn't mean there's nothing there.

To get more specific, that net warming since 1995 has been 'just' statistically insignificant does not mean no warming. It means that under a particular model, the null hypothesis of no overall trend cannot be rejected. It could be because there really is no trend. Or there might be a true trend, but your data are too noisy and too few. Or the test could be cherrypicked. You have to exercise judgment and decide which is most likely. I believe the last two possibilities are most likely: I can see the noise with my own eyes, and apparently 1995 is the earliest year where warming since that year is statistically insignificant, which would be consistent with cherry-picking the year 1995.

Which is why I reject the null hypothesis of no net temperature change since 1995, even though the p-value of Phil Jones' test is presumably a bit higher than 0.05.

That may be true, but so what? characterization of evidence != interpretation of evidence. Agreed?

They are distinct concepts.

I get the feeling that you think calling the last decade of temperatures 'flat' is characterization and not interpretation, and I would disagree. When I say temperatures have risen overall, that's an interpretation. When you say they have not, that's an interpretation. Either interpretation is defensible, though I believe mine is more accurate (but of course I would believe that).

Why not? It's a short term detour in a larger overall trend.

Right, but if you compare the housing price detour to the noise in the house price data, it's relatively way way bigger than the El Niño deviation compared to the noise in the temperature data.

I pulled the temperature data behind this plot and regressed temperature on year. Then I calculated the standard deviation of the residuals from the start of the time series up to 1998 (when the EN kicked in). The peak in the data (at 'year' 1998.08, with a value of 0.6595 degrees) is then 3.9 sigmas above the regression line.

Look back at the home price graph - maybe that particular graph's been massively smoothed, but the post-peak drop looks like way more than a 4 sigma decline: I'd eyeball it as on the order of 10-20 sigmas - and that's a big underestimate because the standard deviation is going to be inflated by what looks like a seasonal fluctuation (the yearly-looking spikes). The El Niño is big and bold, no doubt about it, but it's a puppy compared to the housing pricing crash.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-24T14:29:07.595Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Adding the adverb 'basically' muddies things a bit, because it implies that you're not interested in small deviations from flatness.

Of course it muddies things and we should not be interested in small deviations. That's the basic point of your argument. The only question is how small is small.

When I say temperatures have risen overall, that's an interpretation. When you say they have not, that's an interpretation

Well can you give me an example of a statement about temperature in the last 10 years which is not an "interpretation"?

Right, but if you compare the housing price detour to the noise in the house price data, it's relatively way way bigger than the El Niño deviation compared to the noise in the temperature data.

The El Niño is big and bold, no doubt about it, but it's a puppy compared to the housing pricing crash.

So what? In 1998, would it have been wrong to say that global surface temperatures had risen (relatively) rapidly over the previous few years?

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-24T19:10:43.504Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Of course it muddies things and we should not be interested in small deviations. That's the basic point of your argument.

?!

The point I was making in the first 550 words of the grandparent comment is that one shouldn't automatically disregard a small deviation from flatness merely because it's (barely) statistically insignificant. I am not sure how you interpreted it to mean that 'we should not be interested in small deviations.'

Well can you give me an example of a statement about temperature in the last 10 years which is not an "interpretation"?

A statement that's a few written words or sentences? I doubt it. Trying to summarize a complicated time series in a few words is inevitably going to mean not mentioning some features of the time series, and your editorial judgment of which features not to mention means you're interpreting it.

So what?

You should know, you asked me 'Why not?' in the first place.

In 1998, would it have been wrong to say that global surface temperatures had risen (relatively) rapidly over the previous few years?

Practically, yes, because that claim carries the implication that the El Niño spike is representative of the warming 'over the previous few years.'

comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-23T13:26:00.370Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So the standard is "net gain," and a net gain greater than (or less than) 0.1 Kelvin means not basically flat?

My linear regressions based on NOAA data (I was stupid and lost the citation for where I downloaded it) have 0.005-0.007 K/year since 1880; 0.1 to 0.2 K in a decade is beating the trend.

Replies from: wnoise
comment by wnoise · 2010-03-23T13:34:13.842Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What are the uncertainties on each of these?

Replies from: cupholder, RobinZ
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-23T22:01:13.569Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I took the liberty of downloading the GISTEMP data, which I suspect are very similar to the NOAA data (because the GISTEMP series also starts at 1880, and I dimly remember reading somewhere that the GISS gets land-based temperature data from the NOAA). Regressing anomaly on year I get an 0.00577 K/year increase since 1880, consistent with Robin's estimate. R tells me the standard error on that estimate is 0.00011 K/year.

However, that standard error estimate should be taken with a pinch of salt for two reasons: the regression's residuals are correlated, and it is unlikely that a linear model is wholly appropriate because global warming was reduced mid-century by sulphate emissions. Caveat calculator!

(ETA: I just noticed you wrote 'these,' so I thought you might be interested in the trend for the past decade as well. Regressing anomaly on year for the past 120 monthly GISTEMP temperature anomalies has a trend of 0.0167 ± 0.0023 K/year, but the same warning about that standard error applies.)

comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-23T16:39:04.326Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I have no idea. Varying the starting point from ten to thirty years ago with Feb 2010 as the endpoint puts the slope anywhere in the range [-0.0001,0.2], so it must be fairly large on the scale of a decade.

Replies from: wnoise
comment by wnoise · 2010-03-23T16:54:14.798Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Your regression package doesn't report uncertainties? (Ideally this would be in the form of a covariance matrix.)

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-23T19:17:32.130Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

My regression package is a tab-deliminated data file, a copy of MATLAB, and least-squares.

comment by Jack · 2010-03-17T19:38:23.122Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You're looking at age 9, cupholder is looking at 17.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-17T19:56:16.459Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You're looking at age 9, cupholder is looking at 17

In that case he is looking at the wrong graph when he talks about "your random graph."

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-17T20:01:04.470Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yes, but in that case you aren't looking at the data that Nisbett referred to. As cupholder pointed out

Clicking on the 'White-Black Gap' button, and then on the 'Age 17' tab (as Nisbett refers to 12th graders, so I am guessing that is what he and you are talking about...?)

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-17T20:09:53.672Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Agree, but as I said to cupholder, it doesn't help Nisbett's argument if he is cherry-picking data.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-17T20:19:53.550Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

But Nisbett is quoting from a study "which found improvement on almost all tests for African American 12th graders". That study may not even have contained the data on 9-year-olds. You can ask "Why didn't that study include that data?", well because they were comparing data for 12th graders.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-17T21:08:32.151Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Actually, it's not clear to me what study he is talking about. Here's what he says:

The largest study, conducted by the NAEP, indicated that, if trends were to continue, the gap in reading scores would be eliminated in approximately 25 years and the gap in science scores in approximately 75 years.

So I went to the NAEP web site and looked at the very first graph I saw. What study do you think he is referring to?

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-17T21:56:19.790Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Hedges and Nowell (1998) found improvement on almost all tests for African American 12th graders compared with other 12th graders over the period 1965– 1994. The best estimates in terms of the stability the scores provide, and in terms of their correlations with IQ, are in the form of composites, for example, reading + vocabulary + mathematics for the EEO survey. The Black–White gap on these composites over the period decreased on average by 0.13 standard deviation per decade, yielding an estimate of a reduction of the gap by around 0.39 standard deviation over the period. The largest study, conducted by the NAEP, indicated that, if trends were to continue, the gap in reading scores would be eliminated in approximately 25 years and the gap in science scores in approximately 75 years.

I take this to say that Hedges and Nowell examined lots of test results for African Amercicans 12th graders from 1965-1994. The test with the largest sample was the NAEP test. Since Hedges and Nowell were looking at 12th graders Nisbett is probably talking about the 17-year-olds.

I could be wrong. In any case, the trends have changed since 1994 so obviously the predictions don't hold.

This all seems pretty beside the point to me since the evidence that really matters is the adoption and skin tone studies. The other thing that becomes obvious is that there just isn't nearly enough data-- all the studies are decades old presumably because 1975 was the last time you could get grant money to study the issue. There certainly isn't enough to conclude, as you did, that there is obviously a genetic component.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-17T22:17:20.448Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The test with the largest sample was the NAEP test

Well Nisbett refers to a "study" by the NAEP.

This all seems pretty beside the point to me since the evidence that really matters is the adoption and skin tone studies.

That may be so, but I intentionally chose to run down data from the very first part of the paper so that nobody could accuse me of nitpicking or cherrypicking.

There certainly isn't enough to conclude, as you did, that there is obviously a genetic component

That's only if you feel you need to rely on scientific studies to reach conclusions. Some things don't require such a study.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-18T02:25:41.725Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That's only if you feel you need to rely on scientific studies to reach conclusions. Some things don't require such a study.

Yes, but you have to be super careful when deciding which things need scientific studies.

A few years ago I would've said women were so much more chatty than men - and that the difference in chattiness was so obvious - that it would be a waste of time to check it out scientifically. But sometimes, when you check things out systematically, you're surprised. I think the argument about blacks, whites and IQ is a bit like that, although that argument is more about the cause of the differences and not their mere existence.

Replies from: wedrifid, mattnewport, NancyLebovitz, brazil84
comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-18T03:22:05.051Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Participants were assigned conversational partners at random, and asked to talk for up to ten minutes on one of forty topics

I would never have predicted that women would be more chatty in such a test. I would have predicted that men would talk more on a supplied topic. I believed, and still believe that women are more chatty under the commonly intended meaning of 'chatty'. A more relevant test:

  • Asign random pairs of people and send them on a 5 hour hike together. Count words.

I would expect female pairs to say more words than the male pairs. Mixed pairings I would find somewhat more difficult to predict due to possible interference from courtship protocols.

comment by mattnewport · 2010-03-18T04:34:09.812Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I have my doubts about how strongly that particular test would correlate with what I understand by 'chatty'. It's a pretty artificial setup. When I think about it I have a pretty fuzzy idea of what 'chatty' means though. I would still say women are more chatty than men but that is partly because some part of the fuzzy definition involves 'the type of small talk that women tend to engage in more than men' rather than some idea of total word volume.

comment by NancyLebovitz · 2010-03-18T03:12:30.931Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm interested that you believed women were much more chatty than men as recently as a few years ago.

I can remember it being a default belief in the culture that women were more chatty, but I thought it had faded out in the 80s or thereabouts.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-18T04:18:45.551Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I imagine it's less widespread a belief than before the 80s, but it's just one of those things you get by osmosis from the broader culture when you're young. It's part of the stereotypes there are about the sexes: women can't drive, men won't ask for directions when they're lost, blah blah blah.

comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-18T09:44:21.489Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yes, but you have to be super careful when deciding which things need scientific studies.

I would say "reasonably careful" not "super careful." One thing I've noticed about the race and intelligence debate is that many people apply an extremely heightened standard of skepticism to the question.

By analogy, suppose we were debating the existence of God. There may very well be a few scientific studies out there which lend some degree of support to the theistic point of view. Further, there probably has not been a lot of scientific research into the subject. So one could take the "super careful" approach and say that the jury is still out on the subject. But that's silly. That's just exaggerated skepticism on the part of folks who don't like a particular conclusion.

For those of us who do believe in God but aspire to rationality, the best we can do is to concede there's a contradiction there.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-18T23:18:35.809Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

When I suggested being 'super careful' I meant being super careful about deciding which things are so obvious as to not need systematic debate and study in the first place, not about deciding how skeptical to be of certain 'sides' or conclusions in a debate.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-19T00:26:48.004Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

When I suggested being 'super careful' I meant being super careful about deciding which things are so obvious as to not need systematic debate and study in the first place, not about deciding how skeptical to be of certain 'sides' or conclusions in a debate.

I'm not sure what you mean by "systematic debate and study," but assuming it means the same thing as "scientific studies," it seems to me it amounts to basically the same thing. At least in this case.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-19T01:05:19.531Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'll try and clarify with the non-race and IQ related example that first put the idea into my head: gravity. The idea of things falling to the floor is so obvious to me, and agrees so well with my common sense, that I would not even bother to debate somebody who wanted to argue that things don't fall to the floor. That's the behaviour I'm saying it's a good idea to be super careful about: rejecting challenges to your existing view out of hand.

Stepping back to the race and IQ argument, I'm saying that I would exercise a lot of care before I put the argument into the 'no need to even bother debating it' box. Having entered into the debate, though, I would be content to apply my ordinary standards of evidence to the different 'sides' in the debate. I mean the 'super careful' warning to apply pre-debate, not during the debate.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-19T08:55:35.784Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What about the theism/atheism controversy. Can I take it that you are agnostic?

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-19T22:49:21.858Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm still waiting for y'all to agree on what God is so I can decide. Everyone seems to have a different idea of the bugger. In the meantime I'll carry on spending brain energy on less fuzzy things, like race and IQ and global warming.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-20T02:16:53.655Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

For purposes of this discussion, we can define God as a supernatural being who who more or less did the acts ascribed to Him in the Hebrew Bible. e.g. creating the Earth, and so on. In other words, the God of Abraham.

I take it you are agnostic about the existence of the God of Abraham?

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-20T18:03:56.735Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

For purposes of this discussion, we can define God as a supernatural being

Supernatural beings do not exist.

God, as you define it, therefore does not exist.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-20T18:10:09.116Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm a little confused -- are you saying that by definition, supernatural beings do not exist?

Otherwise, what's your evidence/argument?

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-20T18:42:42.015Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm a little confused -- are you saying that by definition, supernatural beings do not exist?

Yep. The concept of a supernatural being is incoherent.

Replies from: RobinZ, bogus, brazil84
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-20T19:25:24.688Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Not according to the Richard Carrier definition of "supernatural", which I would argue is a more accurate interpretation of the term.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-20T20:03:55.449Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Upvoted for interestingness, but that definition still leaves no room for supernatural beings as far as I'm concerned (assuming I'm interpreting Carrier's post correctly).

That's because I don't draw the distinction between minds and mental things and the 'nonmental' that Carrier does - I've effectively ruled out the supernatural by fiat because I treat it as axiomatic that the mental is just a kind of physical.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-20T20:37:13.339Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I see - along the lines of theological noncognitivism, then. It's an unusual position, in my experience.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-20T20:57:03.435Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Kinda, though I try to acknowledge that different people mean different things by 'God.' For example, some people equate God with love. If you do that God obviously exists.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-20T21:01:34.580Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If God really were love, praying would be a complete waste of time. I suspect such statements are not actually expressions of factual content.

Replies from: bogus, cupholder
comment by bogus · 2010-03-21T00:04:24.326Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If God really were love, praying would be a complete waste of time.

Why? The placebo effect and other mindhacks apply to any sort of ritual or 'magic'. If you accept this, then worshipping 'love' or 'warfare' or other god-forms is not a waste of time at all--the purpose and effect of prayer need not involve anything supernatural.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-21T00:10:54.244Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That ... is a good point, actually. It doesn't affect my argument - the one I elaborated with my Thom Yorke example - but it does complicate the situation in ways which should be acknowledged.

comment by cupholder · 2010-03-20T21:28:10.863Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That's very plausible.

[ETA: It sure is an expeditious way to interpret such statements, though.]

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-20T21:59:34.814Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

[ETA: It sure is an expeditious way to interpret such statements, though.]

You're right - best is to inquire for additional details when someone proposes such a statement.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-20T22:26:09.299Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I tried probing deeper (just out of curiosity) the first few times I was told 'God is love/an energy/kindness/a force', but found that my conversant usually had difficulty elaborating beyond the initial statement. There seemed to be some extra, hard to articulate component to what they thought but they were usually unwilling and/or unable to communicate it to me.

After a time I decided to just politely go 'Hmmmm, I see' and try changing the subject whenever someone equated God with something mundane in conversation. I think I must have started doing that mentally as well - hence why I take the statement at face value when I hear it.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-20T22:35:57.372Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That matches my experience as well - I think it is a necessarily supernatural description in the Carrier sense of the word, though, if it is to be taken at face value. It's not like saying "God is Thom Yorke" (to pick the first name that comes to mind - I don't even know who Thom Yorke is), and then cheerfully conceding that God is not, in fact, omnipotent or omniscient, etc. - the God-is-Love god still has the usual properties, just (or not "just", depending) also that description.

Replies from: orthonormal, cupholder
comment by orthonormal · 2010-03-21T01:28:56.414Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"God is Thom Yorke"

Well, that might make for more interesting Gospels at least:

My brethren, be not anxious that Thom be absent or that this not come to pass (as in the Book of Kid A, Track 4); for recall as Thom sayeth, "there is nothing to fear, nothing to doubt" (Amnesiac, 2)— verily, in an interstellar burst he shall be back to save the universe (OK Computer, 1). Thou mayst not see him in the world as it is, this gunboat in a sea of fear (The Bends, 2), for Thom doth not belong here (Pablo Honey, 2). Repent of your sins, lest you go to hell for what your dirty mind is thinking (In Rainbows, 3); steer away from those rocks of evil, or thou shalt be a walking disaster (Hail to the Thief, 9). Therefore immerse your soul in love (The Bends, 12) with all your will, for the best thou can is good enough (Kid A, 6) and Thom shalt see thee in the next life (Kid A, 10).

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-21T01:35:31.532Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I suspect the original Gospels were similarly interesting to the early Christians - it's just that we (most of us, anyway) don't get the in-jokes any more.

comment by cupholder · 2010-03-20T22:41:30.975Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think you're most likely correct. Now you've made me think about it, the God-is-Love gambit is probably just misdirection.

Note to self: be careful what I express polite indifference to, because that can turn into a thought pattern as well as a speech pattern.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-20T22:48:46.332Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Actually, I favor the "response to the Euthyphro Dilemma" theory - if God is Good, then what God loves must be Good by definition, not by contrivance, and the dilemma collapses.

That is, if you ignore the contrivance that is "God is Good".

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-20T22:57:05.780Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

if God is Good, then what God loves must be Good by definition

Could you elaborate on how the second part follows from God = good?

Replies from: Strange7, RobinZ
comment by Strange7 · 2011-06-28T04:39:37.976Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

As I understand it, "goodness" is being used in a somewhat confusing way there, referring to not only outcomes in the world and the actions which lead to those outcomes, but also preferences or personality traits which lead to those actions. In other words, there is a set of mental qualities which results in preferable outcomes (good) and a set which does not (evil); God has all of the former qualities and none of the latter, therefore similarity to God can be taken as evidence of goodness and vice-versa.

The main practical difference from Friendly AI is that God is presumed to already exist.

comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-20T23:11:41.914Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I assume it's supposed to work like mass-energy equivalence or something, but I don't actually believe it, so I can't say.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-20T23:16:04.877Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Heh, fair enough.

comment by bogus · 2010-03-20T19:45:39.561Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

More rigorously, the distinction between "natural" and "supernatural" must be in the map, not in the territory. As Aleister Crowley put it in his Book of Lies:

“Explain this happening!”

  “It must have a natural cause!”      }____Let these two asses be set to grind corn.
  “It must have a supernatural cause!” } 
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-20T18:52:12.468Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Ok, in that case just take the supernatural part out of the definition. Define God as some entity who did essentially what is ascribed to God in the Hebrew Bible. i.e. He created the Heavens and the Earth, etc.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-20T19:35:13.997Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't have a paper copy of the Bible so I used this. I tried to read it from the beginning, but it didn't make any sense. At first I thought 'God' must have been Hebrew for 'Big Bang,' but that didn't fit. I can't really work out what this 'God' would even be if it existed - it's like trying to deduce what the Jabberwock is. So I guess God is about as likely to exist as slithy toves.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-20T21:34:36.653Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm confused again. Are you telling me you are an atheist?

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-20T21:39:59.507Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

About Hebrew Bible God? Of course! Unless you can think of some sensible way to interpret Genesis (and the rest of it) that hasn't occurred to me and lets you salvage a God.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-21T11:08:55.327Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Do you understand that in the West, when people say they believe in God, they are normally referring to the God of Abraham?

And do you agree that there exists weak evidence for the existence of God?

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-21T20:59:36.288Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Do you understand that in the West, when people say they believe in God, they are normally referring to the God of Abraham?

That is what I thought when I was younger. In practice I've found that when talking to people in depth about their idea of God, they often have a slightly different idea of what God is supposed to be than other people I've spoken to.

And do you agree that there exists weak evidence for the existence of God?

Yes: a lot of people claim to have experienced God directly, which is weak evidence for God's existence. (Assuming they're all talking about essentially the same thing when they say 'God,' anyway.)

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-22T09:04:15.076Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yes: a lot of people claim to have experienced God directly

Sure; also there is hearsay documentary evidence (the Bible) and apparently even some scientific studies which supposedly demonstrate the power of prayer.

But by what standard do you reject such evidence?

Replies from: cupholder, ata
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-23T10:30:13.988Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Rejecting an interpretation of the evidence != rejecting evidence.

(Incidentally, I tried pulling up meta-analyses on the effect of prayer and found this Cochrane meta-analysis which finds no consistent effect of being prayed for on ill health.)

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-23T12:21:53.735Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Rejecting an interpretation of the evidence != rejecting evidence.

:shrug: By what standard do you evaluate this evidence so as to reach your atheistic conclusion notwithstanding this evidence for the existence of God?

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-23T13:26:56.897Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The same standard I use to reach an a-homeopathic conclusion notwithstanding the evidence for homeopathy working, or an a-alien-abduction conclusion notwithstanding the evidence for people being beamed up and anally probed by aliens.

Namely, can I fit the idea of God existing/homeopathy working/alien abduction into my broader understanding of the world, or would it require overturning practically my whole understanding of how reality works?

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-23T15:33:46.836Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So if I understand you correctly, there is no possible evidence which could convince you of the effectiveness of homeopathy, or the existence of God?

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-23T15:52:20.588Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

On the contrary, it is quite possible that there could be evidence that would convince me of either of those things. It is just that the evidence would have to be strong enough to go head-to-head with basic physics. If it could somehow be demonstrated that Avogadro's number were 300 orders of magnitude too tiny, and that molecules were a googol times smaller than we thought, and could explain why our earlier experiments had led us to our original estimates of Avogadro's number and molecular sizes, then that would tend make the effectiveness of homeopathy (more) plausible.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-23T16:21:39.066Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It is just that the evidence would have to be strong enough to go head-to-head with basic physics.

And by what standard would you decide whether the evidence is sufficiently strong?

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-23T20:58:25.551Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

My estimate of the probability of homeopathy working and the current laws of physics being very different would have to be of similar order to my estimate of the probability of the current laws of physics being correct.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-23T23:49:15.778Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

And how do you come up with your probability estimates in a situation like this? Do you rely on your general knowledge and common sense? Do you have some algorithm you follow?

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-24T00:32:03.300Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

No, I don't have a strict algorithm I follow in situations like this. What I actually do is probably more like this:

  • do some initial reading to get an idea of the basic plausibility of the hypothesis based on my background knowledge
  • let the hypothesis bounce around my mind for a while
  • try to spell out to myself the resulting gut feeling for the hypothesis' probability
  • check that rough estimate for any gaping flaws
  • if that rough estimate is really low, reject the hypothesis as Too Unlikely To Debate for the time being (remember that 'super careful' warning I made a few posts up? This is where it applies)
  • if the rough estimate is instead very high, accept the hypothesis as Too Likely To Debate for the time being
  • if the probability estimate is more middling, and the hypothesis' truthiness is important to me, gather more data and try to hone my hunch for the hypothesis' probability
Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-24T14:14:29.981Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Fine, and using a similar method of estimating probabilities based on my knowledge, common sense, etc., I am satisfied that the difference in cognitive performance between blacks and whites results in large part from genetic differences.

In the same way that you are reasonably confident that God does not exist despite evidence to the contrary.

Replies from: Morendil, Jack
comment by Morendil · 2010-03-24T16:07:19.031Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

...using a similar method of estimating probabilities based on my knowledge, common sense, etc., I am satisfied that...

This statement is roughly equivalent to "My opinions on topic X are soundly arrived at". Show, don't tell.

In the instance, the blog where you said you were going to publish "evidence and arguments" in support of the above view has, to a first approximation, zero useful or interesting content at this time. Meanwhile you have wasted the time and attention of many LW readers as you submitted cupholder to an interrogation that would have tried anyone's patience.

I wish you'd stop doing that.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-24T16:19:38.029Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This statement is roughly equivalent to "My opinions on topic X are soundly arrived at".

Perhaps, but I set forth the basis of my reasoning in a blog post elsewhere. So I did more than simply assert a conclusion.

Since this branch of the discussion has fallen below the comment threshhold, I am happy to discuss things here.

In any event, would you apply the same criticism to cupholder's atheism?

to a first approximation, zero useful or interesting content at this time

If you believe that what I stated was not useful or interesting, then you should not mind stipulating for the sake of argument that the facts I state there are correct. Agreed?

Meanwhile you have wasted the time and attention of many LW readers as you submitted cupholder to an interrogation that would have tried anyone's patience.

Unfortunately cupholder was rather evasive in our discussion. That's his fault not mine.

Replies from: cupholder, Morendil, prase
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-24T18:48:20.765Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Unfortunately cupholder was rather evasive in our discussion.

Evidence please.

I see one answer to one of your questions in this atheism discussion that I answered in a cutesy way - though I still think my implication there was quite clear. For your other questions in this subthread I either replied in enough detail to answer your questions, where they were relevant (1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8), or pointed out that your question was underspecified or had a false premise.

That's his fault not mine.

If you felt my answers to your questions were unsatisfactory, it would have been more helpful to have made that more explicit at the time, instead of working through your long-winded Socratic dialogue and taking an unsubstantiated potshot at me.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-24T19:08:58.274Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Evidence please.

For example, consider this exchange:


Me: Sure; also there is hearsay documentary evidence (the Bible) and apparently even some scientific studies which supposedly demonstrate the power of prayer.

But by what standard do you reject such evidence?

You: Rejecting an interpretation of the evidence != rejecting evidence

Me: :shrug: By what standard do you evaluate this evidence so as to reach your atheistic conclusion notwithstanding this evidence for the existence of God?


It's pretty obvious in this context what it means to "reject evidence," but you chose an interpretation which let you avoid the question. i.e. you were evasive.

Anyway, I didn't make an issue out of your evasiveness until somebody made an issue out of the length of our exchange.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-24T19:20:48.631Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It's pretty obvious in this context what it means to "reject evidence,"

Indeed, and that context happens to include this question preceding the first one you quoted there:

And do you agree that there exists weak evidence for the existence of God?

which implies that you thought there was a significant chance that I didn't believe there was evidence of God. (Otherwise, why would you have bothered asking?) So when you subsequently implied that I 'reject such evidence' of God, it was quite reasonable to interpret it as literally just that - rejecting the evidence qua evidence - because you had just implied that you were open to the possibility that I denied evidence of God in general.

Anyway, I didn't make an issue out of your evasiveness until somebody made an issue out of the length of our exchange.

That's nice.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-24T19:31:08.690Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

which implies that you thought there was a significant chance that I didn't believe there was evidence of God. (Otherwise, why would you have bothered asking?) So when you subsequently implied that I 'reject such evidence' of God, it was quite reasonable to interpret it as literally just that - rejecting the evidence qua evidence - because you had just implied that you were open to the possibility that I denied evidence of God in general.

Lol, you are being silly. We had both agreed that the evidence exists and then I asked why you rejected it. It was completely obvious what I meant.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-24T19:43:02.835Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Lol, you are being silly. We had both agreed that the evidence exists and then I asked why you rejected it.

You seem to be writing as if acknowledging the existence of evidence and rejecting evidence are mutually exclusive. Perhaps that is how you understand acknowledging that evidence exists v. rejecting evidence, but that's a new understanding to me.

It was completely obvious what I meant.

Apparently not.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-24T19:51:33.232Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You seem to be writing as if acknowledging the existence of evidence and rejecting evidence are mutually exclusive.

Please either show me where I made such an implication by QUOTING me or admit I implied no such thing. Thank you.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-24T19:59:07.886Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Please either show me where I made such an implication by QUOTING me

I could be mistaken, but I think I already did.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-24T20:11:58.068Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yes you are mistaken. If we both agree to X, it would make no sense for me to ask, in essence, why you believe in ~X.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-03-24T20:23:29.948Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm not asserting that you asked me if I believed there was no evidence of God (which is the ~X you have in mind, as far as I can tell). I'm asserting that you asked me whether I rejected evidence of God.

A second thing. It's plain to me that at this point this argument is capable of going around in circles forever (if it hasn't gone into a full-on death spiral already), and I'm not interested in engaging you on this point indefinitely. I'm not going to continue this subthread after this comment.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-24T21:25:21.074Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm not asserting that you asked me if I believed there was no evidence of God (which is the ~X you have in mind, as far as I can tell). I'm asserting that you asked me whether I rejected evidence of God.

But according to you, I implied that rejecting evidence of God excludes the possibility of acknowledging the existence of that evidence.

However I made no such implication.

and I'm not interested in engaging you on this point indefinitely. I'm not going to continue this subthread after this comment.

That's fine . . . I don't engage with people who strawman me.

Goodbye.

comment by Morendil · 2010-03-24T16:47:08.179Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I am happy to discuss things here.

I'm not. This style of argumentation is ineffective and wasteful of people's time, and I'm unhappy, bordering on angry, that it has gone on that long. I prefer to let this emotion find a productive outlet, namely a top-level post to put a name to the pattern I prefer, so as to encourage more useful discussions in future.

Unfortunately cupholder was rather evasive in our discussion

Claim. Unsupported by evidence.

That's his fault not mine.

Blame. Irrelevant to truth-seeking.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-24T16:54:22.132Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm not.

:shrug: Then don't engage with me.

Claim. Unsupported by evidence.

Would you like to see some evidence? I'm happy to provide it.

Blame. Irrelevant to truth-seeking.

If blame is irrelevant to truth-seeking, then why are you accusing me (and not cupholder) of "wasting time and attention"?

Anyway, please answer my questions:

(1) Would you apply the same criticism to cupholder's atheism?

(2) If you believe that what I stated was not useful or interesting, then you should not mind stipulating for the sake of argument that the facts I state there are correct. Agreed?

Replies from: Strange7
comment by Strange7 · 2011-06-28T00:46:53.595Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Would you like to see some evidence? I'm happy to provide it.

Never say this again. It's a cheap, time-wasting dodge.

If you actually have evidence, simply lay it out as soon as it might be relevant.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-06-28T01:42:54.141Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If you actually have evidence, simply lay it out as soon as it might be relevant.

I disagree with this. It takes time and energy to gather evidence. I don't care to spend my time and energy digging up evidence unless somebody seriously throws down the gauntlet. Just stating "Claim. Unsupported by evidence" -- without indicating an interest in engaging -- is not enough for me. Besides, it would have been easy enough for the poster to come back and say "yes, show me a quote please."

Replies from: AdeleneDawner, Strange7
comment by AdeleneDawner · 2011-06-28T02:26:57.265Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Would you like to see some evidence? I'm happy to provide it.

This seems to imply that you already have the evidence, and are only waiting for confirmation that it's wanted to provide it.

It takes time and energy to gather evidence.

If this is relevant, it implies that you don't have the evidence yet.

Please don't imply that you have evidence when you don't.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-06-28T11:59:36.625Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I would say that you are presenting what's known as a "false dilemma," i.e. your statement assumes that there are only two possibilities: either (1) I have the evidence in which case it costs me nothing to present it; or (2) I don't in which case it is dishonest for me to offer to present evidence.

Of course there is another possibility, which is that I am reasonably confident I can present the evidence, but it will take me time and energy to gather and present it.

For example, suppose I bought a toaster a month ago; it breaks; I call up the store to get it fixed; and the store manager says "We can't help you since you aren't the original purchaser." Before I spend 20 minutes finding the credit card receipt, I'm going to ask the guy "Would you like to see proof that I bought the toaster?"

Replies from: AdeleneDawner
comment by AdeleneDawner · 2011-06-28T13:58:16.029Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If you don't yet have evidence, it's not dishonest to offer to find and present it, but it is dishonest to claim that you already have it, since by making that claim you're claiming something that's not true - namely that you have already confirmed that the evidence exists.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-06-28T14:35:46.321Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't understand your point.

Is it dishonest to offer to present evidence when you are confident you can gather it?

For example, in the toaster scenario, is it dishonest to offer to produce proof that you bought the toaster? (Assume for the sake of argument that you save all of your receipts religiously and you are quite confident that you can produce the receipt if you are willing to take 20 minutes to rummage through your old receipts.)

Replies from: AdeleneDawner
comment by AdeleneDawner · 2011-06-28T15:18:48.818Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Is it dishonest to offer to present evidence when you are confident you can gather it?

If you offer it in such a way as to assert that you already have it, yes.

If I know that someone has a certain amount of evidence for a certain thing, then seeing that evidence myself doesn't tell me much - knowing that the evidence exists is almost as good as gathering it myself. (This is what makes scientific studies work, so that people don't have to test every theory by themselves.) But knowing that someone thinks that a certain amount of evidence exists for a certain thing is much weaker, and actually seeing the evidence in this case tells me much more, because it's not particularly unusual for people to be wrong about this kind of thing, even when they claim to be certain. (Ironically, while I remember seeing a post on here that mentioned that when people were asked to give several 90%-likely predictions most of them managed to do no better than 30% correct, I can't find it, so, case in point, I guess.)

toaster scenario

I don't think this is an accurate metaphor; human brains don't work well enough for us to be that confident in most situations.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-06-28T15:26:48.370Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If you offer it in such a way as to assert that you already have it, yes

I don't understand what you mean by "already have it." If I know that I can pull the evidence up on my computer screen with about 60 seconds of work, do I "have" it? If the evidence is stored my hard drive, do I "have" it? If the evidence is on a web site which is publicly accessible, do I "have" it?

I don't think this is an accurate metaphor; human brains don't work well enough for us to be that confident in most situations

It sounds like your answer to my question is "no," i.e. it would not be dishonest to offer to produce a receipt but that the example I described is extremely rare and non-representative. Do I understand you correctly?

Replies from: Strange7
comment by Strange7 · 2011-06-28T15:54:51.309Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If I know that I can pull the evidence up on my computer screen with about 60 seconds of work, do I "have" it?

If you spend more time arguing about definitions than it would take to present your facts and settle the original point, that constitutes evidence that your motive has little or nothing to do with the pursuit of mutual understanding.

Please either present the evidence you originally offered w/r/t the correlation between race and IQ, or desist in your protestations.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-06-28T16:08:46.115Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If you spend more time arguing about definitions than it would take to present your facts and settle the original point, that constitutes evidence that your motive has little or nothing to do with the pursuit of mutual understanding.

Before you go attacking my motives, maybe it would make sense to you to explain why you took us into meta-debate territory. You could have easily said something like this:

Brazil84, I think you are unreasonably standing on ceremony by offering to produce evidence rather than just doing it. However, rather than debate over whether that was appropriate or not, please just produce the evidence you offered to produce.

And yet you chose not to, instead launching a meta debate (actually a meta-meta debate). If anyone's motives are suspect, it's yours.

Please either present the evidence you originally offered w/r/t the correlation between race and IQ, or desist in your protestations.

Lol, the evidence I offered to produce was that a certain poster was being evasive. Yes, that's right -- you started a meta-meta-debate.

As far as race and IQ goes, I laid out my case on my blog post. You are free read it carefully and then come back if you want evidence or other support for any aspect of it.

http://fortaleza84.wordpress.com/2010/03/16/the-race-and-iq-question/

Replies from: Strange7, Strange7, brazil84
comment by Strange7 · 2011-06-28T17:12:56.301Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I have read the post in question. The heart of your argument seems to be

In other words, you see it pretty much everywhere in the United States and the rest of the world; further, various attempts to eliminate this gap have failed. This is exactly what one would expect to happen if the difference were largely genetic in origin.

Could you please provide some citations, with actual numbers, for "pretty much everywhere" and "various attempts," including at least one study more recent than... let's say 1987?

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-06-28T18:14:38.917Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I could try to, but first you must comply with Rule 4 of my rules of debate.

First tell me that you are seriously skeptical that there is a black/white difference in cognitive abilities pretty much everywhere in the world.

Then tell me that you are seriously skeptical that various attempts to eliminate this gap have failed.

Replies from: Strange7
comment by Strange7 · 2011-06-28T19:00:38.040Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I am seriously skeptical that there is such a difference "pretty much everywhere," that is, without variance along geographical, political, and economic lines.

"Various attempts have failed" taken literally means almost nothing; I am seriously skeptical that the gap has never been reduced as the result of any deliberate intervention.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-06-28T19:12:04.844Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I am seriously skeptical that there is such a difference "pretty much everywhere," that is, without variance along geographical, political, and economic lines.

I don't understand what you mean by this. Of course there is variance in cognitive abilities (as well as differences in the size of the black/white gap) along geographical, political, and economic lines. And I am not claiming otherwise.

I am seriously skeptical that the gap has never been reduced as the result of any deliberate intervention

Well are you seriously skeptical that the gap has never been substantially eliminated?

Replies from: Strange7
comment by Strange7 · 2011-06-28T19:57:14.482Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

An attempt to eliminate the gap could be considered successful in the long term if it resulted in consistent, cumulative reductions in the gap over time, without (yet) eliminating the gap outright. It's cold comfort, like a cancer patient considered 'cured' because they died of something else first, but still worthy of recognition.

And I am not claiming otherwise.

Then please either concede the point that the intelligence gap might be entirely explained by such factors, or provide a more detailed analysis of why it cannot be. For example, how much of the gap is due to differing economic opportunities, and corresponding issues of early childhood nutrition and education, resulting from discriminatory policies that were still legally enforced as of less than fifty years ago?

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-06-28T20:26:24.397Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

An attempt to eliminate the gap could be considered successful in the long term if it resulted in consistent, cumulative reductions in the gap over time, without (yet) eliminating the gap outright. It's cold comfort, like a cancer patient considered 'cured' because they died of something else first, but still worthy of recognition.

Well maybe so, but the question is what exactly you are seriously skeptical of. It sounds like you are not seriously skeptical of the claim that the black/white gap has never been substantially eliminated. Do I understand you correctly?

Then please either concede the point that the intelligence gap might be entirely explained by such factors, or provide a more detailed analysis of why it cannot be.

I address that in my blog post. And it sounds like you are not seriously skeptical of the claim that the black/white gap exists pretty much everywhere, you just dispute that it's the same everywhere and you assert that other factors besides race have a general impact on cognitive abilities. Did I understand you correctly?

Replies from: Strange7
comment by Strange7 · 2011-06-28T22:21:32.149Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I disagree with you on points of fact (namely the causal mechanism behind a difference in intelligence between two subgroups of H. sapiens) about which you claim to have as-yet-unrevealed evidence. I will reply to you no further until you provide that evidence, preferably in the form of a peer-reviewed study published more recently than 1987 Q 4 conclusively supporting your hypothesis.

Furthermore, if you persist in dodging the question and playing games with 'obviousness,' I will take that as a sign of bad faith on your part, an attempt to manipulate me into saying something embarrassing.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-06-28T22:41:52.325Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

:shrug: All I did was ask you simple questions so that I could understand exactly what it is you claim to be skeptical of.

I'm not going to waste time digging up citations for things which you don't seriously dispute.

Furthermore, if you persist in dodging the question and playing games with 'obviousness,

You are the one who is dodging questions.

I asked you two simple, reasonable yes or no questions in good faith so that I could understand your position. You ignored both of them.

Debating with me is not about playing "hide the ball" Before I gather evidence, I want to know exactly where we agree and disagree. You refuse to tell me. So be it.

ETA: By the way, it's possible to be reasonably confident of various generalizations about human groups even without formal, peer-reviewed studies. I think this is pretty obvious, but I can give examples if anyone wants.

comment by Strange7 · 2011-06-28T17:31:37.231Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Lol, the evidence I offered to produce was that a certain poster was being evasive. Yes, that's right -- you started a meta-meta-debate.

If the readers can't understand what you're referring to, the burden is on you to write more clearly. Furthermore, I object to your use of the word "Lol" in this context.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-06-28T18:10:06.661Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If the readers can't understand what you're referring to, the burden is on you to write more clearly.

I see you cannot resist meta-debate.

Anyway, I would say it depends on how much effort and care those readers put into understanding. To any reasonable person, it was clear what I was referring to.

comment by brazil84 · 2011-06-28T16:56:35.696Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

By the way, if you do want to debate this with me, you should know that I have my own rules of debate. You can find them here:

http://brazil84.wordpress.com/my-rules-of-debate/

In particular, you should pay attention to Rule 4.

comment by Strange7 · 2011-06-28T02:18:20.284Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It takes time and energy to gather evidence.

Irrelevant obfuscation.

If you have already gathered the necessary evidence, present it without this teasing preamble; if not, admit your ignorance and lay out the probable search costs.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-06-28T11:51:09.760Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think that when I asked "would you like to see some evidence," the reasonable interpretation is that I can gather and present the evidence with a small but non-zero amount of effort.

However, if you did not understand my comment that way, that's what I meant.

And again, it would have been easy enough for the other poster to say "Yes, I am skeptical of your claim and would like to see the evidence." Since he didn't do it, I infer that he doesn't want to invest any further energy in the interaction. Which is fine, but if he doesn't want to invest further energy, I don't want to either.

comment by prase · 2010-03-24T17:36:02.010Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Unfortunately cupholder was rather evasive in our discussion. That's his fault not mine.

No, you were aggressive and rude in the discussion. You have demanded a detailed answer while your questions weren't clear, and in repeated queries you didn't even try to explain what sort of answer you want. That all only to allow yourself to reply "well, I use the same standards".

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-24T17:45:06.777Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

No, you were aggressive and rude in the discussion.

your questions weren't clear

Can you please QUOTE me where I was aggressive and rude?

Can you please QUOTE a question I asked which was not clear?

"well, I use the same standards".

Actually I said something like "similar" not "same." But so what?

Replies from: prase
comment by prase · 2010-03-24T18:32:12.550Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Your debating style resembles more an interrogation than a friendly discussion, and this I consider rude, but it may be only my personal feeling.

More importantly, you deliberately derailed the debate about racial differences in IQ asking about cupholder's religious beliefs, while being apparently not interested in the question. It seemed to me that the purpose of the long debate was only to prepare positions for your final argument again about racial differences in IQ. This is also on my list of rude behaviour. I don't like people asking questions in order to show that the opponent can't answer appropriately.

If I ask a question and am not satisfied with the answer, the default is to suppose that the other person didn't understood properly the question and my job is to explain it, or possibly give some motivation for it. Repeating the same question with only minimal alterations I consider aggresive. Want a quote?

But by what standard do you reject such evidence? 09:04:15AM

By what standard do you evaluate this evidence so as to reach your atheistic conclusion notwithstanding this evidence for the existence of God? 12:21:53PM

And by what standard would you decide whether the evidence is sufficiently strong? 04:21:39PM

I understand that you interpret it as a result of evasiveness of your opponent, but I simply disagree here. Cupholder has given two answers

Namely, can I fit the idea of God existing/homeopathy working/alien abduction into my broader understanding of the world, or would it require overturning practically my whole understanding of how reality works?

It is just that the evidence would have to be strong enough to go head-to-head with basic physics.

which I find quite appropriate given your question. If you don't, you should explain the question in more detail, because it is unclear. You have basically asked "what's your epistemology", itself a fine question, but full answer could fill a book. So either you wanted some specific answer, and the question was not clear - you should have asked more specifically. Or you didn't want a specific answer, and since I don't think you expected cupholder to explain his rationality in full detail, I must conclude that the question was merely rhetorical, which brings me back to rudeness.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-24T19:16:27.256Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

More importantly, you deliberately derailed the debate about racial differences in IQ asking about cupholder's religious beliefs, while being apparently not interested in the question. It seemed to me that the purpose of the long debate was only to prepare positions for your final argument again about racial differences in IQ.

Well, the atheism/theism issue is a decent example of a situation where it's possible to be reasonably confident in a position without exhaustive scientific studies of the matter. And indeed, even if there are scientific studies going against your position.

I understand that you interpret it as a result of evasiveness of your opponent, but I simply disagree here.

As noted above, cupholder clearly chose an unreasonable interpretation of my question.

If you don't, you should explain the question in more detail, because it is unclear.

What exactly is the question I asked which is unclear?

Replies from: prase, Morendil
comment by prase · 2010-03-24T19:28:42.670Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Well, the atheism/theism issue is a decent example of a situation where it's possible to be reasonably confident in a position without exhaustive scientific studies of the matter. And indeed, even if there are scientific studies going against your position.

Agreed, but I don't understand the relevance.

As noted above, cupholder clearly chose an unreasonable interpretation of my question.

I found all his interpretations (or what I think to be his interpretations) quite natural. Clearly we have conflicting intuitions. What interpretation did you have in mind, i.e. what type of answer you have expected?

What exactly is the question I asked which is unclear?

It is too general to be answered in a concise comment. Therefore, when replying one has to either choose one particular aspect or be very vague.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-24T19:40:50.027Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Agreed, but I don't understand the relevance

As I recall, that's one of the issues which was under discussion.

I found all his interpretations (or what I think to be his interpretations) quite natural. Clearly we have conflicting intuitions. What interpretation did you have in mind,

I claim that the two questions I quoted myself asking are essentially the same question:

http://lesswrong.com/lw/1ww/undiscriminating_skepticism/1t48

It is too general to be answered in a concise comment. Therefore, when replying one has to either choose one particular aspect or be very vague.

Which question are you talking about?

Replies from: prase
comment by prase · 2010-03-24T20:03:03.734Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So "reject the evidence" can mean 1) deny that the evidence exists and 2) not consider the evidence convincing. You find the interpretation 2) obvious and 1) unreasonable in the given context. Am I right? If so, well, after thinking about it for a while I admit that 2) is a lot better interpretation, but nevertheless I wouldn't call the other one unreasonable, nor I suspect cupholder of deliberate misinterpretation; people sometimes interpret others wrongly.

Which question are you talking about?

The question by what standard you reject the evidence for the existence of God?

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-24T20:14:48.786Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So "reject the evidence" can mean 1) deny that the evidence exists and 2) not consider the evidence convincing. You find the interpretation 2) obvious and 1) unreasonable in the given context. Am I right?

Pretty much yes.

If so, well, after thinking about it for a while I admit that 2) is a lot better interpretation, but nevertheless I wouldn't call the other one unreasonable, nor I suspect cupholder of deliberate misinterpretation; people sometimes interpret others wrongly.

I disagree, but at a minimum, it was hardly unreasonable for me to rephrase the question.

comment by Morendil · 2010-03-24T19:25:23.254Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

the atheism/theism issue is a decent example of a situation where it's possible to be reasonably confident in a position without exhaustive scientific studies

On the contrary; many people consider the issue settled because all major scientific debates in history, bar none, have ended up weighing against the notion of a personal God who takes an interest in and intervenes in human affairs.

(It is, rather, the persistence of the myth, and its influence on public affairs, that seems to demand scientific scrutiny!)

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-24T19:37:16.007Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't understand your point. Are you saying that scientific studies are necessary to resolve the theism/atheism question?

Replies from: Morendil
comment by Morendil · 2010-03-24T19:49:40.881Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yes. They are a) necessary and b) already done. (The "question" I have in mind is a specific one, that of a personal God who, etc. as stated above.)

Prior to, say, the invention of writing, it would perhaps have been legitimate to consider the existence of a personal God (or gods) an open question, susceptible of being settled by investigation. In fact under a hypothesis like Julian Jaynes' humans about 3000 years ago might have had overwhelming evidence that Gods existed... yet they'd still have been mistaken about that.

Replies from: Jack, brazil84
comment by Jack · 2010-03-24T23:00:41.375Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

In fact under a hypothesis like Julian Jaynes' humans about 3000 years ago might have had overwhelming evidence that Gods existed... yet they'd still have been mistaken about that.

Discovering this hypothesis makes reading this thread worthwhile. I'm shocked I hadn't heard of it before. Maybe the coolest, most bizarre yet plausible idea I have heard in the last two years. Just hearing it (not even believing it) modifies my worldview. Have you or anyone else read the book? Recommended?

Replies from: Morendil
comment by Morendil · 2010-03-25T00:05:46.662Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I've read the book, which was mentioned favorably in Dennett's Consciousness Explained and forms part of the backstory to Stephenson's Snow Crash. Curiosity compelled me to look further.

My level of understanding of the book's thesis is mostly level-0, i.e. there is a "bicamerality" password but I'd have to reread the book to reacquaint myself with its precise predictions, and I'd be hard pressed to reconstruct the theory myself.

I do have a few pieces of understanding which seem level-2-ish; for instance, the hypothesis accounts for the feeling that a lot of my thinking is internal soliloquy. Also, the idea that consciousness, like love, could in large part be a "memetic" and collective construct (I use the term "meme" evocatively rather than rigorously) somehow appeals to me.

I'd recommend you read it if only for the pleasure of having one more person to discuss it with. I may have to reread it in that case.

comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-24T19:53:14.421Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yes. They are a) necessary and b) already done.

Would you mind pointing me in the direction of the first such scientific study? Thanks in advance.

Replies from: Morendil
comment by Morendil · 2010-03-24T20:03:45.688Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It would be futile to try and pinpoint the first chronologically, but for the one that most pointedly refuted a previously established truth, namely that "God made Man in His image", I'd start with Darwin's Origin of Species.

Though, actually, Dennett's Darwin's Dangerous Idea is probably a better starting point, for being a gloss on Darwin.

You should know, before you ask your next pseudo-Socratic question: given that you seem intent on sticking to that style of "argumentation", I'm going to take your advice and not engage you anymore.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-24T20:18:11.786Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It would be futile to try and pinpoint the first chronologically,

Ok, then how about an early one then.

but for the one that most pointedly refuted a previously established truth, namely that "God made Man in His image", I'd start with Darwin's Origin of Species.

So before the 19th century a rationalist could not reasonably conclude that the atheistic position is correct?

Replies from: thomblake, CronoDAS
comment by thomblake · 2010-03-24T20:30:43.757Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So before the 19th century a rationalist could not reasonably conclude that the atheistic position is correct?

Do you really take this to be a reasonable interpretation / inference based on what Morendil said?

I think we might just have to stop feeding the troll.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-24T21:13:28.854Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Do you really take this to be a reasonable interpretation / inference based on what Morendil said?

Absolutely. The other poster claimed, in essence, that scientific studies are necessary to reach the atheistic conclusion. The implication is that before such studies were done, one could not reach that conclusion.

comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-24T21:19:11.169Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

To be honest, before Darwin, the Argument from Design was a pretty good reason to be a theist. (And I got this from the aforementioned Darwin's Dangerous Idea.)

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-25T00:41:14.795Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Eh. The "who designed the designer" problem still makes theism a mistake. Hume even argued this before Darwin was born.

Replies from: CronoDAS
comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-25T04:24:00.722Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yes, that's a problem, but I don't think it's enough to make Deism ridiculous. Darwin was fortunate enough to find a "designer" that can exist without requiring a designer of its own, basically settling the question.

comment by Jack · 2010-03-24T22:50:37.797Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

In the same way that you are reasonably confident that God does not exist despite evidence to the contrary.

The existence of God has probably the lowest prior probability of any hypothesis ever seriously considered by humans. Further**, any evidence in favor of theism has been swamped by opposing evidence: evil, scientific explanations for nearly every phenomena previously attributed to God, evidence human brains are innately susceptible to believing in gods absent good evidence (and subsequent altering of the God hypothesis to account for the new evidence).

In contrast the hypothesis that the race iq gap is entirely or close to entirely environmental has a prior around .5 (lots of human differences are explained by environmental factors and lots are explained by genetics). What we have to update on consists of a handful of studies, several of which contradict each other and none of which have come close to controlling the relevant factors. We have good evidence the gap has shrunk since the Civil Rights movement, the taboo of overt racism and beneficial developments in African American social and economic position. Then there is some evidence the gap shrinks further when black children are raised by white families. There is zero net evidence that IQ correlates with skin tone. Mainstream science either holds that there is no genetic component or that the question is unresolved. Those who believe there is a genetic component will say that political correctness and egalitarianism mean that mainstream science would ignore evidence in favor of their position. Those who do not believe there is a genetic component will say that those who do are just trying to justify their racism. On balance, I update slightly in favor of the environmental hypothesis but there is enough uncertainty that the question needs more studying if we decide we care about it (I'm not sure we should).

The two cases aren't even roughly comparable.

Now for the hundredth time, if you would like to share the knowledge that we don't have that makes you so confident you are welcome to. Persisting in arguing without presenting such evidence is trollish and honestly, probably suggests to some that you don't share their commitment to egalitarianism.

**Edited for clarification.

Replies from: DonGeddis, bogus, brazil84
comment by DonGeddis · 2010-04-14T19:10:41.370Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There is zero net evidence that IQ correlates with skin tone.

That's not true at all. There is overwhelming evidence that performance on IQ tests is hugely correlated with "race", which basically implies skin tone. Blacks, as a group, score 10-15 points below whites (almost a standard deviation), and (some) Asians and Jews are about half a deviation above whites.

The controversy is not whether there is correlation. The controversy is over the casual explanation. How much of this observed difference is due to genetics, how much due to environment, and how much due to the structure of standard IQ tests?

Mainstream science either holds that there is no genetic component or that the question is unresolved.

Just to clarify: the question is whether there is a genetic component to the observed difference in black/white (and other racial) group IQ scores.

There is clearly a genetic component to individual IQ scores.

This varies based on wealth. Among poor/impoverished peoples, variance in IQ scores is something like 60-90% due to environmental factors (like nutrition). Among wealthy peoples, 60-70% seems to be genetic.

The usual analogy is the height of growing corn. In nutrient-poor dirt, corn height is mostly a function of how much fertilizer/water/sun the plants get. But in well-tended farms, corn stalk height is almost completely a function of inherited genetics.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-04-14T19:59:06.112Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

When I say there is zero net evidence that IQ correlates with skin tone I'm summarizing the findings of the skin tone studies cited in the Nisbett article that was heavily discussed in this conversation. The studies examined IQ among blacks and found that whether the person was light-skinned or dark-skinned had more or less no bearing on that person's IQ (the assumption being that skin tone is a rough proxy for degree of African descent). I think this was obvious at the time from the context of the paragraph: I'm clearly summarizing findings not making general conclusions (until the end). We had been going back and forth on these issues for a while so by that point I was probably using more shorthand than usual. It may not be obvious that is what I was doing a month after the fact.

Just to clarify: the question is whether there is a genetic component to the observed difference in black/white (and other racial) group IQ scores.

Yes, I'm pretty sure the context is more that sufficient to establish that this is what I was talking about. The entire discussion was about origin of the black-white IQ gap.

Replies from: cupholder, wedrifid
comment by cupholder · 2010-04-14T21:39:40.842Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The studies examined IQ among blacks and found that whether the person was light-skinned or dark-skinned had more or less no bearing on that person's IQ (the assumption being that skin tone is a rough proxy for degree of African descent).

Being more precise (pedantic?), Nisbett wrote:

the correlation between lightness of skin and IQ, averaged over a large number of studies reviewed by Shuey (1966), is in the vicinity of .10.

Assuming that correlation's not a chance fluctuation, that would imply that there is a positive correlation between skin tone and IQ. But a meager one.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-04-15T02:16:35.271Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

At the time I wrote the comment I recall some piece of evidence that I thought countered this very low positive correlation enough that it made sense to say "zero net evidence" but I honestly don't remember what my reasoning was.

We should note btw that the existence of a positive correlation with skin tone doesn't mean some of the IQ gap is genetic. There have been studies demonstrating social advantages to having light skin.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-04-15T11:14:51.105Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

At the time I wrote the comment I recall some piece of evidence that I thought countered this very low positive correlation enough that it made sense to say "zero net evidence" but I honestly don't remember what my reasoning was.

That's reasonable; that you were mentally weighing up Nisbett's claim against conflicting evidence hadn't occurred to me.

We should note btw that the existence of a positive correlation with skin tone doesn't mean some of the IQ gap is genetic.

Wholly agreed.

comment by wedrifid · 2010-04-14T21:47:50.210Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Does anyone happen to have any studies that report different findings? This isn't a subject where I trust one source. I know how to lie with studies.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-04-15T02:12:04.712Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yeah, I don't know how to update on meta analyses anymore. I do know though that Ruston and Jensen cite it uncritically (albeit deceptively, they just acknowledge the low correlation and move on) which may be evidence that Shuey (who did the meta analysis) is being honest.

Edit: The other thing I don't trust is that the Shuey analysis of the 18 studies was done in 1966! I'm not sure studies on race from that period are reliable in either direction.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2010-04-15T02:42:15.555Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Edit: The other thing I don't trust is that the Shuey analysis of the 18 studies was done in 1966!

Wow. Just how well did they correct for all external factors? I would have expected a difference in measured IQ to appear based purely on socio-economic disadvantages that are far lesser now.

I'm not sure studies on race from that period are reliable in either direction.

I'm not sure how the political bias / scientific integrity ratio then compares to now. I do suppose that some parties would be particularly interested in finding that result at that time.

Replies from: cupholder, Jack
comment by cupholder · 2010-04-15T12:59:06.212Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I do suppose that some parties would be particularly interested in finding that result at that time.

To say the least.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2010-04-16T07:13:02.896Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I read through the chapter. Interesting.

Not being an American I have been exposed to different kinds of discrimination stories, both historic and current. I'm also not sure how relevant the original study would be here, unless there is actually a direct relationship between skin pigmentation and IQ. Prior to European settlement the people in Australia were isolated for tens of thousands of years, leaving skin tone a relatively poor indicator of genetic kinship. That is a lot of time for selection to work on both IQ and pigmentation.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-04-16T13:00:10.817Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm also not sure how relevant the original study would be here, unless there is actually a direct relationship between skin pigmentation and IQ.

As you point out, it isn't safe to assume that skin tone reflects ancestry in every case. I think the race scientists implicitly reason that it's OK to treat skin tone as an ancestry indicator among US blacks because of the relatively recent injection of African ancestry into the US gene pool, so skin tone's association with African ancestry hasn't been wholly eliminated/confounded yet. The same obviously wouldn't apply to indigenous Australians.

comment by Jack · 2010-04-15T03:02:55.113Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Looked deeper. 1966 is the 2nd edition. The first was 1958. The book both Nisbett and Rushton are citing is titled "The Testing of Negro Intelligence". From what little I can find Shuey was actually something of an early Rushton, arguing that a persistent test score gap since 1910 suggested innate intelligence differences between races. If anyone can find and electronic copy of the book let me know.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-04-15T12:45:19.201Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You'll be lucky to find a copy. The book probably falls into that mid-century obscurity zone, old enough to be forgotten but not old enough to be public domain.

If it helps, the 1975 book Race Differences in Intelligence takes Shuey's results on skin color and IQ and adapts 5 of the studies she found into a table. Looking at the table, the studies are quite a mish-mash. Three report correlation coefficients, and the other two instead report average IQ for different categories of mixed ancestry people ('Light skin' v. 'Dark skin', and 'Strong evidence of white' v. 'Intermediate' v. 'Dominantly Negroid'). The studies date from 1926 to 1947, and the 1947 study's an unpublished dissertation. Each study used a different IQ test. I can only imagine there's even more variation among Shuey's full collection of studies.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-04-15T20:14:53.284Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Not really a reply to you. I just found this and needed to put it somewhere. Anyone who has been following this discussion will be interested. It's an interesting way of posing the question.

Now plot the genome of each human as a point on our lattice. Not surprisingly, there are readily identifiable clusters of points, corresponding to traditional continental ethnic groups: Europeans, Africans, Asians, Native Americans, etc. (See, for example, Risch et al., Am. J. Hum. Genet. 76:268–275, 2005.) Of course, we can get into endless arguments about how we define European or Asian, and of course there is substructure within the clusters, but it is rather obvious that there are identifiable groupings, and as the Risch study shows, they correspond very well to self-identified notions of race.

...

We see that there can be dramatic group differences in phenotypes even if there is complete allele overlap between two groups - as long as the frequency or probability distributions are distinct. But it is these distributions that are measured by the metric we defined earlier. Two groups that form distinct clusters are likely to exhibit different frequency distributions over various genes, leading to group differences.

...

This leads us to two very distinct possibilities in human genetic variation:

Hypothesis 1: (the PC mantra) The only group differences that exist between the clusters (races) are innocuous and superficial, for example related to skin color, hair color, body type, etc.

Hypothesis 2: (the dangerous one) Group differences exist which might affect important (let us say, deep rather than superficial) and measurable characteristics, such as cognitive abilities, personality, athletic prowess, etc.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-04-16T20:12:13.328Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Hsu's blog post makes two claims about race. The first argument is that 'Hypothesis 2' could be correct - i.e., that there could be genetically driven differences in exciting traits like IQ between races (or 'groups,' but I think we all know which 'groups' we're really interested in). I agree with this argument.

I completely disagree with the second claim, which is that genetic clustering studies constitute 'the scientific basis for race.' It's true that scientists can extract clusters from genetic data that match what we call races. If you gave me a bunch of human genotypes sampled from around the world and let me fuck around with that data and run it through PCA for a few hours, I'm sure I could do the same. But it doesn't automatically follow that my classification is correct.

For example, if you sample some whites, sample some blacks, and expect those two categories to automatically pop out of your analysis, you might be surprised. Here's a recent paper that estimated the European ancestry in African-Americans by analyzing genotypes from samples of US whites, US blacks, and several subgroups of Africans. Running PCA on all of the genotype data, and plotting the first two principal components of the subjects' genotypes in each sample gave these clusters:

If we treat the widely separated clusters as races, we don't automatically recover a black race and a white race. We end up with a Mandenka race, a white race, and a Bantu + Yoruba race, with African-Americans smeared out between them.

The researchers could no doubt have come up with an alternative rotation of the axes that would've projected all of the African samples on top of each other, and the European sample far away from them. But what would justify the alternative projection over the original one?

Maybe my own personal concept of 'race' emphasizes differences among sub-Saharan Africans, instead of continental differences. Then I might do a PCA on a set of sub-Saharan African genotypes, find a couple of principal components that best separate out the sub-Saharan African subgroups, and only then plot the north Africans and non-Africans along with the sub-Saharans.

Here are a few plots from a study that did just that. Notice now that the most widely separated clusters are three, or perhaps four, sub-Saharan African clusters - and the rest of the world forms one little cluster in the middle of them!

If I were a scientist who had started with the idea that the main races consisted of several African subgroups, plus one other race containing all non-Africans, this analysis would seem to completely vindicate my initial beliefs! But the analysis turned out the way it did mainly because the way I did it was driven by my original taxonomy of 'races.'

I've picked out two papers myself to make points, now I'll write a bit about the 'Risch et al.' paper Hsu points to. Risch et al. calculated genetic clusters by running data collected for the Family Blood Pressure Program through the structure program. Hsu writes that the clusters that emerged 'correspond very well to self-identified notions of race.'

Well, there's no ready-made algorithm which takes genotypes as input and spits out objectively determined races, and structure is no exception. There are some subtleties to how the program works. For one thing, it doesn't automatically confirm an optimal number of clusters and then sort the subjects into the appropriate number of clusters: the researcher tells structure to put subjects into some number k of clusters, and the program then does its best to fit the subjects into k clusters. So the fact that structure's output contained an intuitively pleasing number of clusters doesn't mean very much.

Another issue is that the kind of model structure uses to represent distributions of genotypes is suboptimal for cases where samples have been isolated due to distance and have suffered a lack of gene flow. But, if Hsu is correct, this is exactly the case for Risch et al.'s data, since he writes that Risch et al.'s 'clustering is a natural consequence of geographical isolation, inheritance and natural selection operating over the last 50k years since humans left Africa!'

There is more I could write, but I might as well just link this book chapter, which discusses issues with trying to algorithmically infer someone's racial ancestry. I've already written more than I meant to - sorry for the lecture - but it disappoints me when someone well-credentialed (a professor of physics!) uncritically waves around ambiguous results to shore up a folk model of race.

(Edited to fix last link.)

Replies from: stevehsu, Jack
comment by stevehsu · 2010-04-16T21:21:52.641Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm typing this on an iPad so apologies for mistakes. A picture for you here:

http://infoproc.blogspot.com/2009/06/genetic-clustering-40-years-of-progress.html

Yes, there are clines, but so what? The population fraction in the clinal region between the major groups is tiny.

The distance (e.g. measured by fst) between the continental groups is so large that you would have to stand on your head to not "discover" those as separate clusters.

See also here http://infoproc.blogspot.com/2008/11/human-genetic-variation-fst-and.html

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-04-16T22:36:42.729Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yes, there are clines, but so what? The population fraction in the clinal region between the major groups is tiny.

I'm not sure that this contradicts what I wrote. I acknowledge that high-resolution genotyping enables one to distinguish geographically distant samples of people. Being able to pull that off does not automatically validate 'race,' as in the conventional white people v. yellow people v. brown people v. red people taxonomy.

The distance (e.g. measured by fst) between the continental groups is so large that you would have to stand on your head to not "discover" those as separate clusters.

Or you need only come at the data with an unusual preconception of race, which would affect your analytic approach.

Also, if you take wide-ranging genetic samples across Africa (as opposed to using a handful of samples from one Nigerian city to represent all of Africa, as seems to have been done to derive your picture), it seems to me that you end up getting African clusters that can be as far apart from each other as they are from Europeans.

Another example: check out subdiagram A in this diagram, from a paper that took samples from West and South Africa. The Fulani + Bulala are as far apart from some of the other African samples as they are from the Europeans!

Replies from: stevehsu
comment by stevehsu · 2010-04-17T01:30:54.375Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

it seems to me that you end up getting African clusters that can be as far apart from each other as they are from Europeans. <

I doubt this would be the case as measured by fst. Note that distance on a principal components graph is not the same as fst: the components might be optimized to separate the clusters of choice (optimize the directions in gene space which show the most variance between the groups). It's possible in principle that some groups (e.g., pygmies) in Africa have been as effectively separated in gene flow from other Africans as, say, Nigerians and Europeans. More likely, the fst distance between any two groups of Africans is less than the distance from the Yoruba to Europeans or E. Asians. That is what happens when you analyze the (better studied) sub-population structure of, e.g., Europe and Asia. That is, no two groups in E. Asia are anywhere near as far apart as they are collectively from Europeans (and the same for any two European groups vs distance to Asia). That's just what you'd expect from the historical gene flow patterns, and I'd expect it to apply to Africa as well.

The real question is whether folk notions of ethnicity map onto clusters in gene space. If they do (and they do) it implies different frequency distributions for alleles in the groups. That raises the possibility of statistical group differences. What those differences are remains to be determined.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-04-17T03:53:03.588Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I agree on the subject of Fst; if you switch from PCA biplots to Fst, that's going to better emphasize differences due to geographical separation. (But likely still not enough to scientifically confirm a classical racial taxonomy as the one true racial taxonomy. One would still have to decide which samples to use to build one's Fst matrix and address the issue of how to extract racial categories from the Fst matrix. I'd also anticipate getting caught up in the same sort of issues as the structure program.)

The real question is whether folk notions of ethnicity map onto clusters in gene space.

Folk notions of ethnicity arguably could, because they are far more squishy and pliable than folk notions of race.

If they do (and they do) it implies different frequency distributions for alleles in the groups.

I can't help feeling that you believe I'm arguing against the validity of race because I think that disproves the possibility of statistical group differences. If so, you can rest easy. I acknowledge the possibility of statistical group differences - it doesn't live or die by the validity of race. I see (or think I do, anyway) genetic group differences in (relatively) boring traits like skin color and hair color - and if those, why not genetic group differences in drama-provoking traits like IQ, personality or genital size?

Replies from: stevehsu, Jack
comment by stevehsu · 2010-04-17T13:51:10.401Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Folk notions of ethnicity arguably could, because they are far more squishy and pliable than folk notions of race.

OK, so we just differ in nuances of definition. If you prefer ethnicity to race, that's fine with me.

The usual lame argument is "race doesn't exist, so how could there be group differences" -- but I think neither of us is arguing that side.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-04-18T04:09:51.656Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

OK, so we just differ in nuances of definition. If you prefer ethnicity to race, that's fine with me.

Well, for whatever it's worth, I continue to disagree with one of the arguments in the blog entry I mentioned - there is more here than a minor semantic divide.

The usual lame argument is "race doesn't exist, so how could there be group differences" -- but I think neither of us is arguing that side.

Correct.

comment by Jack · 2010-04-17T04:40:37.688Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So your position is that there are probably allele clusters do to cultural and geographic isolation (and therefore potentially group differences in IQ or personality) your concern is that you don't think those clusters have been shown to map one to one with our folk racial categories?

Do you think our folk racial categories aren't the product of observable phenotypes? Do you think those categories at least approximate a valid scientific taxonomy?

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-04-18T03:47:33.808Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

My concern (or at least the one that I'm elaborating on in this thread) is that those clusters can be made to map onto folk racial categories, or made to be only partly consistent with folk racial categories, or made to be contradictory to folk racial categories, depending upon how one's own preconceptions of race color one's cluster analyses.

Do you think our folk racial categories aren't the product of observable phenotypes?

No.

Do you think those categories at least approximate a valid scientific taxonomy?

Valid for which scientific purpose? They are likely to be workable categories for a sociologist studying race relations. They are likely to be inadequate categories for a molecular anthropologist studying human genetic variation. Though I expect some molecular anthropologists (and evidently at least one professor of physics) would dispute that.

comment by Jack · 2010-04-16T23:32:29.275Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I've already written more than I meant to - sorry for the lecture

Here of all places this is unnecessary. I posted the link specifically hoping someone would respond like this.

It's true that scientists can extract clusters from genetic data that match what we call races. If you gave me a bunch of human genotypes sampled from around the world and let me fuck around with that data and run it through PCA for a few hours, I'm sure I could do the same. But it doesn't automatically follow that my classification is correct.

If we treat the widely separated clusters as races, we don't automatically recover a black race and a white race. We end up with a Mandenka race, a white race, and a Bantu + Yoruba race, with African-Americans smeared out between them.

If we're discovering clusters that don't fit with our racial preconceptions that is evidence the clusters that do match some of our racial preconceptions aren't bullshit. Also, aren't we looking for genetic evidence of cultural and geographical isolation? Isn't the fact that we see different clusters for different groups in Africa just evidence that those groups have been (reproductively) isolated for a really long time? I would predict from these findings that when humans first left the continent there were already distinct groupings and that not all of these grouping had descendants that left Africa.

Also, from the chart posted here I would predict that the Africans kidnapped and purchased as slaves came more from the Yoruba and much less so from the Mandenka. They probably didn't all come from the Yoruba, perhaps the others came from the groups in the upper right corner of this chart that you linked in your other comment. Or perhaps they didn't come from the Yoruba but others in that corner and the Yoruba are just closely related to those other groups.

EDIT: So there were a lot of tribes that had members become slaves. Like nearly every major tribe appears to have been affected. I'm going to have to find something that tells me proportions which will take longer.

From your other comment on that chart.

The Fulani + Bulala are as far apart from some of the other African samples as they are from the Europeans!

If you go search for pictures of both you can notice the phenotype differences as well.

I'll maybe say more after I look at that chapter.

Replies from: cupholder
comment by cupholder · 2010-04-17T00:59:34.804Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Here of all places this is unnecessary. I posted the link specifically hoping someone would respond like this.

Mission accomplished! :-)

If we're discovering clusters that don't fit with our racial preconceptions that is evidence the clusters that do match some of our racial preconceptions aren't bullshit.

Sounds reasonable.

Also, aren't we looking for genetic evidence of cultural and geographical isolation? Isn't the fact that we see different clusters for different groups in Africa just evidence that those groups have been (reproductively) isolated for a really long time?

It can be, although variation along principal component axes can also represent genetic change due to migration. (I picked up on this potential confound by reading a Nature Genetics paper that made the same point from the opposite direction. That is, variation along a PC can be due to continuous geographic separation instead of migration.)

Also, from the chart posted here I would predict that the Africans kidnapped and purchased as slaves came more from the Yoruba and much less so from the Mandenka.

That's looks about right to me. Table 1 from the paper estimating African ancestry gives a detailed breakdown of the African ancestry of the African-American sample, and it fits what you suggest.

comment by bogus · 2010-03-24T23:14:20.754Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The existence of God has probably the lowest prior probability of any hypothesis ever seriously considered by humans. Any evidence in favor of theism has been swamped ...

Surely you mean 'likelihood' here, not prior probability. Prior probabilities are imputed based on one's uncertainty before any evidence is taken into account, and theism scores fairly high on this metric.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-24T23:18:59.778Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The selection should be read something like:

The existence of God has probably the lowest prior probability of any hypothesis ever seriously considered by humans.

(Due to complexity)

In addition, the hypothesis does not become more likely once we consider the evidence...

Any evidence in favor of theism has been swamped ...

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-24T23:32:18.083Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"Due", not "do".

Also, I think the confusion merely arises from arrangement and Gricean-maxim(-like?) considerations - I predict adding "Further" before "[a]ny evidence" would suffice to invoke the correct interpretation.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-24T23:35:29.034Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You're obviously right on both counts. Edited.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-24T23:38:36.193Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Remember to flag the edit - I like the footnote method.

comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-25T00:40:31.061Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The two cases aren't even roughly comparable.

The fundamental similarity is that it's possible to be reasonable confident of a conclusion based on general knowledge, common sense, and despite scientific studies to the contrary.

Now for the hundredth time, if you would like to share the knowledge that we don't have that makes you so confident you are welcome to.

Lol, you have all the knowledge necessary to come to the same conclusion as I have. Surely you are aware that the cognitive gap between blacks and whites is essentially universal and intractable*. In both time and space, as far as anyone knows. While at the same time, other explanations offered for the gap are not so.

There is only one reasonable inference from these facts. One simple explanation which is not inherently ridiculous.

*I agree that the gap can be lessened to some extent since black children face the environmental disadvantage of being raised by black parents.

Replies from: wnoise
comment by wnoise · 2010-03-25T18:00:01.888Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

it's possible to be reasonable confident of a conclusion based on general knowledge, common sense, and despite scientific studies to the contrary.

This is true. It's also possible to be way too overconfident, based on these same things, and unacknowledged confounders. This is the problem that scientific studies try to address.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-25T18:22:15.956Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It's also possible to be way too overconfident, based on these same things, and unacknowledged confounders

Agree.

This is the problem that scientific studies try to address.

Well, that and other things as well.

comment by ata · 2010-03-22T09:23:26.609Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

apparently even some scientific studies which supposedly demonstrate the power of prayer.

If I recall correctly, there are studies that demonstrate the power of believing one is being prayed for, whether or not one actually is. In studies where the people being prayed for don't know about it, there is no significant difference.

Replies from: mattnewport, brazil84
comment by mattnewport · 2010-03-22T11:43:47.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The largest study I know of found the opposite effect: people who knew they were being prayed for had slightly worse health outcomes.

comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-23T01:37:38.671Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I did a google search and found this, among other things:

One of the most cited studies in prayer literature was conducted by the physician Randolph Byrd in 1988. Byrd looked at the effects of prayer in the Judeo-Christian tradition in a coronary care unit (CCU) population. Over ten months, 393 patients admitted to the CCU were randomly assigned to a treatment group that would receive distant prayers, or a control group that would receive no prayers.

Three to seven people prayed daily for the rapid recovery, and prevention of complications or death, for a single patient in the treatment group. The end result was that statistically significantly fewer patients in the prayer group required ventilation, antibiotics, had cardiopulmonary arrests, developed pneumonia, or required diuretics.

http://scientificinquiry.suite101.com/article.cfm/pray-for-me

comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-16T18:23:22.053Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I updated that post to respond to your question.

Replies from: Rain
comment by Rain · 2010-03-17T19:49:23.748Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Here's your updated answer from the post, and my reply:

I’m a little confused. Do you deny that whites, generally speaking, outperform blacks on tests of cognitive ability?

You have presented no evidence that they do, therefore there is no evidence for me to deny.

Replies from: CarlShulman, brazil84
comment by CarlShulman · 2010-03-17T23:19:56.020Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It's settled science, the psychometric consensus (although genetic causation of these gaps is not consensus).

comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-17T20:05:53.806Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You have presented no evidence that they do, therefore there is no evidence for me to deny.

When I'm debating with people, I generally don't respond to demands for evidence or cites unless the person disputes -- or is at least seriously skeptical -- about the claim in question.

This prevents people from wasting my time and/or sidetracking the discussion with frivolous demands for evidence.

Replies from: Morendil
comment by Morendil · 2010-03-17T20:13:12.999Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

In this discussion you have waited for other people to bring forward the very kind of evidence that underpins your claims, which, seeing as you were the one making a claim in the first place, was your responsibility. From where I sit you're the one who is causing others to waste their time. Your contributions have been vague and overbroad, those of your interlocutors precise and information-rich.

Why should we pay attention to you?

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-17T20:20:44.461Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

seeing as you were the one making a claim in the first place, was your responsibility.

No, it's not my responsibility to anticipate which aspects of my claim or argument people will dispute.

For example, if I claim that men are taller than women, there's no need for me to provide a cite or evidence until somebody actually disputes my claim, or at least expresses serious skepticism about it.

Replies from: wnoise
comment by wnoise · 2010-03-17T21:53:20.812Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Height is far more visible (and objective!) than intelligence. EDIT: And the segregation between men and women is much smaller than the segregation between blacks and whites.

Replies from: ata, brazil84
comment by ata · 2010-03-17T22:59:28.344Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

And the segregation between men and women is much smaller than the segregation between blacks and whites.

That sounds questionable to me.

Obviously men and women aren't geographically segregated in the same way that whites and blacks often are, but socially, economically, and politically, I think the disparity might be greater. (In the US, the income disparity between men and women is greater than that between whites and blacks, for instance.) I'm not saying I'm necessarily very confident about this, but if it's true that "the segregation between men and women is much smaller than the segregation between blacks and whites", then I would be interested in hearing your definitions and evidence.

Replies from: wnoise, thomblake
comment by wnoise · 2010-03-18T04:37:16.350Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Depending on exactly what you mean, I might or might not agree with the premise that the segregation is greater. But in any case, I don't think it has the same effect.

Geographic segregation means some whites may encounter very few blacks. Economic and political segregation doesn't mean that men do not encounter women and vice-versa. Social segregation is one of those fuzzy things again. Yes, most people have a biased sex-ratio of friends, but the world isn't Saudi Arabia, and men and women do see each other daily. The fact that blacks are a minority, whereas women and men are near parity also affects things.

comment by thomblake · 2010-03-18T01:51:51.207Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The graph you link to doesn't specify where it came from, how it was measured, or more specifically whether/how it counts housewives / married couples.

Replies from: ata
comment by ata · 2010-03-18T02:01:34.190Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Where it came from: 2005 US Census. Probably doesn't make any such distinctions between married and unmarried women.

Replies from: thomblake
comment by thomblake · 2010-03-18T02:10:08.995Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Looking at the source data files, I'm guessing there are a lot of zero incomes to be explained there, as well as things like unpaid maternity leave. I'm not sure what it's appropriate for my wife to write in the census - 0 or my salary or half my salary.

There is probably still a gender gap, but it remains to be shown that it's greater than the race gap.

comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-17T22:05:37.404Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Agreed. But so what?

If nobody is willing to dispute -- or even to state they are seriously skeptical -- about some aspect of a particular claim, what's the point of digging up evidence/cites to support that aspect of that claim?

comment by Psychohistorian · 2010-03-15T22:48:25.569Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

A cultural explanation could exclude a genetic one. Simply put, the culture transmitted by black parents is not conducive to intellectual growth, just as the culture transmitted by Ashkenazi Jews is conducive to intellectual growth. This would also explain Alicorn's example, as the mother is more likely to do most of the cultural transmission, it would explain that data.

I'm not advocating this position, and I'm certainly not generalizing about every single member of a very large group, but this would explain the observed discrepancy and data without requiring a genetic basis. The actual explanation is doubtlessly more complicated; the point is that there are certainly other ways of explaining observed data that do not rely on genetics. That doesn't mean that genetics isn't a factor, only that it's not the case that it must be a significant one.

Also, while we're at it, I hate the term "significant." It's one of the most effective weasel words in existence.

If I wanted to claim that any one of these factors plays a significant role in the difference, I'd need to provide evidence. Because genetics is hard to see and so directly intertwined with other factors (the parents who create you generally raise you), claiming, "Genetics must be a key factor!" requires a significant amount of unambiguous evidence.

I admit there may be better evidence on this than I am familiar with, but I would be very surprised if that were the case. Good data on this topic is very hard to procure funding for.

I agree wholeheartedly with NT's statement, though. People unwilling to entertain the possibility that genetics differ between ethnic subgroups are indeed failing at rationality, though I'd have to say a socially motivated failing at rationality is less blameworthy than a personally motivated one.

Replies from: thomblake, None
comment by thomblake · 2010-03-15T22:56:37.809Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

People unwilling to entertain the possibility that genetics differ between ethnic subgroups are indeed failing at rationality

Those people are failing at something much more basic than rationality. Likewise for folks who think intelligence does not have any basis in genetics (try to debate a douglas fir!)

It is obviously true that different people differ genetically, and obviously true that intelligence is related to genetics. But it is not obvious in this way that differences in intelligence between two humans would have anything to do with genetics.

comment by [deleted] · 2011-04-18T14:42:45.334Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I find it interesting that no one points out that the missing heredity of IQ (not explained by genetics) may be due to other environemntal factors rather than culture.

comment by [deleted] · 2011-04-18T14:53:14.329Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I actually find the genetic explanation more hopefull. Genetic engineering would be a cheap and easy fix to the problem at least compared to the price of current and past attempts to close the gap.

If its culture then we are stuck with doing more or less the same things we have already done for 50 or so years, just with more money and more energy this time.

If its a mysterious hereditary factor but not the culture... I'm even less optimistic unless it would turn out to be a family of infectious agents that cause damage in the prenatal environment or alter gene expression.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-04-18T16:31:33.179Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I actually find the genetic explanation more hopefull. Genetic engineering would be a cheap and easy fix to the problem at least compared to the price of current and past attempts to close the gap.


I'm not too optimistic about genetic engineering. It seems that any engineering process requires a lot of failures before you figure out how to do things right. People can accept that a few astronauts and test pilots will die fiery deaths, but I doubt anyone could accept babies being born with brains messed up due to genetic tinkering.

The other thing is that poor man's genetic engineering -- i.e. eugenics -- has been available for some time now and people are very reluctant to embrace it. Even without forced sterilization, it hardly seems outrageous to tweak public policy so as to incentivize the smartest people to reproduce more and discourage the stupidest. And yet it seems it would be politically very difficult to enact even a mild policy along these lines -- its proponents would surely be condemned as racists.

Replies from: CaveJohnson, CaveJohnson, None, army1987
comment by CaveJohnson · 2012-01-07T15:59:40.695Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The other thing is that poor man's genetic engineering -- i.e. eugenics -- has been available for some time now and people are very reluctant to embrace it. Even without forced sterilization, it hardly seems outrageous to tweak public policy so as to incentivize the smartest people to reproduce more and discourage the stupidest.

It is widely employed in the US by parents using (for whatever reason) modern reproductive technology.

Of course we don't call it that, but please what else is it, when the eggs of women with very high SAT or even GRE scores cost thousands of dollars to obtain than those that are merely average? What else is it when you search for a tall/athletic/musically talented/ academically successful sperm donor? Or terminating a pregnancy where the fetus is identified to have a genetic disorder?

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2012-01-07T21:37:56.839Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It is widely employed in the US by parents using (for whatever reason) modern reproductive technology

I would say it depends what you mean by "widely employed." Among the left half of the American bell curve, what percentage of children would you guess are the result of modern reproductive technology and a voluntary search for a high IQ egg or sperm donor? I would guess it's well under 5%. i.e. not enough to have a big impact on the intelligence of future generations.

Replies from: CaveJohnson
comment by CaveJohnson · 2012-01-08T10:46:38.575Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Why is this down-voted?

He is right. Reproductive technology is mostly currently employed by people with above average IQ, not just because this is the general pattern with all almost all technology and medical services in general, but because high IQ people are more likley to be infertile at the period in their life when they want to have children.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-08T11:12:46.919Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

high IQ people are more likley to be infertile at the period in their life

And, incidentally, are more likely to be fertile overall. (And taller and with an ass that conforms to sex appropriate indicators of 'damn fine'.) Of course, not very much more likely.

Replies from: army1987, katydee
comment by A1987dM (army1987) · 2012-01-08T15:19:48.500Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

And, incidentally, are more likely to be fertile overall.

By fertile you mean “able to have children, whether they actually have them or not”? Otherwise, that's wrong.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-09T01:10:55.014Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

By fertile you mean “able to have children, whether they actually have them or not”?

Clearly.

comment by katydee · 2012-01-08T17:03:11.228Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Um, citation needed?

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-09T01:20:13.862Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Um, citation needed?

Really? I thought it was a reference to common knowledge.

comment by CaveJohnson · 2012-01-07T16:17:10.223Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

And yet it seems it would be politically very difficult to enact even a mild policy along these lines -- its proponents would surely be condemned as racists.

I guess that's true. But it can be framed otherwise. Let me demonstrate:

"In America today, minorities are often hardest hit by the widening gap between the rich and the poor and the gap between the technologically savvy and unsavvy. Besides the more abstract measure of "genomic literacy" blogged on by editors of the New York Beta Times last week, a recent disturbing study by the FDA shows that only 15% of African American mothers and 21% of Hispanic American mothers conceive via artificial insemination compared to 40% of white American mothers and 47% of Asian American mothers. Democratic house leaders have called for more generous government assistance and educational programs to help minorities take advantage of these vital services. In related news Republicans stir controversy by calling existing government support for such programs "racist and unconstitutional" in the already fraught atmosphere of last weeks "quarrelling preacher couple" viral video. In the first part of the YouTube video rev. Matthew Young called genetic enhancement an abomination unto God and "another attempt by elitists to push social engineering and sin, masked by false eugenic and evolutionary pseudo-science, unto an unwilling and pious public". The second part of the video is a youtube respond where his husband Jeffrey Young explains that while he strives to fulfil God's commandments to obey his minister, he just can't bring himself to think God would want people to live poorer and less fulling lives and so supports certain uses of reproductive technology and thinks government should make them available. Is this just another sign of the religious right becoming a house divided on the issue? Some experts say that the outdated legislation of 2019 may be repelled earlier than... "

In a very slow and overly cautious approach of just selecting the best embryo of the mix for implantation or even just picking the best sperm and egg, you would get convergence between the groups rather rapidly. Innovation is expensive, copying is cheap in such circumstances. Any genetic advantages of say Askenazi Jews, other Europeans or East Asians will be pretty cheap source of cognitive enhancement for the third world, while the First world will have to mine its talented fraction, which may have somewhat more unpleasant side effects.

The reason why I believe a very slow and overly cautious approach might be probable, is because we already have a very slow and overly cautious approach when it comes to new medical technology.

Replies from: Prismattic, brazil84
comment by Prismattic · 2012-01-08T00:37:33.912Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think you are rather over-optimistic about the ability to reduce opposition to your proposal by framing in less explictly race-related terms. There is a long history, at least in the United States, of policies of racist intent being articulated using criteria that are not explicitly related to race: poll taxes and literacy tests; vagrancy laws; the general trope of "states rights". Everyone is already primed to be looking for the racial discrimination, regardless of how you phrase it.

Replies from: CaveJohnson
comment by CaveJohnson · 2012-01-08T10:44:23.291Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

How is this racial discrimination against anyone but European and Asian Americans? They would bear a disproportionate amount of taxation for government services that mostly help non-Asian minorities.

comment by brazil84 · 2012-01-08T00:00:42.067Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Besides the more abstract measure of "genomic literacy" blogged on by editors of the New York Beta Times last week, a recent disturbing study by the FDA shows that only 15% of African American mothers and 21% of Hispanic American mothers conceive via artificial insemination compared to 40% of white American mothers and 47% of Asian American mothers.

Doesn't sound all that plausible to me. Based on my general observations, the people at the low end of the IQ bell curve tend to reproduce in their late teens and early 20s, i.e. at ages where reproductive technology is not all that necessary.

Replies from: CaveJohnson
comment by CaveJohnson · 2012-01-08T10:42:42.964Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

In this world people use reproductive technology even when perfectly capable of conceiving naturally because it has become much more advanced, more convenient and because children gain a considerable measurable advantage. Also I assume these would be plausible numbers because contraceptive technology has advanced, the male pill for starters or perhaps a safer, more advanced, multi-year version of something like Depo-Provera.

Basically Gattaca to reach for a fictional portrayal.

comment by [deleted] · 2011-04-18T21:44:04.733Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I wasn't proposing we do anything novel, except the technology needed to modify genes in human eggs and perhaps sperm. Nothing truly transhuman in scope (for now).

I assume (eye-baling what I recall from the data) there are enough similarities between various disparate ethnicities and enough diversity within ethnicities that it wouldn't be that hard to simply spread around the wealth so to speak. Just increase the frequency of a few rare alleles or take a few from other groups. Or if you are feeling extra conservative, identify genes that where sweeping say a century or three ago (not sure exactly how long ago high IQ genes became maladaptive, estimating early dates for dysgenics in recent history is difficult) and are associated with IQ and just spread those.

Sure there are very likley some IQ increasing genes that simply wouldn't work for everyone or would cause some averse result, but again I expect these to be rare considering they've been test driven.

As for messed up brains... Just perfect technology for altering genes in eggs on animals, do only what nature has already done for a exceptional group or individual then simply vigorously screen among a few hundred created embryos to figure out which to implant so one can be certain to avoid bad PR.

Generally speaking I think there really is no reason that anyone needs to suffer a IQ lower than 100 in the late 21st century. I wouldn't however dictate to parents that they can't have low IQ children if they so desired, no more that I would at a later time forbid people from living and reproducing as the Homos Sapiens classic. Nature has tested the design, it works mostly, and the benefit to mankind should we find a way to help the lower half of the bell-curve catch up at least to the current average would be immense. The non-negligible increases in economic productivity would be dwarfed by gains in quality of life. This is why I am and have been for so long a supporter of transhumanism, its potential to improve the human condition through enhancement has always captivated my imagination.

The other thing is that poor man's genetic engineering -- i.e. eugenics -- has been available for some time now and people are very reluctant to embrace it. Even without forced sterilization, it hardly seems outrageous to tweak public policy so as to incentivize the smartest people to reproduce more and discourage the stupidest. And yet it seems it would be politically very difficult to enact even a mild policy along these lines

I actually think that having the government step away from barring people access to their genetic information as well as limiting with unnecessary regulation their access to technologies that require in vitro fertilisation (in my own country only infertile couples have access to it), a greater acceptance of genetics and evolution, and a academic culture less biased against hereditarian explanations would result in a strong enough trend of people making eugenic choices to counteract most of the dysgenic decline we are experiencing. Voluntary eugenics is a wonderful way how people can improve the lives of their children.

In the big picture two human generations is a short period from a biological perspective. As long as genetic engineering of humans is available and accepted by 2060 I remain optimistic about humanities long term chances. However if the date would be pushed back to 2090 or if enhancement wasn't accepted in most of the developed world, or perhaps limited to regions with authoritarian regimes then I would be very much concerned.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-04-19T09:55:30.353Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

As for messed up brains... Just perfect technology for altering genes in eggs on animals, do only what nature has already done for a exceptional group or individual then simply vigorously screen among a few hundred created embryos to figure out which to implant so one can be certain to avoid bad PR.

Maybe, we are pretty much in the realm of speculation here. I am still skeptical but I will concede the possibility that with a conservative approach including animal testing, these sorts of genetic modifications might be done with minimal risk to humans. I tend to doubt it based on the observation I made before. Also, I think it's reasonable to expect that different alleles interact and affect an organism in a lot of subtle, unpredictable ways. Dog breeders know that trying to improve one feature often has deleterious effects on other, seemingly unrelated features.

And getting your typical American of low intelligence (perhaps IQ 85) to a point where he can succeed in college (perhaps IQ 115) would seem to require a pretty big jump.

a greater acceptance of genetics and evolution, and a academic culture less biased against hereditarian explanations would result in a strong enough trend of people making eugenic choices to counteract most of the dysgenic decline we are experiencing. Voluntary eugenics is a wonderful way how people can improve the lives of their children.

I kinda doubt that the people towards the bottom of the IQ spectrum have much interest in boosting the intelligence of their children. This is based on general observation of the kind of traits they select for in mating.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-01-07T15:50:36.099Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Dog breeders know that trying to improve one feature often has deleterious effects on other, seemingly unrelated features.

Since we're basically talking about IQ, the negative side effects on anything like personality or health would have to be really big to outweigh the sheer socio-economic benefits one can statistically expect for say a boost of 10 or 20 or 30 IQ points.

I kinda doubt that the people towards the bottom of the IQ spectrum have much interest in boosting the intelligence of their children. This is based on general observation of the kind of traits they select for in mating.

Depressingly plausible.

Replies from: orthonormal
comment by orthonormal · 2012-01-07T16:55:11.250Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Since we're basically talking about IQ, the negative side effects on anything like personality or health would have to be really big to outweigh the sheer socio-economic benefits one can statistically expect for say a boost of 10 or 20 or 30 IQ points.

The adverse effects quite possibly are that significant in the context of the ancestral environment, but probably not in the context of the modern world.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-01-07T17:09:39.924Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The adverse effects quite possibly are that significant in the context of the ancestral environment, but probably not in the context of the modern world.

You need to develop that a bit more. It is important for the benefit of the reader and thinking in general to precisely and clearly separate genetic fitness and general well being in addition to pointing out the environment has changed.

I suggest people read up on Algernon's Law and its loopholes. In short:

Any simple major enhancement to human intelligence is a net evolutionary disadvantage.

Bostrom's formulation, called “evolutionary optimality challenge” (EOC):

If the proposed intervention would result in an enhancement, why have we not already evolved to be that way?

The loopholes as given by Bostrom are:

  • Changed tradeoffs, because our envrionment has changed. What you said.
  • Value discordance, between what we'd like to optimize and what evolution is optimizing for. What I said.
  • Evolutionary restrictions, which don't apply to us. "We have access to various tools, materials, and techniques that were unavailable to evolution. Even if our engineering talent is far inferior to evolution’s, we may nevertheless be able to achieve certain things that stumped evolution, thanks to these novel aids.”"

And also in the current context of discussion (possibility of genetic differences between groups), if one accepts that say Askenazi Jews have a one stdv or half a stdv advantage over some populations due to genetic causes, looking at them today, they don't seem to have shorter or less happy lives or be undesirable people, so why not share that specific genetic wealth around? It has the neat side effect of basically rooting out one of the causes of anti-Semitism too, by reducing inequality, so it is hard to say it would hurt their interest as individuals or an ethnicity either.

Actually one doesn't need to demand genetic differences between groups for the argument that what we're seeing here probably fits either the first or the second loopholes, since we also have individual differences that are caused by genetics. We see that people with an IQ of 115 overall seem to statistically speaking today do better in nearly every measure of quality of life and many measures of psychological well being compared to people with an IQ of 85, they also live longer and are generally more desirable to have around.

Replies from: orthonormal, Baughn
comment by orthonormal · 2012-01-07T17:12:29.683Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Algernon's Law is just the concept I was thinking of; I hadn't seen this link. Thanks!

comment by Baughn · 2012-01-26T23:39:12.743Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I would add a fourth possibility:

Lack of time.

It seems likely to me that our civilization and technology developed at the earliest possible point it could have, in which case the high-IQ genes are simply not fixated yet, but would be if we hung around for a few (tens of) thousands more years. For that matter, there's no reason not to think we'd go well above our current maximum.

Replies from: army1987
comment by A1987dM (army1987) · 2012-01-08T11:14:55.170Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Even without forced sterilization, it hardly seems outrageous to tweak public policy so as to incentivize the smartest people to reproduce more and discourage the stupidest.

Assuming intelligence to correlate with wealth, making it more expensive to raise children would seem like it would have a positive effect in that direction... but apparently rich people prefer to have one or two seriously spoiled children than half a dozen children living decently, and poor people prefer to have several children living in hardship than just one living decently. I can't think of any way to change this (which wouldn't have seriously undesirable side effects).

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2012-01-08T14:30:27.027Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I can't think of any way to change this (which wouldn't have seriously undesirable side effects).

Well if you want to use wealth as a proxy for intelligence, one approach would be to dramatically raise the tax exemption for children. This would have little effect on poor people, since they generally do not itemize their deductions -- if they owe taxes at all.

Still if such a measure were proposed as a way of encouraging smarter people to have more babies, you can bet that a lot of people will scream racism.

Replies from: army1987
comment by A1987dM (army1987) · 2012-01-08T14:50:00.320Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Well if you want to use wealth as a proxy for intelligence, one approach would be to dramatically raise the tax exemption for children.

I was thinking about solutions which wouldn't significantly affect the total fertility rate, but now that I think about it, increasing it wouldn't be a “seriously undesirable side effect”, at least in (say) continental Europe or Japan.

Replies from: army1987
comment by A1987dM (army1987) · 2012-01-10T17:53:11.404Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Now that I think about it, the fertility of lower classes could be decreased by giving out contraception for free and subsidizing abortions, but the latter could be very unpopular. (It shouldn't affect the fertility of upper classes because the price of contraception/abortions isn't one of the reasons why they're not having fewer children.)

(Why was the parent downvoted, BTW? I guess because the downvoter thinks continental Europe/Japan are already overpopulated so sub-replacement fertility there is not bad.)

Replies from: thomblake
comment by thomblake · 2012-01-10T17:58:31.453Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Why was the parent downvoted, BTW?

Possibly because brazil84 is perceived as a troll - someone might be downvoting the entire thread.

comment by gwern · 2012-01-07T16:25:48.460Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Believing in "stereotype threat" as the main reason for the black/white IQ gap is like believing in Aquinas' arguments for the existence of God.

In what sense, exactly? Some of his arguments look logical, like the ontological argument, and others like the argument from design look empirical (and falsified by evolution).

Stereotype threat, on the other hand, looks entirely empirical, should be measurable, and can be argued against by pointing to a meta-analysis showing publication bias (I checked just now, and a full paper does not seem to have been published nor is it listed on one of the authors' homepages which otherwise lists all his work; this nonpublication is ironic if the original meta-analysis was correct...)

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2012-01-08T00:10:57.215Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

In what sense, exactly?

In the sense that to accept the argument, one needs to allow wishful thinking to overcome basic rationality.

Replies from: MixedNuts
comment by MixedNuts · 2012-01-08T00:22:08.094Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I did not even think of stereotype threat as a possible hypothesis until I read about it, at which point I thought it sounded pretty implausible for the thirty seconds it took me to reach the study results. Your model of the psychology of stereotype threat believers is just plain wrong as a matter of fact.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2012-01-08T00:43:38.967Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I did not even think of stereotype threat as a possible hypothesis until I read about it, at which point I thought it sounded pretty implausible for the thirty seconds it took me to reach the study results. Your model of the psychology of stereotype threat believers is just plain wrong as a matter of fact.

I'm not sure what your point is here, but if you want to discuss it further (with me), feel free to comment on my blog post.

Replies from: MixedNuts
comment by CaveJohnson · 2012-01-07T15:54:11.017Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Believing in "stereotype threat" as the main reason for the black/white IQ gap is like believing in Aquinas' arguments for the existence of God.

More or less.

comment by MixedNuts · 2012-01-07T17:12:29.023Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What's your alternative explanation for lower performance when reminded of a stereotype? Publication bias looks plausible.

What about the "one drop" criterion for race? In the US, someone with 7 great-grandparents from Europe and 1 from Africa is quite often classified as black, not white. If the discrepancy is largely genetic, we should expect much more variance among black subjects (only African ancestors to very few African ancestors) than among white ones (very few to no African ancestors) - more than the width of the gap itself, actually. Is this what we observe?

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2012-01-08T00:21:03.367Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What's your alternative explanation for lower performance when reminded of a stereotype?

Why do I need to provide an explanation? It may very well be true that being reminded of a stereotype has a measurable effect on peoples' performance.

If the discrepancy is largely genetic, we should expect much more variance among black subjects (only African ancestors to very few African ancestors) than among white ones (very few to no African ancestors) - more than the width of the gap itself, actually

Well you would need to quantify the amount of variation among both groups. American whites are pretty diverse too. Also, I would guess that blacks with mostly European blood are pretty unusual among American blacks. So I'm not sure what to expect.

Replies from: MixedNuts
comment by MixedNuts · 2012-01-08T01:08:32.560Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So stereotype threat exists but only explains a smallish part of the gap, with most of the rest due to genetics? 'kay.

Quantifying diversity is hard: genetic variation I don't know (KHAN!), specific genes even less, ancestry data isn't available, samples like "famous people" are skewed, etc. I mostly meant "Barack Obama: a definitely white and a definitely black parent, and he's black in the US race system. That seems common".

But here's a way to test: pick people with a race system in common (typically the US one, and I could do an European replication). Ask them to describe their race (ideally open-ended, but given small samples probably a set list). Take pictures of them and ask a (blinded, racially sampled) jury to guess their race. Measure some objective and hopefully relevant criterion like melanin in skin, or some cleverly chosen gene, or ancestry if you have it handy. Have them do some kind of intelligence test. Possibly split into groups and test conditions like "stereotype threat".

The mostly-genetics hypothesis predicts that the objective criterion will be the best predictor, and the jury estimation will be a better predictor than the self-report because it looks at phenotypical evidence of genome rather than irrelevant things like native language. The mostly-culture hypothesis predicts that the self-report will be the best predictor, and that the results will vary widely depending on local race systems.

Clever stupid "it's all interaction" idea of the day: What about a genetic predisposition to social cues such as stereotype threats?

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2012-01-08T09:32:46.294Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So stereotype threat exists but only explains a smallish part of the gap,

I don't know if it "exists" or not. But clearly if it does exist it does not satisfactorily explain the gap.

comment by Sarokrae · 2011-09-26T10:04:32.180Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The problem with discussing racial differences is that when people say "black", they're already making inherent assumptions about genetics. "Black" incorporates an incredible amount of genetic diversity, far more than the label "white". The common error in these debates is that an awful lot of the population will see the label "black" and fail to distinguish between all people labelled as such. People distinguish between, say, east Asians and south-east Asians and Indians, but they say "black" as if all of Africa are the same.

Look at the performance at the Olympics running races. Would you note the fact that "100m winners are always black"? Would you be willing to make the statement that "black people are naturally better sprinters"? How about distance runners? As it turns out, the good sprinters are usually Jamaican or African-American, with little success from Africa itself. The good distance runners almost entirely come from the Nandi area of Kenya - hardly representative of Africa as a whole. Plenty of areas of Africa have fewer good runners, and probably lots of areas have just the same proportion as European countries.

I'd venture to say that there might be black ethnicities which are on average less intelligent, or have behavioural differences - after all, there are black ethnicities that average around 4ft tall. But will that difference makes any meaningful average when you're talking about "black" people? There are for more genetic variations within racial groups than between them, if you're willing to count "black" as a racial group. I personally don't like generalising in such a non-meaningful way. Compare to people of a specific ancestral origin, if you must compare. Comparing with the average of every ethnicity in Africa, without concern for your sampling bias giving you an inaccurate average (by using statements like "blacks are..." or "blacks have..."), does seem a bit, well, racist.

Replies from: brazil84, None
comment by brazil84 · 2011-09-26T11:02:46.854Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The problem with discussing racial differences is that when people say "black", they're already making inherent assumptions about genetics. "Black" incorporates an incredible amount of genetic diversity, far more than the label "white".

I don't see why this is necessarily a problem. For example, if I observed that generally speaking, the South is warmer than Minnesota, I would be correct even though the South incorporates a lot more geographic diversity than Minnesota.

People distinguish between, say, east Asians and south-east Asians and Indians, but they say "black" as if all of Africa are the same.

For purposes of this discussion, it's a reasonable category. If there were a large subgroup of blacks which was highly intelligent, then it might be appropriate to use different categories.

Would you note the fact that "100m winners are always black"?

Generally speaking, yes.

Would you be willing to make the statement that "black people are naturally better sprinters"?

Probably not, since sprinting ability seems concentrated in a subgroup of blacks. (Relatively) low intelligence does not seem to be this way.

Perhaps more importantly, either way you look at it, it doesn't change the fact that genetics is partly responsible for the black/white sprinting gap.

But will that difference makes any meaningful average when you're talking about "black" people?

I would say "yes" in the same way that the South is generally warmer than Minnesota. Put another way, I'm not aware of any subgroup of blacks which stands out in terms of intelligence. But even if there were, it would not change the fact that there is a black/white IQ gap and genetics is responsible for a lot of it.

There are for more genetic variations within racial groups than between them,

Assuming that's true, so what?

Replies from: Sarokrae, Nick_Tarleton
comment by Sarokrae · 2011-09-26T11:40:00.450Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It means that there are few contexts where you might ask me "are blacks less intelligent than whites on average" without me saying anything more than "insufficient data: error bars too big".

And any scientist who researches the issue (or indeed anyone taken seriously who discusses the issue) and uses the term "black people" without considering whether or not they really mean "all black people" or even "a representative average of all black people" are being very misleading if they report it using that wording, considering the biases of the general public.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-09-26T15:47:11.798Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It means that there are few contexts where you might ask me "are blacks less intelligent than whites on average" without me saying anything more than "insufficient data: error bars too big".

I'm not sure I understand this. Are you denying that there is a statistically significant difference in intelligence (as measured by IQ) between blacks and whites?

considering the biases of the general public.

So you are saying that special rules need to apply when discussing race and intelligence?

Replies from: Bill_McGrath
comment by Bill_McGrath · 2011-09-26T15:58:20.995Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Are you denying that there is a statistically significant difference in intelligence (as measured by IQ) between blacks and whites?

I think the point is, such a statement is not useful, considering the huge number of different groups that can be classed as "black" and "white."

So you are saying that special rules need to apply when discussing race and intelligence?

Well when reporting findings, its important to do so in a way which conveys the meaning correctly to the intended audience. And Sarokae did originally say

are being very misleading if they report it using that wording, considering the biases of the general public.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-09-26T16:09:28.989Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think the point is, such a statement is not useful, considering the huge number of different groups that can be classed as "black" and "white."

Does this principle apply just to statements concerning intelligence? Or does it apply to any perceived racial difference which may be due to genetics, in part or in whole?

Also, does it apply only to human racial groups? Or does the same thing apply to all biological groupings?

Well when reporting findings, its important to do so in a way which conveys the meaning correctly to the intended audience

Perhaps, but I think that when discussing things on this discussion board, the statement "Group X is more Y than Group Z" can be reasonably understood to mean that if you measure quality Y, then in general and on average, members of Group X have a higher measurement for Y than members of Group Z. Further, it doesn't imply that every last member of each group has been measured.

Certainly that's what I mean.

Replies from: Bill_McGrath
comment by Bill_McGrath · 2011-09-26T21:58:21.803Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I reckon the principle applies in general - there's too much diversity within the classification "black" for it to be particularly useful, I reckon. Perhaps if it was geographically specific, it might be more useful.

It applies to all biological groupings that are sufficiently broad.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-09-26T22:15:10.772Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I reckon the principle applies in general - there's too much diversity within the classification "black" for it to be particularly useful, I reckon. Perhaps if it was geographically specific, it might be more useful.

So the same reasoning would apply to the categories commonly referred to as "worms," "birds," "penguins," "bears," "elephants," "baboons," "chimpanzees," "rats," and "mice," Agreed?

Replies from: Bill_McGrath, Jack
comment by Bill_McGrath · 2011-09-26T22:20:14.083Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I see your point but I'm not sure I agree. Perhaps I'm just reluctant to think in those terms, but I don't think that's it. I'm not thinking of this in terms of PC, just in terms of usefulness.

I'm having trouble thinking up an analogy to explain my point; I'll think about it and see if I can. If not, guess I need to start over.

EDIT: Actually, if we replace "intelligence" with a less loaded or emotive quality, say "height", I think I'd still be inclined not to consider it useful. But as I say, I'll have a think about this.

Replies from: Sarokrae, None, brazil84
comment by Sarokrae · 2011-09-27T09:16:56.872Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Just to add a note here: using the "height" example, suppose I told you that research has shown black people were on average shorter than white people. Then, it turns out, that my sample of "blacks" was from the area with the pigmy ethnicities, and if I excluded those from my definition of "blacks" then they were on average taller than white people. This is an extreme example, but here the statement "the mean height of black people is less than the mean height of white people" might be TRUE, but it won't be USEFUL.

This is because your sample of black people contains within it many separate distributions for the same attribute, and simply taking their mean is not helpful. I'm merely saying that in an unhomogeneous group, averages are more likely to be misleading.

Sure, a set of equal numbers of mice and elephants are on average bigger than a set of guinea pigs, but that's not a useful statement. And a generalisation from that particular sample to "short-haired animals are bigger than long-haired animals" would be outrightly unjustifiable from your data.

comment by [deleted] · 2011-09-26T22:47:41.963Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

His point isn't actually very good -- "worms" isn't a single category about which you could make many meaningful statements on average either (well, you try coming up with many non-vague true statements that universally apply to platyhelminths, polychaetes, annelids, nematodes...).

Linneaus coined the taxon vermes to hold any non-arthropod invertebrate. Later, cladistics came along and demolished the idea that it was ever a useful biological group.

Whereas "elephants" consists of just a handful of living species in two genera, so we shouldn't be surprised that they have a lot in common -- and even then, if you over-presume on those similarities when making theories, you'll wind up wrong because you didn't realize the ways in which they can differ.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-09-26T23:53:21.794Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

worms" isn't a single category about which you could make many meaningful statements on average

I don't see what difference this makes. If someone were to observe that "elephants" are generally speaking larger than "worms," the fact that the two categories are extremely diverse would not preclude you from reasonably asking whether the difference was due to genetics.

The statement that "blacks" have lower IQs than "whites" is both meaningful and true.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2011-09-27T00:38:33.031Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I do not think you understand biology (either in the context of the race/IQ discussion or in general) well enough for it to be worth arguing with you further.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-09-27T00:45:44.202Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I disagree. What I'm doing is to take the exact criticisms made of categories like "blacks" and "whites" and applying them to other biological categories in order to show that there's a double standard at work.

What exactly am I missing?

Replies from: AspiringKnitter, None
comment by AspiringKnitter · 2012-01-08T01:47:51.167Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You're missing the fact that people are arguing "but the groups are heterogeneous" when they mean "but the different means might be within a standard deviation of each other because single groups have a spread much wider than the difference between them". That would apply when trying to ascertain whether, say, worms are larger than insects, but NOT when trying to ascertain whether worms are larger than elephants, because the difference between the largest and smallest worms is probably a lot bigger than the difference between the average size of a worm and the average size of an insect. On the other hand, the average size of an elephant is greater than the average size of a worm (any worm) by way more than the biggest worm is bigger than the smallest worm.

Suppose I got together all the worms and all the insects and measured their volume, and found the mean size of a worm and the mean size of an insect. And suppose (I have no idea what the truth is here, but it seems about as plausible as anything else) that I found that on average worms are smaller than insects. Would that be meaningful? I don't think it would be useful to know.

How big an IQ gap are you saying exists? Are we talking as much as a standard deviation? Then maybe it would be important (if true). But if so, genetics isn't the only possible explanation. I'd expect upbringing and class to be very important, as well as quality of public schools where they live, perhaps so much so that a genetic difference, if any, could be completely overwhelmed.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2012-01-08T09:50:28.220Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

but the different means might be within a standard deviation of each other because single groups have a spread much wider than the difference between them

I don't recall anyone arguing that in this thread, but this argument -- to the extent it makes any sense at all -- lacks merit.

Let's take your analogy.

Suppose I got together all the worms and all the insects and measured their volume, and found the mean size of a worm and the mean size of an insect. And suppose (I have no idea what the truth is here, but it seems about as plausible as anything else) that I found that on average worms are smaller than insects. Would that be meaningful?

To make things simple, let's assume that there are 100 species of worms and 100 species of insects and 1,000,000 individuals from each species. Let's further assume that there is an animal known as the African Aardvark which eats both worms and insects (and has equal access to all), but eats only individuals greater than a certain size. Now suppose it is observed that the African Aardvark eats 75% insects and 25% worms, and we are presented with two hypotheses to explain this observation: (1) The African Aardvark likes the taste of insects better than that of worms; or (2) the African Aardvark prefers larger individuals to smaller individuals.

In evaluating which of the two hypotheses is correct, is it useful (or meaningful) to know that on average worms are smaller than insects? (And you can assume that the two groups each have a spread much wider than the difference between them.)

But if so, genetics isn't the only possible explanation.

I'm not sure what this means. To be sure, genetics is not the only reason for the black/white iq gap. At the same time, there is no non-genetic explanation which (1) explains the gap; and (2) is not ridiculous.

Replies from: AspiringKnitter
comment by AspiringKnitter · 2012-01-08T22:03:57.066Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

To be sure, genetics is not the only reason for the black/white iq gap. At the same time, there is no non-genetic explanation which (1) explains the gap; and (2) is not ridiculous.

I don't quite understand how you didn't just contradict yourself.

However, if you want a non-ridiculous, non-genetic explanation that explains the gap, try this one: while whites came to America with diverse socioeconomic backgrounds, the biggest group of black Americans today is descended from slaves, and until recently, there was extreme racial segregation. Hence, rather than just assimilating, they as a group have ended up forming a subculture. (If you don't believe that, look at the world and try again.) Not all African Americans live in ghettos, but a greater percentage of them than of whites do. (Similarly, not all of them are stupid.) Among their subculture, poverty is high, teenage pregnancy is high, single mothers are common and violence is really common. In such an environment, they're not likely to have highly-educated parents to nurture their intellectual development. Meanwhile, worldwide, large numbers of blacks live in Africa, which is 1. not a good place, and 2. full of primitive peoples, resulting not only in people (the common people) having less access to education, but also to cultural biases skewing IQ test readings.

Test that would distinguish between this theory and genetics: study IQ among African Americans born after the Civil Rights Movement to married couples whose income is above the poverty line and who don't live in "bad neighborhoods". If the gap disappears, it's more likely environmental; if it doesn't, that may indicate a genetic difference. But taking the raw IQ data doesn't distinguish between these; it merely rules out the hypothesis that there are neither genetic nor environmental differences. Since there may even be a big enough population now to survey, someone should do it. The only problem I can think of here is that people who rise above poverty are already selected for intelligence (as well as persistence and work ethic).

In evaluating which of the two hypotheses is correct, is it useful (or meaningful) to know that on average worms are smaller than insects? (And you can assume that the two groups each have a spread much wider than the difference between them.)

Ah, now I see. I couldn't think of a reason why it would matter in everyday life, because it's more reliable to just ascertain whether or not people are actually intelligent by getting to know them, not using deeply flawed binary heuristics. However, now I see that you're worried about whether people will end up assuming someone is being racist when they're not. That's fair. In the current political climate, it's a big risk, for everyone. In that case, whether it's genetic or environmental doesn't really matter, though.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2012-01-08T22:33:20.988Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

However, if you want a non-ridiculous, non-genetic explanation that explains the gap, try this one:

Respectfully, that explanation is ridiculous. If you wish to debate it with me further, please read my blog post and respond there.

However, now I see that you're worried about whether people will end up assuming someone is being racist when they're not

Some one, or some organization. Anyway, the issue you are addressing is a slightly different one from what I raised. Basically you are making the "who cares" argument. But the reality is that our society cares very much, just like many Europeans in the middle ages cared very much about devotion to Christianity. Publicly pointing out the weaknesses in the Christian position could get you into serious trouble back then, just like pointing out the truth about race and intelligence can evoke a lot of hostility in modern day Western world.

Replies from: AspiringKnitter
comment by AspiringKnitter · 2012-01-08T23:01:16.098Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If you wish to debate it with me further, please read my blog post and respond there.

What blog post?

Replies from: brazil84
comment by [deleted] · 2011-09-27T01:11:59.405Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What you are missing is context -- the context to understand what you are arguing about, and the limits of your analogy.

Additionally, you are missing the context needed to understand why the larger argument you're making cannot effectively be made in those terms. I am no longer interested in discussing it with you.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-09-27T01:23:16.392Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What you are missing is context -- the context to understand what you are arguing about, and the limits of your analogy.

Exactly what context? The history of subjugation and oppression on the basis of race?

comment by brazil84 · 2011-09-26T22:39:09.554Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Fundamentally, the point is that reasoning about race should be subject to the exact same standards as reasoning about any other kinds of categories.

In regular life, and even in science, people readily accept categories which are somewhat arbitrary; which are difficult to define around the edges; which contain pairs of elements more different than some pairs of elements, only one of which is contained in the category; and so on.

I think that for various emotional reasons, people tend to get wound up over the categories "black" and "white" but such considerations should not affect rationalists.

Replies from: Bill_McGrath
comment by Bill_McGrath · 2011-09-26T22:51:42.569Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I agree with you here; I don't think I'm getting wound up for emotional reasons, I just don't think the category is necessarily a partiuclarly useful one, but for reasons I can't really articulate. (I am not knowledgeable about statistics and the relevant terminology.)

But yes, there's no reason to adopt new rules for reason on any topic - that wasn't what I was arguing, and it's clearly counter-rational.

Replies from: MinibearRex
comment by MinibearRex · 2011-09-26T23:57:49.472Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

for reasons I can't really articulate. (I am not knowledgeable about statistics and the relevant terminology.

We'll be all right without formal terminology. I'm not at all sure what it is you're trying to get at, and I'd be perfectly happy with you describing it as a metaphor, or an example, or really anything other than "I can't explain why I believe this."

Replies from: Bill_McGrath
comment by Bill_McGrath · 2011-09-28T19:47:10.624Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Excuse delay getting back to this.

Okay, I think I can explain. Let's say that we have 5 ethnic groups under the umbrella "black." All of approximately equal size. Groups A and B are found to, in general, be slightly above average intelligence, C and D are about equal, and E are significantly below. The average intelligence for "blacks" is now below average, and this is mathematically correct, while in reality, 4 out 5 black people you meet will tend to be of average or higher intelligence.

Perhaps this is a common statistical fallacy, but this is what I mean about the classification being too broad to be useful; with such a broad area to work from, with no internal distinctions being made in a hugely diverse category, the data isn't all that interesting or enlightening.

Replies from: MinibearRex, Bugmaster
comment by MinibearRex · 2011-09-28T22:47:58.662Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Ok, that makes sense. The next obvious question, though, is why you think that the category of people labeled "black" fits this pattern, instead of, say, a Gaussian distribution.

Replies from: Bill_McGrath
comment by Bill_McGrath · 2011-09-28T23:13:00.235Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Well, I don't neccessarily think it does fit this pattern, I'm just saying it's a possibility, and there's no particular reason to consider it an unlikely possibility. On the other hand, seeing as the argument linking race to intelligence seems to be based on genetics, I feel that there is too much of a broad genetic sample within "black" for race to be a reliable indicator of intelligence, as I outline above.

Replies from: MinibearRex
comment by MinibearRex · 2011-09-29T01:26:58.031Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There is also no reason to consider it to be more likely than the possibility that there are groups A and B with intelligence slightly less than the mean (of everyone in the category "black"), groups C and D about equal, and a group E significantly above average, in which case your argument that the mean value of IQ unfairly discriminates against blacks is exactly reversed.

I see no reason to consider it more likely that the mean unfairly discriminates against blacks as opposed to the hypothesis that the mean unfairly inflates the "true" average intelligence of that group. Your argument that there are multiple ethnic groups is correct, and that does mean that we should give a lower weight to the mean value of IQ. It does not mean that we are licensed to believe that this value is off in one particular direction, because that direction is what we would like to be true.

Replies from: Bill_McGrath
comment by Bill_McGrath · 2011-09-29T06:52:17.661Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I agree, but you're strawmanning me here. I never said that IQ discriminated any particular direction, I was arguing that black is too large a group, contaning too much diversity, to give useful results one way or the other. I just happened to choose that specific example.

I've made it pretty clear it's not about what I want to think.

comment by Bugmaster · 2011-09-28T20:22:29.502Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think this is, in fact, a common statistical fallacy: using the mean instead of the median to represent "average".

Replies from: dlthomas, Bill_McGrath
comment by dlthomas · 2011-09-28T20:49:42.080Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Median is often better, but not always - it depends on the purpose you wish to put the data to. With anything less than the full distribution, you'll be able to hit some cases in which it can mislead you.

Edited to add:

Specifically - if you are interested in totals, mean is usually a more useful "average". Multiplying the total number of water balloons by the average amount of water in a balloon gives you a much better estimate (exact, in theory) with mean than with median. If you are interested in individuals, median is usually better; if I am asking if the next water balloon will have more than X amount of water, median is a much more informative number. Neither is going to well represent a multimodal distribution, which we might expect to be dealing with in the great*-grandparent's case anyway if the hypothesis of a strong genetic component to variation in intelligence does in fact hold.

Replies from: Bugmaster
comment by Bugmaster · 2011-09-29T01:35:56.376Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Good point. You should select a metric that would be most useful in any given situation, be it the mean, the median, or anything else.

comment by Bill_McGrath · 2011-09-28T20:37:14.174Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Ah; so I'm misunderstanding what brazil84 means by average?

Replies from: Bugmaster
comment by Bugmaster · 2011-09-29T01:38:50.001Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

No, I think his example of 5 ethnic groups is flawed, because he's using the wrong metric to calculate the average. If he was using the median instead of the mean -- which is the right thing to do in this case -- he'd obtain the result that "most blacks have average intelligence", and his conclusion would no longer follow.

(Edited: typo)

Replies from: Bill_McGrath
comment by Bill_McGrath · 2011-09-29T06:55:45.884Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The 5 ethnic groups was mine originally.

But then I have to consider the scenario where the median gives the result of below averge intelligence - will take me slightly longer to puzzle out in my head.

comment by Jack · 2011-09-26T22:49:51.280Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

No. More like Jellyfish. Which isn't a valid taxonomic grouping. This has hardly anything to do with the Race and IQ issue. There are valid taxonomies that recognizably relate to race- but in addition recognizable groupings like "European" and "East Asian" you end up with a bunch different African groupings.

It is not unreasonable to expect people making socially controversial hypotheses to do so by referring to real entities.

(ETA: Worms too as Jandila points out)

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-09-26T23:06:45.941Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm not sure I understand your point. Bill_McGrath seems to say that statements about "blacks" are not useful (whatever that means) because the group "blacks" contains too much diversity. And yet all of the categories I listed contain far more diversity than "blacks," at least as far as I know.

It is not unreasonable to expect people making socially controversial hypotheses to do so by referring to real entities.

How do I know if an entity is "real" or not?

Replies from: Jack, Sarokrae
comment by Jack · 2011-09-27T00:15:58.730Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Look, there is an infinite number of conceivable groupings and an infinite number of variables you could use to compare those groupings. You've chosen to spend your time comparing a group you call "white people" with a group you call "black people" along a variable you call IQ. Now, there are lots of reasons to wonder about group variation of IQ-- we might be interested in evolutionary anthropology questions like how intelligence (or whatever IQ tests) evolved, we might be interested in the relationship between IQ and cultural development, we might want to answer social policy questions that depend on average group IQ.

We should therefore use the groupings that are most useful in helping us understand these questions. "Black", "white" and "yellow" are not those groupings. This is trivially true for all but the social policy question. If you don't understand this then you don't understand basic population genetics. With regard to the social policy question- the right groupings are the ones you're talking about setting social policy for.

You are comparing two groups. The choice of these two groups specifically is not justified by their utility in answering a scientific or political question. Moreover, this particular division is the result of centuries of subjugation and oppression. Indeed, it is extremely unlikely that you would have chosen these two groups were it not for the fact that you are part of a culture that persists in thinking in terms of these groups. And the variable you've chosen to compare them along is one which we routinely use to judge a person's value. Since your choice of groupings is not helpful in answering scientific or policy questions. And since intelligence is constantly used in judging someone's value-- people will justifiably suspect you of choosing these groups in order to make judgments about how valuable they are.

(The third paragraph is what people mean when they say you're being racist for arguing this. Something is real if it figures in our best scientific theory of the relevant domain)

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-09-27T00:41:47.616Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

With regard to the social policy question- the right groupings are the ones you're talking about setting social policy for.

As far as social policy goes, it seems to me that it's people who are most upset about the black/white IQ gap who are also most insistent on making use of these groups. For example by counting the number of blacks versus whites who pass a firefighters' examination and insisting that the examination must be unfair in some way because blacks fail the exam disproportionately.

In a world with anti-discrimination laws that specifically apply to race, it's totally reasonable to compare those groups in terms of IQ and reasonably ask how much of the difference is due to genetics.

Since your choice of groupings is not helpful in answering scientific or policy questions. And since intelligence is constantly used in judging someone's value-- people will justifiably suspect you of choosing these groups in order to make judgments about how valuable they are.

Assuming that's all true, so what? It doesn't change the fact that there is a black/white IQ gap and one can ask whether the gap is largely genetic in origin.

Indeed, the fact that you are questioning my motivations and talking about "centuries of subjugation and oppression" illustrates my original point very well.

Something is real if it figures in our best scientific theory of the relevant domain

Can you provide a couple examples of this?

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2011-09-27T00:56:17.516Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Can you provide a couple examples of this?

neutrinos, Homo Sapiens, Helium, the Dravidian language group, ribosomes, spacetime, Tectonic plates, igneous rock, the mesosphere, Jupiter, the Inca, Abraham Lincoln.

Assuming that's all true, so what? It doesn't change the fact that there is a black/white IQ gap and one can ask whether the gap is largely genetic in origin.

I'm not arguing the question with you. I gave that up a long time ago. I'm asking you to use scientifically respectable, non-racist terminology when you talk about group difference and IQ. You can easily state your hypothesis in scientifically recognized terms.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-09-27T01:22:02.724Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Homo Sapiens . . . the Dravidian language group,

And what scientific theories are these categories part of?

I'm asking you to use scientifically respectable, non-racist terminology when you talk about group difference and IQ

Why should I?

You can easily state your hypothesis in scientifically recognized terms.

Well, consider the hypothesis that the black/white IQ gap is due to racism. How would you state this in scientifically recognized terms?

Replies from: wedrifid, Jack
comment by wedrifid · 2011-09-27T02:25:42.741Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

And what scientific theories are these categories part of?

I really don't think science has much to do with the bulk (or strength) of objections you will get on this subject. You're doing yourself no good by continuing to argue about it. Even the terrible arguments made against you will receive positive support by virtue of being sandwitched between two of yours - reading need not be involved.

It is probably better to make the ethnic-group references a bit more specific than a two category split. It is fairly clear what 'black/white' labels refer to in countries with two clear dominant ethnic groups of appropriate melanin levels but less useful if trying for a worldwide reference. Then the references become more ambiguous. I suggest making your stand somewhere a bit more secure than the 'black' word. Your main point is a bit deeper than that.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-09-27T11:06:43.571Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I really don't think science has much to do with the bulk (or strength) of objections you will get on this subject.

I agree. The problem is that people see "racism" as evil, hurtful, low status, etc. Just like they viewed atheism that way a few hundred years ago. Which is kinda the point.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2011-09-27T15:13:52.824Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I wish to explicitly distance myself from the analogy you use. The implications are not desirable (and in a way that is not quite accurate either).

comment by Jack · 2011-09-27T01:45:09.398Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

And what scientific theories are these categories part of?

Google it.

Why should I?

Because you don't like hurting people? Because racism is evil? Because racism is low status? Because you would look less stupid? Because it would be less embarrassing for all of Less Wrong? Because you prefer to avoid downvotes?

I'm done.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-09-27T11:03:51.935Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Google it.

It's not really my responsibility to do research trying to figure out what you mean by "real entity." Is "elephants" a "real entity"? What about "worms"? Is "the South" a real entity? What about "Minnesota"?

Because you don't like hurting people? Because racism is evil? Because racism is low status? Because you would look less stupid? Because it would be less embarrassing for all of Less Wrong? Because you prefer to avoid downvotes?

This illustrates my point very well. A few hundred years ago, someone might have argued that atheism is hurtful, evil, low status, embarassing, and makes you look stupid. But none of these things affect the fundamental correctness or incorrectness of atheism.

Replies from: Jack, shokwave
comment by Jack · 2011-09-27T16:20:40.108Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It's not really my responsibility to do research trying to figure out what you mean by "real entity." Is "elephants" a "real entity"? What about "worms"? Is "the South" a real entity? What about "Minnesota"?

You asked "What scientific theories are these categories from?" For most of the examples I gave this answer was obvious and had you not before heard of, say, ribosomes, you could google and quickly determine a ribosome is a entity from cell biology. You have a history of making people defend extended and irrelevant points so as to avoid ever conceding any point -- so I don't take your request at face value. And if you don't already know 'Helium' comes from chemistry then you need to drastically reduce your confidence in lots of your beliefs. By way of analogy, matter was once believed to consist of five elements. It turned out Aristotelian cosmology was not a theory that helped us answer many important questions so we stopped believing in quintessence. Similarly, "blacks, whites, reds and yellows" is not a theory of human genetic difference at all adequate for answering interesting questions in population genetics or anthropology.

The preposterous thing about this is that I don't actually strongly disagree with your position. I think you're wildly overconfident but I don't think and have never said that positing group IQ differences due to genetics along groups that roughly correspond to some traditional racial categories is by definition racist or even likely to be wrong.

This illustrates my point very well. A few hundred years ago, someone might have argued that atheism is hurtful, evil, low status, embarassing, and makes you look stupid. But none of these things affect the fundamental correctness or incorrectness of atheism.

For the third time: it is the way you talk about these issues involving race, genetics and IQ that is hurtful, low status, etc. You seem to be under the misconception that because (you think) your beliefs are true you have the right to offend people when you share them. This may be the case if people are offended by the content of the beliefs. But it is not the case when people are offended by the way you state your beliefs. Less Wrong would not tolerate posts of the kind one finds at r/atheism despite nearly everyone here agreeing with their propositional content. Those posts would get downvoted because they do not rise to Less Wrong standards- despite being trivially true. I don't think it is too great a burden on people discussing this issue that they have a passing familiarity with population genetics and anthropology.

This debate should look like the exchange between cupholder and steve hsu not, well this.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-09-27T16:50:28.351Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

" For most of the examples I gave this answer was obvious

I limited my request to two of the "real entities" you named. "Homo Sapiens" and the "Dravidian Language Group."

It's not obvious to me what scientific theories these categories come from and I will not guess at what you mean.

I also asked you whether "elephants," "worms" "The South," or "Minnesota" are "real entities." You have not answered my question.

I also asked you to state a particular hypothesis in "scientific terms," which you apparently think would be easy. You have not done so.

In short, I am trying to figure out your point and you are not making it easy for me.

as to avoid ever conceding any point

Exactly what point do you think I should concede?

Similarly, "blacks, whites, reds and yellows" is not a theory of human genetic difference at all adequate for answering interesting questions in population genetics or anthropology.

Even assuming this is true, it doesn't change the fact that the black/white IQ gap is largely due to genetics. In short, it's a red herring.

Let me ask you this:

Suppose I divide up human beings into three races:

Race 1: Ethnic Swedes plus people born in Maine;

Race 2: Ethnic Japanese plus people born in Sri Lanka;

Race 3: Everyone else.

Would you agree that this racial division is "inadequate foranswering interesting questions in population genetics or anthropology."?

For the third time: it is the way you talk about these issues involving race, genetics and IQ that is hurtful, low status, etc

Lol, the exact point of raising the genetic basis of the black/white IQ difference is because it is considered one of the most offensive, hurtful things to say in the West in the 21st century.

comment by shokwave · 2011-09-27T11:55:51.390Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

But none of these things affect the fundamental correctness or incorrectness of atheism.

If atheists had not kowtowed to popular opinion as some wish you would, more would have been burned at the stake; more effort would have been put into refutations of atheism, and more time spent on indoctrination of religion as right and atheists as evil non-humans. It's possible that this could have meant that today there would not be places where the fundamental correctness of atheism could be asserted. In many ways atheism thrives only because religions put so little effort into competing!

By the same token, the net effect of pissing off a portion of LessWrong by using fundamentally correct "racist" terminology may push back recognition of such fundamental correctness. In aggregate it may solidify political correctness into an unassailable fortress!

Replies from: MarkusRamikin, brazil84
comment by MarkusRamikin · 2011-09-27T13:54:13.625Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Something about this pro-appeasement argument strikes me as really wrong, though I wish I were able to better explain why. It just seems to me that the people historically interested in the rule of religion - say, Church hierarchy - would find it better for their agendas that any closet atheists should keep kowtowing rather than become vocal about their disbelief. Surely if nobody ever challenged orthodox ideas, they'd never get overturned?

Well, I'm no historian. But in any case, if a medievial equivalent of Less Wrong, some group of people unusually interested in forming true beliefs formed in those times, then they should be able to discuss atheism at least among themselves, surely. It would be contrary to their common goal to do otherwise. It might prevent them from figuring out that atheism is probably correct, you see.

Sure, atheism may be low status and immoral and evil and "not useful" to know about if true - but if for whatever reason they already decided they are interested in forming true beliefs, then they should consider atheism anyway.

We're on Less Wrong because we are unusually interested in pursuing true beliefs, and methods of forming them. If other factors such as political correctness or some people's being sensitive about some topics or whatever get in the way of that, then so much the worse for those other factors. If we have to commit heresies and be offensive to our age's moral fashions to get closer to truth, then let us commit heresies and be offensive.

Not that I'm in favor of alienating anyone for its own sake, or when it's avoidable at negligible cost to the discussion's clarity and usefulness (i.e. by phrasing things neutrally and not taking potshots). All I'm saying is, let's not let get mind-killed too easily. Currently Less Wrong strikes me as the best place in the entire Internet to pursue intelligent, sane discussion, and possibly even change your mind. Even on topics that would never have a chance in other environments.

I'd hate to see this quality diluted. For what?

comment by brazil84 · 2011-09-27T16:19:37.045Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I agree largely with MarkusRamikin's response, but I would add that you are basically speculating here. It's also possible that if atheists had been more vocal, their views would have more quickly become tolerated.

I agree that highly emotional issues such as race and intelligence are problematic to discuss, but Eliezer kind of opened the door by talking about atheism as a test of rationality. Today, atheism is much more accepted, at least in the West, so it's not as good as a test. That naturally leads to the question as to what our taboos are in America in the 21st century.

comment by Sarokrae · 2011-09-27T11:47:40.622Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Just a short note, since I posted on a different branch in detail: what matters isn't the absolute magnitude of diversity within the group itself, but the difference in magnitude of the differences within and the differences between the groups you compare.

So you can make a fairly diverse set {mice, elephants and rhinos}, as a sample of mammals that are grey-brown, and compare them on some attribute, say size, with some other set. It would be a clear contrast with the a set containing three diverse species of bacteria, somewhat less clear next to a set containing three species of unrelated reptiles, and probably not a sensible comparison against some arbitrary three mammals that are orange-brown. You can form true conclusions in all three comparisons, but I'm asking whether all of those conclusions are useful.

ETA: What I don't know, which stops me from forming a strong opinion on the matter, is how big the genetic variation within the group we're calling "white" is. It could be that white people are a very closely related group, in which case it would be useful to investigate a statement like "the group we call "white" are, on average, one of the groups of humans which have higher IQ. As a result they have higher average IQ than the much more diverse group of we call "black"."

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-09-27T16:01:27.915Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Just a short note, since I posted on a different branch in detail: what matters isn't the absolute magnitude of diversity within the group itself, but the difference in magnitude of the differences within and the differences between the groups you compare.

I disagree. For example, imagine that Group A is Loxodonta Africana Africana and Group B is "worms"

It's both meaningful and true to assert that members of Group A are larger than members of Group B.

comment by Nick_Tarleton · 2011-09-26T23:31:16.316Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The problem with discussing racial differences is that when people say "black", they're already making inherent assumptions about genetics. "Black" incorporates an incredible amount of genetic diversity, far more than the label "white".

I don't see why this is necessarily a problem. For example, if I observed that generally speaking, the South is warmer than Minnesota, I would be correct even though the South incorporates a lot more geographic diversity than Minnesota.

More usefully put, blacks are paraphyletic.

Of course, this hardly affects the extremely general point about IQ differences and ideology.

comment by [deleted] · 2011-09-26T16:20:57.935Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There are for more genetic variations within racial groups than between them, if you're willing to count "black" as a racial group.

Nailed it. Racial groups are an idea a few centuries old; we've had a functional understanding of genetics for less than a hundred years.

Long before we had any ability to group people by ancestry in a reliable way, a bunch of distinct populations were grouped by the people of a tiny corner of the globe according to nothing more salient than skin color, and by the fact they often lived hunter-gatherer lifestyles (viewed by the Europeans as unconscionably primitive no matter how happy and prosperous the people themselves were) or low-tech agricultural and pastoralist ones (viewed similarly, insofar as industrializing European populations considered those lifestyles representative of ancestral, earlier times). A whole bunch of these peoples wound up colonial subjects; any intergroup strife between them or conditions they considered normal but Europeans found backward was used to. These marginalized, conquered, exploited peoples did pretty much what marginalized, conquered, exploited peoples anywhere and anytime have done in that situation: their cultures, lifeways, institutions and so on fragmented under the strain, existing tensions amplified, resources became increasingly scarce for the majority, and access to health and wealth plummeted as they went from their own former economies to the bottom rung of another civilization's.

The Europeans with decisionmaking power largely looked at all this and concluded that the members of this group were a sorry lot and perhaps conquest was better for them than leaving them to their own devices. In some places throughout the greater colonial Eurosphere, they were still legal to own as property until relatively recently.

Then, long after their marginalized status had had centuries to take root, someone discovers the basis for genetic inheritance, and a comparitively short time after, that the populations grouped as "black" (which includes a huge number of quite-distinct groups in Africa, South Asia, Southeast Asia and Australia as well as their descendant diasporas elsewhere) are the single most diverse human subgroup on the planet. Oops.

sarcasm Well, no matter -- they clearly haven't done as well on the world stage as European-descended whites, and why are you getting upset that we'd want to ask why? It must be genetic, we've got centuries of evidence that these people just don't do as well! /sarcasm

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2011-09-26T16:28:40.597Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm not sure I agree with your view of colonialism. Europeans did not uniformly judge all of the non-white peoples they encountered so it's not just a matter of ethnic chauvinism.

More importantly, none of what you said changes the facts that (1) there is a group of people in the world known as "blacks"; (2) there is a group of people in the world known as "whites"; (3) there is a large an intractable difference in intelligence between these groups; and (4) it's reasonable to ask whether genetics might play a significant role in this gap.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2011-09-26T16:52:14.497Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm not sure I agree with your view of colonialism.

What specific historical details do you contest?

Europeans did not uniformly judge all of the non-white peoples they encountered so it's not just a matter of ethnic chauvinism.

But they did pretty-uniformly judge the peoples they grouped into the category "black", which just to be clear is the group I specified and the group you're talking about too.

(1) there is a group of people in the world known as "blacks";

Who were originally grouped long ago, on the basis of the exceedingly superficial detail of skin color, a trait that turned out to be a red herring since they don't form a "natural group" in the sense that was assumed originally.

(2) there is a group of people in the world known as "whites";

See previous, with the added note that this level of grouping didn't take as thoroughly or as readily outside the colonies.

(3) there is a large an intractable difference in intelligence between these groups;

Disagreed. There is a large, thus-far intractable difference in performance on IQ tests between these groups; we do not concur as to what IQ tests are measuring, let alone the reasons for that.

and (4) it's reasonable to ask whether genetics might play a significant role in this gap.

But, given what we now know about the genetics of the groups in question, it's privileging the hypothesis to treat "blacks" as a natural group as opposed to a socially-constructed one, and given the many other plausible hypotheses not contradicted by evidence (and the data about historical power asymmetries in their interactions) it's hardly as primarily or all-consumingly interesting to focus on genetics, when there are so many other relevant factors that turn out not to be undermined by biology.

Just because the genetic evidence has come in does not mean that centuries of racism vanished overnight, and the idea of blacks as a natural group and the differences between them and whites as attributable to genetic factors are quite a bit older than our understanding of what genetics even was. It's no surprise they're still kicking around, influencing white intellectual types who've never personally been on the oppressed side of the equation and can't easily understand what all the fuss is about and why people might get so angry that they're still trying to talk about it in those terms...

Replies from: FAWS, brazil84
comment by FAWS · 2011-09-26T17:19:24.310Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I agree that the idea of skin-color defined races as the units you should look for genetic variation between is unhelpful in the context of pure science, but if you politically define all sub-par outcomes compared to the privileged group that are not caused by genes (or something else politically defined as untouchable) as needing to be fixed you need to know about genetic differences between politically defined groups to make sensible decisions.

comment by brazil84 · 2011-09-26T17:35:24.604Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

But they did pretty-uniformly judge the peoples they grouped into the category "black", which just to be clear is the group I specified and the group you're talking about too.

I apologize, I thought you were referring to non-whites all over the world when you talked about distinct populations being grouped by skin color.

Who were originally grouped long ago, on the basis of the exceedingly superficial detail of skin color, a trait that turned out to be a red herring since they don't form a "natural group" in the sense that was assumed originally.

Well what is the criteria for deciding if a group of people form a "natural group"? And what difference does it make if they are a "natural group" or not?

For example, I could divide the world into 3 races as follows:

(1) Ethnic Swedes plus anyone who was born in Maine;

(2) Ethnic Japanese plus anyone who was born in Sri Lanka; and

(3) Everyone else.

Now one could observe that members of Race 1 are more likely to have blue eyes than members of Race 2 and ask whether the difference is genetic. The answer would be yes even though the races have been defined in a completely arbitrary manner.

There is a large, thus-far intractable difference in performance on IQ tests between these groups; we do not concur as to what IQ tests are measuring,

I disagree, I think it's pretty clear that IQ tests measure intelligence. But perhaps it's not something which needs to be resolved, because one can simply ask whether the IQ gap between blacks and whites is due in large part to genetic differences.

natural group as opposed to a socially-constructed one,

Again, what is the criteria for deciding whether you have a "natural group" or a "socially-constructed one"?

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2011-09-26T18:17:39.044Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I apologize, I thought you were referring to non-whites all over the world when you talked about distinct populations being grouped by skin color.

"Black" has been used to refer to indigenous peoples of Subsaharan Africa, many parts of Asia, and Australia. Even some South American groups were once classed as "black."

Well what is the criteria for deciding if a group of people form a "natural group"?

Genetic relatedness, which I hope you'll agree is kind of relevant when discussing genetics.

For example, I could divide the world into 3 races as follows:

Irrelevant; I'm talking about how different groups were actually defined in history, not about the many arbitrary ways which one could choose to split up the world's human population.

Now one could observe that members of Race 1 are more likely to have blue eyes than members of Race > 2 and ask whether the difference is genetic. The answer would be yes even though the races have been defined in a completely arbitrary manner.

One could also observe that members of Race 2 in your scheme are more likely to eat a lot of rice than members of Race 1, and ask whether the difference is genetic. The answer would be no, even if the answer to some other possible question might be yes. People in Sri Lanka plus ethnically Japanese people tend to eat more rice due to history and local circumstances (the agricultural civilizations that most influenced them were rice-farming ones), not innate characteristics that predispose them to a diet high in rice.

I disagree

You disagree that we disagree? I'm afraid I have to disagree with that.

I think it's pretty clear that IQ tests measure intelligence.

Right, as I said: we disagree on that point; if you continue to assume it in your arguments with me you will not be inherently more-convincing because I believe your argument rests on flawed premises. I might be wrong about that, but my own priors do not concur with yours, and you won't get me to update mine by merely reasserting yours.

Replies from: Jack, brazil84
comment by Jack · 2011-09-26T19:01:06.816Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I really recommend you look through the discussion on this subject from Spring 2010 (the ancestors and distant cousins of this thread) to make sure that a) the people you are going back and forth with are likely to argue honestly and productively on this subject and b) your contributions aren't repeating facts or myths that have already been covered many times before.

For obvious reasons, comments on this subject should be in the upper 10-20% of Less Wrong comments in terms of evidence cited, intellectual honesty, tone, grammar etc.

comment by brazil84 · 2011-09-26T19:33:57.995Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Genetic relatedness, which I hope you'll agree is kind of relevant when discussing genetics.

I don't understand this response. I am asking how one decides if a group is a "natural group" or a "socially-constructed" group. Simply answering "genetic relatedness" doesn't answer the question. I prefer not to guess at what you mean.

Irrelevant; I'm talking about how different groups were actually defined in history

Then I don't understand your argument. I thought you were arguing that (1) the group known as "blacks" are defined in an arbitrary manner; and therefore (2) it's not legitimate to claim that the black/white IQ gap has a large genetic component.

What exactly are you arguing?

One could also observe that members of Race 2 in your scheme are more likely to eat a lot of rice than members of Race 1, and ask whether the difference is genetic. The answer would be no, even if the answer to some other possible question might be yes.

I agree 100%. The point is that it's possible to define a "race" in a completely arbitrary manner; observe that 2 races are different; and reasonably ask whether the difference might be caused in whole or in part by genetics.

You disagree that we disagree?

I disagree with your claim about IQ tests and intelligence, but it's a separate issue.

comment by Jack · 2010-03-15T20:44:48.883Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Anyone know if there is a racial IQ gap between blacks and whites in the UK?

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2011-01-06T20:34:43.756Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/education/6176070.stm

Googling the answer appears to be yes. There quite a lot of sources on this, but I wanted to give a news story to show that this is already apparently a source of public concern in the country.

comment by Morendil · 2010-03-16T11:39:59.701Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Can you make an effort to state in more detailed terms what it would mean to find that "genetics play a significant role in the black/white IQ difference", in other words what precise predictions this theory makes? (And more precisely, what predictions it makes that distinguish it from the predictions of alternative theories, such as "environmental differences resulting from e.g. discrimination play a significant role in the black/white IQ difference".)

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-16T12:15:25.797Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I responded to your question here:

http://fortaleza84.wordpress.com/2010/03/16/the-race-and-iq-question/

Replies from: Morendil
comment by Morendil · 2010-03-16T12:25:43.436Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Not really. Of that (relatively short) post, the only part that counts as a prediction is "you see it pretty much everywhere in the United States and the rest of the world; further, various attempts to eliminate this gap have failed". And this is compatible with a non-genetic explanation: environmental in African countries, and from discrimination in rich countries. Attempts at eliminating other kinds of discrimination (e.g. gender) have also been less than successful.

How does a world in which the causal origin of the black/white IQ gap is genetic look different from a world in which that gap has a different explanation?

Replies from: mattnewport, brazil84
comment by mattnewport · 2010-03-16T16:09:33.115Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Attempts at eliminating other kinds of discrimination (e.g. gender) have also been less than successful.

I'd imagine there's a pretty strong correlation between belief that race differences are largely innate and belief that gender differences are largely innate. Your point is unlikely to change any minds on either side of the issue.

Replies from: Morendil
comment by Morendil · 2010-03-16T16:30:16.474Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'd imagine there's a pretty strong correlation between belief that race differences are largely innate and belief that gender differences are largely innate.

Assuming there is such a correlation, what kind of thinking would you expect it relies on?

What we really need to see, if this issue is to be approached in a Bayesian manner, is a fully laid-out hypothesis about the causal pathways that go from genes to race to intelligence to IQ, and which of these pathways bypass environmental causal links. If we do have this and are in fact approaching the issue in a Bayesian manner, then success or lack thereof in eliminating gender discrimination can be rigorously treated as evidence.

If someone has not formalized their hypothesis so as to make it testable, then their thinking is anyway of too low a grade to reach reliably correct conclusions based on the evidence, and it does not matter what evidence they look at, they'll end up right or wrong purely by chance.

comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-16T18:20:28.520Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It seems you did not read my entire post.

Look again more carefully.

Replies from: Morendil
comment by Morendil · 2010-03-16T18:38:07.216Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I read the entirety of your post at the time you first advertised it here, and I'm less than impressed by your implication that I wasn't careful then.

Your later expansion adds no new prediction beyond what I already conceded in the grandparent counts as a prediction. I am already on record as stating that non-genetic explanations can adequately account for the observations you report. See also this comment.

I am disinclined to spend much more time arguing the issue with you. I'll sit back and let others participate if they wish.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-16T18:52:55.887Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I read the entirety of your post at the time you first advertised it here, and I'm less than impressed by your implication that I wasn't careful then.

:shrug: I told you that I responded to your question and proceeded to give you a link. I suppose I should have explicitly told you that I had edited the post to respond to your question.

I am already on record as stating that non-genetic explanations can adequately account for the observations you report.

Of course they can, just like you can use circles and lots of epicycles to model the orbits of planets.

ETA: I edited my post again to respond to your argument.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-16T19:13:21.074Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I love the epicycle metaphor and plan to use it in the future, but it's not like there have never been ''overly simple'' explanations of phenomena in the past, either. Phlogiston, for example.

I believe what Morendil et al. wanted was closer to this degree of analysis.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-16T23:33:40.963Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think we need to specify what is meant by the phlogiston hypothesis. Fundamentally, the idea is that the burning of different materials, as well as processes like rusting, are all the same process. Which is basically correct when you think about it. Phlogiston is really the absence of oxygen from substances which can react with oxygen.

That said, I agree that it's possible for a hypothesis to be too simple. It's just that an overly simple hypothesis wears its flakiness on its sleeve . . . one can usually think up counter examples pretty easily. Which usually then starts the epicycle game.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-16T23:41:49.403Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Please respond to the second paragraph.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-16T23:50:18.152Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm not sure what your point is. If he wants me to link to studies and articles, he can ask me. Before I did that, I would want to know what exactly he is disputing.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-17T00:34:27.924Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Imagine I proposed that pretty people were more likely to carry genes for sociopathy. Ask yourself what kind of evidence it would take to convince you of this claim. Use that as a reference for the amount of evidence you should present for the claim that "a signifcant amount of the black/white difference in cognitive abilities is genetic in origin."

Replies from: Nick_Tarleton, Alicorn, brazil84
comment by Nick_Tarleton · 2010-03-17T00:49:38.512Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The prior probability would be much lower in this case. Pretty and non-pretty people don't form historically separated populations, and attractiveness isn't known to be correlated with numerous non-superficial genetic differences the way race is (e.g. genetic diseases).

Replies from: wnoise, RobinZ
comment by wnoise · 2010-03-17T06:20:13.206Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Pretty and non-pretty people don't form historically separated populations,

They don't have to be physically separated to be reproductively separated. I think there is some segregation on attractiveness, but not that much.

attractiveness isn't known to be correlated with numerous non-superficial genetic differences the way race is (e.g. genetic diseases).

Of course it is! There is a huge correlation with health, often revealed through things like parasite and disease resistance.

comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-17T01:07:00.545Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Those points are true, but I stand by my advice. I don't believe the difference in the amount of evidence required is tremendous, and it is a natural tendency among humans to underestimate this amount in any case.

comment by Alicorn · 2010-03-17T00:36:00.761Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I agree with this as a commensurate claim, but I'm curious about where the specific example came from.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-17T00:42:39.260Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I made it up to be commensurate - it has no visible basis in evidence. I could try to reverse-engineer the details of my thought-processes, if you like.

Replies from: mattnewport, Alicorn
comment by mattnewport · 2010-03-17T00:54:42.193Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

it has no visible basis in evidence.

Are you sure? The Sociopath Next Door: The Ruthless Versus the Rest of Us

How do we recognize the remorseless? One of their chief characteristics is a kind of glow or charisma that makes sociopaths more charming or interesting than the other people around them. They’re more spontaneous, more intense, more complex, or even sexier than everyone else, making them tricky to identify and leaving us easily seduced.

I don't know how much scientific evidence there is to back up the claims in this book but I remembered hearing about it when I read your post.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-17T01:28:19.386Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Hmm. My remark appears to have been overly strong.

It has no publicly-known scientifically-rigorous basis in evidence - it may be true, but it's not widely claimed to be. This is still sufficiently like unto brazil84's claim to be comparable.

comment by Alicorn · 2010-03-17T00:44:18.198Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I would indeed so like, if it's not too much trouble.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-17T01:21:02.677Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

First of all, I wanted to create a claim which was similar in scope, strength, and kind. Pretty people are probably no more common than black people in the First World; the proposed difference is not an on-or-off switch, but a statistical distinction; and it relates to genetic effects on personality.

Second, I wanted it to be similarly provocative to brazil84's claim. It is widely considered bad to call people stupid; it is widely considered bad to call people sociopaths.

Third, it is not inconceivable that someone could draw the conclusion. Numerous studies have shown that pretty people are considered better people than ugly people given the same actions; therefore it is possible for pretty people to get away with being worse.

Fourth, brazil84 is likely not to believe it is true - and, in fact, likely to believe it is unlikely. The point of the exercise is to suggest something which would require strong, non-obvious evidence to convince, precisely because the people brazil84 seeks to convince demand strong, non-obvious evidence.

comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-17T00:44:39.863Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Imagine I proposed that pretty people were more likely to carry genes for sociopathy.

Am I allowed to assume that pretty people are far more sociopathic than others by pretty much every measure of sociopathy, and even from simple observation? And that prettiness is known to be 100% genetic in origin? And that sociopathy is known to be strongly influenced by genes?

Replies from: Alicorn, RobinZ
comment by Alicorn · 2010-03-17T00:49:38.716Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Only if you also assume that there are many robust factors with long histories contributing to do the following:

1) Encourage you to think of pretty people as an out-group

2) Strongly bias you towards considering garden-variety not-niceness in pretty people indicative of sociopathy, while doing no such thing about garden-variety not-niceness in ugly people

3) Prompt pretty people to act more sociopathic in a variety of circumstances due to psychological factors working on them

4) Make examples of pretty sociopaths dramatically more accessible in media and public cached thoughts than examples of ugly sociopaths or pretty non-sociopaths

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-17T02:11:46.889Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

In that case, the proof which would convince me is if the sociopathy gap were universal and intractable in time and space while the factors you list were not.

comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-17T01:00:32.435Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Those variables are not changed in this hypothetical - the only variable that changes is that I propose that "pretty people are more likely to carry genes for sociopathy" in all seriousness, rather than counterfactually.

Replies from: brazil84
comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-17T02:13:16.770Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Those variables are not changed in this hypothetical

I think you are saying "yes," in which case the proof which would convince me is if the sociopathy gap were universal and intractable.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-17T02:29:16.253Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think you are saying "yes," [...]

No, I am not. I don't know how to explain it - what I am trying to describe is the number and variety of bits of evidence you need to overwhelm the beliefs of those who are disagreeing with you here. You need to present the kind of proofs which would convince you that something you currently doubt for good reasons, something which is not a simple slam-dunk "this happens" but a complicated "the statistical distributions have different means and variances" claim, is decisively true.

The example is of less than zero importance - it's the standards of evidence I am trying to describe.

comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-15T20:30:56.303Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't have a clue either way.

comment by Nick_Tarleton · 2010-03-15T19:35:10.893Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It is obvious that going into an affective death spiral against genetically-based racial differences in intelligence is very common and speaks poorly of rationality. It is not obvious (at least from most people's, or my, knowledge base) that significant differences of that kind exist.

comment by byrnema · 2010-03-17T00:48:28.760Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There's something I want to say here that I think is really important to be said, but I'm having trouble finding the words. Please paraphrase and augment my message in a more coherent direction, if you can figure out how to, but what I want to say is along these lines:

I think it is really important that we bring up the fact that the statement we're arguing about is fundamentally racist and treating this question as just a question of fact lends way too much respectability to the question. I mean, who cares if one genetic group has a higher average IQ than another genetic group? It's NOT like discussing the third digit of pi, and not just because it's more complex.

I'm afraid we're offending minority groups reading this site and I feel acutely embarrassed by the possibility that we'll bring the subject up, dabble in it, and then won't argue carefully enough or fully enough because we don't have the resources, subtlety or interest. People will come here and think that Less Wrong doesn't really care. I realize that people in these threads are providing arguments, but they seem too calm and impartial, given the issues involved.

Replies from: wedrifid, wedrifid, juliawise, brazil84, JackChristopher, lessdazed, None
comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-18T04:32:45.247Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

People will come here and think that Less Wrong doesn't really care. I realize that people in these threads are providing arguments, but they seem too calm and impartial, given the issues involved.

You mean not appearing to have been mind-killed is a bad thing?

Replies from: gregconen, anon895, byrnema
comment by gregconen · 2010-03-18T04:40:27.437Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You mean not appearing to have been mind-killed is a bad thing?

Welcome to the world. Sanity is not always valued so highly here as you might be used to.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-18T04:47:39.182Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Welcome to the world.

Don't confuse preference with prediction.

Sanity is not always valued so highly here as you might be used to.

Where else have I been where sanity is valued more highly and how do I get back to it?

Replies from: gregconen
comment by gregconen · 2010-03-18T04:52:33.935Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I see my joke fell flat.

In the world at large, sanity is valued much less than it is here at lesswrong. Absurd as it sounds, many people would value righteous indignation above rational debate, or even above positive results.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-18T05:02:39.119Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I see my joke fell flat.

See the recent discussion on jokes with Rain. The joke implication missed.

Absurd as it sounds, many people would value righteous indignation above rational debate, or even above positive results.

I almost wish that did sound absurd.

comment by anon895 · 2011-09-24T18:50:13.898Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You mean conspicuously not displaying the emotion that should fit the facts sends a signal that it's not present and that you possibly don't think it should be, a position that isn't exactly unheard of in the present world?

comment by byrnema · 2010-03-18T15:45:50.072Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I guess I'm missing the humanitarian aspect; facts don't exist in a vacuum and the "question of fact" we're considering has already cut reality into an absurd slice of state space. Given the world we live in, I would like to see some solidarity with a discriminated group before we dive into answering an ill-posed question willy-nilly.

It seems to me that there are so many foundational questions we'd need to consider first.

What is intelligence? Who gets to define intelligence? Could we possibly measure intelligence in an accurate non-culturally-skewed way? If we could define intelligence, what would its dimension be (i.e., how many parameters would we need to specify it)?

Should the multi-dimensional measure of intelligence be assigned according to a person's peak potential, or their average potential? If measures of peak potential verses range of potential vary independently from person to person, how would we compare two people? In general, how do we compare two multi-dimensional distributions that don't have the same shape?

What is the value of asking about the result due to genetics in particular given that it is practically impossible to separate genetic and environmental effects? Consider:

(i) without the effects of cultural selection maintaining the different populations, genetic meanings of 'black' and 'white' would quickly become meaningless

(ii) even if someone imagined they were controlling for genetics by looking at cross-racial adoptions, a lot of cultural selection has already occurred in the biological mother's choice of partner and with environmental effects during gestation (there is already a large health gap between mothers of each race, and if the child was given up for adoption, the care during gestation may be an influencing factor)

(iii) Genetics is a result of environmental selection anyway, and it might be non-sensical to compare distributions that are not in equilibrium.

Given that the question is so complex and ill-posed you have to ask why the question is being asked. What exactly would be irrational about not wanting to glibly admit (socially) if one group has a higher IQ than another group, if it was possible to know it? Is it irrational to not want to entertain a racist agenda? Is it irrational to find it quite troubling that someone you're talking to would want to discuss the issue of whether one race is inferior to another race, for any reason? I understand that we can't avoid 'truth' just because it is troubling, but what kind of 'truth' are we pursuing here? I don't think we're qualified to answer this last set of questions. We're reductionists, and need to keep in mind that some issues are so complex there's no way to currently address them without being greedy.

Replies from: None, Morendil, MarkusRamikin, wedrifid, wedrifid, None, PhilGoetz, Roko
comment by [deleted] · 2010-03-22T05:00:49.386Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It seems like you're trying to torture the answer you want into the question.

comment by Morendil · 2010-03-18T16:01:53.160Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't think we're qualified to answer this last set of questions.

We're qualified to inquire into any topic that seems worthy of curiosity.

There seems to be much convergent evidence that people who self-identify as "black" tend to test more poorly on some standard measures of cognitive ability than do people who self-identify as "white", and I don't think acknowledging that makes someone racist.

I'm in violent agreement with you that a) self-identification as a member of some ethnic group is a cultural phenomenon, not obviously related to any "natural kinds" or empirical clusters, b) standard measures of cognitive ability are a very poor proxy for what we may generally think of as "competencies", whereby individual humans contribute value to the world, c) it's unclear even if the 'genetic' claim were established as fact what influence it should have on social policies.

If we think about a) clearly enough we might be able to dissolve the confusing term "race" and that seems perhaps a worthy goal. If we think about b) clearly we might be able to dissolve the confusing term "intelligence" and its cortege of mysterious questions, and if we think about c) clearly enough the mysterious questions of ethics.

Isn't that what this site has been about all along?

Replies from: byrnema, PhilGoetz
comment by byrnema · 2010-03-18T16:12:57.258Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Thank you for helping to frame this. I believe I can clarify my position now as the following: I'm afraid it is unethical to dive into the relationship between (a) and (b) if we can gauge in advance we are going to be unsuccessful (culturally, politically, real-world-wise) with (c). Let's stick with working on (a), (b) and (c) in the abstract before we dive into a real-world example for which even our discussion will have immediate personal and socio-political consequences.

(Or let's work on (c) first. This is what I mean by facts not existing in a vacuum.)

comment by PhilGoetz · 2011-09-26T02:17:24.819Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There seems to be much convergent evidence that people who self-identify as "black" tend to test more poorly on some standard measures of cognitive ability than do people who self-identify as "white", and I don't think acknowledging that makes someone racist.

Yes, it does, by definition. If you disagree, define racism in a way such that someone who believes different races have different distributions of attributes is not racist.

The problem is we have two meanings of "racist". One is "a person who believes the distribution of traits differs among races". The other is, roughly, "a person who hates members of other races". Most people believe these are equivalent.

Replies from: Emile, Morendil, wnoise
comment by Emile · 2011-09-26T15:26:40.670Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The problem is we have two meanings of "racist". One is "a person who believes the distribution of traits differs among races". The other is, roughly, "a person who hates members of other races". Most people believe these are equivalent.

I agree with what you mean, but I'm not sure the demarcation line between the two is very sharp, especially for non-nerds who don't overthink the issue.

Our brains store information as rough summaries, and don't always separate the value judgement from the characteristics. I'm not sure that there's a big difference between the mental representations for "X has such-and-such negative characteristic" and "I don't like X".

comment by Morendil · 2011-09-26T07:27:49.315Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'll pass on playing definitional games. What are we arguing about?

comment by wnoise · 2011-09-26T02:38:53.942Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The first is a singularly useless definition satisfied by everyone. Everyone believes that the distribution of skin color differs between black people and white people.

I'd propose a third definition: "someone who treats different people differently based on their race."

Replies from: JoshuaZ, PhilGoetz
comment by JoshuaZ · 2011-09-26T02:49:08.699Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Suggested alternate that captures what I think Phil means by the first definition "a person who believes the distribution of traits differs among races in a way that matters in some deep sense." That doesn't make it much more precise but I think it captures what he is trying to say in terms of your objection.

comment by PhilGoetz · 2011-09-27T02:01:25.987Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Everyone believes that the distribution of skin color differs between black people and white people.

I think this makes the first definition a singularly useful one, because people who think about it and try to be consistent must either find some way in which skin color is a qualitatively different kind of property than every other property people have, or they must admit they are racists.

Replies from: wnoise
comment by wnoise · 2011-09-27T02:54:17.413Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It's useful as a polemical tool, not useful in describing the ordinary meaning of the word, that describes actual clusters of common characteristics observed out in the world. I'm uninterested in using definitions constructed for polemical purposes instead of describing empirically observed clusters.

comment by MarkusRamikin · 2011-09-26T08:09:25.115Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

One thing I'm afraid of is that the forces of political correctness would only permit inquiring into sensitive topics as long as the questions are framed and definitions (of things such as "intelligence") redefined to such a state, that it's not possible to get a politically incorrect answer, facts be damned.

Is it irrational to find it quite troubling that someone you're talking to would want to discuss the issue of whether one race is inferior to another race, for any reason?

I don't know if it's "irrational", but I find it troubling when someone wishes to discourage inquiring - for any reason, at that! - into some topic. Whenever that happens, I smell a conflict between free inquiry and a moral fashion. It's pretty obvious to me which side I should take there...

Yes, some topics are more dangerous than others, more politically loaded or likely to offend or difficult to reduce. But to me it also means they are promising. Widely held views on such a topic are at least somewhat likely to prove incorrect.

I don't think we're qualified to answer this last set of questions.

We're not qualified, and we never will be, and we shouldn't ever hope or try to be?

comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-19T00:18:36.088Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't believe that (i), (ii) and (iii) are real reasons. In fact, I think your real reasons may be better in as much as they are normative and I probably accept them in a somewhat milder form.

comment by wedrifid · 2011-09-26T09:39:27.708Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Is it irrational to find it quite troubling that someone you're talking to would want to discuss the issue of whether one race is inferior to another race, for any reason?

I don't know about that. I just know that it has the instrumental consequence of me holding the 'you' in question in utter contempt. I pretty much write off people as intellectually irrelevant unless I have reason to believe that their epistemic incompetence is an isolated event.

The people with the advocated flaw of thought should be expected to be extremely prejudiced. Because they are obliged to do... what's it called again? When you be sexist or racist or otherwise discriminate because you think it makes things fair? Affirmative action. That's the one. You have to take affirmative action whenever there is a difference in performance because it couldn't possibly be due to actual individual merit. If a basketball team has a greater proportion of black people than would be representative of the population it is because they are racist.

Oh, and I should expect them to conclude that Ethiopians are all drug cheats. Because their success is a statistically implausible sampling from a fair distribution.

This isn't to say that I encourage bringing up the subject of racial inequalities when it is not immediately relevant. The times I can recall holding people in contempt is if they speak up on the subject and declare equivalence (contrary to evidence), speak up and condemn anyone who doesn't make their own error or when people comment on a decision that relies on the forbidden epistemic question as a premise as though their opinion has any meaning. Because that is just, well, evil.

EDIT: Oh, wow! I just noticed that the grandparent is me! Hi Wedrifid_2010! What comment brought me back here again?

comment by [deleted] · 2011-09-26T04:13:03.670Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Upvoted because you have stumbled upon the issue with all of these seemingly-abstract discussions of race and IQ.

You don't have to deny that IQ is something measurable or that it has correlates with other things (both personal traits, and life outcomes) to be unwilling to take at face value that what IQ is measuring can best be described as "general intelligence." Context is of massive importance here.

The focus on genetics is especially problematic, but I suspect that reflects a prevailing subconscious attitude that IQ is pretty much just that: a measure of your general intelligence. Most of the people on this site are probably not poor, not women (though that ratio seems to be changing, I daresay it's still nothing like even) not members of a racial minority in their country (I'm guessing the vast majority here are either "white" colonials in North America or Australia, or else Western Europeans), probably not disabled in a highly-visible way...

In short, these issues are just abstract to them, so they will tend to have very few "buttons" around it except around being seen as bigoted towards people who are.

As to the question itself, you've nailed the issue when you say:

Given that the question is so complex and ill-posed you have to ask why the question is being asked. What exactly would be irrational about not wanting to glibly admit (socially) if one group has a higher IQ than another group, if it was possible to know it? Is it irrational to not want to entertain a racist agenda? Is it irrational to find it quite troubling that someone you're talking to would want to discuss the issue of whether one race is inferior to another race, for any reason? I understand that we can't avoid 'truth' just because it is troubling, but what kind of 'truth' are we pursuing here?

comment by PhilGoetz · 2011-09-26T02:29:15.991Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

...

comment by Roko · 2010-05-03T00:04:16.214Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I can hear the Race-IQ question screaming as Byrnema applies her methods to it:

No! Please! Anything but the Dark Side Epistemology! I'll tell you anything you want! Einstein was black! AAARGH!

comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-18T04:18:46.539Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Consider the point Brazil was making in the context, by making the claim more realistically comparable now to making the "no God" claim some time ago.

I think it is really important that we bring up the fact that the statement we're arguing about is fundamentally [religiously intollerant] and treating this question as just a question of fact lends way too much respectability to the question.

I would expect similar social pressure for the God question historically (in a god-denying but PC heavy context). It seems to me that the comparison is an accurate one.

comment by juliawise · 2011-09-24T16:48:19.348Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It matters to me as a person considering adopting children.

comment by brazil84 · 2010-03-17T02:21:18.185Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I mean, who cares if one genetic group has a higher average IQ than another genetic group?

For purposes of this discussion, the reason I care is that the racial IQ gap is the big taboo of our age just as the existence of God was the big taboo at some point in the past (and still is to a certain extent).

The real test for whether or not somebody is a "cheap credit" skeptic will necessarily involve inflammatory issues, it seems to me.

Replies from: orthonormal
comment by orthonormal · 2010-03-22T06:01:52.417Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The real test for whether or not somebody is a "cheap credit" skeptic will necessarily involve inflammatory issues, it seems to me.

Wow, yeah. This suggests another Umeshism to me:

If you haven't horrified or offended anyone you care about, you're not a genuine skeptic.

(It goes without saying that the inverse of this statement is false.)

comment by JackChristopher · 2010-03-18T03:56:26.469Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I agree, byrnema. Speaking that way is status lowering.

Talking matter-of-factly about things that the other person finds displeasing or offensive.

It makes people feel bad. So it's no surprise site stumbler (from certain groups) are bound to sprint. But that wouldn't prove they couldn't talk controversials.

Side note: I have a mixed background.

comment by lessdazed · 2011-09-24T21:13:12.193Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm afraid we're offending minority groups reading this site

There is probably a substantial population of people who are minorities and more offended by your projection of them as emotionally fragile and thin skinned, if you'll pardon the expression.

Replies from: byrnema
comment by byrnema · 2011-09-26T01:02:08.319Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I've meditated on this comment, and have sorted this out: your comment appears to be raising the question, in a particularly non-face-saving way, of whether this conversation is offensive.

Because if it is offensive, then I can surely regret offending. If it isn't offensive, only then would I be projecting 'emotional fragility and thin-skinned-ness'.

I would like to point out the obvious, that if it turns out to not be offensive, then this only means that I am emotionally fragile and thin-skinned, a persona I'm happy to wear if it gives me liberty to speak out earlier than otherwise. I speak again of the discomfort I feel of 'speaking out' towards the end of this comment. I'm not sure where it comes from but it's not really a fear of being emotionally fragile. Rather, it's the confusion of not knowing where to draw the line, and looking for a line to be crossed, and wondering if the line was crossed already and you should already have said something or say something stronger.

I would guess (charitably, I hope) that you expect that any carefully measured, rational discussion of any issue should not be offensive.

However, from previous experience I simply don't trust this site to have this conversation. My prejudice is that in particular commenters here are overall too naive to notice, or too apathetic to respond appropriately, to the ways evil introduces itself into these intended rational conversations.

Humans are humans are humans everywhere. We have this potential for evil when we try to convince ourselves we're superior to another group of humans. The next step is rationalize things being different for that group of people. We've already been there, for a long time, with minorities. Things are better but they're still bad and humans are humans are always humans. I'll skip enumerating examples of the blatant racism I've encountered in my life. There's way to much hatred going on to pretend that this is 'just a question', and there is too much potential for abuse -- even if the conversation really is rational, which I believe might be possible in a closed discussion here -- due to the public nature of the conversation.

My point isn't that this question is particularly taboo (I think it's rather absurd, actually) or that a rational discussion isn't possible. I really think there are other steps that need to be taken first, for example, beginning with a panel of people specifically educated in the appropriate topic (social justice? I've no idea) to moderate and make the correct disclaimers regarding the intention of the discussion. I think we (including myself certainly, I have continuously felt extremely uncomfortable speaking out due to being so inarticulate and uninformed) are just butchering the topic, applying a hack-saw willy-nilly to a set of issues that needs some care, considering.

Replies from: PhilGoetz, lessdazed
comment by PhilGoetz · 2011-09-26T02:04:12.363Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I would guess (charitably, I hope) that you expect that any carefully measured, rational discussion of any issue should not be offensive.

Why would anyone expect that?

What does it mean to be offended? How is it different from being insulted? Is an insult that is true not an insult?

Replies from: Emile
comment by Emile · 2011-09-26T15:13:40.802Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Relevant: The Nature of Offense.

As you may have guessed by now, I think the answer is status. Specifically, to give offense is to imply that a person or group has or should have low status. Taking offense then becomes easy to explain: it’s to defend someone’s status from such an implication, out of a sense of either fairness or self-interest.

Seems to match this case perfectly.

comment by lessdazed · 2011-09-26T21:34:15.158Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I would guess (charitably, I hope) that you expect that any carefully measured, rational discussion of any issue should not be offensive.

Offensiveness is not a property of a discussion, it's a property of a relationship between an action like speech or a discussion and a person, the offended person. For every discussion, there are possible minds who would be offended by it.

superior

Error: word undefined. Any definition implicates not only a theory of facts of the world but also a theory of values.

There's way to much hatred going on

Why do you speak primarily of hatred, rather than of other emotions, or of thoughts, or of consequences? For example, it is possible to feel hated while actually being despised, envied, or not thought of at all; one can only infer another's emotions, it's an unsure thing.

make the correct disclaimers regarding the intention of the discussion.

Your enemies are not innately evil. When you infer only one meaning from someone's speech, it is not necessarily what they meant, and the notion both the listener and the speaker may have that the speech only had one meaning is a failure of inferential distance. These are the most important disclaimers.

comment by [deleted] · 2011-09-26T03:59:49.948Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm afraid we're offending minority groups reading this site and I feel acutely embarrassed by the possibility that we'll > bring the subject up, dabble in it, and then won't argue carefully enough or fully enough because we don't have the resources, subtlety or interest.

Frankly, "offending" is almost the wrong thing to worry about here. No amount of spinning people's beliefs here on LW would make it less apparent to most non-White people visiting the site that the ideas and goals on display here are skewed by the site's existing demographics.

There is serious, entrenched bias in this site's population around matters racial. I am willing to make a bet that greater than 75 percent of this site's membership is White or from some European majority ethnic group; their perspectives on what racism even is are affected by their experiences with it, and I daresay most people here have very little experience with racism.

Take the struggle to even define what it is downthread. Is it hating people of other skin colors? Is it acknowledging that skin color differences exist? Or only that there might be clusters of humanity grouped by some kind of shared trait?

Those definitions have very little to do with how racism is actually experienced by people of color in the US (it is difficult to even speak of this in a global context, since different regions of the globe have different experiences with colonialism, their diaspora and indigenous populations have different experiences of marginalization in different places). In the real world, it's more complicated than that.

In the US population, white people's ancestors were mostly settlers and colonists from abroad. But black people's ancestors were mostly brought over involuntarily as property, not as people. Most East Asian families that came here a long time ago were barely-tolerated migrant workers welcome for their labor, but distrusted by the white population, unable to become citizens and unable to access many of the social networks open to whites only. Don't even get me started on what Native populations faced during the first couple centuries (or even within the last one -- how many people on this site realize it was still common practice for Indian Health Service doctors to perform involuntary sterilization on Native women when they came in for unrelated health complaints, or to give birth?) .

Not all white people wound up rich, but just being seen as white meant a greater chance of access to all kinds of social and wealth-creating opportunities (great example: The Homestead Act and westward expansion -- basically not open to non-whites, reliant upon government funds and promises of newly-conquered or even still-owned Indian land). Not all of them saw the statistical benefit turn to their favor specifically, but those those who did more reliably had something to pass on to their descendants, meaning their descendants got to start with that much more in their favor. And because white people were the numerical majority and cultural majority (in terms of being the group that the largest number of media outlets, service providers, marketing types, politicians and so on were aiming to serve, represent, sell to or satisfy) this country's society and culture have built up to be focused around the needs, resources, ambitions, desires and so on of an assumedly-white populace. They're the mainstream. They're the normal against which anything else is seen as an alternative.

This has compound effects as the generations go by. Poverty is every bit as inheritable as wealth, and for a much larger proportion of non-whites than whites, that's what they'll be born to. Poverty impacts health, opportunities for work and education, the social networks to which you can reasonably expect access, access to income, how hard you have to work to make ends meet, and a whole host of other things. This is before you get into active bigotry -- and while today it's hard to get away with signalling active bigotry in a mainstream context, it's still trivial in practice to get away with many forms of unstated, even subconscious discrimination, conscious or not.

I'm outlining only a very small portion of the picture here -- understanding how majority vs minority social positioning can affect your life seems to be very difficult for members of the majority, probably because on an individual level you're all just living your lives and are acclimated to your own context. That context shapes your worldview in many subtle ways, and leads to many biases that are non-obvious to many members of this site (indeed, I fully expect the noise-to-signal ratio here to get bad in short order, though I hope I'm wrong about that).

So, yeah, you do have a point that the cavalier discussion of racial IQ differentials is probably a bit unseemly for a group probably composed mostly of white USians, Australians, Canadians and Europeans and tends to signal some things that may be offputting to people of color -- but trust me, those things are going to come through abundantly anyhow.

(And yes, for the record, seeing race-and-IQ-discussions carried out on this site is just painful; but then it seems like so many people here tend to view IQ as primarily-genetic, whereas I tend to view it as more a measure of proficiency at functioning in an industrialized, highly-individualistic, mostly-urban capitalist society. Most of the people here wouldn't last a day in a hunter-gatherer's world; it is darn convenient that your idea of "general intelligence" is skewed towards the challenges you face in your own everyday life!)

Replies from: JoshuaZ
comment by JoshuaZ · 2011-09-26T04:11:18.935Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So, this is well written and does bring up some valid points. But there are some serious issues:

First, your comment about defining racism misses the point: The issue there was specifically whether individuals are being racist and what that means. You seem to be arguing that that might not be terrible relevant. But that doesn't undermine that discussion at all.

Another issue is that there a large set of minorities which have succeeded quite well in the US despite having had serious issues in the past. The Chinese and the Jews are excellent examples (the second curiously enough seems to be overrepresented here.)

so many people here tend to view IQ as primarily-genetic, whereas I tend to view it as more a measure of proficiency at functioning in an industrialized, highly-individualistic, mostly-urban capitalist society.

This confuses me in that you seem to be arguing that ability to function in an "industrialized, highly-individualistic, mostly-urban capitalist society" must not be genetic. But all the time traits which evolved in one context turn out to be relevant in a new environment. Incidentally, there's a fair bit of evidence that conscientiousness matters as much if not more than IQ for actually succeeding in modern societies. (See e.g. this paper).

Replies from: None, None
comment by [deleted] · 2011-09-26T04:20:32.504Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

First, your comment about defining racism misses the point: The issue there was specifically whether individuals are being racist and what that means.

I think it's sort of important to understand what Property X is before we can meaningfully argue about whether a given case specimen has Property X, let alone whether it's meaningful to group them in Reference Class X. Isn't it putting the cart before the horse to do it the other way?

Another issue is that there a large set of minorities which have succeeded quite well in the US despite having had serious issues in the past. The Chinese and the Jews are excellent examples (the second curiously enough seems to be overrepresented here.)

The Chinese and the Jews have hard remarkably different outcome distributions, and Jews in the US generally fit into the "white" category these days (and have for a long time). I'd avoid over-presuming on the amount of success Chinese-Americans have had, too -- see the Model Minority Stereotype, and consider that for most Asian Americans they've only enjoyed comparable gains to many whites at the cost of having to work two to four times harder to achieve it.

Even then, I'd still hardly call Chinese Americans included in mainstream-society; they're still predominantly seen as "other" by whites except insofar as they assimilate.

comment by [deleted] · 2011-09-26T04:24:14.809Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What I'm arguing is that most people here seem to view IQ as "general intelligence" rather than context-specific functional level, and I don't think that's warranted. If you mean the latter when you say IQ, then we agree that far, but I haven't found it safe to assume that here.

Assuming we do agree on that point, I'd add that as to whether it's primarily genetic, I am skeptical, and while I would not call the question inherently uninteresting, I think it's been poorly-framed and doesn't warrant anything like the level of attention it receives compared to the many other questions that could be asked. The specific questions that seem to occur to people and their level of interest strikes me as very skewed.

comment by Psychohistorian · 2010-03-15T22:25:08.386Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There's an additional issue of subtlety that isn't addressed here. People will typically reveal "improper" views by starting small and seeing if their audience is sympathetic, not because they are irrational, but because they aren't stupid and they care about consequences.

That is, if I'm in some highly religious town, I'm not going to open my conversation with, "So, this whole God thing makes about as much sense as Santa Claus, am I right?" I'm going to open with, "You know, there's something about the story of Job that just doesn't sit right with me," or something else small, safe, and exploratory.

Replies from: Shae
comment by Shae · 2010-03-16T14:05:16.315Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Agreed. There's another reason why people might give religion the "respect" of treating it worthy of debate, while not doing so with astrology. One might feel that religious people are taking their agendas into politics and school classrooms to the detriment of society in a way that astrologists are not, and might therefore give religionists the respect necessary to engage them in debate and hopefully change their minds.

comment by DonGeddis · 2010-03-16T22:06:06.886Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Proposed litmus test: infanticide.

General cultural norms label this practice as horrific, and most people's gut reactions concur. But a good chunk of rationality is separating emotions from logic. Once you've used atheism to eliminate a soul, and humans are "just" meat machines, and abortion is an ok if perhaps regrettable practice ... well, scientifically, there just isn't all that much difference between a fetus a couple months before birth, and an infant a couple of months after.

This doesn't argue that infants have zero value, but instead that they should be treated more like property or perhaps like pets (rather than like adult citizens). Don't unnecessarily cause them to suffer, but on the other hand you can choose to euthanize your own, if you wish, with no criminal consequences.

Get one of your friends who claims to be a rationalist. See if they can argue passionately in favor of infanticide.

Replies from: simplicio, Morendil, Eliezer_Yudkowsky, Alicorn, CronoDAS, taw, MichaelVassar, Clippy, Jack, Chrysophylax, lispalien, wedrifid, Strange7, Rain, Ishaan, CronoDAS, byrnema, FAWS
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-17T04:03:57.673Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Once you've used atheism to eliminate a soul, and humans are "just" meat machines, and abortion is an ok if perhaps regrettable practice ...

Kudos to you for forthrightness. But em... no. Ok, first, it seems to me you've swept the ethics of infanticide under the rug of abortion, and left it there mostly unaddressed. Is an abortion an "ok if regrettable practice?" You've just assumed the answer is always yes, under any circumstances.

I personally say "definitely yes" before brain development (~12 weeks I think), "you need to talk to your doctor" between 12 and 24 weeks, and "not unless it's going to kill you" after 24 weeks (fully functioning brain). Anybody who knows more about development is welcome to contradict me, but those were the numbers I came up with a few years ago when I researched this.

If a baby/fetus has a mind, in my books it should be accorded rights - more and more so as it develops. I fail to see, moreover, where the dividing line ought to be in your view. Not to slippery-slope you but - why stop at infants?

*(Also note that this is a first-principles ethical argument which may have to be modified based on social expedience if it turns into policy. I don't want to encourage botched amateur abortions and cause extra harm. But those considerations are separate from the question of whether infants have worth in a moral sense.)

Once you've used atheism to eliminate a soul, and humans are "just" meat machines...

This gave me a nasty turn, because probably the most annoying idea religious people have is that if we're "just" chemicals, then nothing matters. One has to take pains to say that chemicals are just what we're made of. We have to be made out of something! :) And what we're made of has precisely zero moral significance (would we have more worth if we were made out of "spirit"?).

I mean, I could sit here all day and tell you about how you shouldn't read "Moby Dick," because it's just a bunch of meaningless pigment squiggles on compressed wood pulp. In a certain very trivial sense I am absolutely right - there is no "élan de Moby Dick" floating out in the aether somewhere independent of physical books. On the other hand I am totally missing the point.

Replies from: DonGeddis, wnoise, None, gimpf
comment by DonGeddis · 2010-03-17T17:56:29.426Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Is an abortion an "ok if regrettable practice?" You've just assumed the answer is always yes, under any circumstances.

Sorry, you have a point that my test won't apply to every rationalist.

The contrast I meant was: if you look at the world population, and ask how many people believe in atheism, materialism, and that abortion is not morally wrong, you'll find a significant minority. (Perhaps you yourself are not in that group.)

But if you then try to add "believes that infanticide is not morally wrong", your subpopulation will drop to basically zero.

But, rationally, the gap between the first three beliefs, and the last one, is relatively small. Purely on the basis of rationality, you ought to expect a smaller dropoff than we in fact see. Hence, most people in the first group are avoiding the repugnant conclusion for non-rational reasons. (Or believing in the first three, for non-rational reasons.)

If you personally don't agree with the first three premises, then perhaps this test isn't accurate for you.

Replies from: gimpf, MugaSofer
comment by gimpf · 2010-03-20T09:35:50.039Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

But, rationally, the gap between the first three beliefs, and the last one, is relatively small. Purely on the basis of rationality, you ought to expect a smaller dropoff than we in fact see. Hence, most people in the first group are avoiding the repugnant conclusion for non-rational reasons. (Or believing in the first three, for non-rational reasons.)

Well, my comment from http://lesswrong.com/lw/1ww/undiscriminating_skepticism/1sek would probably be better here. I still dispute that argument, as I think this drop-off is justified, even for rationalists.

comment by MugaSofer · 2012-10-10T12:43:59.320Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So your point is that anyone who feels there is a moral difference between infanticide and abortion is irrational?

Because most pro-lifers already say that, in my experience.

comment by wnoise · 2010-03-20T05:42:30.459Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If a baby/fetus has a mind, in my books it should be accorded rights - more and more so as it develops. I fail to see, moreover, where the dividing line ought to be in your view. Not to slippery-slope you but - why stop at infants?

The standard answer is that at that point there is no longer a conflict with the rights of the women whose body the infant was hooked into. We don't generally require that people give up their bodily autonomy to support the life of others.

Replies from: simplicio, army1987, MugaSofer
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-20T07:00:19.814Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

We don't generally require that people give up their bodily autonomy to support the life of others.

The complication here is that a responsible, consenting adult tacitly accepts giving up her bodily autonomy (or accepts a risk of doing so) when she has sex. That's precisely the same reason men are required to pay child support even if they didn't wish for a pregnancy. (Yes, I see the asymmetry; yes, it sucks).

Case-by-case reasoning is probably a good thing in these circs, but unless the mother was not informed (minor/mental illness) or did not consent, then the only really tenable reason for a late-term abortion I can think of is health. In which case the relative weighing of rights is a tricky business, a buck I will pass to doctors, patients & hospital ethics boards.

Replies from: wnoise, thomblake
comment by wnoise · 2010-03-20T07:57:37.098Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

but unless the mother was not informed (minor/mental illness) or did not consent,

This is already a significant retreat from your previously stated position. ("not unless it's going to kill you" after 24 weeks)

The complication here is that a responsible, consenting adult tacitly accepts giving up her bodily autonomy (or accepts a risk of doing so) when she has sex.

That's a hell of an assertion. I don't really see any reason to accept it as other than a normative statement of what you wish would happen.

That's precisely the same reason men are required to pay child support even if they didn't wish for a pregnancy. (Yes, I see the asymmetry; yes, it sucks).

As you say, there is an asymmetry. Garnishing a wage is a bit different, and seems appropriate to me.

Case-by-case reasoning is probably a good thing in these circs,

Yes, it is, so long as it is reasoning rather than assertions that this case is different. We have to specify how it is different, and how those differences make a difference. The easiest way for me to do this is to use analogies. This is dangerous of course, as one must keep in mind that they can ignore relevant differences while emphasizing surface similarities.

So, in this case the relevant specialness you're calling out is that a risky activity was knowingly engaged in that created a person who needs life support for some time, as well as care and feeding far after that. So I'm going to try to set up an analogous situation, but without sex being the act (which I think is irrelevant) coming into the mix. This will also mean another difference: the person will not be "created" except metaphorically from a preëxisting person. I personally don't see how that would be relevant, but I suppose it is possible for others to disagree.

Suppose a person is driving, and crashes into a pedestrian. This ruptures the liver of the pedestrian. A partial transplant of the driver's liver will save the pedestrian's life. Is the driver expected to donate their liver? Should it be required by law?

Note that the donor's death rate for this operation is under 1%. When we compare this to the statistics for maternal death, we see it is similar to WHO's 2005 estimate of world average of 900 per 100,000, though developed regions have it far lower at 9 per 100000.

Replies from: simplicio, BarbaraB, gimpf, Strange7, Jiro
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-20T21:09:11.358Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This is already a significant retreat from your previously stated position. ("not unless it's going to kill you" after 24 weeks)

Is it? I suppose it is. I contain multitudes. No, honestly, I just didn't name all my caveats in the previous post (my bad). Clearly there are two people's interests to take into consideration here. Also, as I noted, that was an ethical rather than legal argument. I don't have any strong opinions about what the law should do wrt this question.

That's a hell of an assertion. I don't really see any reason to accept it as other than a normative statement of what you wish would happen.

I don't think it's unreasonable, although you're right it's not a fact statement. But I think it's a fairly well-established principle of ethics & jurisprudence that informed consent implies responsibility. Nobody has to have unprotected sex, so if you (a consenting adult) do so, any reasonably foreseeable consequences are on your shoulders.

Suppose a person is driving, and crashes into a pedestrian. This ruptures the liver of the pedestrian. A partial transplant of the driver's liver will save the pedestrian's life. Is the driver expected to donate their liver? Should it be required by law?

It's a reasonably good analogy I guess. There are two separate questions here: what should the law do, and what should the driver do. I don't think anybody wants the law to require organ donations from people who behave irresponsibly. However, put in the driver's shoes, and assuming the collision was my fault, I would feel obligated to donate (if, in this worst-case scenario, I am the only one who can).

There is a slight disanalogy here though, which is that an abortion is an act, whereas a failure to donate is an omission. It's like the difference between throwing the fat guy on the tracks and just letting the train hit the fat guy.

Replies from: gimpf
comment by gimpf · 2010-03-20T21:26:42.569Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

which is that an abortion is an act, whereas a failure to donate is an omission

I'm curious to the reasoning on what the difference is, except maybe that, no better options being available (it seems) we use omission as the default strategy when consequences are not within our grasp (as watching and gathering more information will at least not worsen your later ability to come to a conclusion, with the only caveat that then it may be too late to act).

comment by BarbaraB · 2012-04-16T10:53:58.919Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"Suppose a person is driving, and crashes into a pedestrian. This ruptures the liver of the pedestrian. A partial transplant of the driver's liver will save the pedestrian's life. Is the driver expected to donate their liver? Should it be required by law?"

For organ transplantations, the body biochemistries of the organ donor and acceptor must be somewhat compatible, otherwise the transplanted organ gets rejected by the immune system of the acceptor. The best transplantation results are between the identical twins. For unrelated people, there are tests to estimate the compatibility of organs, and databases. A conclusion: The driver is not generally expected to donate their liver, because in the majority of the cases, it would not help the victim.

Imagine an alternate universe, where all the human bodies are highly compatible for transplantation purposes.

  • Yes, I believe it might become a social norm in this alternate universe, or even a law, that the driver must donate their liver to the victim.
comment by gimpf · 2010-03-20T09:56:31.630Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Suppose a person is driving, and crashes into a pedestrian. This ruptures the liver of the pedestrian. A partial transplant of the driver's liver will save the pedestrian's life. Is the driver expected to donate their liver. Should it be required by law?

This depends mostly upon whether you think that law should enforce doing actions which save lives with insignificant risk to the actor.

If yes, then this (quite special) case is clear-cut, given a few assumptions (liver matches and is healthy, is not already scheduled for another similarly important surgery, etc. etc.). However, at least as far as I know, this is not the case.

And I doubt it will be soon (simply did not think about whether it should yet). Just an example: In Austria by default all deceased people are potential donors -- you have to file an explicit opt-out. This is quite different than for instance in Germany. Therefore we have a relatively good "source" of organs. However, though sometimes under discussion, Germany has not changed its legislation, even with the possibility to compare the numbers. Maybe for religious reasons, or freedom of whomever. I didn't follow it that close...

If such simple matters (we are talking about already medically dead persons) do not change within years, what can be expected for such, really fundamental, decisions?

Replies from: simplicio
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-20T21:11:24.969Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Just an example: In Austria by default all deceased people are potential donors -- you have to file an explicit opt-out.

I am very much in favour of this sort of policy; it would do no end of good.

Replies from: Douglas_Knight
comment by Douglas_Knight · 2010-04-22T06:26:41.252Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Just an example: In Austria by default all deceased people are potential donors -- you have to file an explicit opt-out.

I am very much in favour of this sort of policy; it would do no end of good.

The effect of pretending to have opt-out organ donation is small. Austria is unique in really having opt-out organ donation (everywhere else, next of kin decide in practice), so it's hard to judge the effect, but it's not an outlier. In the 90s, Spain became the high outlier and Italy ceased being the low outlier, so rapid change is possible without doing anything ethically sensitive. graph. More Kieran Healy links here.

Replies from: BarbaraB
comment by BarbaraB · 2012-04-18T15:12:14.902Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

An interesting article.

"Reform of the rules governing consent is often accompanied by an overhaul and improvement of the logistical system, and it is this—not the letter of the law—that makes a difference. Cadaveric organ procurement is an intense, time-sensitive and very fluid process that requires a great deal of co-ordination and management. Countries that invest in that layer of the system do better than others, regardless of the rules about presumed and informed consent."

In our country, we have an opt-out donation, but I guess the relatives can have a veto. I have seen a physician on TV, who said some scary things openly. Our doctors are standardly overworked and underpayed. Imagine a doctor, who, towards the end of the long shift, sees a patient dying with some of the organs intact. If he decides to report the availability of the organs, he creates an extra, several hours work for himself and others, paperwork included. There is either none or very little financial reward for reporting the organs, I do not remember exactly. They might feel heroic for the first couple of times, but, eventually, they resign and stop making these reports, after they work long enough. I have seen this on TV cca 3 years ago, do not know the current situation.

comment by Strange7 · 2013-12-14T05:35:40.635Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The driver could instead be made responsible for the victim's exact medical costs or some fraction thereof, in addition to any punitive or approximated damages. This would provide adequate incentive to seek out ways to reduce those costs, including but not limited to a voluntary donation on the part of the driver or someone who owes the driver a favor.

comment by Jiro · 2013-12-02T16:51:40.459Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

In the abortion example, the fetus 1) is created already attached and ending ongoing life support may not be the same as requiring that someone who is not providing it provide it, 2) needs life support for an extended period, and 3) can only use the life support of one person.

comment by thomblake · 2012-10-10T18:11:24.448Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The complication here is that a responsible, consenting adult tacitly accepts giving up her bodily autonomy (or accepts a risk of doing so) when she has sex.

The complication there is that on the standard view, one cannot give up one's bodily autonomy permanently. You cannot sell yourself into slavery. The pregnant person always has the right to opt-out of the contract.

Though the fetus would presumably be able to get damages. I guess those get paid to the next-of-kin.

Replies from: TheOtherDave
comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-10-10T18:35:35.396Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I guess those get paid to the next-of-kin.

Upvoted entirely for this line, which made me spit coffee when it finally registered.

comment by A1987dM (army1987) · 2013-10-06T03:05:31.737Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

In the first month of pregnancy, right, but in the seventh month you can Caesarean the baby out of the mother and put it into an incubator, can't you?

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2013-10-06T05:47:43.561Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Not without some risk to both, the exact amounts depending on the situation..

Replies from: army1987
comment by A1987dM (army1987) · 2013-10-06T05:53:38.492Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

(I'm assuming that by “some” you mean ‘larger than that of either abortion or natural childbirth’, otherwise it wouldn't be relevant. Right?)

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2013-10-06T09:21:14.261Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Smaller would be relevant too, for the opposite reason.

comment by MugaSofer · 2012-10-10T12:53:16.036Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

We don't generally require that people give up their bodily autonomy to support the life of others.

We don't?

In what situation, exactly, do we fail to do this? I can't think of any other real-world situation. I can imagine counterfactual ones, sure, but I'm fairly certain most people see those as analogies for abortion and respond appropriately.

Replies from: wnoise
comment by wnoise · 2012-10-10T15:43:31.558Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

We don't, for instance, require people to donate redundant organs, nor even blood. Nor is organ donation mandatory even after death (prehaps it should be).

What are some cases where we do require people to give up their bodily autonomy?

Replies from: TimS
comment by TimS · 2012-10-10T17:54:45.147Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Mandatory drug testing?

Replies from: wnoise
comment by wnoise · 2012-10-12T06:11:39.437Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That's the big one I can think of, and this usually arises in a very different context where it's easy to dehumanize those forced to take such tests: alleged criminals and children.

(Even in these contexts, peeing in a cup or taking a breathalyzer is quite a bit less severe than enduring a forced pregnancy. Mandatory blood draws for DUIs do upset a signifianct number of people. How you feel about employment tests and sports doping might depend on how you feel about economic coercion and whether it's truly "mandatory".)

comment by [deleted] · 2010-03-24T01:19:04.919Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

.

comment by gimpf · 2010-03-20T09:31:46.537Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Sidetrack:

When one chooses subjective experience of pain and pleasure as one basic necessity for the privilege of taken into account when deciding moral matters, and if one assumes that this privilege is only gradually applicable (i.e. the pain/pleasure experience of a dog is less vivid than that of a human, etc.), than the immediate right/wrongfulness of an action like abortion/infanticide with regard to the fetus/baby should correlate to similar decisions on pets.

simplicio:

I personally say "definitely yes" before brain development (~12 weeks I think), "you need to talk to your doctor" between 12 and 24 weeks, and "not unless it's going to kill you" after 24 weeks (fully functioning brain).

But, if, as I think, we also have a common ground by preferring consequentialist ethics, which also more or less leads to resolve "omission vs. act" as both being similary morally active, then one has to take into account that an abortion or infanticide will make it impossible for this person to develop, whereas a dog will never by itself, however long you wait, suddenly develop the vivid subjective experience of a human.

And then you have to take into account that consequentialism demands to take more factors into account, like the increase of bad-practice abortions and increased mental stress for many people.

DonGeddis:

Once you've used atheism to eliminate a soul, and humans are "just" meat machines, and abortion is an ok if perhaps regrettable practice ...

However, if you do take those matters into account, then the conclusion is not "bad, but OK because of some reasons we do not like", but simply "OK". Or not. Whatever conclusion you may come. And yes, it would probably a case-by-case decision. Extremely complicated, and given the nature of human thought probably more open to manipulation than one would like.

Then, when we have failed to simplify the method to determine the consequences, we fall back to a "practical simplification", and here a common line of thinking is: Well, there may not be a sharp line between a fetus and a newborn, but we have exactly one criterium we can count on (birth), and it is sufficiently similar to the "real thing" one can use this metric without having too much of a problem. And yes, it works, in practice, not too bad (when compared with other legislations).

comment by Morendil · 2010-03-17T09:15:06.088Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Time of birth serves as a bright line.

Replies from: ciphergoth
comment by Paul Crowley (ciphergoth) · 2010-03-17T10:15:21.308Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Very much agreed. This is also why we place much more moral value in the life of a severely brain-damaged human than a more intelligent non-human primate.

comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-17T18:31:14.530Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Despite some jokes I made earlier, things that could arguably depend on values don't make good litmus tests. Though I did at one point talk to someone who tried to convert me to vegetarianism by saying that if I was willing to eat pork, it ought to be okay to eat month-old infants too, since the pigs were much smarter. I'm pretty sure you can guess where that conversation went...

Replies from: ata, Psy-Kosh, ciphergoth, MugaSofer, None, Fallible
comment by ata · 2010-03-17T21:52:27.605Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm pretty sure you can guess where that conversation went...

You started eating month-old infants?

comment by Psy-Kosh · 2010-03-19T21:38:14.744Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Option zero: "There's an interesting story I once wrote..."

Option one: "Well then, I won't/don't eat pork. But that doesn't mean I won't eat any animals. I can be selective in which I eat."

Option two: "mmmmm... babies."

Option three: "Why can't I simply not want to eat babies? I can simply prefer to eat pigs and not babies"

Option four: "Seems like a convincing argument to me. Okay, vegetarian now." (after all, technically you said they tried, but you didn't say the failed. ;))

Option five: "actually, I already am one."

Am I missing any (somewhat) plausible branches it could have taken? More to the point, is one of the above the direction it actually went? :)

(My model of you, incidentally, suggests option three as your least likely response and option one as your most likely serious response.)

Replies from: Eliezer_Yudkowsky, Desrtopa, DanielLC
comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-19T22:59:15.320Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Well, not quite option two, but yes, "You make a convincing case that it should be legal to eat month-old infants." One person's modus ponens is another's modus tollens...

comment by Desrtopa · 2011-05-29T16:22:56.291Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I actually did a presentation arguing for the legality of eating babies in a Bioethics class.

And I don't eat pigs, on moral grounds.

comment by DanielLC · 2012-03-18T23:54:26.499Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Option six: "I was a vegetarian, but I'm okay with eating babies, and if pigs are just as smart, it should be okay to eat them too, so you've convinced me to give up vegetarianism."

This reminds me of the elves in Dwarf Fortress. They eat people, but not animals.

comment by Paul Crowley (ciphergoth) · 2010-03-18T09:00:14.346Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm imagining this conversation while you're both holding menus...

In seriousness, there are good instrumental reasons not to allow people to eat month-old infants that are nothing to do with greatly valuing them in your terminal values.

Replies from: Psy-Kosh
comment by Psy-Kosh · 2010-03-19T21:38:47.185Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Both menus being "vegetarian and non vegetarian" or "pork menu and baby menu"? :)

comment by MugaSofer · 2012-11-05T09:20:12.324Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That guy clearly asked you those questions in the wrong order.

  • Do you believe killing animals for food is OK?
  • Killing animals for food is the same as eating babies!
  • Do you believe killing babies for food is OK?

... is obviously going to activate biases leading to the defense of killing animals for food, whether by denying they are equivalent or claiming to accept killing children for food. Thus the chance of persuading someone eating babies is morally acceptable depends on how strongly you argue the second point.

However...

  • Do you believe killing babies for food is OK?
  • Killing animals for food is the same as eating babies!
  • Do you believe killing animals for food is OK?

... leads to the opposite bias, as if the listener cannot refute your second point they must convert to vegetarianism or visibly contradict themselves.

comment by [deleted] · 2010-03-24T01:09:42.111Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

this is sounding like a copout....

comment by Fallible · 2011-12-12T05:08:56.970Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It isn't a question of current intelligence, it's a question of potential. Pigs will never grow beyond human-infant-level comprehension. Human babies will eventually become both sapient and sentient.

Saying a baby and a pig can be considered equally intelligent is like saying a midget and an 11-year-old of the same height are equally likely to become basketball players.

Replies from: pedanterrific, Baughn
comment by pedanterrific · 2011-12-12T05:33:26.706Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

No, saying a baby and a pig can be considered equally intelligent is like saying a midget and an 11-year-old can be considered equally tall.

Replies from: matthew-milone
comment by Matt Vincent (matthew-milone) · 2022-05-06T20:10:06.491Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Doesn't this depend on whether one is referring to fluid intelligence or crystal intelligence? Human babies may have the same crystal intelligence as adult pigs, but they have much higher fluid intelligence.

I think what happened here is that the vegetarian failed to realize that the component of intelligence that people find morally significant is fluid, not crystal, and then he equivocated between the two. EY realized what was going on, even if subconsciously, which is why he trolled the vegetarian instead of disputing his premise. Finally, Fallible failed to pick up on the distinction entirely by assuming that "intelligence" always refers to fluid intelligence.

comment by Baughn · 2012-01-26T01:06:20.659Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

How about fertilized egg cells?

Caviar made from fertilized human egg cells, yum.

comment by Alicorn · 2010-03-16T22:19:07.826Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I like this test, with the following cautions:

The regrettability of abortion is connected to the availability of birth control, and so similarly, the regrettability of infanticide should be connected to the availability of abortion. A key difference is that while birth control may fail, abortion basically doesn't. I can think of a handful of reasons for infanticide to make sense when abortion didn't, and they're all related to things like unexpected infant disability the parents aren't prepared to handle, or sudden, badly timed, unanticipated financial/family stability disasters.

In either case, given that the baby doesn't necessarily occupy privileged uterine real estate the way a fetus must, I think it makes sense to push adoption as strongly preferred recourse before infanticide reaches the top of the list. Unlike asking a woman who wants an abortion to have the baby and give it up for adoption, this imposes no additional cost on her relative to the alternative.

Additionally, I think any but the most strongly controlled permission for infanticide would lead to cases where one parent killed their baby over the desire of the other parent to keep it. It seems obvious to me that either parent's wish that the baby live - assuming they're willing to raise it or give it up for adoption, and don't just vaguely prefer that it continue being alive while the wants-it-dead parent deal with its actual care - should be a sufficient condition that it live. I might even extend this to other relatives.

comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-16T23:20:27.313Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Basically, this is a variant on the argument from marginal cases; infants don't differ from relatively intelligent nonhuman animals in capabilities, so they ought to have the same moral status. If it's okay to euthanize your dog, it should also be okay to euthanize your newborn.

(The most common use of the argument from marginal cases is to argue that animals deserve greater moral consideration, and not that some humans deserve less, but one man's modus ponens is another man's modus tollens.)

Replies from: Jack, khafra, DonGeddis, Larks
comment by Jack · 2010-03-17T18:36:37.644Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

(The most common use of the argument from marginal cases is to argue that animals deserve greater moral consideration, and not that some humans deserve less, but one man's modus ponens is another man's modus tollens.)

Cerca 1792 after Wollstonecrafts A Vindication of the Rights of Women a philosopher name Thomas Taylor published a reductio ad absurdum/ parody entitled A Vindication of the Rights of Brutes which basically took Wollstonecrafts arguments for more gender equality and replaced women with animals. It reads more or less like an animal rights pamphlet written by Peter Singer.

comment by khafra · 2010-03-24T18:12:36.839Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Professor Mordin Solus solves marginal cases by refusing to experiment on any species with at least one member capable of Calculus, which is a bit different from criticism, "argument from species normality."

Replies from: wnoise
comment by wnoise · 2010-03-24T18:19:57.960Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

any species with at least one member capable of Calculus,

Any species with at least one member who has demonstrated to humans the capability of Calculus.

Replies from: PhilGoetz, Ishaan
comment by PhilGoetz · 2010-03-24T18:35:59.178Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So it's perfectly acceptable to use a time machine to gather your experimental subjects from before the 17th century.

Also, once a human solves the problem of friendly AI, aliens will stop abducting us and accept us as moral agents.

Replies from: khafra
comment by khafra · 2010-03-24T19:26:58.896Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That sounds like a reasonable conclusion--compared to an intelligence capable enough of introspection and planning to make a friendly AI, the overwhelming majority of my actions arise purely from unreasoning instinct.

comment by Ishaan · 2013-10-05T20:23:56.296Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Any species with at least one member who has demonstrated to humans the capability of doing calculus as per human notions of "doing calculus".

I don't remember the source, but I read a fiction somewhere in which an alien observed a few children playing catch. The alien commented on how impressed it was that they could do such sophisticated calculations so quickly at such a young age.

comment by DonGeddis · 2010-03-17T17:49:19.921Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Your parenthetical comment is the funniest thing I've read all day! The contrast with the seriousness of subject matter is exquisite. (You're of course right about the marginal cases thing too.)

comment by Larks · 2010-03-18T00:15:08.302Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

(The most common use of the argument from marginal cases is to argue that animals deserve greater moral consideration, and not that some humans deserve less, but one man's modus ponens is another man's modus tollens.)

This is a hand, this is an inviolate right to life...

comment by taw · 2011-07-23T10:51:07.545Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That's an amusing example because infanticide was extremely common among human cultures, so all good cultural relativists should be fine with this practice.

Usually there was a strong distinction between actually killing a baby (extremely wrong thing to do), and abandoning it to elements (acceptable). I'm not talking about any exotic cultures, ancient Greece and Rome and even large parts of Christian Medieval Europe practiced infant abandonment. There are even examples of Greek and Roman writers noting how strange it is that Egyptians and Jews never kill their children - perfect stuff for any cultural relativists. It was only once people switched from abandoning infants to elements to abandoning them at churches when it ceased being outright infanticide.

Anyway, pretty much the only reason babies are cute is as defense against abandonment. This shows it was never anything exceptional and was always a major evolutionary force. By some estimates up to 50% of all babies were killed or abandoned to certain death in Paleolithic societies (all such claims are highly speculative of course).

Infant abandonment is normal, and people should have the same right to abandon their babies as they always had. Especially since these days we just put them into orphanages. Choosing infanticide over abandonment is pretty pointless, so why do it?

A lot of sources can be easily found here: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Infanticide

Replies from: BarbaraB
comment by BarbaraB · 2012-04-16T10:31:08.321Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"Choosing infanticide over abandonment is pretty pointless, so why do it?"

How about infanticide as euthanasia ?

Replies from: taw
comment by taw · 2012-04-16T18:06:44.968Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Killing another living thing doesn't qualify as "euthanasia" if you do it for your benefit, not that being's.

By infant abandonment by giving it to an orphanage (it's not legal everywhere, but in a lot of countries it's perfectly legal and acceptable) you lose both your responsibility and your control over the baby, so you no longer have any right to do so.

And speaking of euthanasia, we really should seriously reban it. We pretty much know how to deal with even the most severe pain - very large doses of opiates to get rid of it, and large doses of stimulants like amphetamines to counter the side effects. War on Drugs is the reason why we don't routinely do this to people in severe pain.

We don't have a magical cure for depression, but if someone is depressed, they cannot make rational decisions for themselves anyway, so they cannot decide to kill themselves legitimately.

Once you cover these casese, there are zero legitimate arguments left for euthanasia.

Replies from: BarbaraB, Alicorn, None, wedrifid
comment by BarbaraB · 2012-04-18T12:31:29.410Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"Choosing infanticide over abandonment is pretty pointless, so why do it?" "Killing another living thing doesn't qualify as "euthanasia" if you do it for your benefit, not that being's."

  • Let me respond by a little story telling, without making a clear point. I am not proving You wrong, just sharing my personal experience. Warnings: depressive stories about ilnesses, probably bad reading.

I once was a friend with a boy with a progressive muscular dystrophy. It is a degenerative disease, where gradually, Your muscles stop working, and at the age of cca 20, most patients die, because they stop breathing. If You have heard great stories about people on the wheelchair getting adapted to their situation, well, here adaptation can be only shorterm, because next year, You might not be able of doing what you can do now. The pain was not excruciating but there was some, the body which is deprived of excercise gives You this feedback. If he had a bad dream at night, he could not turn to the other side (a very usual remedy, most people do it without even realizing). The boy had 2 suicide attempts, although, frankly, he did not really mean them. He would make phonecalls to his friends in the evening to relieve his pain - very unwelcome calls. I sometimes pretended not to be at home, and I know other people who did the same (We were in our twenties). Then, his desperation was deepened by feeling he is not loved. Once he was calling his psychologist, and caught her in the middle of a suicide attempt, poisoned by drugs - she repeated to him HIS previous statements from the previous phonecalls. I am not saying it was HIS fault, the lady clearly failed to safeguard the known risks of her profession (plus had other problems, departed partner etc.) I am just illustrating how hard it was sometimes to deal with him. (He called other people who saved her life, to close up this branch of the story). His parents took great care of him up to the level of their financial abilities, plus using the limited help of our government. There were frequent conflicts between him and his parents, though, and made him feel unloved, again. On the other hand, his parents were deeply religious and, knowingly, had another baby with the same genetic defect later, they did not choose abortion. The older boy has died at the age of 28, his life being surprisingly long.

This story clearly contains aspects, which were not optimized, the parents could have earned more money and bring more comforts to his lives, he could have gotten a personal assistant at night, more physiotherapy excercises, a better computer, some lectures how to deal with people and get a girlfriend (his desires were strong), he could have tried harder to develop his talents and get a job, which would make him feel useful to society. (We persuaded him to get a job eventually, phone operator, lasted 1 year or so). His friens, including me, could have worked harder on their emotional maturity. But, can You see all the energy and resources to make a misery somewhat better ?

Now let us see a different story, where the parents of a sick child became EXTREME optimizers. Watch the film Lorenzo's Oil (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorenzo%27s_Oil_%28film%29) or read about Lorenzo Odone (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lorenzo_Odone). Wonderful and admirable story. But can You see the end result, after You do all that is in Your power for Your baby ?

"Choosing infanticide over abandonment is pretty pointless, so why do it?" Abandoning a baby with a severe genetic defect at birth condemnes the baby to even lower quality of life in most government institutions, unless a millionaire chooses to adopt him.

I have a counterargument to my own reasoning right away - what if some parents killed their baby diagnosed with adrenoleukodystrophy (but with no developed symptomps yet) a year before Augusto and Michaela Odone invented the Lorenzo's Oil for their son ? Such parents would have lost a potentially healthy baby, the baby would lose a realistic chance to live their normal life...

I am not really trying to win this argument, just explaining, why I sometimes TOY with the idea of infanticide being not so immoral, and considering it a form of euthanasia.

Replies from: taw
comment by taw · 2012-04-18T19:11:54.146Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There's plenty of diseases we can now deal with quite well because we didn't infanticide or murder everyone who had them. This isn't a coincidence that a treatment is found, if we killed everyone with a disease there would be no search for treatment.

Replies from: thomblake, orthonormal
comment by thomblake · 2012-04-18T21:08:17.857Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Is this one of those "torture one person for 50 years" versus "deaths of millions" thought experiments?

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-04-18T21:28:20.585Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Is this one of those "torture one person for 50 years" versus "deaths of millions" thought experiments?

Easiest thought experiments ever?

Replies from: TheOtherDave
comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-04-18T22:13:11.912Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Would you rather be tortured for 3^^^3 years, or have a dust speck in your eye?

Replies from: wedrifid, Eliezer_Yudkowsky, None
comment by wedrifid · 2012-04-18T22:23:39.193Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Would you rather be tortured for 3^^^3 years, or have a dust speck in your eye?

If I use UDT2 can I choose 'both'?

comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2012-04-18T22:44:52.422Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This seems like a good "control" thought experiment to determine whether people are just being contrarian.

Replies from: Nornagest, thomblake, army1987
comment by Nornagest · 2012-04-18T22:48:46.345Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think you'd have to be a pretty unsubtle contrarian to answer that with "torture".

Replies from: TheOtherDave
comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-04-19T18:09:17.141Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

And yet, at least one person below did just that. Edit: ...but later asserted that had been a joke.

comment by thomblake · 2012-04-18T23:50:15.188Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think in this case you can drop the suffix and just say "being contrary".

comment by A1987dM (army1987) · 2012-04-19T17:13:11.891Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

More like, to determine whether people are paying any attention. (I once took an online personality test which included questions such as “I've never eaten before” to prevent people from using bots or similar to screw up their data.)

Replies from: ciphergoth
comment by Paul Crowley (ciphergoth) · 2012-04-20T06:51:41.678Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It's hard to get people to answer such things straightforwardly. I once included "Some people have fingernails" in a poll, as about the most uncontroversially true thing I could think of, and participants found a way to argue that it wasn't true - since "some" understates the proportion.

Replies from: army1987, shokwave
comment by A1987dM (army1987) · 2012-04-22T00:42:36.011Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Well... Some people does usually implicate ‘not all people, and not even all people except a non-sizeable minority’, but if we go by implicatures rather than literal meanings, X has fingernails (in contexts where everyone knows X is a human), in my experience at least, usually implicates that X's fingernails are not trimmed nearly as short as possible, since the literal meaning would be quite uninformative once you know X is a human.

comment by shokwave · 2012-04-20T08:08:16.410Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"There exists at least one X that ..." is what logicians have settled on as the most easily satisfiable and least objectionable phrasing.

comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-19T17:37:43.078Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That's not that easy, unless having a dust speck in my eye also entails my living for 3^^^3 years.

Replies from: thomblake, TheOtherDave, steven0461, army1987
comment by thomblake · 2012-04-19T18:23:21.673Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I nominate ABrooks as this month's contrarian.

comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-04-19T17:46:14.410Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Wait, what?

To clarify:
A = Dust speck in your eye, and your life is otherwise as it would have been without this deal.
B = 3^^^3 years of torture, followed by death.

Is that an easy choice for you?
If not, can you summarize your arguments in favor of choosing B?

Replies from: None, thomblake
comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-19T17:52:10.219Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If not, can you summarize your arguments in favor of choosing B?

Well, if I choose B, I'll be alive for a very large number of years. I'll be alive so long, that I expect that I'll get used to anything deployed to torture me. And I'll be alive so long, I'd need to study a fair amount of cosmology just to understand what my lifetime will involve, by way of the deaths and rebirths of whole universes or whatever. Some of that would be interesting to see.

The easy thought experiment would be dust speck vs. 3 years of torture followed by death. I think there, I'd go with the speck.

Replies from: Vaniver, Eliezer_Yudkowsky, TheOtherDave
comment by Vaniver · 2012-04-19T18:50:10.420Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'll be alive so long, that I expect that I'll get used to anything deployed to torture me.

Is this based on the experience of torture victims? I think that "get used to" would more closely resemble "catatonic" than "unperturbed." I don't think your ability to be interested would survive very long.

Replies from: siodine
comment by siodine · 2012-04-20T01:39:10.656Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I wonder if there's a case study of an individual that's been exposed to prolong torture. Probably have to look through Nazi and Japanese experiments.

comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2012-04-20T01:31:13.336Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

(takes deep breath)

AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAIIIIIEEEEEEEEEEEE

sorry, I just had to scream for a bit

Replies from: shminux, None
comment by shminux · 2012-04-20T03:47:19.546Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Them dust specks hurtin'?

comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-20T02:51:18.319Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I...um. Are you agreeing with me? Or did I say something stupid?

Replies from: siodine, RobinZ
comment by siodine · 2012-04-20T03:03:05.078Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think you can be confident that he's not agreeing with you.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-20T05:22:35.535Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I ask only that people disagree with me in such a way that my errors are corrected.

Replies from: siodine
comment by siodine · 2012-04-20T13:22:27.994Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
  • If you've acclimated to torture it's no longer torture.
  • If you've acclimated to torture the effects have likely left you with a life not worth living.
  • Torture isn't something you can acclimate yourself to in hypotheticals. E.g., the interlocutor could say "oh you would acclimate to water boarding, well then I'll scoop your brain out, intercept your sensory modalities, and feed you horror. but wait, just when you're getting used to it I wipe your memory."
  • All this misses the point of the hypothetical by being too focused on the details rather than the message. Have you told someone the trolley experiment and had them say something like "but I would call the police, or I'm not strong enough to push a fat man over" and have to reform the experiment over and over until they got the message?
Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-20T13:27:41.146Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Torture isn't something you can acclimate yourself to in hypotheticals....

This is a fair point. Though my response was very much intended to be a joke.

All this misses the point of the hypothetical by being too focused on the details rather than the message. Have you told someone the trolley experiment and had them say something like "but I would call the police, or I'm not strong enough to push a fat man over" and have to reform the experiment over and over until they got the message?

I think this is wrong: saying you'd yell real loud or call the police or break the game somehow is exactly the right response. It shows that someone is engaging with the problem as a serious moral one, and it's no accident that it's people who hear these problems for the first time that react like this. They're the only ones taking it seriously: moral reasoning is not hypothetical, and what they're doing is refusing to treat the problem hypothetically.

Learning to operate within the hypothetical just means learning to stop seeing it as an opportunity for moral reasoning. After that, all we're doing is trying to maximize a value under a theory. But that's neither here nor there.

Replies from: TheOtherDave, siodine, TheOtherDave
comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-04-20T14:36:32.175Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think this is wrong: saying you'd yell real loud or call the police or break the game somehow is exactly the right response. It shows that someone is engaging with the problem as a serious moral one,

It is not clear to me that that is a more "right" response than engaging with the problem as a pedagogic tool in a way that aligns with the expectations of the person who set it to me. Indeed, I'm inclined to doubt it.

In much the same way: if I'm asked to multiply 367 by 1472 the response I would give in the real world is to launch a calculator application, but when asked to do this by the woman giving me a neuropsych exam after my stroke I didn't do that, because I understood that the goal was not to find out the product of 367 and 1472 but rather to find out something about my brain that would be revealed by my attempt to calculate that product.

I agree with you that it's no accident that people react like this to trolley problems, but I disagree with your analysis of the causes.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-20T15:24:36.181Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It is not clear to me that that is a more "right" response than engaging with the problem as a pedagogic tool in a way that aligns with the expectations of the person who set it to me.

You called the trolly problem a pedagogic tool: what do you have in mind here specifically? What sort of work do you take the trolly problem to be doing?

Replies from: TheOtherDave
comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-04-20T15:41:10.064Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It clarifies the contrast between evaluating the rightness of an act in terms of the relative desirability of the likely states of the world after that act is performed or not performed, vs. evaluating the rightness of an act in other terms.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-20T17:39:11.247Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Okay, that sounds reasonable to me. But what do we mean by 'act' in this case? We could for instance imagine a trolly problem in which no one had the power to change the course of the train, and it just went down one track or the other on the basis of chance. We could still evaluate one outcome as better than the other (this must be the one man dying instead of five), but there's no action.

Are we making a moral judgement in that case? Or do we reason differently when an agent is involved?

Replies from: TheOtherDave
comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-04-20T19:03:57.284Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't know who "we" are.

What I say about your proposed scenario is that the hypothetical world in which five people die is worse than the hypothetical world in which one person dies, all else being equal. So, no, my reasoning doesn't change because there's an agent involved.

But someone who evaluates the standard trolley problem differently might come to different conclusions.

For example, I know any number of deontologists who argue that the correct answer in the standard trolley problem is to let the five people die, because killing someone is worse than letting five people die. I'm not exactly sure what they would say about your proposed scenario, but I assume they would say in that case, since there's no choice and therefore no "killing someone" involved, the world where five people die is worse.

Similarly, given someone like you who argues that the correct answer in the standard trolley problem is to "yell real loud or call the police or break the game somehow," I'm not sure what you would say about your own proposed scenario.

comment by siodine · 2012-04-20T13:39:40.324Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It shows that someone is engaging with the problem as a serious moral one

I think it shows someone is trying to "solve" a hypothetical or be clever, because with a trivial amount of deliberation they would anticipate the interlocutors response and reform. Moreover, none of this engages the point of the exercise for which you're free to argue without being opaque. E.g., "okay, clearly the point of this trolley experiment is to see if my moral intuitions align with consequentialism or utilitarianism, I don't think this experiment does that because blah blah blah."

Moreover, moral reasoning is hypothetical if you're sufficiently reflective.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-20T13:56:51.638Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Moreover, moral reasoning is hypothetical if you're sufficiently reflective.

Well, in what kinds of things does moral reasoning conclude? I suppose I would say 'actions and evaluations' or something like that. Can you think of anything else?

Replies from: siodine
comment by siodine · 2012-04-20T14:09:41.449Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Moral reasoning should inform your moral intuitions--what you'll do in the absence of an opportunity to reflect. How do you prepare your moral intuitions for handling future scenarios?

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-20T15:18:59.667Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Well, regardless of whether we have time to reflect or not, I take it moral reasoning or moral intuitions conclude either in an action or in something like an evaluative judgement. This would distinguish such reasoning, I suppose, from theoretical reasoning which begins from and concludes in beliefs. Does that sound right to you?

Replies from: siodine
comment by siodine · 2012-04-20T15:21:40.881Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

An evaluative judgement is an action; you're fundamentally saying moral reasoning has consequences. I agree with that, of course. I don't think it disguishes it from theorical reasoning.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-20T15:36:42.438Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

By 'action' I mean something someone might see you do, something undertaken intentionally with the aim of changing something around you. But when we ask someone to react to a trolly problem, we don't expect them to act as a result of their reasoning (since there's no actual trolly). We just want them to reply. So sometimes moral reasoning concludes merely in a judgement, and sometimes it concludes in an action (if we were actually in the trolly scenario, for example) that will, I suppose, also involve a judgement. Does all this seem reasonable to you?

Replies from: siodine
comment by siodine · 2012-04-20T16:15:39.825Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This would go quicker if you gave your conclusion and then we talked about the assumptions, rather than building from the assumptions to the conclusion (I think it's that you want to say hypotheticals produce different results than reality). But to answer your question, I don't think that giving a result to the trolley problem merely results in a judgement. I think it also potentially results in reflective equilibrium of moral intuitions, which then possibly results in different decisions in the future (I've had this experience). I think it also potentially affects the interlocutor or audience.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-20T17:34:39.277Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This would go quicker if you gave your conclusion and then we talked about the assumptions, rather than building from the assumptions to the conclusion.

I've already given you my conclusion, such as it is: not that hypotheticals produce different results, but that reasoning about hypotheticals can't be moral reasoning. I'm just trying to think through the problem myself, I don't have a worked out theory here, or any kind of plan. If you have a more productive way to figure out how hypotheticals are related to moral reasoning then I'm happy to pursue that.

But to answer your question, I don't think that giving a result to the trolley problem merely results in a judgement.

Right, but I'm just talking about the posing of the question as an invitation for someone to think about it. The aim or end result of that thinking is some kind of conclusion, and I'm just asking what kinds of conclusions moral reasoning ends in. Since we use moral reasoning in deciding how to act, I take it for granted that one kind of conclusion is an action: "It is right to X, and possible for me to X, therefore..." and then comes the action. When someone is addressing a trolly problem, they might think to themselves: "If one does X, one will get the result A, and if one does Y, one will get the result B. A is preferable to B, so..." and then comes the conclusion. The conclusion in this case is not an action, but just the proposition that "...given the circumstances, one should do X."

ETA: So, supposing that reasoning about the trolly problem here is moral reasoning (as opposed to, say, the sort of reasoning we're doing when we play a game of chess) then moral reasoning can conclude sometimes in actions, and sometimes in judgements.

Replies from: TheOtherDave, siodine
comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-04-20T19:24:08.408Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Suppose I sit down at time T1 to consider the hypothetical question of what responses I consider appropriate to various events, and I conclude that in response to event E1 I ought to take action A1. Then at T2, E1 occurs, and I take action A1 based on reasoning of the form "That's E1, and I've previously decided that in case of E1 I should perform A1, so I'm going to perform A1."

If I've understood you correctly, the only question being discussed here is whether the label "moral reasoning" properly applies to what occurs at T1, T2, both, or neither.

Can you give me an example of something that might be measurably different in the world under some possible set of conditions depending on which answer to that question turns out to be true?

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-21T01:12:30.459Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If I've understood you correctly, the only question being discussed here is whether the label "moral reasoning" properly applies to what occurs at T1, T2, both, or neither.

You've understood me perfectly, and that's an excellent way of putting things. I think there's an interpretation of those variables such that both what occurs at T1 and at T2 could be called moral reasoning, especially if one expects E1 to occur. But suppose you just, by way of armchair reasoning, decide that if E1 ever happens, you'll A1. Now suppose E1 has occured, but suppose also that you've forgotten the reasoning which lead you to conclude that A1 would be right: you remember the conclusion, but you've forgotten why you thought it. That scenario would, I believe, satisfy your description, and it would be a case in which your action is quite suspect. Not wholly so, since you may have good reason to believe your past decisions are reliable, but if you don't know why you're acting when you act, you're not acting in a fully rational way.

I think it would be appropriate to say, in this case, that you are not to be morally praised (e.g. "you're a good person", "You're a hero" etc.) for such an action (if it is good) in quite the measure you would be if you knew what you were doing. I bring up praise, just because this is an easy way for us to talk about what we consider to be the right response to morally good action, regardless of our theories. Does all this sound reasonable?

If what went on at T1 was fully moral reasoning, then no part of the moral action story seems to be left out: you reasoned your way to an action, and at some later time undertook that action. But if it's true that we would consider an action in which you've forgotten your reasoning a defective action, less worthy of moral praise, then we consider it important that the reasoning be present to you as you act.

And I take it for granted, I suppose, that we don't consider it terribly praiseworthy for someone to come to a bunch of good conclusions from the armchair and never make any effort to carry them out.

Replies from: TheOtherDave
comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-04-21T01:22:23.556Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'll point out again that the phrase "moral reasoning" as you have been using it (to mean praiseworthy reasoning) is importantly different from how that phrase is being used by others.

That aside, I agree with you that in the scenario you describe, my reasoning at T2 (when E1 occurs) is not especially praiseworthy and thus does not especially merit the label "moral reasoning" as you're using it. I don't agree that my reasoning at T1 is not praiseworthy, though. If I sit down at T1 and work out the proper thing to do given E1, and I do that well enough that when E1 occurs at T2 I do the proper thing even though I'm not reasoning about it at T2, that seems compelling evidence that my reasoning at T1 is praiseworthy.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-21T02:22:44.950Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If I sit down at T1 and work out the proper thing to do given E1, and I do that well enough that when E1 occurs at T2 I do the proper thing even though I'm not reasoning about it at T2, that seems compelling evidence that my reasoning at T1 is praiseworthy.

Sure, we agree there, I just wanted to point out that the, shall we say, 'presence' of the reasoning in one's action at T2 is both a necessary and sufficient condition for the action's being morally praiseworthy if it's good. The reasoning done at T1 is, of itself, neither necessary nor sufficient.

Replies from: TheOtherDave
comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-04-21T03:09:55.122Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't agree that the action at T2 is necessary. I would agree that in the absence of the action at T2, it would be difficult to know that the thinking at T1 was praiseworthy, but what makes the thinking at T1 praiseworthy is the fact that it led to a correct conclusion ("given E1 do A1"). It did not retroactively become praiseworthy when E1 occurred.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-21T14:42:02.752Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So you would say that deliberating to the right answer in a moral hypothetical is, on its own, something which should or could earn the deliberator moral praise?

Would you say that people can or ought to be praised or blamed for their answers to the trolly problem?

Replies from: TheOtherDave
comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-04-21T15:16:36.510Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I would say that committing to a correct policy to implement in case of a particular event occurring is a good thing to have done. (It is sometimes an even better thing to have done if I can then articulate that policy, and perhaps even that commitment, in a compelling way to others.)

I think that's an example of "deliberating to the right answer in a moral hypothetical earning moral praise" as you're using those phrases, so I think yes, it's something that could earn moral praise.

People certainly can be praised or blamed for their answers to the trolley problem -- I've seen it happen myself -- but that's not terribly interesting.

More interestingly, yes, there are types of answers to the standard trolley problem I think deserve praise.

comment by siodine · 2012-04-20T18:13:39.089Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

In case of a possible misunderstanding: I didn't mean to imply that moral reasoning is literally hypothetical, but that hypotheticals can be a form of moral reasoning (and I hope we aren't arguing about what 'reasoning' is). The problem that I think you have with this is that you believe hypothetical moral reasoning doesn't generalize? If so, let me show you how that might work.

Hmm, save one person or let five people die.

My intuition tells me that killing is wrong.

Wait, what is intuition and why should I trust it?

I guess it's the result of experience: cultural, personal, and evolution.

Now why should I trust that?

I suppose I shouldn't because there's no guarantee that any of that should result in the "right" answer. Or even something that I actually prefer.

Hmm... If I look at the consequences, I see I prefer a world in which the five people live.

And this could go on and on until you've recalibrated your moral intuitions using hypothetical moral reasoning, and now when asked a similar hypothetical (or put in a similar situation) your immediate intuition is to look at the consequences. Why is the hypothetical part useful? It uncovers previously unquestioned assumptions. It's also a nice compact form for discussing such issues.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-20T19:44:34.537Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

but that hypotheticals can be a form of moral reasoning (and I hope we aren't arguing about what 'reasoning' is).

We're not, and I understand. We do disagree on that claim: I'm suggesting that no moral reasoning can be hypothetical, and that if some bit of reasoning proceeds from a hypothetical, we can know on the basis of that alone that it's not really moral reasoning. I'm thinking of moral reasoning as the kind of reasoning you're morally responsible for: if you reason rightly, you ought to be praised and proud, and if you reason wrongly, you ought to be blamed and ashamed. That sort of thing.

Hmm... If I look at the consequences, I see I prefer a world in which the five people live.

This is a good framing, thanks. By 'on and on' I assume you mean that the reasoner should go on to examine his decision to look at expected consequences, and perhaps more importantly his preference for the world in which five people live. After all, he shouldn't trust that any more than the intuition, right?

Replies from: Hul-Gil, thomblake, TheOtherDave
comment by Hul-Gil · 2012-04-21T05:09:39.737Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm thinking of moral reasoning as the kind of reasoning you're morally responsible for: if you reason rightly, you ought to be praised and proud, and if you reason wrongly, you ought to be blamed and ashamed. That sort of thing.

Can't that apply to hypotheticals? If you come to the wrong conclusion you're a horrible person, sort of thing.

I would probably call "moral reasoning" something along the lines of "reasoning about morals". Even using your above definition, I think reasoning about morals using hypotheticals can result in a judgment, about what sort of action would be appropriate in the situation.

comment by thomblake · 2012-04-20T20:46:49.188Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm thinking of moral reasoning as the kind of reasoning you're morally responsible for: if you reason rightly, you ought to be praised and proud, and if you reason wrongly, you ought to be blamed and ashamed.

That can't be what people normally mean by "moral reasoning". Do you have a philosophy background?

I'm suggesting that no moral reasoning can be hypothetical

I don't see why that would be the case. Cheap illustration:

TEACHER: Jimmy, suppose I tell you that P, and also that P implies Q. What does that tell you about Q?
JIMMY: Q is true.
TEACHER: That's right Jimmy! Your reasoning is praiseworthy!
JIMMY: Getting the right answer while reasoning about that hypothetical fills me with pride!

Replies from: None, TheOtherDave
comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-21T02:25:25.685Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't see why that would be the case. Cheap illustration:...

You've taken my conditional: "If something is moral reasoning, it is something for which we can be praised or blamed" for a biconditional. I only intend the former. ETA: I should say more. I don't mean any kind of praise or blame, but the kind appropriate to morally good or bad action. One might believe that this isn't different in kind from the sort of praise we offer in response to, say, excellence in playing the violin, but I haven't gotten the sense that this view is on the table. If we agree that there is such a thing as distinctively moral praise or blame, then I'll commit to the biconditional.

comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-04-21T00:05:56.735Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I suspect ABrooks is continuing his tradition of interpreting "X reasoning" to mean reasoning that has the property of being X, rather than reasoning about X.

If I'm right, I expect his reply here is that your example is not of hypothetical reasoning at all -- supposing that actually happened, Jimmy really would be reasoning, so it would be actual reasoning. Sure, it would be reasoning about a hypothetical, but so what?

I share your sense, incidentally, that this is not what people normally mean, either by "moral reasoning" or "hypothetical reasoning.:"

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-21T02:30:40.210Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I suspect ABrooks is continuing his tradition of interpreting "X reasoning" to mean reasoning that has the property of being X, rather than reasoning about X.

It's not an interpretation, it's a claim. If something is reasoning about moral subject matter, then, I claim, it is the sort of thing that is (morally) praiseworthy or blameworthy. When we call someone bad or good for something they've done, we at least in part mean to praise or blame their reasoning. And one of the reasons we call someone good or bad, or their action good or bad, is an evaluation of their reasoning as good or bad. And praise and blame are, of course, the products of moral reasoning. And we do consider them to be morally valued: to (excepting cases of ignorance) praise bad people is itself bad, and to blame good people is itself good.

Now, the claim I'm arguing against is the claim that there is another kind of moral reasoning which is a) neither praiseworthy, nor blameworthy, b) does not result in an action or an evaluation of an actual person or action, and c) is somehow tied to or predictive of reasoning that is praiseworthy, blameworthy, and resulting in action or actual evaluation.

So I've never intended 'moral reasoning' to mean 'reasoning that is moral' except as a consequence of my argument. That phrase means, in the first place, reasoning about moral matters. Same goes for how I've been understanding 'hypothetical reasoning'. (ETA: though here, I can't see how one could draw a distinction between 'reasoning from a hypothetical' and 'reasoning that is hypothetical'. I'm not trying to talk about 'reasoning about a hypothetical' in the broadest sense, which might include coming up with trolly problems. I only mean to talk about reasoning that begins with a hypothetical.)

I am sorry if that hasn't been clear.

Replies from: TheOtherDave
comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-04-21T03:23:48.836Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If something is reasoning about moral subject matter, then, I claim, it is the sort of thing that is (morally) praiseworthy or blameworthy.

Er. Just to make sure I understand this: is "whether it's correct to put babies in a blender for fun" moral subject matter? If so, does it follow that if I am reasoning about whether it's correct to put babies in a blender for fun, I am therefore something that is reasoning about moral subject matter? If so, does it follow that I am the sort of thing that is morally praiseworthy or blameworthy?

When we call someone bad or good for something they've done, we at least in part mean to praise or blame their reasoning.

Sure, if I were to say "Sam is a bad person" because Sam did X, I would likely be trying to imply something about the thought process that led Sam to do X.

And one of the reasons we call someone good or bad, or their action good or bad, is an evaluation of their reasoning as good or bad.

I agree that it's possible for me to call Sam "good" or "bad" based on some aspect of their reasoning, as above, though I don't really endorse that usage. I agree that it's possible to call Sam's act "good" or "bad" based on some aspect of Sam's reasoning, although I don't endorse that usage either. I agree that it's possible to label reasoning that causes me to call either Sam or Sam's act "good" or "bad" as "good reasoning" or "bad reasoning", respectively, but this is neither something I could ever imagine myself doing, nor the interpretation I would naturally apply to labeling reasoning in this way.

And praise and blame are, of course, the products of moral reasoning.

That's not clear to me.

to (excepting cases of ignorance) praise bad people is itself bad,

That's not clear to me either.

and to blame good people is itself good.

That's definitely not clear to me.

So I've never intended 'moral reasoning' to mean 'reasoning that is moral' except as a consequence of my argument. That phrase means, in the first place, reasoning about moral matters.

Ah, OK. That was in fact not clear; thanks for clarifying it.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-21T14:48:14.516Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Just to make sure I understand this: is "whether it's correct to put babies in a blender for fun" moral subject matter?

Not necessarily, it may or may not be taken up as a moral question. We can, for example, study just how much fun it is and leave aside the question of its moral significance. If you're reasoning about whether or not it's right in some moral sense to put babies in a blender, then you're doing something like moral reasoning, but if this were purely in the hypothetical then I think it would fall short. If you were seriously considering putting babies in a blender, then I think I'd want to call it moral reasoning, but in this case I think you could obviously be praised or blamed for your answer (well, maybe not praised so much).

and to blame good people is itself good.

That's definitely not clear to me.

Sorry, typo. I mean't 'to blame good people (or to blame people for good actions) is bad.' It shows some praiseworthy decency to appreciate the moral life of, I donno, MLK. It shows real character to stick up for a good but maligned person. Likewise, it shows some shallowness to have praised someone who only appeared good, but was in fact bad. And it shows some serious defect of character to praise someone we know to be bad (I donno, Manson?).

I agree that it's possible for me to call Sam "good" or "bad" based on some aspect of their reasoning, as above, though I don't really endorse that usage.

What's the difference between agreeing here, and endorsing the usage?

Replies from: TheOtherDave
comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-04-21T15:59:28.831Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

OK, so just to be clear, you would say that the following are examples of moral reasoning...

  • "It would be fun to put this baby in that blender, and I want to have fun, but it would be wrong, so I won't"

  • "It would be wrong to put this baby in that blender, and I don't want to be wrong, but it would be fun, so I will"

...and the following are not:

  • "In general, putting babies in blenders would be fun, and I want to have fun, but in general it would be wrong, so if a situation arose where I had a baby and a blender and could put one inside the other with impunity, I would not do so, all else being equal."

  • "In general, putting babies in blenders would be wrong, and I don't want to be wrong, but in general it would be fun, so if a situation arose where I had a baby and a blender and could put one inside the other with impunity, I would do so, all else being equal."

Yes? No?

If so, I continue to disagree with you; I absolutely would call those last two cases examples of moral reasoning.
If not, I don't think I'm understanding you at all.

What's the difference between agreeing here, and endorsing the usage?

If A is some object or event that I observe, and L is a label in a language that consistently evokes a representation of A in the minds of native speakers, I agree that it's possible for me to call A L. If using L to refer to A has other effects beyond evoking A, and I consider those effects to be bad, I might reject using L to refer to A.

For example, I agree that the label "faggot" reliably refers to a male homosexual in American English, but I don't endorse the usage in most cases because it's conventionally insulting. (There are exceptions.)

'to blame good people (or to blame people for good actions) is bad.' It shows some praiseworthy decency

Incidentally, here you demonstrate one of the behaviors that causes me not to endorse the usage of calling Sam "good" or "bad" in this case. First you went from making an observation about a particular act of reasoning to labeling the reasoner in a particular way, and now you've gone from labeling the reasoner in that way to inferring other facts about the reasoner. I would certainly agree that the various acts we're talking about are evidence of praiseworthy decency on Sam's part, but the way you are talking about it makes it very easy to make the mistake of treating them as logically equivalent to praiseworthy decency.

People do this all the time (e.g., fundamental attribution fallacy), and it causes a lot of problems.

comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-04-20T20:14:24.432Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm thinking of moral reasoning as the kind of reasoning you're morally responsible for: if you reason rightly, you ought to be praised and proud, and if you reason wrongly, you ought to be blamed and ashamed.

Oh!
I understand you now.
Thanks for clarifying this.

comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-04-20T15:11:09.852Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Also...

Though my response was very much intended to be a joke.

Can you please clarify which of your comments in this thread you stand by, and which ones you don't stand by?

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-20T15:26:47.466Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I stand by everything I said about trolly problems. I don't think an eternity of torture is preferable to a dust speck in one's eye.

comment by RobinZ · 2012-04-20T14:50:48.088Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Until you posted this comment, I thought your response was intended as humor.

Edit: And not of the ha ha only serious type.

comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-04-19T18:07:42.586Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

OK, thanks for clarifying.

comment by thomblake · 2012-04-19T17:51:27.453Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

An obvious argument in favor of B is that you get to live for 3^^^3 years. A reframing:

A = Dust speck in your eye, after which you read a normal life except that you cease to exist a mere 60 years later.
B = Tortured for the rest of your life, but you never die.

Replies from: army1987, TheOtherDave
comment by A1987dM (army1987) · 2012-04-20T00:23:02.010Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

B is just the traditional idea of hell, isn't it? (IIRC, the present-day Catholic Church's idea is that hell is just the inability to see God.)

comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-04-19T18:11:38.548Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

(nods) That seemed the obvious argument, as you say, though it depends on the notion that being tortured for a year is a net utility gain (relative to not existing for that year at all), which seemed implausible to me. But it turns out that is indeed what ABrooks meant.

(shrug) No accounting for taste.

Edit: He later asserted that had been a joke.

comment by steven0461 · 2012-04-20T01:59:13.384Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This is another great example of a comment that should have been silently downvoted, not responded to.

Replies from: TheOtherDave
comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-04-20T03:28:07.860Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I generally avoid downvoting comments that are direct responses to me. I'm not exactly sure why, beyond a sense that it just feels wrong, although I can justify it in a number of different ways that I'm pretty sure aren't my real reasons.

Replies from: Nornagest, drethelin
comment by Nornagest · 2012-04-20T03:37:40.277Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I do the same. The reasoning that comes to mind is that the timing tends to imply that you did it, and that that -- especially if you're already in an adversarial mode -- can provoke a cycle of retaliation that's harmful to your karma and doesn't carry much informative value. Short of that, I feel it carries adversarial implications that're harmful to the quality of discussion.

I'm reasonably sure that that's my true objection.

Replies from: TheOtherDave
comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-04-20T13:18:02.641Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yeah, that's plausible in my case as well. Evidence in favor of it is that I do become mildly anxious when people who are responding to me get downvoted by others, which suggests that I fear retaliation.

comment by drethelin · 2012-04-20T07:50:27.391Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Anyone who has to respond to me has suffered enough already.

comment by A1987dM (army1987) · 2012-04-20T00:29:19.139Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I thought that too, but I assumed I'd die right after being tortured anyway. And I'd rather live to age n without ever being tortured than live to age n + m being tortured for m years.

comment by orthonormal · 2012-04-20T15:03:41.773Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Note that you're arguing that your preferred policy can never have true drawbacks, rather than arguing that it's worth it on balance. Be careful.

Replies from: taw
comment by taw · 2012-04-20T21:02:33.402Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Policy of not mass murdering people is as close to drawback-free as it gets.

I'm sure you can figure out some trivial drawbacks if you want.

Replies from: Nornagest
comment by Nornagest · 2012-04-20T21:30:16.717Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Doesn't appreciably constrain your behavior, though, unless you happen to be the star of a popular Showtime series or something. Declaring a policy is only meaningful if it actually affects your choices, which in this case only makes sense if you expect to be considering mass murder as a solution to your problems.

And in a situation as extreme as that, I wouldn't be surprised if some otherwise unthinkable subjective downsides came up.

comment by Alicorn · 2012-04-16T19:29:34.998Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

We don't have a magical cure for depression, but if someone is depressed, they cannot make rational decisions for themselves anyway, so they cannot decide to kill themselves legitimately.

Suppose I say now, in my non-depressed state, that if I were ever to become so depressed that I wanted to die, I'd prefer that this want be fulfilled.

Replies from: taw
comment by taw · 2012-04-16T23:12:04.998Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

We cannot allow this any more than we can allow people to sold themselves to slavery as a loan guarantee.

Replies from: thomblake, wedrifid
comment by thomblake · 2012-04-16T23:15:20.373Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Sure, I can see how if you didn't like the latter then you'd dislike the former.

comment by wedrifid · 2012-04-16T23:32:46.709Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

We cannot allow this any more than we can allow people to sold themselves to slavery as a loan guarantee.

Which doesn't preclude allowing both. I can see benefits of allowing the latter. Or, more to the point, I can see situations where forbidding the latter is morally abhorrent. Specifically, when there is not a safety net in place that prevents people starving or otherwise suffering for the lack of finances that they should be able to acquire.

comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-16T19:38:00.492Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

We pretty much know how to deal with even the most severe pain - very large doses of opiates to get rid of it, and large doses of stimulants like amphetamines to counter the side effects.

I'd be incredibly surprised if this actually worked clinically.

Replies from: taw
comment by taw · 2012-04-16T23:11:33.497Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Start here, and follow the links.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-04-16T23:49:07.987Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That doesn't answer my question. I'm not interested in the ethical, legal, and societal barriers to adequate pain management, which is what your link covers as far as I can tell.

I want to know how one intends to circumvent opiate tolerance, and whether or not large doses of stimulants really do counteract the side effects of large doses of opiates in a large enough class of people to be effective, without the side effects of these stimulants becoming undesirable.

Replies from: Strange7
comment by Strange7 · 2013-12-14T05:14:50.625Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Assembling a drug cocktail in order to achieve some central result while minimizing side effects, with ongoing adjustment as the severity of the underlying condition and the patient's sensitivity to the drugs in question both change, is one of those complicated problems which modern medicine is nonetheless capable of solving, given adequate resources.

comment by wedrifid · 2012-04-16T23:36:29.056Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Killing another living thing doesn't qualify as "euthanasia" if you do it for your benefit, not that being's.

Wow. You just decreed it impossible for euthanasia to be done professionally.

Replies from: Strange7
comment by Strange7 · 2013-12-14T05:01:17.021Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think if someone's paying you do perform a service for them, that counts as doing it for their benefit. You're benefiting from the money, not the act itself.

comment by MichaelVassar · 2010-03-17T20:34:11.079Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

A key point is that they don't need to advocate the legalization of infanticide, they just need to be able to cogently address the arguments for and against it. Personally, I think that in the US at this time optimal law might restrict abortion significantly more than it currently does and also that in many past cultural contexts efforts to outlaw or seriously deter infanticide would have been harmful. Just disentangling morality from law competently gets a person props.

comment by Clippy · 2010-03-17T23:20:32.166Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Infanticide and abortion are okay, as long as doing so increases paperclip production.

However, infanticide and abortion are obviously not alone in that respect.

Replies from: mattnewport
comment by mattnewport · 2010-03-17T23:25:54.804Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

How do you feel about the destruction of a partially bent piece of steel wire before it has been bent fully into paperclip shape?

Replies from: Clippy
comment by Clippy · 2010-03-17T23:29:20.528Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Is that some kind of threat???

Replies from: Random832
comment by Random832 · 2012-04-16T18:46:38.398Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Okay, what about melting down a large paperclip in order to make multiple smaller paperclips?

comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T23:41:52.423Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'll be the first to disagree outright.

First, when a woman is pregnant but will be unable to raise her child we do not force a woman to give birth to give up the baby for adoption. This is because bringing a child to term is a painful, expensive and dangerous nine-month ordeal which we do not think women should be forced into. In what possible circumstances is infanticide ethically permissible when the baby is born, the woman has already paid the cost of pregnancy and giving birth, and adoption is an option?

In general, I'm not sure it follows from the fact that persons aren't magic that persons are less valuable than we thought. Maybe babies are just glorified goldfish. Maybe they aren't valuable in the way we thought they were. But I haven't seen that evidence.

Replies from: goodside
comment by goodside · 2010-03-17T11:59:59.660Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Due to a severe birth defect, the baby is profoundly mentally retarded, will suffer severe pain its entire life, and will most likely not live to see its fifth birthday.

Unfortunately, thus phrased it fails as a litmus test. For better discrimination, leave out the part about childhood death, then the pain. Then, if you're adventurous, the retardation.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-17T18:20:32.721Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Once you've left out the pain I no longer think killing the baby is ethically permissible. And I don't see how knowing that people don't have souls alters my position.

Replies from: DonGeddis
comment by DonGeddis · 2010-03-17T19:01:57.337Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Most people's moral gut reactions say that humans are very important, and everything else much less so. This argument is easier to make "objective" if humans are the only things with everlasting souls.

Once you get rid of souls, making the argument that humans have some special moral place in the world becomes much more difficult. It's probably an argument that is beyond the reach of the average person. After all, in the space of "things that one can construct out of atoms", humans and goldfish are very, very close.

Replies from: Jack, Hook
comment by Jack · 2010-03-17T19:29:19.519Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I like what Hook wrote. If I believed that babies were valuable because they have souls and then was told, "no they don't have souls", I might for a while value them less. But it has been a very long time since I believed in souls and the value I assign to babies is no longer related at all to my belief about souls (if it ever was).

After all, in the space of "things that one can construct out of atoms", humans and goldfish are very, very close.

Sure, they just don't resemble each other in many morally significant ways (the exception, perhaps, being some kind of experience of pain). There is no reason to think the facts that determine our ethical obligations make use of the same kinds of concepts and classifications we use to distinguish different configurations of atoms. Humans and wet ash are both mostly carbon and water, and so have a lot more in common than, say, the Sun. But wet ash and the sun and share more of the traits we're worried about when we're thinking about morality. The same goes for aesthetic value, if we need a non-ethics analogy.

comment by Hook · 2010-03-17T19:09:21.787Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think "making the argument that humans have some special moral place in the world" in the absence of an eternal soul is very easy for someone intelligent enough to think about how close humans and goldfish are "in the space of 'things that one can construct out of atoms.'"

Replies from: byrnema
comment by byrnema · 2010-03-18T17:35:02.073Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Would you please share? I would really, really like to know how the argument that "humans have some special moral place in the world" would work.

Replies from: mattnewport, Hook
comment by mattnewport · 2010-03-18T17:36:50.615Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Humans are the only animals that seem to be capable of understanding the concept of morality or making moral judgements.

Replies from: Strange7
comment by Strange7 · 2013-12-14T05:45:30.918Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Morality is complicated and abstract. Maybe cetaceans, chimps, and/or parrots have some concept of morality which is simply beyond the scope of the simple-grammar, concrete-vocabulary interspecies languages so far developed.

comment by Hook · 2010-03-18T19:22:33.461Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Show me someone who actually needs to be convinced. Just about everyone acts as if that is true. One could argue that they are just consequentialists trying to avoid the bad consequences of treating people as if they are not morally special. I'm not even sure that is the psychological reality for psychopaths though.

Also, a corollary of what Matt said, if humans aren't morally special, is anything?

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-18T20:30:25.555Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The question might be less "do humans have some special moral place in the world" than "do human beings have some special moral place in the world". For example: are we privileging humans over cows to an excessive extent?

Replies from: Hook
comment by Hook · 2010-03-18T20:38:53.940Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Leaving aside the physical complications of moving cows, I think most vegetarians would find the decision to push a cow onto the train tracks to save the lives of four people much easier to make than pushing a large man onto the tracks, implying that humans are more special than cows.

EDIT: The above scenario may not work out so well for Hindus and certain extreme animal rights activists. It may be better to think about pushing one cow to save four cows vs. one human to save four humans. It seems like the cow scenario should be much less of a moral quandary for everyone.

Replies from: AdeleneDawner
comment by AdeleneDawner · 2010-03-18T20:48:27.425Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I agree that they would probably have that reaction, but that's not the question; the question is whether that's a rational reaction to have given relatively simple starting assumptions.

Replies from: Hook
comment by Hook · 2010-03-18T21:04:06.613Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Since when were terminal moral values determined by rationality?

Replies from: AdeleneDawner, byrnema
comment by AdeleneDawner · 2010-03-18T21:26:51.022Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

'Starting assumptions' as I used it is basically the same concept as 'terminal moral values', and a terminal moral value that refers to humans specifically is arguably more complex than one that talks about life in general or minds in general.

More-complex terminal moral values are generally viewed with some suspicion here, because it's more likely that they'll turn out to have internal inconsistencies. It's also easier to use them to rationalize about irrational behavior.

comment by byrnema · 2010-03-18T21:07:10.303Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So then what did you mean by this?

I think "making the argument that humans have some special moral place in the world" in the absence of an eternal soul is very easy for someone intelligent enough to think about how close humans and goldfish are "in the space of 'things that one can construct out of atoms.'"

Replies from: Hook
comment by Hook · 2010-03-18T21:15:00.358Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Jack and mattnewport both seemed to do a good job above.

Replies from: byrnema
comment by byrnema · 2010-03-18T21:27:11.904Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You seem to be equivocating. What do you really think?

(1) Do you believe there are logical reasons for terminal values?

(2) Do you believe that it would be easy to argue that humans have special moral status even without divine external validation (e.g., without a soul)?

comment by Chrysophylax · 2013-12-29T19:16:51.712Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This doesn't argue that infants have zero value, but instead that they should be treated more like property or perhaps like pets (rather than like adult citizens).

You haven't taken account of discounted future value. A child is worth more than a chimpanzee of equal intelligence because a child can become an adult human. I agree that a newborn baby is not substantially more valuable than a close-to-term one and that there is no strong reason for caring about a euthanised baby over one that is never born, but I'm not convinced that assigning much lower value to young children is a net benefit for a society not composed of rationalists (which is not to say that it is not an net benefit, merely that I don't properly understand where people's actions and professed beliefs come from in this area and don't feel confident in my guesses about what would happen if they wised up on this issue alone).

The proper question to ask is "If these resources are not spent on this child, what will they be spent on instead and what are the expected values deriving from each option?" Thus contraception has been a huge benefit to society: it costs lots and lots of lives that never happen, but it's hugely boosted the quality of the lives that do.

I do agree that willingness to consider infanticide and debate precisely how much babies and foetuses are worth is a strong indicator of rationality.

comment by lispalien · 2010-03-16T23:32:29.735Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

My mother made this argument to me probably when I was in high school. Given my position as past infanticide candidate, it was an odd conversation. For the record, she was willing to go up to two or six years old, I think.

And let us not forget the Scrubs episode she also agreed with: "Having a baby is like getting a dog that slowly learns to talk."

Replies from: Eliezer_Yudkowsky, wnoise, MichaelVassar
comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-17T18:37:03.906Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

My mother made this argument to me probably when I was in high school. Given my position as past infanticide candidate, it was an odd conversation.

Hey, now you know you were kept around because you were actually wanted, not out of a dull sense of obligation. It's like having a biological parent who is totally okay with giving up children for adoption - and stuck around!

Replies from: lispalien, Multiheaded
comment by lispalien · 2010-03-25T05:47:09.653Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That's an interesting take. She clearly loves me and my siblings and has never hurt anyone to the best of my knowledge, besides. So, it wasn't an uncomfortable topic--only a bit of an odd position to be in.

Although, I also have to point out adoption does not carry the death penalty, so I can imagine a situation in which my hypothetical parent opts not to kill me because they think the fuzz will catch them.

comment by Multiheaded · 2012-03-16T09:54:21.188Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Hey, now you know you were kept around because you were actually wanted, not out of a dull sense of obligation.

Eliezer, your thought processes and emotions are quite a bit different from those of most currently living humans. And that mostly leaves you quite well-off, but you've always got to account for that before you say something like this.
How the hell do you know what others, especially children, would feel in an odd situation like that? Me, I know for sure that I'd MUCH rather have a cold/distant but dutiful and conscientous parent than one who could really, seriously plan to kill Pre-Me for their own convenience.

(If that was supposed to be a joke, I claim that it was in bad taste, just like an anti-AI LessWronger's joke about planning to assassinate you and your colleagues would be.)

Replies from: TheOtherDave
comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-03-16T12:53:05.447Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Can you generalize your claim a bit?

I mean, if the general form of your claim is that a joke whose punchline is "your parents wanted you" is in bad taste just as a joke whose punch line is "I'm going to kill you" is, I simply disagree. I find this unlikely, I just mention it because that's the vast difference between the two examples that jumped out at me.

If the general form of your claim is that a joke that mentions the (unactualizable) possibility of my infanticide is in bad taste just as a joke that mentions the (thus-far-unactualized, but still viable) possibility of my assassination, I also disagree, though I have more sympathy for the claim. I find this more likely.

If it's something else, I might agree.

Of course, if you don't actually mean to make a general claim about what is or isn't in bad taste, but rather to assert somewhat indirectly that references to infanticide upset you and you'd rather not read them, that's a whole different kettle of fish and my question is meaningless.

Replies from: Multiheaded
comment by Multiheaded · 2012-03-16T13:02:54.125Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Jokes aren't only about punchlines; here Eliezer was talking about how the (apparently REAL) fact that a murder was contemptated by the guy's own mother ended up having an upside.

Replies from: TheOtherDave
comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-03-16T13:59:21.782Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yes, that's true, he was indeed talking about that.
I infer that your claim is that talking about that is in sufficiently bad taste to be worth calling out.
Thanks for clarifying.

comment by wnoise · 2010-03-17T06:27:02.734Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I have said before "I'm a moderate on abortion -- I feel it should be okay up to the fifth trimester." While this does shock people into adjusting what boundaries might be considered acceptable, I no longer think it is something useful to say in most fora. Too much chance of offending people and just causing their brains to shut off.

Replies from: khafra
comment by khafra · 2010-03-24T17:50:19.235Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It should be safe to use on Philip K. Dick fan forums.

comment by MichaelVassar · 2010-03-17T20:29:54.464Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Sounds like it would be interesting to have your mother make some comments on LW, if you think she would be interested.

Replies from: lispalien
comment by lispalien · 2010-03-25T05:37:04.051Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That's very unlikely, I think. She's not interested in rationalism.

comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-19T23:16:00.612Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Don't unnecessarily cause them to suffer, but on the other hand you can choose to euthanize your own, if you wish, with no criminal consequences.

Yes, I should also be allowed to kill adults. Especially if they have it coming. After all, the infant still has a chance to grow up to make a worthwhile contribution while there are many adults that are clearly a waste of good oxygen or worse!

comment by Strange7 · 2010-03-18T00:51:48.420Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'd say the primary value of an infant is the future value of an adult human minus the conversion cost. Adult humans can be enormously valuable, but sometimes, the expected benefits just can't match the expected costs, in which case infanticide would be advisable.

However, both costs and benefits can vary by many orders of magnitude depending on context, and there's no reliable, generally-applicable method to predict either. No matter how bad it looks, someone else might have a more optimistic estimate, so it's worth checking the market (that is, considering adoption).

Replies from: Gurkenglas
comment by Gurkenglas · 2013-12-02T09:02:19.447Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Is it acceptable to assume that the conversion cost up to a newborn is less than the rest of the way to an adult? (Think this through before reading on, to avoid biased thinking about the above (This is called "Meditate", right?)) Given that, wouldn't a rich excentric that commits to either spend a pool of money on paying people to roll boulders up and down a hill or on raising the next child he makes you pregnant with cause you to not be allowed to say no? (Edited for clarity)

Replies from: hyporational
comment by hyporational · 2013-12-02T11:29:12.657Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Is it acceptable to assume that the conversion cost up to a newborn is less than the rest of the way to an adult?

It quite obviously is.

Given that, wouldn't a rich excentric that commits to either spend a pool of money on paying people to roll boulders up and down a hill or on raising your child cause you to not be allowed to refuse him?

If you mean as an alternative to infanticide, definitely. What's your point?

Replies from: Gurkenglas
comment by Gurkenglas · 2013-12-02T13:36:07.446Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What I meant to say is that this complete stranger wants to have a child with Strange7 (for this hypothetical Strange7 can get pregnant) and it would be as wrong/illegal for Strange7 to not do so as late abortion or infanticide would be. (Edited grandparent for clarity)

Replies from: Strange7
comment by Strange7 · 2013-12-14T04:53:31.888Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If this hypothetical rich person is able and willing to cover all the costs of me bearing a child and the child being raised, they can draft a contract and present it to me. What greater good would be served by making it illegal for me to refuse? Such a law would weaken my negotiating position, increasing the chances that the rich eccentric would be able to avoid internalizing some of the long-term costs and/or that I would be put in the position of having to give up some marginally more lucrative prospect in order to avoid the legal penalty.

I'd rather not try to derive the full ethical calculus of abusive relationships and rape from first principles, but i can point you at some people who've studied the field enough to come up with excellent working approximations for most real-world cases.

comment by Rain · 2010-03-19T18:47:35.739Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Real world test of human value along similar lines: Ashley X.

comment by Ishaan · 2013-10-05T20:28:08.996Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Are you allowed to use moral questions as litmus tests for rationality? Paper clippers are rational too.

It isn't inconceivable that a human might just value babies intrinsically (rather than because they possess an amount of intellect, emotion, and growth potential).

If anyone here has been reading this and trying to use more abstract values to try to justify why one should not to harm babies, and is unable to come up with anything, and still feels a strong moral aversion to anyone harming babies anywhere ever, then maybe it means you just intrinsically value not harming babies? As in, you value babies for reasons that go beyond the baby's personhood or lack thereoff?

(By the way, the abstract reason i managed to come up with was that current degree of personhood and future degree of personhood interact in additive ways. I'll react with appreciation to someone poking a hole in that, but I suspect I'll find another explanation rather than changing my mind. It's not that I necessarily value babies intrinsically - it's more that I don't fully understand my own preferences at an abstract level, but I do know that a moral system that allows gratuitous baby-killing must be one that does not match my preferences. So if you poke a hole in my abstract reasons, it merely means that my attempt to abstractly convey my preferences was wrong. It won't change the underlying preference.)

<But a good chunk of rationality is separating emotions from logic

Even if I insert "epistemic", i find this only partially true.

Edit: Although, my preferences do agree with yours to the extent that harming a young child does seem worse than harming a baby (though both are terrible enough to be illegal and punishable crimes). So I might respect the idea of merciful killing (in times of famine, for example) at a young age to prevent future death-inducing-suffering.

comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-16T22:17:33.661Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If I agreed with this logic, should I be reluctant to admit it here?

Replies from: byrnema
comment by byrnema · 2010-03-16T23:04:02.081Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Agreeing with the logic is OK, but the problem with reductionism is that if you draw no lines, you'll eventually find that there's no difference between anything.

Thus the basic reductionist/humanist conflict: how does one you escape the 'logic' and draw a line?

Replies from: pengvado
comment by pengvado · 2010-03-16T23:46:48.860Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Draw a gradient rather than a line. You don't need sharp boundaries between categories if the output of your judgment is quantitative rather than boolean. You can assign similar values to similar cases, and dissimilar values to dissimilar cases.

See also The Fallacy of Gray. Now you're obviously not falling for the one-color view, but that post also talks about what to do instead of staying with black-and-white.

Replies from: byrnema
comment by byrnema · 2010-03-17T01:38:31.345Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Sure. But I was referring to my worry that if you don't allow your values to be arbitrary (e.g., I don't care about protecting fetuses but I care about protecting babies), you may find you wouldn't have any. I guess I'm imagining a story in which a logician tries to argue me down a slippery slope of moral nihilism; there'll be no step I can point to that I shouldn't have taken, but I'll find I stepped too far. When I retreat uphill to where I feel more comfortable, can I expect to have a logical justification?

Replies from: pengvado
comment by pengvado · 2010-03-17T03:52:19.199Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm not sure what "arbitrary" means here. You don't seem to be using it in the sense that all preferences are arbitary.

a story in which a logician tries to argue me down a slippery slope of moral nihilism

If the nihilist makes a sufficiently circuitous argument, they can ensure that there's no step you can point to that's very wrong. But by doing so, they will make slight approximations in many places. Each such step loses an incremental amount of logical justification, and if you add up all the approximations, you'll find that they've approximated away any correlation with the premises. You don't need to avoid following the argument too far, if you appropriately increase your error bars at each step.

In short: "similar" is not a transitive relation.

Replies from: simplicio, byrnema
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-17T04:30:44.160Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Each such step loses an incremental amount of logical justification, and if you add up all the approximations, you'll find that they've approximated away any correlation with the premises. You don't need to avoid following the argument too far, if you appropriately increase your error bars at each step.

In short: "similar" is not a transitive relation.

This was rather elegantly put.

comment by byrnema · 2010-03-18T18:09:52.954Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

From your answer, I guess that you do think we have 'justifications' for our moral preferences. I'm not sure. It seems to me that on the one hand, we accept that our preferences are arational, but then we don't really assimilate this. (If our preferences are arational, they won't have logical justifications.)

Replies from: gregconen
comment by gregconen · 2010-03-18T18:42:56.027Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm not sure what "arbitrary" means here. You don't seem to be using it in the sense that all preferences are arbitary.

That seemed to be exactly how he's using it. It would be how I'd respond, had I not worked it through already. But there is a difference between arbitrary in: "the difference between an 8.5 month fetus and a 15 day infant is arbitrary" and "the decision that killing people is wrong is arbitrary".

Yes, at some point you need at least one arbitrary principle. Once you have an arbitrary moral principle, you can make non-arbitrary decisions about the morality of situations.

There's a lot more about this in the whole sequence on metaethics.

Replies from: byrnema
comment by byrnema · 2010-03-18T19:35:44.762Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I am generally confused by the metaethics sequence, which is why I didn't correct Pengvado.

at some point you need at least one arbitrary principle. Once you have an arbitrary moral principle, you can make non-arbitrary decisions about the morality of situations.

Agreed, as long as you have found a consistent set of arbitrary principles to cover the whole moral landscape. But since our preferences are given to us, broadly, by evolution, shouldn't we expect that our principles operate locally (context-dependent) and are likely to be mutually inconsistent?

So when we adjust to a new location in the moral landscape and the logician asks up to justify our movement, it seems that, generally, the correct answer would be shrug and say, 'My preferences aren't logical. They evolved.'

If there's a difference in two positions in the moral landscape, we needn't justify our preference for one position. We just pick the one we prefer. Unless we have a preference for consistency of our principles, in which case we build that into the landscape as well. So the logician could pull you to an (otherwise) immoral place in the landscape unless you decide you don't consider logical consistency to be the most important moral principle.

Replies from: gregconen
comment by gregconen · 2010-03-18T20:03:39.259Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

But since our preferences are given to us, broadly, by evolution, shouldn't we expect that our principles operate locally (context-dependent) and are likely to be mutually inconsistent?

Yes.

I have a strong preferences for simple set of moral preferences, with minimal inconsistency.

I admit that the idea of holding "killing babies is wrong" as a separate principle from "killing humans is wrong", or holding that "babies are human" as a moral (rather than empirical) principle simply did not occur to me. The dangers of generalizing from one example, I guess.

comment by byrnema · 2010-03-16T23:13:29.822Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Don't unnecessarily cause them to suffer,

Aren't abortions unnecessarily painful? This is as strong an argument pro-life as pro-infanticide.

I agree there a continuum between conception and being, say, 2 years old that is only superficially punctuated by the date of birth. Yet our cultural norms are not so inconsistent...

General cultural norms label [infanticide] as horrific, and most people's gut reactions concur.

For example, many of these same people would find it horrific to kill a late-stage fetus. And they might still find it horrific to murder a younger fetus, but nevertheless respect the mother's choice in the matter.

comment by FAWS · 2010-03-16T22:15:07.805Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Voted up, but I think abortion shouldn't be legal once the fetus is old enough to have brain activity other than for medical reasons (life of the mother), and I'm an unrepentant speciesist.

Replies from: taryneast
comment by taryneast · 2011-06-27T13:42:48.881Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

As I recall (I haven't gone to check), fetuses have "brain activity" about the same time they have a beating heart... ie about one week after conception. The brain activity regulates the heartbeat.

The problem with your definition is that it's very vague - it doesn't carve reality at the joints.

I myself prefer the "viability" test. If a foetus is removed form the mother.... and survives on it's own (yes, with life support) then it is "viable" and gets to live. If it's too undeveloped to live... then it doesn't. This stage is actually not very far prior to birth - somewhere around 34-36 weeks (out of 40) (again as I recall without having to look it up).

This is very similar to (but gives just a bit more wiggle room) to the "birth" line... ie it disentangles the needs of the mother from the needs of the child, and can be epitomised by the "which would you choose to save" test.

If you had to choose between the life of the mother or the life of the child: if the child is not viable without the mother - then there is no choice necessary: you choose the mother, because choosing the child will result in them both dying. But if the child is viable - then you actually have to choose between them as individual people.

Replies from: None, Strange7
comment by [deleted] · 2011-06-27T13:48:34.407Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This stage is actually not very far prior to birth - somewhere around 34-36 weeks (out of 40) (again as I recall without having to look it up).

Actually a good bit earlier than that. Like 24, 25 weeks I think is the age where you get 50% survival (with intensive medical care, but you seem to say that's ok).

Replies from: taryneast
comment by taryneast · 2011-06-27T16:07:17.348Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Ok... then I should clarify. If the mother has 100% chance to live, but the foetus has only 50% chance to live... and only on seriously intensive care... I do not consider that an equal chance to live.

I use the 34-36 week limit because women are encouraged to continue to 34-36 weeks if at all possible (based on what my mother tells me - who is an experienced midwife).

I guess the 34-36 weeks cutoff is, for me, a reasonable chance at living on just minimal life support. ie the mother and the child have a roughly equal chance of survival... thus it becomes a choice between them where external factors of who they are (or potentially could be) are the main issue - rather than simply based upon survival probability.

comment by Strange7 · 2013-12-14T05:56:51.008Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So, as technology improves and artificial substitutes become viable progressively earlier in the developmental process, you'll eventually be advocating adoption as an alternative to the morning-after pill?

Replies from: taryneast
comment by taryneast · 2013-12-29T10:23:11.999Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If people are willing to pay for the cost of those artificial substitutes - then I would have no problem with it. If there are sufficient people wanting to adopt, too.

There is still a step between "being fine with it" and "advocating for" - that's turning a "could" into a "should" and you have not given any evidence why this should become a "should"

Right now I'd still not see a benefit for advocating for a child to be placed onto this kind of life-support if the parents do not want it. If the adoptive parents do, then no problems.

The issue with what FAWS is proposing is that "brain activity" is vague int he extreme. Ants have brain activity...

comment by Luke_A_Somers · 2011-11-18T15:15:33.904Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

No, I don't believe in UFOs either

Sometimes things are in flight and the observers can't identify them. What we don't believe in is paranormal or space alien explanations for UFOs.

I've seen undiscriminating skepticism applied to doubting the reports of slightly weird things in the sky.

comment by JulianMorrison · 2010-03-16T17:18:00.251Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Of course, once you pick a test you have to keep it secret - a well known test will be memorized as a shibboleth.

comment by djcb · 2010-03-15T06:48:34.948Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think it's also important to mention that not having a (strong) opinion on something may be the best (rational) thing to do, when things are not so clear.

For many things (say, the AGW controversy) it's not so clear-cut as to where to find the 'truth' (I do happen to find it more likely that there is a thing called AGW and that it really could lead to great problems... but to what extent? Hard to say). Saying that you don't know may sometimes be the best answer.

Now all we need is a test to separate 'I don't know' from ignorance to 'I don't know' because your epistemic error margins are too big...

(btw, I found this an excellent article)

comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2010-03-15T03:38:08.442Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't believe in UFOs.

To my own great embarrassment, I have experienced a "UFO sighting". It was in the late 1990s in Phoenix, Arizona. What I saw was 7 or 8 bright orbs in the shape of a triangle traveling very slowly over the Phoenix/Scottsdale area (which is why I thought it was a blimp at first). After about a minute and comparing it to a nearby mountain I decided that it couldn't possibly be a blimp. The length and width were way too large. Next, I thought that perhaps it was flares, but after watching it for about 10 more minutes was sure they they had either floated higher into the sky or stayed the same altitude and were still in the same configuration with respect to each other (an isosceles triangle).

Before my personal experience, I had assumed that the people on those ridiculous documentary shows on the Discovery Channel were simply fools or people suffering from a psychological illness. I wasn't the kind of person who believed in that stuff. The next day I started questioning if I even saw it (after all, I would probably has ridiculed someone who told me they saw such a thing the previous day). It must have been a mistake. A few months later, I rationalized it by telling myself that it had been a dream. This worked until my mother (who also saw it) reminded me about something that happened on that same day.

Replies from: JamesAndrix, nazgulnarsil, Eliezer_Yudkowsky, Eneasz, TimFreeman, turchin, simplicio, Tom_Talbot, roland
comment by JamesAndrix · 2010-03-15T05:11:05.023Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Well, not believing in "UFOs" is just silly to start. They are definitely up there. The disagreement is usually over what they are.

You should certainly not be embarrassed. What you describe doesn't even rank as a sign of foolishness or psychological illness. Probably at worst it means you're not used to looking at aerial phenomena, so you couldn't identify it. On a bad day, it's taken me a little while to identify the Moon.

If you would have discounted as crazy someone who made a report like you just did, that was a rationalist error. Strangely moving lights in the sky are often reported by multiple witnesses and captured on videotape.

comment by nazgulnarsil · 2010-03-15T19:46:33.424Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

it is a grave mistake to believe that ultra-rationality means immediate dismissal of sensory experiences that (currently) have no good explanation.

comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-16T09:56:17.652Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

My father was once involved in an UFO sighting - he built the UFO, and did the sound effects too, when the other kids got close. Summer camp was involved.

Hope no one ever told those kids it was a flock of birds...

Replies from: Kevin
comment by Kevin · 2010-03-16T10:38:52.992Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This report [http://lesswrong.com/lw/1s4/open_thread_february_2010_part_2/1n29] makes it seem like UFO sightings of the kind Jayson experienced are relatively common.

And a memo reveals how former prime minister Winston Churchill expressed curiosity in "flying saucers" and requested a briefing from his ministers.

He was told in reply that following an intelligence study conducted in 1951, the "flying saucers" could be explained by "one or other" of four causes.

These were known astronomical or meteorological phenomena, mistaken identification of conventional aircraft, optical illusions and psychological delusions, or deliberate hoaxes.

The reports on objects previously known as UFOs would probably be more interesting.

comment by Eneasz · 2010-03-18T19:37:45.725Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I had a very similar UFO sighting, just a couple months ago. Fortunately I've been consuming rationalist media for a long time, and I was able to say "There is a non-magic answer to this question, just because I don't know the answer doesn't mean UFOs exist. My map is incomplete, but the territory isn't magic."

It doesn't make the creepy shiver-up-your-spine and cold-knot-in-your-stomach feelings go away, those are biological reactions. But it does let you accept them and ride them out, like the cramp you know will go away in a while that isn't ACTUALLY a knife in your leg, no matter how much it feels like it.

Replies from: Strange7
comment by Strange7 · 2011-06-27T08:56:02.581Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If it's an object, it's suspended in the air ("flying"), and you haven't identified it's nature or origin in any meaningful way, then in the most ham-fistedly literal sense, it's an Unidentified Flying Object. What am I missing, here?

Replies from: Eneasz
comment by Eneasz · 2011-06-28T15:49:07.948Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

While it may literally mean "unidentified flying object", in the USA it is synonymous for "Extra-Terrestrial Craft"

comment by TimFreeman · 2011-05-08T20:29:19.394Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Don't discount the possibility of a joke. Wouldn't it be fun to make an assembly of PVC pipe, lights, a motor, batteries, and a large balloon, launch it, and watch people make up excuses about what it is?

Actually, I remember where I first heard the idea, and if I recall correctly it was a triangle over Arizona somewhere. I don't recall whether the joke hypothesis was based on seeing the thing fly or seeing the thing be assembled or hearing reports from the people who assembled it. I'll forward a pointer to your article to the person I heard it from and see if he wants to share what he knows.

Replies from: Jayson_Virissimo
comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2011-05-09T00:11:47.106Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Thanks.

comment by turchin · 2010-03-16T13:38:40.933Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

May be my confestion will spoil again my low reputation, but I should tell that I wrote an article about UFOs. And I think it was rational.

Because even slightest probability that we have unknown phenomena in our sky should be taken in account when we speak about existential risks. Also I use Baiesian path of weighting different hypothesis and calculating expected negative utility associated with each.

"UFO as Global Risk" Alexei Turchin, expert on global catastrophes of Russian Transhumanist Movement

Version 0.910, 5 Jan 2010.

Abstract In this article are discussed global risks – i.e. risks that could lead to the complete extinction of mankind, – associated with the problem of UFOs. Although the author is on 90 per cent sure that the UFOs are some common phenomena, the remaining 10 percent are forced him to consider these risks seriously. In the paper is suggested almost complete list of possible hypotheses explaining the nature of UFOs, including a number of new hypotheses (crown discharge around human body, ships from other dimensions covered by the shell of liquid metal, alien nanorobots, conspiracy of suppressed unconscious parts of self, parasites-symbionts from unknown forms of matter, bugs and viruses in the Matrix, etc.) and assessed the reliability of each of the hypotheses and the risk that relates to it. I consider several factors of global risk that may be associated with UFO (intelligence, energy, specific form of toxicity, informational effect, global power), based on observational data. The work is intended for a wide range of readers, as well as for anyone interested in existential risks. This work does not reflect the official position of the Russian Transhumanist Movement, or of any other organization and is only my personal research.

Permalink: http://www.scribd.com/doc/18221425/UFO-as-Global-Risk

comment by simplicio · 2010-03-15T04:28:42.843Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Brilliant!

Did you ever figure out what it was (not that one has to)?

Reminds me very much of Trisha's experience in HHGTTG.

Replies from: Jayson_Virissimo, Jayson_Virissimo
comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2010-03-17T19:08:06.430Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It turns out I wasn't the only one who saw it! Wikipedia has a page with a description that sounds almost exactly like what I experienced. Looks like if I am crazy, so was our Arizona Governor (because he saw the same thing).

comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2010-03-15T04:55:50.788Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The only other thing I ever heard about it was on a local news channel. It didn't really help one way or the other because they said it was military flares, but they claimed they were shot off after I saw the lights and the video they showed of the flares didn't resemble what I saw (they were much too small and moved too fast). I honestly wish I never saw the damn thing.

Replies from: Eliezer_Yudkowsky, simplicio
comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-15T07:09:54.141Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I honestly wish I never saw the damn thing.

This sounds like you're a bit too scared that it has an "unnatural" explanation. If it did happen, there's a normal explanation for it. Curious, yes, scared, no.

Replies from: Jayson_Virissimo
comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2010-03-17T19:02:35.760Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This is exactly why I wish it didn't happen. I can't think of anything else I would tell someone about that would cause them to say "if it did happen...". Either I could provide enough evidence for my claim or my reputation as a truth-teller would be sufficient. Not so, in this case.

Replies from: thomblake
comment by thomblake · 2010-03-17T19:12:42.158Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think you're misreading a logical statement as a statement of uncertainty.

Replies from: Jayson_Virissimo
comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2010-03-17T19:17:27.002Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I see your point. After rereading it, I see that I didn't really have any reason for interpreting it as being particularly uncertain, as opposed to a conditional statement. Perhaps it would be less ambiguous if it was spoken instead of written.

comment by simplicio · 2010-03-15T05:06:19.347Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I honestly wish I never saw the damn thing.

I totally empathize with the psychology, but there's no good reason to regret seeing it. You saw something you didn't understand. You still don't understand it. Such things will happen. I think it's admirable that you hope for a rational explanation even when one isn't forthcoming - moreover, in the teeth of our human need for some explanation, even if it's a bad one.

To extend on Eliezer's point here, it's trivially easy to be a skeptic when the believer's epistemic position is foreign to you. Much harder when you're the experiencer-of-experiences, and the object of scrutiny.

We're nearly all of us materialists here; how many of us would still be if we had a powerful religious experience? And yet we (rightly) reject the truth claims of people who have had such experiences.

Replies from: Matt_Duing, Morendil
comment by Matt_Duing · 2010-03-20T04:53:54.658Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There was a time that I prayed intensely and experienced the presence of God on a nearly daily basis. Reading identical reports from people of other religions and learning about the many frailties of the brain helped me greatly to discount these experiences.

Replies from: simplicio
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-20T05:10:15.732Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I hope I don't sound too effusive if I say that's borderline heroic.

But yeah, I suppose if you read "The Varieties of Religious Experience" or some other such book, you realize pretty fast that an experience like that is not really evidence.

I'm nonetheless surprised at your ability to do that calculus, as opposed to just closing the book. It impresses me almost as much as, say, the family of a murder victim speaking up in the defendant's cause. You were surely working through the Venus-of-Willendorf of all biases (I would imagine).

Replies from: Eliezer_Yudkowsky, Matt_Duing, orthonormal
comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-22T02:56:14.449Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm not worried about sounding effusive and I'll omit the "borderline" part.

comment by Matt_Duing · 2010-03-20T06:10:21.657Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Thank you. Another factor that helped me was that I was encouraged to read the Bible. I actually did read all of it and was disturbed by some of the things I found. Something that particularly sticks out in my mind is the story of Jephthah from Judges chapter 11. Here God basically demands that a man sacrifice his young daughter (i.e. stab her to death and burn her body) as repayment for answering a prayer. God also claims responsibility for creating evil somewhere in the book of Isaiah, though the exact reference escapes me. It took me several years after these initial disturbances to ultimately own up to my mistake, but I gradually realized that the truths I were protecting were structurally quite different from the truths that were protecting themselves.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-22T03:06:31.563Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

My experience was similar. If you (are similar to me and) want to lose the Christian faith - go to church and read the Bible. Two recipes for apostasy.

Replies from: NancyLebovitz
comment by NancyLebovitz · 2010-03-22T03:49:42.926Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

For another similar account see Julia Sweeney's Letting Go of God-- she was contently Catholic, went to Bible classes, and gradually became an atheist.

comment by orthonormal · 2010-03-20T05:29:21.774Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That calculus isn't as uncommon as you'd imagine; most people who take a religion very seriously end up having experiences they identify as "the presence of God", and anyone who leaves a religion they'd taken seriously must confront that bit of evidence. I'm another such case, although I have to cede the most impressive of these stories to the acquaintance of Eliezer (sorry, can't find the link to this anecdote) who had frequent, detailed, coherent visions and eventually decided that the most likely explanation was hallucination rather than contact with a deity or superintelligence.

Replies from: arundelo
comment by arundelo · 2010-03-20T15:05:24.597Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I have to cede the most impressive of these stories to the acquaintance of Eliezer (sorry, can't find the link to this anecdote)

It's here (starting at "I know a transhumanist who has strong religious visions").

comment by Morendil · 2010-03-15T10:34:44.937Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

We're nearly all of us materialists here; how many of us would still be if we had a powerful religious experience?

I once experienced "Hag syndrome", I must have been around eleven. I woke up during the night, unable to move and convinced I had a witch sitting on me.

The next day when I could think about it in bright daylight I thought it was kinda cool that my brain could make me believe something so clearly supernatural, but it seemed just as obvious it had only been the same kind of thing as a nightmare, only more powerful. I didn't mention it to my parents or anything, just filed it as "one of those things". (It was downright scary at the time though; I don't recommend the experience, which as you can see still, um, haunts me.)

Replies from: Shae, Peter_de_Blanc, Matt_Duing
comment by Shae · 2010-03-16T13:55:42.807Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I had very strong religious experiences in my past, and became an atheist/materialist later, if that counts. So I'm guessing a later one could be similarly worked around.

Replies from: simplicio
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T23:31:42.068Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I had very strong religious experiences in my past, and became an atheist/materialist later, if that counts. So I'm guessing a later one could be similarly worked around.

Thanks for coming forward. May I press you for details? What was it like? What were the circumstances? Do you think it showed you anything psychologically, if not factually, worthwhile? What is your general take on the thing now?

comment by Peter_de_Blanc · 2010-03-15T13:00:55.853Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I've also had sleep paralysis (multiple times). No hallucinations, though. I just couldn't move.

comment by Matt_Duing · 2010-03-20T04:43:40.359Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I've had about one episode of sleep paralysis per year starting around the same age. I haven't had any visual hallucinations, though there have been occasions where I've heard ambient sounds that very likely weren't real. It was terrifying the first time I experienced it, but they no loger bother me at all.

comment by Tom_Talbot · 2010-03-15T12:59:16.788Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Was the sun setting? It could have been illuminating the underbellies of a flock of geese.

Replies from: Tom_Talbot
comment by Tom_Talbot · 2010-03-15T13:04:52.239Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

On second thoughts the sun would provide too much light, street lights maybe?

Replies from: Jayson_Virissimo
comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2010-03-16T05:40:31.660Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I can't tell if you are honestly trying to help or making fun of me. Although it is possible that it was the things that you mentioned, it feels like it would if I thought I saw an eagle in my backyard and you asked "are you sure it wasn't a pigeon?"

Replies from: Tom_Talbot
comment by Tom_Talbot · 2010-03-16T09:21:50.930Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I was genuinely trying to be helpful. I apologise for lack of context/social skills. The fact that you said it was orange made me think of street lighting, and the v-shape of migrating birds.

Anyway, I googled and this explains what I meant:

"Birds

Individually and in flocks, birds can catch out the unwary. Many fuzzy, elliptical UFOs captured by chance on photographs have been attributed to birds flying unnoticed through the field of view just as the shutter was pressed.

Migrating flocks of birds can create UFO ‘formations’, particularly if lit up by streetlights at night.

As a boy, I was fooled by an orange UFO that zig-zagged over the roof of my parents’ house one night. Not until many years later did I realize that it must have been an owl lit up by sodium lighting, which was newly installed in our area at that time."

http://www.ianridpath.com/ufo/astroufo1.htm

comment by roland · 2010-03-18T20:05:11.789Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I couldn't resist but notice the similarity between your comment and mine. Both of them start by quoting a statement from the original post and then introduce a contraposing eye witness testimony. Yet mine was downvoted to -12, I guess it' a matter of political incorrectness.

Replies from: gregconen
comment by gregconen · 2010-03-18T20:23:48.488Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

They were also both written in English. The question is, can you see the difference?

Jayson apologetically expressed misunderstanding of rationality combined with an apparent willingness to be corrected. You arrogantly expressed your failure, and responded to criticism with ad hominems and whining.

Edit: In that post. Some of you responses were productive, and one is, at time of this writing, at positive karma.

Replies from: roland
comment by roland · 2010-03-18T20:32:14.265Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Jayson apologetically expressed misunderstanding of rationality combined with an apparent willingness to be corrected.

So is social deference the missing ingredient in my post? I would rather have the evidence speak for itself.

You arrogantly expressed your failure, and responded to criticism with ad hominems and whining.

Could you be more specific in what exactly was/is my failure and why/how I was arrogant about it, and what are the ad hominems?

Some of you responses were productive,

You don't consider the mention of prima facie evidence to be productive?

Replies from: gregconen
comment by gregconen · 2010-03-18T20:44:41.728Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So is social deference the missing ingredient in my post?

It would help, but the difference I was refer to was that Jayson was embarrassed by his failure of rationality, while you either failed to recognize yours or were proud of it.

Could you be more specific in what exactly was/is my failure and why/how I was arrogant about it, and what are the ad hominems?

Ad hominem arguments are attacks against the arguers, rather than the arguments. For example:

what can we say about the epistemological waterline here?

Comments like that will not impress people here. They may provoke a more hostile response than is really warranted, but they are not serious arguments.

You don't consider the mention of prima facie evidence to be productive?

Starting an argument is often not perceived as productive by those who consider the topic a no brainer.

No one here is going to consider whining about persecution to be productive.

Replies from: roland
comment by roland · 2010-03-18T20:51:01.041Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It would help, but the difference I was refer to was that Jayson was embarrassed by his failure of rationality, while you either failed to recognize yours or were proud of it.

How can mentioning of evidence ever be a failure of rationality? In the particular case of explosives in the WTC there are lots of supporting eye witnesses and video testimonies. The failure is to downvote it, which constitutes the same as supression of evidence.

Replies from: gregconen, FAWS
comment by gregconen · 2010-03-18T20:59:40.899Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You weren't just presenting evidence. You were making an argument. Some people believed that you were engaged in motivated reasoning and/or privileging the hypothesis.

Please discuss the merits of the argument in the original thread, if desired. I'd prefer to keep the discussions of the merits of the argument and the reactions to it separate.

comment by FAWS · 2010-03-18T20:58:54.460Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

How can mentioning of evidence ever be a failure of rationality?

It can't, but the way you communicate it can imply a failure of rationality. (i. e. the conclusions you imply and your expectations of the effect of the evidence on others)

comment by John_Maxwell (John_Maxwell_IV) · 2010-03-16T22:54:40.700Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Did anyone read this post and worry whether they're one of the poseurs and not one of the true-blooded rationalists?

I could believe I'm a poseur with respect to this group, i.e. adopting the opinions of the average Less Wrong reader without doing much thinking myself. But this might be rational in the case of issues where the average Less Wrong reader has done more thinking than me, right?

But I do propose that before you give anyone credit for being a smart, rational skeptic, that you ask them to defend some non-mainstream belief. And no, atheism doesn't count as non-mainstream anymore, no matter what the polls show. It has to be something that most of their social circle doesn't believe, or something that most of their social circle does believe which they think is wrong.

Maybe we should have a thread where we all do this? Heh, what a cult initiation ceremony that would be: loudly proclaim to the cult what they're wrong about.

Replies from: ciphergoth
comment by Paul Crowley (ciphergoth) · 2010-03-16T23:37:48.589Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Of course. If you know others who share your belief, that's a cause for worry, and if you know no-one who does, that's also a cause for worry.

Replies from: DanielLC, John_Maxwell_IV
comment by DanielLC · 2012-03-18T22:47:14.351Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Doesn't that violate conservation of expected evidence? Or are you saying that this article was a cause for worry?

Replies from: ciphergoth
comment by Paul Crowley (ciphergoth) · 2012-03-19T13:20:24.876Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm having a bit of a hard time reconstructing my meaning from two years ago I'm afraid! Clearly it does violate conservation of expected evidence, so I can only think that it's offered as a way to combat overconfidence bias than actually meant as a way that a ideal reasoner would update on the evidence. Or I'm just trying too hard to sound clever...

comment by John_Maxwell (John_Maxwell_IV) · 2010-03-17T00:12:13.880Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Of course. If you know others who share your belief, that's a cause for worry, and if you know no-one who does, that's also a cause for worry.

OK. So I can only stop worrying if exactly 1 person shares my belief? :-P

Replies from: Strange7
comment by Strange7 · 2011-06-27T07:22:32.009Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You can stop worrying after your brain's been properly frozen. The question is what to worry about.

comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-15T03:43:49.054Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

To what extent does "ability to choose the right tribe" mitigate "undiscriminating skepticism"? There are lots of different tribes with different beliefs, and people often explicitly choose what tribe to affiliate with...

As far as I can tell, "not-mainstream" (for the right value of "mainstream") is almost always a huge hurdle to overcome...

comment by Nirgal · 2010-03-15T13:36:55.956Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Poincare said: “To doubt everything or to believe everything are two equally convenient solutions; both dispense with the necessity of reflection.”

comment by Rain · 2010-03-15T03:40:35.227Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I've used AI as a sniff test many times (>10 tests), along with better-than-human humans (posthumans) and engineered immortality (SENS). Very few people, even those who are smart and educated, are able to argue against them rationally. Every time I've been given more than 10 minutes to discuss the point with someone who disagrees they're possible, it comes down to some sort of mystical mysteriousness which humankind cannot fathom or recreate. Quite often (>20%), it's even revealed a religiosity in the person they don't express in any other way apparent to me (god of the gaps).

Replies from: ExAequali
comment by ExAequali · 2013-10-15T09:10:52.956Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So is the source of consciousness not a mystery? Or is consciousness not necessary for intelligence?

Replies from: ArisKatsaris
comment by ArisKatsaris · 2013-10-15T10:48:33.059Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Or is consciousness not necessary for intelligence?

Indeed. If we mean "intelligence" as ability to optimize an arbitrary goal X, I don't see either consciousness or intelligence being at all necessary for the other. These are two completely different things.

Consciousness is currently mysterious (at least for me), intelligence not really.

Replies from: ExAequali
comment by ExAequali · 2013-10-27T07:43:32.175Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This article makes some interesting points about the meaning of intelligence. Curious what you think of Hofstadter's arguments.

comment by clarissethorn · 2010-03-15T02:23:54.549Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Sorry if this is overly tangential, but as a sex educator I'm interested to know what you all think are your tribal beliefs around sexuality, and what kind of sexuality-related arguments would lead you to consider someone to be defending a non-mainstream belief.

Replies from: Eliezer_Yudkowsky, PhilGoetz, RobinZ, CronoDAS, rwallace, Morendil, steven0461
comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-15T02:42:44.345Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Heh. My tribal beliefs are from reading Spider Robinson books as a teen. Ciphergoth is an example of the sort of person I grew up thinking of as normal, and I've always felt a little guilty about not being bisexual. You have to get up pretty early in the morning to go outside that mainstream, which is one reason I went to the lengths of postulating legalized rape in Three Worlds Collide.

Replies from: clarissethorn, ciphergoth
comment by clarissethorn · 2010-03-15T10:42:04.106Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Ah, Spider Robinson. I remember buying a stack of his books at Borders around age 12 and having the clerk give my mother an alarmed look. Mom just waved her hand ....

I think it's pretty normal for science-fiction-reading middle- to upper-middle-class kids to think that alternative sexuality is "normal" and to feel guilty for being vanilla/monogamous/whatever. (I used to feel a lot of pressure to be polyamorous.) Interestingly, though, there still seems to be a lot of internalized stigma about certain forms of sexuality, as demonstrated for example in my coming-out story. I would imagine that most people here fit that tribal group.

Still, within that tribal group I still encounter a lot of people with assumptions I'd call weird and/or irrational, which is why I asked specifically what kind of sexuality-related arguments would lead you to consider someone to be defending a non-mainstream belief. I think your legalized rape post (it was forwarded to me last year, actually, and I still haven't decided how I feel about it) is a definite example of defending a non-mainstream belief, but I wonder if there are less dramatic ones.

Replies from: Multiheaded, Eliezer_Yudkowsky
comment by Multiheaded · 2012-03-16T10:02:05.435Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm adamant that none of us should use the messed-up word "Rape" to point to a benevolent social practice of a made-up libertarian utopia, where that term and its implications are not just forgotten but can hardly be understood. Something like "meta-consensual sex" would be way better. This alone would've allowed us to avoid half the controversy about this relatively minor point.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-03-16T13:15:10.903Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"meta-consensual sex

I like it. I hope the term catches on - even if the situations where it can be useful are rather uncommon.

comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-15T10:48:24.228Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I still haven't decided how I feel about it

I call that a win for literature.

comment by Paul Crowley (ciphergoth) · 2010-03-15T08:43:44.689Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

*smiles* I'm sure you know this, but I don't think it makes any sense to think you should enjoy X. And I agree, alt-sex is not a useful discriminator here. I've been having a lot of arguments about cryonics with my friend David Gerard who is also an alt-sex community member, and this article could have been written specifically with him in mind (as well as other contributors to the "RationalWiki" article on cryonics).

There's a warning flag you don't mention: the logical rudeness of the skeptical Gish Gallop. I have over and over again begged David to pick one counter-argument to cryonics and really press it home. Instead he insists on picking up everything that looks to him like shit and flinging it as fast as he can, and it appears to give him no pause at all when one argument after another turns out to be without merit.

Replies from: Eliezer_Yudkowsky
comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-15T08:47:51.419Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm sure you know this, but I don't think it makes any sense to think you should enjoy X.

Why doesn't it make sense? If there were a pill to turn me bisexual, I'd take it, modulo the fact that in general I take almost no pills (it'd have to be really really safe, but I hold all mind-affecting substances to that standard, don't drink etcetera, it's not a special case for the bisexuality pill).

Replies from: ata, ciphergoth, wedrifid
comment by ata · 2010-03-15T09:13:00.801Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm somewhat sympathetic to that idea (I haven't felt guilty about being straightish, but I've wished I were more bisexual once in a while, and succeeded in pushing myself in that direction in some cases), but I'm curious now: is gender the only dimension you'd apply that to? Would you also take a pill (again assuming it's really really safe) that would make all outward physical attributes irrelevant to how attractive you find someone? Would you take a pill that would make you enjoy every non-harmful sexual practice/fetish (not necessarily seeking them out, but able to enjoy it if a partner initiated it)?

(I originally started writing this comment thinking something like "hmm, I'd take the bi-pill, but let's take that reasoning to its vaguely-logical conclusion and see if it's still palatable", but now I'm actually thinking I'd probably take both of those pills too.)

Replies from: Eliezer_Yudkowsky, clarissethorn, Strange7, Bindbreaker
comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-15T10:25:38.966Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Well, to ask the non-mainstream-relative-to-this-community version of the question, ask "Would I take the loli pill?"

Replies from: CronoDAS, ata, FAWS
comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-15T19:40:49.457Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

How about the anti-Westermark effect pill? ;)

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-15T19:53:28.120Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I can't believe I had never heard of that before. Fascinating.

A question if you can answer it. Wikipedia says:

When close proximity during this critical period does not occur—for example, where a brother and sister are brought up separately, never meeting one another—they may find one another highly sexually attractive when they meet as adults

The addition of "highly" seems to suggest that separated brothers and sisters find themselves especially or unusually attracted to one another. Is that the case or is Wikipedia just adding unnecessary adjectives?

Replies from: thomblake, CronoDAS
comment by thomblake · 2010-03-15T20:01:40.891Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There are clearer language and relevant citations at (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Genetic_sexual_attraction)

comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-15T20:00:55.837Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There is a hypothesis that claims that, but the evidence is dubious.

comment by ata · 2010-03-15T21:28:11.671Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The two pills I proposed are mainstream relative to this community?
I'm surprised yet not surprised. Good to know, anyway.

(So, alright, would you take the loli pill?)

comment by FAWS · 2010-03-15T12:10:06.528Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Does "loli" mean non-persons and emotionally mature persons who look like a child, or are actual children (of average or below average emotional maturity) included by the effect?

Replies from: sketerpot, wedrifid
comment by sketerpot · 2010-03-15T21:28:48.465Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If it meant the former, I would take the loli pill if the (unlikely) circumstances called for it. Why not? If it meant the latter, then you would have to tell your libido "no" a lot, but it wouldn't necessarily lead to doing bad things. I doubt it would be worth the hassle, though, except in very special circumstances.

Actually, the biggest drawback to either version of the loli pill would probably be how society would react if they ever found out. It probably wouldn't matter if the one you're sleeping with is really 700 years old; you'd still get put on every sex offender registry out there, and shunned vigorously, at the very least. People are damn tense on this subject. Just look at how much trouble Christopher Handley got in for his manga collection.

Edit: I felt pretty uncomfortable writing this post, even though I know I shouldn't be. Looks like this really is a good question.

Replies from: MBlume, kodos96
comment by MBlume · 2011-09-24T21:09:30.690Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Upvoted for noticing discomfort

comment by kodos96 · 2010-03-17T00:39:29.049Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

upvoted for citing tvtropes :)

Replies from: Alicorn
comment by Alicorn · 2010-03-17T00:42:30.904Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Downvoted for encouraging such irresponsible behavior as citing TV Tropes!

Replies from: thomblake
comment by thomblake · 2010-03-17T22:04:11.867Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You just say that because your karma is over nine thousand!

comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-15T12:44:44.578Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Loli means actual preteen girls.

Replies from: ata
comment by ata · 2010-03-15T21:29:37.528Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If I understand correctly, loli only refers to cartoon depictions of preteen girls (and maybe roleplaying with that theme). Being attracted to actual preteen girls is just pedophilia.

(At least that's what loli fans say. I've always been a bit confused by the distinction — I've known people into loli and shota who seemed to find actual children as unappealing as any normal person does, but I can't quite figure out why a person would be turned on only by a cartoon and not the real thing.)

Replies from: Jack, kodos96
comment by Jack · 2010-03-15T21:47:00.851Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This is a really a frustrating exchange given the number of terms that need googling and the fact that I am in a public library.

Replies from: sketerpot, wedrifid
comment by sketerpot · 2010-03-16T00:07:27.434Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The TV Tropes page is work-safe and pretty illuminating. No guarantees if you click on any of the links, though.

comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-15T23:00:05.756Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Google define:'s loli as -

  • Abbreviation of lolita
  • Japanese term for Lolita, which means young, pre-teen girls.

Google define:'s lolita as -

  • a sexually precocious young girl
  • In the marketing of legal pornography, lolita is used to refer to a neotenic female, frequently one who has only recently reached the age of consent, or appears to be younger than the age of consent. Usually overlaps with 'barely legal'.
comment by kodos96 · 2010-03-17T00:42:55.593Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

but I can't quite figure out why a person would be turned on only by a cartoon and not >the real thing

Because they're lying

comment by clarissethorn · 2010-03-15T10:43:50.336Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'd definitely take all three of the above pills. In fact, I wonder how much harm such pills would have to do for me not to take them.

comment by Strange7 · 2010-03-15T16:16:39.294Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There is a well-established mechanism within the transformation fetish subculture making use of devices which work a bit like temporary tattoos, altering the subject's body and/or personality in ways both profound and fully reversible. Like most magic intended to make a story possible rather than to make it interesting, the patches in question are entirely without negative side effects.

As demonstrated with Clippy, I would be willing to provide further information even if doing so does not serve my long-term interests in any obvious way.

comment by Bindbreaker · 2010-03-16T06:15:02.316Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Would it be reversible?

Replies from: ata
comment by ata · 2010-03-16T06:30:29.641Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You can just answer it for each case. Would you take either pill if they were irreversible? If they were reversible?

Replies from: Bindbreaker
comment by Bindbreaker · 2010-03-16T06:48:19.238Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yes in all cases, but absolutely only if reversible.

I am asexual and thus have not experienced any of the romantic/sexual emotions. I feel as if doing so would almost certainly help my understanding of others, as well as broaden my emotional range. However, I seem to do quite fine without these emotions, and they seem to cause more problems than they are worth in many of the people around me. Therefore I would only take such pills if they were reversible, as my present state is quite happy and the alternative could certainly be worse.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T08:08:58.442Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

However, I seem to do quite fine without these emotions, and they seem to cause more problems than they are worth in many of the people around me.

No kidding.

Do people remember that guy who was here at the very beginning and wouldn't shut up about how the key to being rational was castration? I doubt that troll would have had much to say would have been helpful but the position has a certain intuitive plausibility to me. To begin with, I'm pretty sure the ebb and flow of sexual arousal would be really easy to money pump.

Replies from: wedrifid, Morendil
comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-16T08:23:49.905Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

To begin with, I'm pretty sure my the ebb and flow of sexual arousal would be really easy to money pump.

Buying and selling bulk cupons for the service of prostitutes?

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-19T23:12:41.761Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I was actually thinking pornographic website subscriptions. That works too, though.

comment by Morendil · 2010-03-16T08:33:23.938Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Easy enough to find by searching. ;)

Those contributions were... interesting. I'm somewhat tempted to doubt the disclosure. While researching permanent forms of contraception, in particular vasectomy, I learned that the procedure was illegal in France up until a few years ago: it was considered "self-mutilation". I'd be rather surprised to learn about someone getting elective castration, unless some plausible details substantiated that story.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T09:49:19.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Agreed. And I obviously wouldn't volunteer. But sexuality does appear to generate some serious bias. I imagine straight men might be unreliable rebutters and evaluators of arguments made by attractive females, for example.

comment by Paul Crowley (ciphergoth) · 2010-03-15T09:25:25.427Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Why would you take such a pill? So that you can have more fun, or for some other reason?

Replies from: Eliezer_Yudkowsky
comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-15T10:22:41.520Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So I wouldn't miss out on half the fun.

Replies from: ciphergoth, CronoDAS
comment by Paul Crowley (ciphergoth) · 2010-03-15T12:15:45.947Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

How do you distinguish the sort of fun it's worth changing your values to enjoy from the sort of fun (like wireheading) it's worth not having access to?

Of course, it's nothing like half the fun you're missing. Adding a gender would increase your fun by less than 100% since it's not that different in many ways. Adding all the sexual variation in the world would be a humongous amount of fun, but you'd start to hit diminishing returns after a while.

comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-15T19:26:26.755Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Technically, given that most people are heterosexual, Woody Allen's quote - "The good thing about being bisexual is that it doubles your chance of a date on a Saturday night." - is inaccurate. It only increases your chances by the percentage of people of your gender who are open to same-sex encounters.

Replies from: Jack, ata, CWG, Eliezer_Yudkowsky, sketerpot
comment by Jack · 2010-03-15T19:41:33.675Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think I have enough evidence to say this confidently without unfairly stereotyping: On balance, gay men are so much more promiscuous than straight women that being bisexual really might double or triple the opportunities for a man to have sex. But your point is well taken and certainly applies to chances for a monogamous relationship.

Replies from: Eliezer_Yudkowsky, CronoDAS
comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-15T21:27:46.249Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Point of curiosity if anyone knows the answer: How promiscuous are bisexual men and do they tend to have more m-m than m-f sex because the m-m sex is much easier to obtain? If not, why not?

Replies from: Kevin, Psychohistorian, Jack, CronoDAS, thomblake
comment by Kevin · 2010-03-15T23:00:30.861Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm a 1 on the Kinsey scale but I have only had sex with women, not men. I don't identify as bisexual.

I suspect that the median bisexual man has more m-m sex because the median person willing to identify as bisexual is not a 3 on the Kinsey scale but leans towards the homosexual side of the scale. Also, especially for young people just coming to terms with their sexuality, identifying as bisexual is often a path towards identifying as gay, and such people are likely to have more sex with their true preferred type of partners.

There is a negative perception in the gay community that bisexual people are more promiscuous, but this probably isn't true. I'm pretty sure the reason bisexual men tend to have sex with men more often than women is not because getting gay sex is as easy as posting a "Hey, who wants to come over, blow me, and leave right away without talking?" on Craigslist, but because most people that identify as bisexual are just more gay than straight.

Btw, if anyone was intrigued by the possibility of making such a Craigslist post, if you say you're straight you'll get at least twice as many replies! :D

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T00:00:47.231Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This is of course controversial but I've had a number of gay friends and acquaintances deny that there even are true bisexual men. The position they take it is that homosexuality is a binary, pre-natal development characteristic and that bisexual males are pretty much just gay men holding out hope for a normal marriage/family life.

No offense to those men here who identify as bisexual, obviously. This all may just be in group posturing and what not.

Replies from: Alicorn, None, Kevin, ciphergoth, simplicio, army1987
comment by Alicorn · 2010-03-16T00:09:38.485Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

deny that there even are true bisexual men.

I, meanwhile, am not entirely sure that there are straight women.

(Every woman I have met has fallen into one of the following categories: 1) She would not know if she were non-straight, due to inadequate self-examination or understanding of the concept of orientation. 2) I would not know if she were not straight, due to not having a close enough relationship with her or due to social constraints on her end preventing her from being out or due to the topic never having come up. 3) I know her to be bisexual, gay, asexual, or some other non-straight sexuality.)

Counterexamples are welcome to present themselves, of course.

Replies from: Swimmer963, smk, juliawise, Jack, CronoDAS, TheOtherDave, knb
comment by Swimmer963 (Miranda Dixon-Luinenburg) (Swimmer963) · 2011-09-26T14:54:33.510Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Reminds me of a study I read about. They basically showed men and women different types of porn and measured genital arousal. The results were straightforward for men: if they identified as straight, girl-on-girl porn caused the greatest arousal, girl-on-guy was ok, and guy-on-guy caused almost no arousal. For gay men, the results were reversed. For girls, there were no simple categories, and their identification as straight or gay didn't predict which images would be the biggest turn-on.

comment by smk · 2011-09-25T07:33:08.719Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The thread seems to be resurrected, so I'll present myself. :)

I am a cissexual slightly genderqueer exclusively androsexual monogamously married woman. I think about sexuality and orientation a lot. Including my own. I don't recall ever being sexually or romantically attracted to a woman. Intellectually, monosexuality seems a little weird to me, but nevertheless it seems to describe me. In fact I think of my monosexuality as a gender fetish, but I hesitate to apply that paradigm to other people's monosexuality.

Replies from: Mark_Ash
comment by Mark_Ash · 2012-12-19T13:14:21.996Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That is one of the most delightfully precise explanations of personal gender identity and sexual preferences I have ever seen. Also, as an exclusively monosexual male, I agree with your thoughts that monosexuality is understandable but doesn't seem optimal from an individualistic standpoint.

comment by juliawise · 2011-09-24T17:34:54.845Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

My impression from attending a women's college was that by the fourth year, most women who came in identifying as straight had experienced some attraction to other women. And those who came in saying "My life would be so much easier if I liked girls" were more likely to be dating women by the end (though no data on whether their lives were actually easier!)

comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T00:27:07.213Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm around 90% confident my girlfriend is straight.

Replies from: Jack, mattnewport
comment by Jack · 2011-09-24T17:50:47.467Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Update- She has a date with a girl next week. So... oops. :-)

Replies from: Jack, MBlume, Oscar_Cunningham
comment by Jack · 2012-07-07T08:50:45.340Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Update #2-- And now.... she is in a long-term relationship with a woman.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2019-06-04T21:19:05.113Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Feels like I should tie a bow around this, in memory of old Less Wrong. They got married 6 months ago.

Replies from: habryka4
comment by habryka (habryka4) · 2019-06-04T23:07:20.479Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Huh, that sure was an interesting series of comments. Thanks for updating this after so many years and providing a tiny bit of data (and humour).

comment by MBlume · 2011-09-24T21:19:58.544Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I've gone on dates with a couple guys just to check -- I'm still pretty definitely straight.

comment by Oscar_Cunningham · 2011-09-24T18:16:36.526Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Polls show that about 10% identify as non-straight, so your initial estimate wasn't bad.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2011-09-24T18:33:30.376Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

One would hope that dating someone would provide enough evidence to make a better estimate than a blind prior.

Replies from: shokwave
comment by shokwave · 2011-09-25T02:49:17.215Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Not necessarily true - it's possible you had an implicit "given that she is straight" at work when you were interpreting evidence. If you conditioned on her being straight it makes perfect sense that you'd have no evidence one way or the other from a blind prior.

(People conditioning on such things is extremely common - for a much less innocuous example, consider what "no thanks, I don't want to" looks like to someone who is conditioning on "this person wants me to")

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2011-09-25T03:52:58.266Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You're right, actually. This occurred to me when posting the above. I started from "She's a girl who says she is straight" and then updated down to .9 based on what I learned.

comment by mattnewport · 2010-03-16T00:43:44.930Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think you both need to clarify your definitions a bit. It seems to me that females have a lot more scope for physical intimacy with other females in western society without generally being considered non-straight than males do. A straight female expressing physical attraction/admiration for other females is not considered grounds for doubting self-reported sexuality the way it might be for males.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T01:30:21.220Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It's true that evidence one has for classifying people's sexual orientation can be different for men and women. Thus I have female friends who, if they were men and behaved toward men the way they now behave toward women, my beliefs about their sexual orientation would alter dramatically. But such behaviors don't define heterosexuality. An Anglo-American man who compliments other men on their attractiveness, holds hands or is affectionate toward other men is giving us evidence that he is gay or bisexual. But these facts don't make him gay or bisexual. Facts about who wants to have sex with and who he wants to have romantic relationships define his sexual orientation.

People really aren't comfortable with their naive notion of heterosexuality? It's true that these concepts, like all cultural and social concepts, might break down upon extremely close examination. There are often degrees and exceptions. But I think we can use them just fine.

Replies from: mattnewport
comment by mattnewport · 2010-03-16T01:51:14.984Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I more or less agree with your interpretation but it seems to me that the crux of any disagreement you have with Alicorn may well be over your respective defintions of 'straight' for males and females rather than a disagreement over the prevalence of certain behaviours.

Examples of behaviours that are quite common between girls I consider 'straight' but I would consider an indication of homosexuality in (western/anglo-american) males: holding hands; kissing on the lips; sharing a bed; overtly sexual dancing; commenting on the sexual attractiveness of other females. Would you consider any of these behaviours evidence that your girlfriend is not straight? Would Alicorn consider any of them evidence that a girl is not straight? That's where I think some clarification is needed.

Replies from: Jack, Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T05:19:44.217Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

any disagreement you have with Alicorn

I'm actually not sure how much my data point suggests a disagreement with Alicorn. After all this is my girlfriend and I'm still only 90% sure she is straight.

comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T02:24:07.187Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Actually, I think all of those behaviors are evidence of non-heterosexuality in women they're just weak and easily trumped by other kinds of evidence. After all, pretty much every non-straight girl I know does these things and only some of the straight girls I know do them. None are, of course, constitutive of non-heterosexuality. Incidentally, none are a pattern with my girlfriend.

comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-16T01:47:47.172Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Which category do you yourself fall into? (Or would you prefer not to answer that question?)

Replies from: Alicorn
comment by Alicorn · 2010-03-16T03:00:21.207Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm bi.

comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-03-16T14:42:23.670Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

For what it's worth, I know a few women (2 certainly, 1 arguably) who strike me as reasonably self-aware, are at least as familiar with the concept of orientation in the abstract as I am, whose sex lives I'm reasonably well acquainted with, who have expressed sexual attraction to and initiated/accepted sexual intercourse with a number of men, and who have expressed (sometimes with regret) their lack of sexual attraction to and have never initiated/accepted sexual intercourse with any women.

Calling them straight seems reasonable to me... certainly I would call myself gay were all of that true of me.

That said, I can certainly imagine all of them having sex with another woman were the circumstances perfectly aligned (at least, I suppose I can imagine it; I've never actually done so and it seems vaguely impolite to do so now, especially since I'm at work).

comment by knb · 2010-03-18T01:15:31.063Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So you think it is possible for a woman to be fully gay but not fully straight? That seems unlikely. According to Bailey, Kim, Hills & Linsenmeier (1997) 1% to 2% of women describe themselves as as having a primary or exclusive female orientation. On the continuum of sexuality, that leaves a vast potential area of women who likely have totally straight sexual orientations.

comment by [deleted] · 2011-09-24T18:17:31.411Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

deny that there even are true bisexual men.

I don't exist -_-;;

Replies from: Jack, Clippy
comment by Jack · 2011-09-24T18:31:35.875Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So there is actually new evidence since we had this conversation. Bisexual men do exist! Past studies found that the men they studied who identified as bisexual weren't.

The different results are likely due to the different procedures used to determine the participant pool. The 2005 study took it's sample of bisexual men mainly from college campus LGBTQ student associations while the more recent study advertised on craigslist M/F for M and, on top of that, refused to include anyone whose claim to bisexuality they didn't believe.

comment by Clippy · 2011-09-25T00:16:24.916Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Neither do I, apparently, even after meeting with LWers in person!

comment by Kevin · 2010-03-16T01:03:03.651Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There are also "David Bowie bisexuals", straight men willing to identify as bisexual in solidarity with the gay rights movement, or as an acknowledgement of the general fluidity of sexuality and gender.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T02:08:55.467Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

straight men willing to identify as bisexual in solidarity with the gay rights movement

Interesting. I'm pretty sure my gay friends would find this offensive and patronizing.

Replies from: Eliezer_Yudkowsky, Kevin
comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-16T02:29:16.941Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I have trouble imagining how I would feel if heterosexuals were persecuted and one of my gay male friends kissed a woman to show solidarity.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T03:18:50.766Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So I think I just figured out the motivation behind this tactic which wasn't obvious to me before (maybe it was to you). I doubt straight men innately dislike kissing or showing affection toward men. It seems more likely to me that they (okay, we) are either homophobic or wary of the status cost of being seen as gay or bisexual. Thus a straight male who declares himself to be bisexual demonstrates a rejection of homophobia and in part shows that he doesn't think being gay or bisexual is low status and refuses to accept some (but not all) of the privileges he has as a straight male (the privilege language is obviously controversial but it probably isn't to the people who do this).

The problem is part of the anti-gay narrative is that homosexuality isn't actually an important part of anyone's identity, that it isn't innate but basically just people choosing to be "sinful". Identifying as bisexual for political reasons bolsters this position. "If these straight males can choose to behave like bisexuals, then the bisexuals can choose to behave like good, church-going straight people!" Also, the fact is a straight male really can't take on the same persecution non-heterosexuals face. They can always opt out and they are never told that a part of their identity is immoral (their told that the act their putting on is immoral, but that isn't the same thing). And of course in some circles being gay or bisexual is a status booster- my friends would be suspicious I was "coming out" for these status-benefits, not out of a genuine attempt at solidarity. Actually, I've seen this complain leveled at some college-aged bisexual women.

Replies from: CWG
comment by CWG · 2015-06-05T23:14:50.673Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I doubt straight men innately dislike kissing or showing affection toward men.

I went to a kissing workshop. (Things escalated slowly and nothing was mandatory.) I was turned off more quickly than I expected by kisses with guys - just by a very short closed-mouth kiss.

(I like hugs though.)

I'm certain I'd also benefit from the bisexual pill, and my aversion to the idea is irrational.

"I hate spinach, which is a good thing because if I liked it I'd eat it all the time, and I hate the stuff." - half remembered second-hand quote, apparently from the 19th C(?)

comment by Kevin · 2010-03-16T07:58:37.557Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This isn't exactly very common (I can't think of a David Bowie bisexual other than David Bowie), and David Bowie was also all kinds of crazy and drugged up at the time. Saying he was gay was kind of stupid, but it certainly was not the dumbest thing he did under the influence of drugs. This is the guy who read some Nietzsche and then misunderstood it so dramatically that he wrote The Supermen. Good song, though.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T08:11:02.982Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm willing to forgive David Bowie for nearly anything.

Replies from: Kevin
comment by Kevin · 2010-03-16T10:17:52.109Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

We could almost call Oh! You Pretty Things transhumanist pop.

I'd embed a copy of the song but Markdown doesn't allow, so anyone that wants to listen will have to google for it.

comment by Paul Crowley (ciphergoth) · 2010-03-16T08:18:19.998Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I understand that you're describing another's position not your own, but can you describe how that position's predictions differ from the predictions from "true bisexuality"?

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T08:57:54.102Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I suppose it predicts a likelihood that any given male bisexual will more and more exclusively have sexual relationships with males, a higher probability of eventually identifying as gay (relative to the probabilities of those of other orientations changing their identifications) and a low probability of a successful and happy relationship with a female.

ETA: The number of people who still identify as bisexual and lead bisexual lifestyles late into adulthood should be negligible modulo some kind of continued denial.

Replies from: ciphergoth
comment by Paul Crowley (ciphergoth) · 2010-03-16T10:12:20.806Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So having been in the bi community for 19 years, I should know lots of men who used to identify as bi but now identify and behave as gay, and relatively few who still identify and behave as bi? In that case I can confidently say that this is nonsense.

Obviously the ones who "turn gay" might not continue to come to bi events, but I'd still have noticed through social networking websites.

comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T03:20:24.215Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

bisexual males are pretty much just gay men holding out hope for a normal marriage/family life.

I dunno... I talked to a couple of (male, straight) friends of mine about this once. We all agreed that although we were straight, 100% would be an exaggeration. I think it's probably a continuum, although dominance/submission factors muddy the waters a bit too.

EDIT: I have now officially heard of the Kinsey scale.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T05:16:10.365Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't think the fact that most straight men wouldn't say 100% is particularly strong evidence against the original thesis. It is consistent with the claim that sexual orientation for men is very heavily clustered at the poles of the Kinsey scale.

comment by A1987dM (army1987) · 2012-03-16T13:25:09.974Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

On the other hand, I think I've read claims that everyone is actually bisexual, and people who claim they're heterosexual are just suppressing their homosexual tendencies and vice versa.

Replies from: TheOtherDave
comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-03-16T14:49:31.695Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Well, the claims are certainly made. I find them about as absurd as the claims that everyone is actually monosexual, myself, though I'd certainly agree that there are a whole lot of people asserting a far greater degree of monosexuality than they actually possess.

Whenever this subject comes up I'm reminded of a woman at a party who was trotting out the "there are no bisexual men, they're just gay men in denial" chestnut, to which I replied "Right! I mean, consider me and my husband. We've been in a monogamous same-sex relationship for the last twenty years, but we claim to be bisexual solely to preserve our heterosexual privilege. Um. No, wait, how does that work again?"

She was annoyed with me.

comment by Psychohistorian · 2010-03-15T23:03:10.654Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

My understanding is that bisexuality rarely endures past one's twenties, and that bisexuals of both genders tend to end up choosing men. Of course, that may stem from the fact that publicly displayed bicuriousity is far less ostracized when it occurs amongst women, so more straight-leaning women are tempted to fool around than straight-leaning men, resulting in most bisexuals settling with men.

Of course, there are people who remain bisexual past that, and my data is not exactly rigorously gathered - I have some friends who study psychology and sexuality, and I've heard it from them.

comment by Jack · 2010-03-15T22:50:34.457Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Bisexual males often don't identify as 50-50 which complicates the matter.

comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-16T01:37:24.012Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Is someone who is what might be called "prison gay" bisexual? (That is, someone who will engage in homosexual acts as a substitute for masturbation, but is not physically attracted to members of the same sex. Yes, it's probably a bad/loaded term, but I don't know what a better one is.)

Replies from: MugaSofer
comment by MugaSofer · 2012-10-10T12:30:47.736Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

As I understand it, it's a standard human response to being trapped with substandard mates to have increasingly-greater estimates of their attractiveness. This has no relevance to sexual orientation.

comment by thomblake · 2010-03-15T22:46:58.884Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There don't seem to be any findable sources that present an unbiased view on the matter (say, relevant statistics), and I suspect that the categories are sufficiently fluid at the moment that the question would be difficult to pin down.

comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-15T19:57:40.178Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

But what if you're female?

Replies from: FAWS, Jack
comment by FAWS · 2010-03-15T20:10:06.404Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think I have enough evidence to say this confidently without unfairly stereotyping: On balance, straight men are so turned on by the idea of girl on girl sex that being bisexual really might double or triple the opportunities for a woman to have sex.

Well, not really. The having enough evidence part at least.

Replies from: thomblake
comment by thomblake · 2010-03-15T20:41:55.037Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think "opportunities for a woman to have sex" must mean something entirely different from "opportunities for a man to have sex", given the facts on the ground w.r.t. the market.

comment by Jack · 2010-03-15T20:00:40.092Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think I have enough evidence to say this confidently without unfairly stereotyping: On balance, straight men are so much more promiscuous than gay women that being bisexual really might double or triple the opportunities for a woman to have sex.

:-)

Edit: On reflection, this might not be right. But yeah, my point doesn't exactly apply to straight women.

Replies from: CronoDAS
comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-15T20:05:31.721Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Funny!

comment by ata · 2010-03-15T20:52:00.328Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

We'll have to make enough bi-pills for everyone, then.

comment by CWG · 2015-06-05T23:05:59.569Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It only increases your chances by the percentage of people of your gender who are open to same-sex encounters.

But the other people of your gender are also restricted to this smaller pool in their search for a pairing, giving you a better chance of being accepted/selected by a particular individual that you're attracted to (assuming you spend significant time around people in this pool). So this factor may not have a big effect.

comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-15T21:26:26.845Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Actually, what you really need is the sexchange pill, but that's a lot harder than it sounds.

Replies from: CronoDAS
comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-16T02:49:18.130Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'll settle for the bisexuality pill, an attractive female-shaped body (including the "vagina-shaped penis"), some time to get used to moving around in it, and the capacity for having multiple orgasms. "Gay man in a woman's body" is close enough for my purposes. ;)

comment by sketerpot · 2010-03-15T21:16:17.906Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If you're calculating this, remember that men are statistically a lot more promiscuous than women.

comment by PhilGoetz · 2010-03-15T15:12:58.728Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Someone who believes that homosexuality is not immoral, but believes it is a dysfunction.

Actually I have more answers, but this question is just too toxic. So I'll go meta: Anyone who responds to this question either by saying that rationality is indicated either by signalling acceptance of more-outlandish sexuality, or by signalling intolerance, is indicating their own irrationality; they are turning this question into a tribal test.

Replies from: NancyLebovitz, Morendil, FAWS
comment by NancyLebovitz · 2010-03-15T15:24:55.777Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

How far can you judge a person's rationality by what sort of evidence they use to support their beliefs about sexuality?

Replies from: PhilGoetz
comment by PhilGoetz · 2010-03-15T15:38:15.223Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That's a specific instance of what this post is about, right?

comment by Morendil · 2010-03-15T15:26:06.169Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm having difficulty parsing your meta observation.

Replies from: PhilGoetz
comment by PhilGoetz · 2010-03-15T15:33:52.384Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There's a large community where you are expected to be open to anything except sex with children; and a large community where you are expected to not be open to anything except sex between a monogomous man and woman.

I'm not arguing whether either of these points of view is valid. But both have enough adherents that no position that can be characterized entirely as more liberal or less liberal can identify its holder as rational. Therefore, anyone who says that such a position (for instance, being open to polyamory) indicates rationality, is merely stating their tribal affiliation. The fact that they think that such a stance demonstrates rationality in fact demonstrates their irrationality.

I can think of a few possible exceptions (sexual practices that are far enough beyond the pale that even tongue-pierced goths disclaim them, yet which have no rational basis for being banned), but they're too toxic for me to mention.

Replies from: Psychohistorian, Morendil, Normal_Anomaly
comment by Psychohistorian · 2010-03-15T23:18:46.600Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Therefore, anyone who says that such a position (for instance, being open to polyamory) indicates rationality, is merely stating their tribal affiliation.

"Merely" is incorrect. If people are employing consistent justifications for their beliefs, that indicates rationality. If their beliefs rely on inconsistent justifications, then they are not.

Suppose I believe polyamory is OK, because I believe that sex between consenting parties will make people happier. If you provided me with overwhelming evidence that most people who practice polyamory are especially miserable specifically because they practice polyamory, that would test my rationality. If I continue to be OK with it, I have an inconsistent belief system. If I cease being OK with it, I am consistently adhering to my beliefs.

Conversely, suppose I believe, "Homosexual sex is wrong because two men can't procreate." If you point out, "Post-menopausal women can't procreate," then, if I say, "Well, they shouldn't have sex either!" then I may be a bit crazy, but I'm consistent. If I say, "Well, that's different" without providing a very specific "that's different" principle, my beliefs are inconsistent, and I am irrational. If I say, "Homosexuality is wrong because the bible says so," then I'd better not be wearing clothing made from both cotton and wool while I burn oxen for the Lord.

I think most of what you see in the "internet crowd" is approval of any sexual activity between consenting adults, which is (usually) a highly consistent principle. I am not aware of any such consistent principle among the married hetero-only crowd. I'm not saying there aren't consistent principles that support a married hetero-only lifestyle, only that it is not my understanding that a large group of people embrace such principles.

If this observation is correct, beliefs about sexuality can be a very strong indicator of rationality if inconsistent, or (at least) a weak indicator if consistent. If they remain consistent through difficult or unusual hypotheticals, that is a strong indication of rationality.

Replies from: Eliezer_Yudkowsky
comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-15T23:28:06.544Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If this observation is correct, beliefs about sexuality are a very strong indicator of rationality.

The problem is if the supposedly rational beliefs also happen to be the tribal belief system of a large, pre-existing tribe. Then someone was rational, sometime back in the history, but it isn't necessarily the person you're talking to right now.

A better test would be to ask them to defend a sexual view of theirs that they see as unconventional, or at least, not a typical view of their tribe as yet.

Replies from: Psychohistorian
comment by Psychohistorian · 2010-03-15T23:45:47.692Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

A better test would be to ask them to defend a sexual view of theirs that they see as unconventional, or at least, not a typical view of their tribe as yet.

This is absolutely true and I've changed the last paragraph to reflect that.

comment by Morendil · 2010-03-15T16:03:51.282Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Therefore, anyone who says that such a position (for instance, being open to polyamory) indicates rationality, is merely stating their tribal affiliation.

I wouldn't suppose that "being open to polyamory" per se indicates rationality. But I would consider someone rational who, having thought about the matter, and concluded on the basis of sound reasoning that there is no valid reason to condemn polyamory, decided to adopt that lifestyle even in the face of some cultural opposition.

And I would consider someone irrational who, having no sound reasoning behind that position, would act in such a way as to deny others the enjoyment of a non-straight-monogamous lifestyle.

Controversies involving third parties are a valid matter of debate, for instance, I'd concede that there is some grounds to ask whether gay couples should adopt. But to assert, without argument, an interest in what consenting adults do behind closed doors, and that doesn't cause anyone lasting harm, just because it concerns sex - that does strike me as irrational.

Replies from: wnoise, army1987
comment by wnoise · 2010-03-15T16:41:55.649Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This all presupposes a consequentialist and libertarian ethic: that morality is about harm.

Replies from: Morendil
comment by Morendil · 2010-03-15T17:14:38.601Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This all presupposes a consequentialist and libertarian ethic: that morality is about harm.

Not necessarily - I don't think of myself as a consequentialist but as a contractarian. Although I'm less than firm in my metaethical convictions.

Still, I have the clear intuition that someone who would assert a claim against me, based on who I chose to spend time in bed with, isn't all right in the head. They wouldn't deny me the right to have dinner with whomever I choose, and (within some reasonable bounds on consent, privacy, and promises made to other people) I see no sound basis to distinguish sex from another sensual experience like dinner.

At the moment I am straight, monogamous, and in fact legally married (for fiscal reasons mostly), but I see no reason to elevate my personal choices and inclinations to the status of universal moral law.

Replies from: wnoise, thomblake, Jack
comment by wnoise · 2010-03-15T17:32:28.350Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There really do exist those who consider who you're having dinner with, and what you're eating to be valid regulatory targets.

Replies from: CronoDAS
comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-15T20:37:47.859Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Consuming human meat is generally disapproved of...

Replies from: Eliezer_Yudkowsky, sketerpot
comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-15T21:49:43.000Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If you uploaded, would you be willing to let someone else eat your body if they were, y'know, into that sort of thing?

Replies from: Jordan, FAWS, Kevin, Document, Strange7
comment by Jordan · 2010-03-17T03:03:38.340Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If you wanted to kill yourself you could satisfy the desires of quite a few fringe people at once: have a psychopath kill you, a necrophiliac rape you, and a cannibal eat you. Hell, if done under the right medical supervision it might even be possible to save the organs too (of course, if I were a cannibal I'd probably be bummed out if I didn't get any liver).

Replies from: Eliezer_Yudkowsky, RobinZ, wnoise
comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-17T08:02:28.958Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I am constantly amazed by the number of people who commit suicide without getting on the evening news.

Replies from: Strange7
comment by Strange7 · 2011-04-18T15:59:36.524Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I've heard that many deaths ruled suicide might be better classified as signaling botches. That is, the individual in question was doing something with the lowest available probability of actually killing them, which would still be recognized as a suicide attempt and thereby provoke reassurances. A multifetish scenario would be far enough outside societal norms to be unlikely to attract support, and virtually impossible to survive.

In other cases, it's a matter of extreme altruism, not wanting to be a burden on others. That's more compatible with the psychopath/necrophile/cannibal option, but, statistically speaking, so few people empathize with any of those demographics (let alone all three) that they aren't common targets for even minor altruism, let alone literal self-sacrifice.

comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-17T13:21:55.687Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Wait, is it rape if you give pre-mortem consent?

comment by wnoise · 2010-03-17T05:54:11.476Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Liver grows back far more readily than any other organ. It might be possible to give the cannibal a slice and still use the rest. Of course, given the shortages of livers, it would probably be better to split it and graft into multiple people.

comment by FAWS · 2010-03-15T21:54:00.107Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Eat your simulated body while you are in it (presumably with pain turned off or at least down?) or your original body (which you don't have any use for anymore in the scenario?)?

comment by Kevin · 2010-03-15T22:28:57.115Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Depends on my current state of wealth and the current meaning of "wealth" in the universe. I think if I uploaded I'd still prefer to be frozen/vitrified (or whatever the current state of the art with regards to that is), just in case I ever changed my mind. Also, I hold a bit of sentimental value towards my body, and if I could afford to keep it well preserved for an extremely long time, why not?

If, say, I could only afford to upload if I let someone eat my body and that paid better than medical research or donating my organs, sure, a cannibalism fetishist or super-hardcore foodie could eat my body.

comment by Document · 2010-03-17T06:59:42.809Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

No, but I'd remind them that if they uploaded they could simulate eating it as many times as they wanted. That could go badly if they wanted it as a token of friendship or intimacy, but in that case a too-casual agreement would be equally bad.

comment by Strange7 · 2010-03-15T22:16:03.410Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Are you talking about vore in general, or snuffie?

comment by sketerpot · 2010-03-15T21:43:45.240Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Hey, good idea. New question for getting evidence of rationality: "How do you feel about cannibalism? Not killing people, just the act of eating human meat. Imagine that the meat was vat-grown, or you're a starving survivor of a plane crash, or something."

Replies from: ata, FAWS, army1987, Document
comment by ata · 2010-03-15T22:04:57.433Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I remember once reading Richard Stallman saying that when he dies, if his body cannot be used for medical research, he would want it to be used for cannibalism or necrophilia.

A rather weird thing to say, but on reflection, not quite as weird as people's usual thoughts on death — "I want my body to be put into the ground so it can decompose" or "I want my body to be burned so it can be of no use to anybody" — right?

Replies from: gregconen, Kevin
comment by gregconen · 2010-03-15T23:28:32.273Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Well, along with medical research, organ donation and cryonics also probably exceed the expected utility of cannibalism or necrophilia.

That said, I'm not sure they would be mutually exclusive. My head for my future self, my innards for the sick, my penis and anus for lovers, and my arms and legs for the hungry.

Replies from: Eliezer_Yudkowsky, Liron
comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-15T23:30:32.356Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

My head for my future self, my innards for the sick, my penis and anus for lovers, and my arms and legs for the hungry.

NEW UTILITARIAN LITMUS TEST

Replies from: dclayh
comment by dclayh · 2010-03-16T19:31:56.482Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Perhaps a slightly more poetic phrasing like "My head for myself, my organs for the sick, my crotch for the horny, and my limbs for the hungry."

(Of course the most tasty meat is on the torso, at least in cows...)

comment by Liron · 2010-03-16T03:29:10.369Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Cryonics and organ donation is really a winning combination. It solves the organ donor's worry that doctors might not take long shots at saving your life if they can harvest your organs instead.

Replies from: MBlume
comment by MBlume · 2010-12-25T08:03:53.133Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

As I understand, current cryo practices use your circulatory system to get cryopreservant into your brain, and this leaves your organs useless.

Is this wrong?

Replies from: Vaniver, Liron
comment by Vaniver · 2010-12-25T10:47:41.389Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This is correct but I imagine it could be bypassed, if you severed the head and used the carotid arteries / jugular veins. I imagine that's much messier and more difficult than doing the whole body through one well-defined entry point, but may be possible.

comment by Liron · 2010-12-25T09:54:19.943Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

shit

comment by Kevin · 2010-03-15T22:17:39.216Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I tried searching to find a citation for this and the most obvious keywords just take me here. 50 karma to anyone who has enough Google-fu to find me a citation.

Replies from: ata, Jack
comment by ata · 2010-03-15T22:26:44.439Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I was thinking of the fourth post on this page. Looks like I misremembered, he didn't mention cannibalism, but given the rest of that post, I'd bet money that he'd be fine with it (perhaps as a third choice).

comment by Jack · 2010-03-15T22:25:13.106Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Here.

Command-F "corpse".

Replies from: thomblake
comment by thomblake · 2010-03-15T23:01:38.297Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Command-F "corpse".

In context and reading quickly, I thought you were suggesting a macro in Emacs.

comment by FAWS · 2010-03-15T21:48:26.688Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think disgust is the normal reaction and doesn't tell anything about rationality so you'd need to ask about the ethics of eating human meat.

Replies from: ata
comment by ata · 2010-03-15T21:58:02.629Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It could be a good test of feeling rational, if the premises were defined clearly enough. Presumably, most of us would not object morally to the idea of eating human meat if we were certain that it had been vat-grown, and would not object practically if we were reasonably sure that it is safe, but I'd guess that many of us would have a cached disgust response anyway, which, under these circumstances, would not be rational (because the disgust emotion would be stopping us from doing something that does not oppose our goals or values). I have to admit I'd probably fall into that group, those people who would not morally object but would feel disgusted anyway (especially as I'm used to feeling disgusted by all meat).

Replies from: FAWS
comment by FAWS · 2010-03-16T21:43:36.839Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

ISTM that the most likely evolutionary origin of disgust is a warning sign of a high risk of infection or poisoning, which would be present in the plane crash scenario so I wouldn't even necessarily call it an irrational feeling.

Moreover not being content with someone merely acting rationally when being confronted with a powerful impulse towards a certain reaction that in this particular situation happens to be irrational, but going so far as requiring that they not even feel this impulse in that situation seems to be asking a bit much. One might say that displaying this attitude towards humans is rather irrational.

comment by A1987dM (army1987) · 2012-03-16T12:58:25.694Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"How do you feel about cannibalism? Not killing people, just the act of eating human meat. Imagine that the meat was vat-grown, or you're a starving survivor of a plane crash, or something."

Dunno, I've never tasted it.

Replies from: sketerpot
comment by sketerpot · 2012-03-16T20:57:27.270Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If your main decision criterion is the taste of the meat, then you have already given your answer.

(I hear it tastes more or less like pork, in case you were wondering.)

comment by Document · 2010-03-17T06:43:21.909Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Hey, good idea. New question for getting evidence of rationality: "How do you feel about cannibalism? Not killing people, just the act of eating human meat. Imagine that the meat was vat-grown, or you're a starving survivor of a plane crash, or something."

Vat-grown meat could still be a problem if it provided the real (killer) cannibals with camouflage.

comment by thomblake · 2010-03-15T17:21:29.044Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I see no sound basis to distinguish sex from another sensual experience like dinner.

I'm not the first to point this out, but by that reasoning, rape is no worse than forcing someone to eat broccoli.

Replies from: Morendil, jimmy
comment by Morendil · 2010-03-15T17:32:10.889Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'd appreciate if you would read my parenthetical qualifications before making misleading comments about my "reasoning".

I disapprove of coercion in general, but it seems clear that people in general experience sex as a much more significant experience than eating, to the extent that rape can make for life-threatening emotional trauma. Given these (possibly local) facts of human nature, we would clearly not agree to a social contract that provided no protection from rape.

comment by jimmy · 2010-03-16T04:36:39.151Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What about forcing 3^^^3 people to eat broccoli?

comment by Jack · 2010-03-15T22:08:34.909Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

At the moment I am straight, monogamous, and in fact legally married (for fiscal reasons mostly), but I see no reason to elevate my personal choices and inclinations to the status of universal moral law.

I don't see any reason to either. The problem is I'm not sure I see a reason not to. Rationality governs our degrees of belief and how we incorporate new evidence into our degrees of belief. I don't see how rationality can govern our terminal values. You're right that there is no sound basis to distinguish sex from dinner, but there is also no sound basis to distinguish sex from murder. To say otherwise requires a pretty untenable kind of moral naturalism. Moral acts and immoral acts aren't natural kinds. PhilGoetz's original point is fully generalizable to all claims about terminal values. Policy positions are indicative of irrationality only when they are inconsistent with the subscriber's own values.

Thus, in my comment elsewhere on this post, I hedged when it came using support for immigration as an indicator of rationality among conservatives because opposition to immigration may well be the right position to hold if you don't value the welfare of immigrants or value cultural homogeneity.

Replies from: Morendil
comment by Morendil · 2010-03-15T22:33:28.122Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

but there is also no sound basis to distinguish sex from murder

There clearly is, at least on my contractarian view. You would not consent to a social contract that left you vulnerable to murder, if it could be avoided.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-15T22:47:43.143Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm not sure this works (Why would a strict social conservative consent to a contract that allowed me to have sex with multiple partners at the same time?). But no matter: If the distinction is only non-arbitrary given your normative ethics then you need to give non-arbitrary reasons why we should all be contractarians. Otherwise you've just pushed the conversation back a step.

Replies from: Morendil, simplicio
comment by Morendil · 2010-03-16T07:10:05.131Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The contract view appeals to me because it takes as a starting point the fact of our living in large groups; that much is non-arbitrary. In this context, some sort of basis for adjudicating our claims against each other is a requirement, just as food or shelter are a requirement. On this view, the features of social contracts that would make for more general agreement - such as protection from murder - can be treated differently from features of these contracts that would make for narrower (temporally and geographically local) agreement. One way to formalize this intuition is Rawls' veil of ignorance.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T09:30:50.405Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The contract view appeals to me because it takes as a starting point the fact of our living in large groups; that much is non-arbitrary.

I suppose this is a nifty feature for a normative theory to have but there doesn't seem to be a reason why my values must proceed from this fact. I have a theory where an old book tells me what I should value. What argument is there to dissuade me? Moreover, contractarianism is hardly the only normative theory which uses this fact as a starting point. Indeed, the other theory I have in mind, communitarianism, is often sympathetic to certain kinds of social conservative positions!

On this view, the features of social contracts that would make for more general agreement - such as protection from murder - can be treated differently from features of these contracts that would make for narrower (temporally and geographically local) agreement.

True, you can treat them differently. But the social conservative wants to treat them the same.

One way to formalize this intuition is Rawls' veil of ignorance.

Rawls is formalizing our intuitions about justice in a liberal society. But it is exactly that-- a popular intuition. I share this intuition. But there is nothing in rationality (as we mean the term, here) that compels that intuition if you don't already hold it. If you believe in liberal justice it is indeed irrational to oppose polyamory. The point is, lots of people aren't Rawlsian liberals!

Replies from: Morendil
comment by Morendil · 2010-03-16T09:56:48.569Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Looping back to the starting point of this discussion, from which we are in danger of drifting too far, what I wanted to say is that people who take an intolerant position on the subject of (say) homosexuality do not seem to do so after having held up their own ethical intuitions to anything like the kind of scrutiny you and others here are clearly capable of.

Rather, they seem to rationalize an immediate "eww" reaction and look for any ammunition they can find supporting their intution that "people shouldn't do that". That strikes me as irrational. This comment seemed to be saying much the same thing.

My stance, I guess, could be summarized as "Show me someone who has rational reasons to oppose homosexuality, or polyamory." That is, consistent reasons, stable under reflection.

Replies from: mattnewport, Jack, SilasBarta
comment by mattnewport · 2010-03-16T16:25:30.761Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The best general argument for conservativism I've encountered is that we should pay attention to established social customs and innate moral intuitions because the world is a complex place and practices that persist over time probably exist for a good reason. The fact that we don't fully understand the reason for a practice is not enough to discard it, we should exercise caution when messing with established customs because we don't fully understand what customs are key to society achieving whatever level of success it has so far achieved.

I don't fully buy this argument but I think it has some merit. Thus it is not necessarily irrational to see an intuitive "eww" reaction as a reason to think that we should exercise caution when liberalizing attitudes towards the provoking practice. I think the generous interpretation of the social conservative attitude to homosexuality is that the "eww" reaction probably exists for some 'good' reason and should not be totally ignored. Generating hypotheses to explain why the "eww" is beneficial is not necessarily an irrational first step to understanding what's really going on.

Relatively few social conservatives can articulate this argument but some can and I don't think it is fair to dismiss them as irrational. Indeed the more thoughtful conservatives tend to think that most people are not capable of thinking rationally about the costs and benefits of certain behaviours and so social customs must do the work of preserving the 'good' society.

Replies from: Rain, Richard_Kennaway, Morendil
comment by Rain · 2010-03-16T16:28:00.210Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There are two kinds of fools:
One says, "This is old therefore it is good."
The other one says, "This is new therefore it is better."

-- John Brunners

Replies from: SilasBarta, wnoise
comment by SilasBarta · 2010-03-16T17:57:32.287Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

mattnewport's comment was much more broad and insightful than "This is old therefore it is good".

His point (paraphrasing the general conservative thesis) is that social customs arise as solutions to difficult problems and have highly immodular interplay. Therefore, before relaxing them, you should at least identify what problem it was (believed to be) solving, and how it interplays with the other customs and factors (including the ick factor in others).

In the case of homosexuality, the taboo against it is extremely common across cultures, which suggests some kind of mechanism like, "Cultures that didn't have a taboo against it were outbred or otherwise dominated by a more populous culture."

Of course, no one actually argues for such a taboo against it today on that basis, though it has the trappings of a good argument: "If we don't have pro-reproduction customs, we'll be unable to withstand the memetic overload from cultures that do, and will be unable to perpetuate our values across generations." (Several European countries provide good examples of cultures slowly losing their ability to protect Western values by being outbred by those who don't share those values.)

But even so, if this is the concern, there are much better, Pareto-surperior ways to go about it: e.g., require everyone to either have children, help with the raising of other's children, or pay a tax after a certain age that goes toward relieving the burden of others' childbearing.

Unfortunately, the debate on the issue is nowhere near this point.

Replies from: Rain
comment by Rain · 2010-03-17T16:55:43.296Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm sorry if you felt I was advocating a position when instead I understood and was in agreement with his points. I was merely supplying an interesting quote about half of them.

I do not appreciate being called a fool when you make no attempt to discern my reasoning.

Replies from: SilasBarta
comment by SilasBarta · 2010-03-17T17:02:14.004Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Tell me what reasoning I was supposed to find your comment, as it related to the parent's point, and if we can agree there's something non-foolish about it, I'll revise my comment. Sound good?

Replies from: Rain, FAWS
comment by Rain · 2010-03-17T17:17:03.383Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There are two kinds of fools:

One says, "This is old therefore it is good.": Conservatism, when the person is holding beliefs for irrational reasons (fear, ick-factor, a desire to avoid all change, etc.)

The other one says, "This is new therefore it is better.": Change advocates, when they fail to take into account the possibility that conservative positions may be robust or long standing solutions to difficult problems that made sense for a large period of time or in certain cultures.

Both sides can hold the correct position for irrational reasons, and one should put thought into it, and obtain more knowledge, before deciding which is correct.

Replies from: SilasBarta
comment by SilasBarta · 2010-03-19T14:53:01.439Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

So it didn't say anything that the parent of your quotation comment hadn't already said?

Replies from: Rain
comment by Rain · 2010-03-19T15:00:37.520Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yes. It's almost as if I was merely supplying an interesting quote.

And as much as I do not appreciate being called a fool when you make no attempt to discern my reasoning, likewise, I do not appreciate passive aggressive questions whose intent is apparently to state my comment is worthless to you.

I'm sorry that I took the valuable 4 seconds it took to read the quote, and that it spawned this subthread where you have continued to complain about my posting of the comment. I'm sorry that it bothers you enough that you feel the need to indirectly call me a fool, and to indirectly say my comment is worthless.

Replies from: SilasBarta
comment by SilasBarta · 2010-03-19T15:12:55.518Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I apologize for giving you grief about the quote.

When I initially saw it, the tone of the quote seemed to reveal a lack of assimilation of the insight mattnewport gave; to the extent that the quote is doing so in this context, such oversimplification does count as a (3rd) kind of foolishness. I do not, however, deem you a fool.

While I still don't think the quote was helpful, I will remove the remark that implies you are a fool. And, as standard practice, I didn't mod down any of your comments in this thread because I was involved in the thread's argument.

Please do not take offense.

comment by FAWS · 2010-03-17T17:14:59.872Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"Discrimination when considering changing things is important" is what I got from it.

comment by wnoise · 2010-03-16T16:48:36.456Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That is a severe undercounting of types of fools.

Replies from: Rain
comment by Rain · 2010-03-16T16:49:45.976Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There are 1 types of people in the world: those who start indexes at 0, and those who don't.

-- Unknown

Replies from: rhollerith_dot_com
comment by RHollerith (rhollerith_dot_com) · 2010-03-16T17:28:56.269Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There are 1 types of people in the world: those who start indexes at 0, and those who don't.

Lame quote because everyone I have ever met who starts indexes at 0 says "2 types": it is just that they call them Type 0 and Type 1 instead of Type 1 and Type 2.

ADDED. I am not saying that writers should start indexes at 0, just that the fact alluded to in the quote (that, e.g., the "1" in "Type 1", is different from "2") is not a good reason for avoiding the practice. A good reason to avoid the practice is that diverging from a long-standing stylistic convention distracts without contributing anything substantial to your point.

Replies from: Rain
comment by Rain · 2010-03-17T16:50:10.353Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It's a joke.

Replies from: wedrifid, rhollerith_dot_com, thomblake
comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-18T02:40:19.391Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I approve of the potential for humor and found the joke amusing until I noticed that it is flawed.

  • You can start your indexes anywhere. 0 and 1 are the most common but I have had occasion to use others. (Not technically contradicted by the joke but enough to make it lame... you just have to count the types after the colon and ignore the number).
  • It doesn't matter how you index it, the size is not altered. {0 => "a", 1 => "b"}.size = 2. {1 => "a", 2=>"b"}.size = 2. (I say this to elevate it from rhollerith's "everyone I have ever met" to "everyone who isn't wrong".)

Then I noticed that the humor itself is a powerful persuader, it nearly distracted me from both those obvious flaws despite their familiarity with the subject. The fact that pointing this out would in most contexts be a faux pas demonstrates a risk that the abuse of humor entails. In fact, even here the "It's a joke" reply is upvoted to 3. Humor as a conversation halter is (epistemically) undesirable when it conveys false meaning.

Replies from: Caspian, Rain
comment by Caspian · 2010-03-21T06:14:33.742Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I thought the error in logic contributed to the humour in the joke. A perfect parallel to a joke I'd already heard (the binary one) would be less amusing.

I saw the joke before the context so I can't really say how it affected the conversation, but it didn't look sufficiently related to the parent to be either misleading or informative about how many types of fools there are. At worst it could be distracting.

I agree with you about jokes in general having a risk of being misleading. I think a good response to a joke that's misleading in a way you care about is to acknowledge that it's a joke and respond seriously anyway. And distinguish between replying to the joke and the joke-teller, unless you're willing to assume the teller agrees with the joke's implications.

This advice is targeted at the context of lesswrong discussions, where the joke's been there for minutes or hours,. I don't know that it would be a faux pas in general, but it would changing conversation tone to a serious mood to respond in real-time like that. Also I don't know that I'd use it in a hostile environment.

comment by Rain · 2010-03-18T02:54:43.108Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What would be your suggestion for repairing the situation?

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-18T03:13:28.866Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Ignore it. At the margin such effort would be far better spent on bigger, easier to fix issues. On average humor seems (to me) to push away from bullshit rather than towards it so counters would need to be fine tuned.

Something most of us do automatically is reduce association with people who don't share our sense of humor. People who actively use humor for anti-epistemic purposes (ie. not you) I tend to avoid unconscously. They feel evil.

comment by RHollerith (rhollerith_dot_com) · 2010-03-17T21:55:27.907Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It would probably work well if you rattle it off quickly in a real-time conversation because it would show that you are engaged and have some wits about you, but what does it contribute to a conversation in which participants have hours to formulate a reply before the reply becomes stale?

Maybe I'm missing something: is there a truth or half-truth buried in, "There are 1 types of people in the world: those who start indexes at 0, and those who don't," that I have missed?

Replies from: Rain
comment by Rain · 2010-03-17T22:10:34.993Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

what does it contribute to a conversation in which participants have hours to formulate a reply before the reply becomes stale?

The potential for humor. Is this not an acceptable purpose on Lesswrong? If so, I will cease posting potentially humorous or interesting quotes and other miscellany outside of Quote and Open Threads.

Replies from: mattnewport, rhollerith_dot_com, wedrifid, rhollerith_dot_com
comment by mattnewport · 2010-03-17T22:57:20.617Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't think most people object to humour here, I think the complaint was not that this was a joke but that it was not a very good joke.

I don't think it's a very good joke for the same reason as rhollerith but then I'm a dyed-in-the-wool C++ programmer so I can't understand why anyone would start indexes at 1...

comment by RHollerith (rhollerith_dot_com) · 2010-03-17T23:18:05.065Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Speaking just for myself -- well, speaking for myself and for anyone who upvotes this comment -- I have a slight preference for you to restrict your humor and interesting quotes to Rationality Quotes, which by the way I do not read. (I do not have a way to avoid reading humorous comments in Open Thread without avoiding all the other comments there.)

comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-18T02:36:47.727Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I approve of the potential for humor and found the joke amusing until I noticed that it is flawed.

  • You can start your indexes anywhere. 0 and 1 are the most common but I have had occasion to use others.
  • It doesn't matter how you index it, the size is not altered. {0 => "a", 1 => "b"}.size = 2. {1 => "a", 2=>"b"}.size = 2.

Then I noticed that the humor itself is a powerful persuader, it nearly distracted me from both those obvious flaws despite their familiarity with the subject. The fact that pointing this out would in most contexts be a faux pas demonstrates a risk that the abuse of humor entails.

comment by RHollerith (rhollerith_dot_com) · 2010-03-17T23:20:07.256Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I hope I have not made you feel unwelcome, Rain. I find what you have to say interesting in general, and I am glad you are here.

ADDED. And I admire anyone who donates to the Singularity Institute.

Replies from: Rain
comment by Rain · 2010-03-18T02:20:32.419Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I have found the persona required to interact positively with this community to be very different than the others I have adopted in the past, and the scrutiny is merciless.

Which is to say, I have mixed feelings on the matter, and am willing to continue engagement.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-18T02:26:33.552Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I am intrigued and wonder how much my experience matches yours. Are there any observations you would be willing to share?

Replies from: Rain
comment by Rain · 2010-03-18T02:52:42.977Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

1) Use longer sentences and bigger words. The community appears to react favorably to academic styling in prose.

2) State all the givens. Things which I believed would be understood automatically and omitted to save time are much more likely to be picked apart as flaws, where the other person assumes I have not thought the matter through.

3) Be careful about how much you share. People here are far more willing to do research and analysis to pick apart every claim you make, even if its a metaphor, and they will look into your background. Any of the information you've posted can and will be used against (for?) you. Alternately, this same point should be used as a suggestion for how to treat other posters. Link to their previous comments and any evidence regarding their claims.

4) Don't let your rationality slip due a sense of comradery. I feel that this community doesn't treat commenters as friends; rather, it feels more like being treated as a coworker who is on the clock. As Morendil phrased it, "I wish someone had told me, quite plainly [...] this is a rationality dojo."

That's off the top of my head and in no particular order. There are other aspects I'm still developing which do not have a formal definition.

Replies from: komponisto, Morendil, ciphergoth, wedrifid, Jack
comment by komponisto · 2010-03-18T03:39:03.638Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

2) State all the givens. Things which I believed would be understood automatically and omitted to save time are much more likely to be picked apart as flaws, where the other person assumes I have not thought the matter through.

Yes -- I have seen this so many times!

It's particularly frustrating, because encountering it feels like discovering that you've overestimated your audience at the same time that they've underestimated you.

4) Don't let your rationality slip due a sense of comradery. I feel that this community doesn't treat commenters as friends; rather, it feels more like being treated as a coworker who is on the clock. As Morendil phrased it, "I wish someone had told me, quite plainly [...] this is a rationality dojo."

I've noticed this too, and I long for the day when our rationality skills have advanced to the point where we can be rational and nice.

I haven't really seen 3), and EY's posts undermine 1) significantly, it seems to me.

Replies from: Rain, gregconen, Jack
comment by Rain · 2010-03-18T14:27:53.319Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

EY's posts undermine 1) significantly, it seems to me.

Of his most recently posted articles: Undiscriminating Skepticism scores at a Flesch-Kincaid grade level 17 and a Gunning Fog index of 17.9, You're Entitled to Arguments is at 16 and 17.8, and Outside View as Conversation Halter is at 14 and 14.5. Note that a score of 15+ is considered academic writing by these measures. Tests of his recently upvoted comments show scores ranging from 7 to 20.

Here's the Flesch-Kincaid calculator I used, and the Gunning Fog calculator. I would be surprised if other measures of readability, and tests of his other posts, did not show it to be academic-level writing.

Replies from: komponisto, Richard_Kennaway
comment by komponisto · 2010-03-18T18:03:15.740Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Of his most recently posted articles: Undiscriminating Skepticism scores at a Flesch-Kincaid grade level 17 and a Gunning Fog index of 17.9,

"Undiscriminating Skepticism" -- why, that's ten (10) syllables right there in the title! My head is already spinning!

Seriously: tests like those do not control for the content or subject matter of the writing. There exists, furthermore, a significant subset of the (adult!) human population who would consider a phrase like "undiscriminating skepticism" itself to be difficult and unusually abstract. Needless to say, tests which heavily weight the judgements of such people are not very useful for the purpose of judging "readability" in most contexts here.

If you want to judge the readability of LW posts, I suggest spending some time reading typical articles published in academic journals.

Replies from: Rain
comment by Rain · 2010-03-18T18:24:55.550Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"Undiscriminating Skepticism" -- why, that's ten (10) syllables right there in the title! My head is already spinning!

You're right! It's agonizing! Oh the pain of posting and reading here! My mouth is bloodied. You have defeated me, oh wise and amazing person who obviously knows better and is fully within their right to ridicule every attempt I make to explain the use of a single word in a sentence whose structure is still largely intact, as it was meant to be a frickin' suggestion.

good jorb.

Replies from: CronoDAS
comment by CronoDAS · 2010-04-27T05:57:42.316Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

(addresses both of the posters above)

Wow, sarcasm. That's original.

comment by Richard_Kennaway · 2010-03-18T15:34:32.157Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I would be surprised if other measures of readability, and tests of his other posts, did not show it [Eliezer's postings] to be academic-level writing.

And yet I find his writing a model of clarity here, despite a few randomly chosen articles by other people having a far lower Fog Index. How useful are these indices? On the Gunning Fog page it says "The higher the Fog Index the trickier it is to read." But the Wiki pages for these tests reference no empirical studies.

Replies from: Rain
comment by Rain · 2010-03-18T16:57:23.366Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I find his writing to be very readable as well. However, I consider myself highly educated, with excellent English skills, and I have been following his writing for some years now.

I was deferring to experts in the field of readability, and considered it likely that they would provide a better measure than self-reports of "looks fine to me."

Further, it seems likely to me that Eliezer is very good at targeting his audience and maintaining interest despite the complexity of his prose. Academic doesn't mean "boring" by necessity. One of the references from the Gunning Fog page states:

Although we have often given permission for reprinting the Fog Index, our means of measuring reading difficulty, we have sometimes cringed at the use made of it. In our work, we emphasize that the Fog Index is a tool, not a rule. It is a warning system, not a formula for writing. Testing without the support of analysis based on experience can be detrimental.

And yes, I do realize that this criticism can be applied to my own use of the tool, but point out that the measure directly supports my initial statement: "Use longer sentences and bigger words," with the caveat that you should also be a good writer, to ensure the complexity doesn't hinder the message. Or I could add, only do this if you can get away with it (still be a successful communicator).

I'd also like to point out that this feels like a good example of the dojo-style response to my clumsy use of a single word: academic.

comment by gregconen · 2010-03-18T03:47:14.942Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

EY's posts undermine (1) significantly

What works for EY may not work for everyone else. For better or worse, he enjoys a special status in this community.

Replies from: komponisto
comment by komponisto · 2010-03-18T04:00:10.980Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

For better or worse, [EY] enjoys a special status in this community.

A status earned precisely by writing posts that people enjoy reading!

If you're suggesting that the ordinary academic/intellectual norm of only allowing high-status people to write informally, with everyone else being forced to write in soporific formal-sounding prose, is operative here, then I suggest we make every effort to nip that in the bud ASAP.

This is a blog; let's keep it that way.

comment by Jack · 2010-03-18T03:48:37.974Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It's particularly frustrating, because encountering it feels like discovering that you've overestimated your audience at the same time that they've underestimated you.

It feels the same way from the other end too! I.e. "Really? I have to explain this to you?"

comment by Morendil · 2010-03-18T08:11:54.996Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There's definitely a martial feel to the way this community requires you to earn its respect, rather than granting it to you almost immediately upon uttering the appropriate shibboleths as is common elsewhere. I'm not sure that's a bad thing.

Sometimes I feel that upvotes are wordless substitutes for what would otherwise be verbal "strokes" of appreciation; the community prefers when words are used to convey info rather than good vibes.

I would add a 5) which really surprised me when I noticed it: link, link, link. This is a community which lives less than others in an ever-flowing present, but instead constantly strives to weave together past, present and future thought and discourse. That could well be an explanation for your 3.

I feel perfectly at home with 1) as long as it doesn't reach the passive-voice level of academic styling. I see the writing style here as literate rather than academic. ;)

comment by Paul Crowley (ciphergoth) · 2010-03-18T20:47:08.248Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Perhaps I'm just being oblivious, but only the first of these ring true for me.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-18T21:07:09.411Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Actually, to me, the first seems rather like a G* for the G that is precision and the third and fourth seem like ordinary, fully-general good advice.

It might be worth noting that all are fundamentally comparative - it could be that your starting point on 2-4 is sufficiently different to Rain's as to render them inapt.

comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-18T03:08:57.735Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Good list. I was going to say "in particular, 3)" but 2, 3 and 4 all seem to be vying for first spot. I've certainly noticed that any forays into comradery seem to backfire. I don't notice 1) but that is probably because I have instead stopped noticing the converse.

comment by Jack · 2010-03-18T03:32:14.714Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

the other person assumes I have not thought the matter through.

It is sometimes very difficult detect expertise and to communicate it. This would be a very helpful skill to improve on but I have no idea how.

1) Use longer sentences and bigger words. The community appears to react favorably to academic styling in prose.

I guess this is right. I tend to very rapidly adapt the style of writing or talking of people around me. I feel like I manage to get in a fair amount of levity, though. Somehow "True story: my lesbian roommate runs mad game" got 5 karma. Sometimes I think, informal language is a way people here highlight really important messages. You'll see really informal bumper-stickers to summarize academic style posts, I guess because informal language stands out from the formal.

Don't let your rationality slip due a sense of comradery.

This makes me sad. It hasn't felt quite that bad to me, still sad that people feel this way though.

Have you thought about which of these you would change?

Replies from: Rain
comment by Rain · 2010-03-18T14:47:41.983Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Have you thought about which of these you would change?

They were observations about how I've had to alter myself to fit in successfully. I wasn't trying to judge whether they were good or bad, and I'm not sure any of them really need changing.

The only thing I'd look into further is the amount of time people spend "on the clock" or sparring in the dojo, preferring a bit more tolerance of lighter material. But this desire appears at odds with the standards of the community, as it seems to consider lighter material as pure noise in the signal/noise ratio, and there's a high demand for signal.

To appease both desires, perhaps improve on the Open Thread-style areas. Forums? More easily followed thread structures? Allowance for 'OpenThread' tagged, top-level posts with separate 'recent' threads? I'm not sure what specific action to suggest.

comment by thomblake · 2010-03-17T17:37:49.234Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Right, but it's obviously inferior to the common "There are 10 types of people in the world: those who use binary, and those who don't."

comment by Richard_Kennaway · 2010-03-16T18:46:35.617Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Or as G. K. Chesterton may have put it:

Never tear down a fence until you know why it was put up in the first place.

(It's a good summary of the linked passage, but I can't find evidence that he ever expressed it in this form, which is variously attributed.)

comment by Morendil · 2010-03-16T16:41:44.505Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That is perhaps a good argument in favor of conservatism in general, but it falls short of my request to point at someone who has rational reasons to oppose homosexuality, at the very least as practiced in private.

I'm not saying that anyone who opposes, say, gay marriage or gay adoption is irrational by virtue of having that position. But it seems clear that people who allow their "eww" reaction to become an excuse to "pick on the queer", as is seen for instance in cases of workplace harassment, are simply not using their heads, to put it mildly.

Replies from: Larks, mattnewport
comment by Larks · 2010-03-19T15:23:35.627Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If you believed that

  • The level of homosexuality could be reduced through taboos (for example, if people chose to be gay)
  • Homosexuals have fewer children than heterosexuals
  • You were a total utilitarian, or wanted to ensure your culture wasn't out-competed.
  • a few trivial other beliefs, like that gay people didn't have unusually high positive externalities)

then you might oppose homosexuality, including as practiced in private.

Disclaimer: I do not hold the above view, for fairly standard Libertarian reasons, and also do not believe all the premises are true.

Replies from: NancyLebovitz, SilasBarta
comment by NancyLebovitz · 2010-03-19T15:52:08.937Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There's one more belief needed for that complex to make sense-- that the costs (both to homosexuals and to heterosexuals) of suppressing homosexuality are low enough to counterbalance the benefits.

Replies from: Larks
comment by Larks · 2010-03-19T15:58:44.079Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I was considering adding it in, but I think the costs of the missed 'lives worth living' would likely exceed it greatly, assuming the first premise is true.

Edit: I just editted it in, and then re-removed it. Firstly, it makes the whole thing trivial, and secondly, I was only presenting a sketch of a case- really, we'd need a cost-benefit analysis. Rather, this is outlining one of the benefits.

Replies from: NancyLebovitz
comment by NancyLebovitz · 2010-03-19T16:10:57.963Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If you're trying to convey a system of thought you don't agree with, you might as well include all the bits and pieces.

The interesting thing about that anti-homosexual argument is it considers the costs of repressing homosexuality to be so low for homosexuals that they aren't even generally conscious for the conservative.

Also, there are costs to non-homosexuals-- frex, it's rough for a heterosexual to be married to a homosexual who'd hoped (with support from their culture) that they'd get over their homosexuality.

And if a homosexual is driven to suicide, it's very hard on their family.

Replies from: mattnewport, Larks
comment by mattnewport · 2010-03-19T17:01:28.346Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

frex

I'm not familiar with this word but I've seen you use it a couple of times now. Google didn't enlighten me either. Is it short for for example?

Replies from: NancyLebovitz
comment by NancyLebovitz · 2010-03-19T17:16:14.724Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yes. I didn't realize it was so rare.

comment by Larks · 2010-03-19T16:19:26.624Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Well, part of the idea may be that you're not repressing, you're curing: they cease to be homosexual. They're ex ante pleased to be cured, and the cost of healing/oppressing is one-time rather than life-long.

Whatever the suicide rate would be, I doubt it's high enough to make up for the loss of potential-children.

Replies from: NancyLebovitz
comment by NancyLebovitz · 2010-03-19T16:51:17.369Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm sure that's part of the premise, but my point was that the low cost is simply assumed rather than examined. Also, the possibility of a failure rate isn't considered.

Replies from: Larks
comment by Larks · 2010-03-19T18:16:37.889Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

None of the premises are examined; they're all assumed. Clearly, as we all agree the argument is unsound at least one of them (including those implied but not delineated) must be false, and it's not particularly important which. What Morendil asked for, more or less, was a rational argument against private homosexuality.

Obviously, no unsound argument should be stable under reflection, but from the point of view of Classical Logic this seems to satisfy the requirements.

If you'd like it more formally, I'll write out all the premises in full and come up with a cost/benefit analysis / natural deduction proof - but it wouldn't help answer the request, because we're not discussing whether or not private homosexuality is bad, but whether there are any (close enough to) rational arguments for the other side.

comment by SilasBarta · 2010-03-19T15:40:26.081Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Mostly agree, but what exactly is "the" libetarian reason for rejecting that chain of reasoning? A libertarian (and I consider myself one) would tend to reject the premises, but not the deductions you made based on the premises.

Also, as a libertarian, do you believe something like, "If rampant homosexuality/ childless/ etc. leads to a libertarian society being undermined and outbred, so be it -- that means the whole program was flawed to begin with"? What's your general position on libertarian-permitted acts that, at the large scale, would undermine the ablity of a society to remain libertarian?

(Btw, Hans-Hermann Hoppe, a "hardcore" libertarian drew a lot of criticism for his position that practioners of non-family-centered lifestyles would have to be "physicallly removed" from a libertarian society for it to function.)

Usual disclaimer: the chain of reasoning you gave still wouldn't justify opposition to homosexuality, but rather, a kind of compromise like I proposed before, where you can either have/adopt children of your own, or pay a tax after a certain age.

Replies from: Larks
comment by Larks · 2010-03-19T16:13:05.010Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Things like the utility homosexuals get from freely expressing themselves, and the various Public Choice problems with implementing the system. But I also think the first premise is false, and third is at least a simplification.

Yes, but that doesn’t mean we couldn’t adopt the nearest stable system, which could be Libertarianism without sexual freedom.

I would bite the HHH bullet and say that we'd have to do something about it. Things like SeaSteading provide non-coercive alternatives, in basically the same way that making property rights totally secure would prevent being outnumbered being a problem.

However, Minarchists are quite happy to accept taxes to defend liberty, and I know the President of the Oxford Libertarians would accept conscription, and I don't think there's that much difference. It may well be that we should adopt a consequentialist deontology: we act in such a way as to maximise rule-following. The danger here is that in breaking rules to try to enforce them, we might undermine them further.

In general, I don't think Libertarianism has much chance without a culture of individual responsibility, quite possibly family-based.

comment by mattnewport · 2010-03-16T17:50:05.945Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That is perhaps a good argument in favor of conservatism in general, but it falls short of my request to point at someone who has rational reasons to oppose homosexuality, at the very least as practiced in private.

I would imagine the general form of an argument to that effect would be that taboos against homosexuality must exist for a reason and despite not fully understanding that reason we should preserve the taboos for fear of causing unintended damage to society. If you are the kind of person who believes that society should formalize its taboos as legal prohibitions then you might support laws against the private practice of homosexuality.

To be clear, I'm a staunch libertarian and so firmly oppose laws against any kind of sexual activity between consenting adults but the libertarian position on prohibitions on the activities of individuals is neutral on the question of whether any activity is in the best long term interests of the participants or on the pros or cons of indirect consequences on society as a whole. I also support the right of an employer to refuse to employ homosexuals or the proprietor of a business to refuse to serve them for example.

It is fairly common on both the left and the right to oppose practices that are considered harmful both through social taboos and through legal prohibition on private activity. The only real difference is in the types of activities that are considered harmful. I see little difference between a social conservative arguing that homosexuality should be illegal because we don't know the potential consequences for society and a left liberal arguing that GM foods should be illegal because we don't know the potential consequences for society. In both cases it arguably should be an empirical question but in practice it is driven largely by the "eww" response in the majority of people.

comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T16:48:07.159Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

My stance, I guess, could be summarized as "Show me someone who has rational reasons to oppose homosexuality, or polyamory." That is, consistent reasons, stable under reflection.

I suggest looking up the views of communitarians on these topics. Some names: David Popenoe, Amitai Etzioni. See this book, and especially this part from Popenoe. tl;dr: The won't go as far as the most bigoted but they're also not cool with just affirming homosexuality and out of wedlock promiscuity. Communitarianism isn't my bag of tea but it has pretty firm theoretical foundations and the research that suggests marriage's importance isn't obviously bunk.

As for those who are just rationalizing an "eww" reaction, their mistake isn't basing their terminal values on disgust, their mistake is trying to justify those values in terms liberals, who don't share their intuition, can understand. "Polyamory should be prohibited because polyamory is immoral" is a consistent position. See Jonathan Haidt's page on the foundations of morality. Most people who object to polyamory and homosexuality are coming from the purity/sanctity foundation (i.e. "ewww!"). But there is nothing rationalist or not rationalist about these intuitions. They're just intuitions like all moral reasons. You and I might have more complicated intuitions that can be formalized in interesting ways and employ philosophers-- But I'm with Hume here, you can't reason your way to morality.

Replies from: mattnewport, Morendil
comment by mattnewport · 2010-03-16T18:05:57.514Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

An interesting related recent post from Haidt regards the similarity between the social conservative attitude to sexual purity/sanctity and the left liberal attitude to food and the environment:

Yet there are enough hints of “liberal purity” scattered about that we at Yourmorals are actively trying to measure it ... It can be seen in the liberal tendency to moralize food and eating, beyond its nutritive/material aspects. (See this fabulous essay by Mary Eberstadt comparing the way the left moralizes food and the right moralizes sex). It can be seen in the way the left treats environmental issues and the natural world as something sacred, to be cared for above and beyond its consequences for human – or even animal—welfare.

comment by Morendil · 2010-03-16T17:46:46.674Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

We should be tolerant of these practices when they are engaged in voluntarily, in private, and do no harm to others.

That's a direct quote from Popenoe, so our very different intuitions are converging to at least some common ground. That's suggestive of something.

I'm with Hume here, you can't reason your way to morality.

Well, there seem to be strong regularities in the moral intutions developed by healthy humans, strong regularities in our terminal values, strong and predictable regularities in our instrumental values (or more precisely what Gary Drescher calls our "delegated values", what Rawls calls "primary social goods", what it is rational to desire whatever else we desire).

Reason is a tool whereby we can expoit these regularities and so compress our discourse about people's claims against each other; I don't see why we should refrain from using that tool merely because the subject of discourse is a particular subset of human intuitions. We do not shy from using it in our analysis of other types of intuitions, and there is nothing which designates "moral thinking" as less subject to analysis than other types of thinking.

Further, there is some evidence that our moral intutions are changing over time; and they are changing in consequence of our thinking about them. In the same way that we have found it useful for our thinking about the material world to incorporate some insights that we now label "rationality", so I expect to find that our thinking about our own moral intutions (which are part of the material world) will also benefit from these insights.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T20:29:13.415Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't think Rawls's work is useless or meaningless. Indentifying regularities in human moral intuitions and applying our reasoning to them to clarify or formalize is a worthwhile enterprise. It can help us avoid moral regret, spot injustice and resolve contradictions. But you can't justify the whole edifice rationally. There isn't any evidence to update on beyond the intuitions we already have. You start with your moral intuitions, you don't adopt all of them as a result of evidence. There is no rationalist procedure for adjudicating disputes between people with different intuitions because there isn't any other evidence to tilt the scale.

comment by SilasBarta · 2010-03-16T18:09:06.429Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I believe my comment here addresses your concern.

Replies from: Morendil
comment by Morendil · 2010-03-16T18:47:38.768Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Actually I come closer to being convinced by this one here, at least for the general case in favor of transcribing taboos into prohibitions.

I do note that both the Popenoe passage linked earlier and the observation that "the taboo against [homosexuality] is extremely common across cultures" run counter to some of the evidence. And that there is plenty of evidence that this and similar taboos, when enforced, are enforced hypocritically.

Replies from: SilasBarta
comment by SilasBarta · 2010-03-16T19:36:22.953Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Actually I come closer to being convinced by this one here, at least for the general case in favor of transcribing taboos into prohibitions.

That links to this comment. Which argument did you mean?

I do note that both the Popenoe passage linked earlier and the observation that "the taboo against homosexuality" is extremely common across cultures" run counter to some of the evidence

The relevant period to look at would be the modern era (post 1500), when new advances would screen off the apparent connection between old taboos as their function. And in that period, it is significant that populations making up most of the world, depsite separation and diversity in other areas, had such a taboo. Yes, places have relaxed taboos since then, but they were all taboos that had a long origin.

And that there is plenty of evidence that this and similar taboos, when enforced, are enforced hypocritically.

What do you mean "hypocritically"? Homosexuals enforcing the taboo? I'll assume you meant "inconsistently", in which case I still think you're not addressing the conservative argument. Of course their enforcement will look inconsistent, because it has long been detached from its original change-in-taboo/consequence feedback loop (like the woman who follows the family tradition of cutting off the ends of a turkey without realizing that the tradition only began in order to be able to fit it into the first generation's small oven).

Nevertheless (the conservative argument goes), you still need to be able to identify the need the taboo filled and its interplay with the other social mechanisms before justifably concluding it's time to end the taboo.

So, I ask you: Do you accept that a culture has to be pro-reproduction to avoid memetic overload from cultures with different values? If so, what would be the limit of the taboos/prohibitions you would want for achieving that end, given the resistance people will put up to different kinds of laws? (e.g. why not make use of people's existing ick-reactions?)

Just to clarify, I'm not defending laws against homosexuality, just pointing out reasonable concerns that underlie the (unjustifiable) prohibitions, since you asked.

Replies from: thomblake, Morendil
comment by thomblake · 2010-03-16T19:57:08.012Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What do you mean "hypocritically"

A google search for:

  • vatican prostitution ring, or

  • anti-gay congressman

should be amusing.

comment by Morendil · 2010-03-16T19:40:58.937Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Edited grandparent to point to correct comment.

What do you mean "hypocritically"?

People imposing the taboo on others are violating it privately.

Do you accept that a culture has to be pro-reproduction to avoid memetic overload from cultures with different values?

I'd have to think about that.

comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T08:16:21.024Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I concur with Morendil that Rawls' "Veil of Ignorance" is a rather elegant way of showing morality to be conditionally objective.

Why would a strict social conservative consent to a contract that allowed me to have sex with multiple partners at the same time?

I think you may be overestimating the consistency of the social conservative viewpoint. If you were to tell them about how, when, where & why they could have sex, they would be outraged - even if you couched it in, say, biblical terms. I don't think many social conservatives really believe that sex is a community matter. They're just applying a good old fashioned double standard. Call them on their own sexual behaviour and they'll rush back to consensual ethics ("none of your business!") so fast you'll see Lorentz contraction.

Replies from: Jack, wnoise
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T09:38:25.635Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I concur with Morendil that Rawls' "Veil of Ignorance" is a rather elegant way of showing morality to be conditionally objective.

I don't know what work "conditionally" is doing here. But I'm pretty sure Rawls himself doesn't take his theory to justice to show that morality is objective. In fact, in A Restatement he explicitly disclaims that he has demonstrated morality is objective. What he is doing is trying to formalize Western/liberal intuitions about justice.

(EDIT: Just checked. The correct interpretation of the initial publication of A Theory of Justice is that Rawls is trying to demonstrate the objective truth of liberalism, but in later publications he changes his mind in response to criticisms and agrees that he is really just formalizing this intuition of justice as fairness)

I think you may be overestimating the consistency of the social conservative viewpoint. If you were to tell them about how, when, where & why they could have sex, they would be outraged - even if you couched it in, say, biblical terms.

I'm certain there are non-hypocritical social conservatives somewhere. I don't think prohibiting polyamory while also allowing measures of sexual privacy are necessarily inconsistent. Holding that some aspect of sexual behavior should be community matters does not require holding that all aspects of sexual behavior must be community matters.

comment by wnoise · 2010-03-16T08:23:20.072Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Lorentz contraction. (Oddly enough, I made the opposite correction a week ago for the Lorenz attractor.)

Replies from: simplicio, simplicio
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T08:25:16.574Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yikes, thanks!

comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T08:24:32.260Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Already corrected. :) It's late.

comment by A1987dM (army1987) · 2012-03-16T13:03:36.203Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I suspect that there are good game-theoretical/TDT reasons for the rule that one shouldn't break promises, so if Alice has promised to Bob that she won't have sex to anybody else, I'd say it'd be wrong for Alice to have sex with Charlie even if both Alice and Charlie are consenting. (But the idea that people should never have sex unless they promise each other to not have sex with anyone else I do find silly.)

comment by Normal_Anomaly · 2011-06-26T20:06:32.486Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I can think of a few possible exceptions (sexual practices that are far enough beyond the pale that even tongue-pierced goths disclaim them, yet which have no rational basis for being banned), but they're too toxic for me to mention.

I for one would like you to mention them.

comment by FAWS · 2010-03-15T15:17:14.391Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It's just as dysfunctional as non-vaginal straight sex is.

Replies from: PhilGoetz
comment by PhilGoetz · 2010-03-15T15:23:14.699Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Your position may be valid; but in the context of the current distribution of opinions on sexuality, it does not in itself signal rationality to me. And that's what we're discussing.

comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-15T14:33:19.576Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Emotionally, I feel I have two tribes: the meatspace upper-middle-class collegiate culture and my Internet circle of acquaintances.

In the meatspace tribe, vanilla heterosexuality or homosexuality are considered normal and unremarkable, things like 2 girls 1 cup, goatse, etc. are considered disgusting/gross-out material - and I cannot remember anyone acknowledging anything else.

In the Internet tribe, sexual relations of any kind between consenting adults are considered fine provided that they are carried out in private, sexual intercourse between teenage minors is considered normal (fine or not may vary), and crossing the line ... well, I haven't heard Snape/Hermione strongly condemned, but pedophilia is definitely out. I note that no-one I know talks about anything involving permanent damage, however.

Replies from: Strange7
comment by Strange7 · 2011-06-27T09:06:00.523Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If you're looking for unusual concepts for use as test cases (and have a strong stomach), I recommend poking around and asking some open-ended questions on gurochan.net. The site has, of necessity, a very diverse and open-minded attitude toward anything which does not directly threaten it's primary objectives.

comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-15T04:01:06.165Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Hi Clarisse, and Welcome to LessWrong! I've seen your blog, and I'm happy to see you commenting here. (I comment as "Doug S." on various feminism-related blogs - I'm not very prolific, but you may have seen a couple here and there.)

Replies from: clarissethorn
comment by clarissethorn · 2010-03-15T10:30:13.142Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Hi Doug! Yes, I remember you. I've actually read a number of posts here, and I've commented once here before, but I was too angry and irrational and in feminist-community mode during that little fracas, so I decided to give myself lots of time to cool off before posting again. (Note that the original post has been edited to the point where it is no longer clear what pissed me off.) (I also discussed some of the cultural differences between this site and the feminist blogosphere that contributed to that blowup in the comments here.)

comment by rwallace · 2010-03-15T14:37:04.773Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Almost every tribe tacitly accepts the assumption that it is healthy and appropriate to have a passionate interest in the sex lives of complete strangers. Disagreement with that assumption would lead me to consider someone to be defending a non-mainstream belief.

comment by Morendil · 2010-03-15T10:16:32.755Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Cultural norm for me is "sexuality is a matter of choice between consenting adults".

Non-mainstream beliefs around sexuality that I'm currently curious about include PUA lore, and this interesting site.

Replies from: NancyLebovitz
comment by NancyLebovitz · 2010-03-15T13:54:15.103Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I agree about what my cultural norm is.

I disagree with it on two points. I'm pretty sure the legal age of consent is set considerably too high, though I'm not sure where it should be, or whether there should be a legal age of consent.

I think the "enthusiastic consent" standard in Yes Means Yes makes sense.

comment by steven0461 · 2010-03-15T03:03:07.379Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Sorry if this is overly tangential

open thread

comment by Morendil · 2010-03-16T12:57:17.200Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

On reflection, polyamory really is just wrong. Count me as a skeptic on this unnatural alliance.

(Yes, yes, I can hear the comebacks already: "Playing with the use-mention distinction" isn't "everything in life, you know".)

Replies from: thomblake, ciphergoth, RobinZ
comment by thomblake · 2010-03-16T13:25:33.948Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Geh - It's the new "pun".

"polyamory" really is just wrong.

Really? Do you have the same problem with "television"? What about zoological binomial nomenclature?

comment by Paul Crowley (ciphergoth) · 2010-03-16T13:37:13.600Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Homosexuality is also wrong, as are many other things...

comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-16T15:13:46.415Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

C'mon - there's much worse than that. "Ombudsperson", for one.

comment by dclayh · 2010-03-15T01:57:48.315Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Huh, I had completely forgotten that P&T did an anti-cryonics bit. Disappointing. On the other hand, their basic point ("Why not spend that $125,000 on hookers?") reminded me of Reedspacer's Lower Bound.

Replies from: sketerpot, Roko, knb
comment by sketerpot · 2010-03-15T07:54:31.725Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There's still hope for Penn and Teller; their last episode is going to be a bunch of miscellaneous retractions for the times they've been wrong on their show. Which is a good sign in itself.

Replies from: gwern
comment by gwern · 2011-07-13T01:14:43.827Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Bullshit! has apparently finished up. Did they do any interesting retractions?

Replies from: saturn
comment by saturn · 2011-07-13T01:31:18.566Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

From Wikipedia:

During an interview on the January 31, 2007 episode of The Skeptics' Guide to the Universe, Teller claimed that the final episode of the show would be about "the bullshit of Bullshit!" and would detail all the criticisms that they themselves had of the show, however the series ended before such an episode ever aired.

Replies from: gwern
comment by gwern · 2011-07-13T01:48:11.451Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Oh. What a pity. I guess the network didn't think it was worth spending money on.

comment by Roko · 2010-03-15T02:17:34.695Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

First, it's only 30,000 for neuro.

Second, your utility in hookers is sublinear. If you have 50,000, spend 20k on hookers and then 30k on neuro. It seems inconcievable that there are many people who have exactly 30,000 free.

I am also disappointed in Penn and teller. But the bar for discriminating truth against much social pressure is very high.

Replies from: khafra, dclayh
comment by khafra · 2010-03-15T14:24:13.505Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

$80K USD for Alcor neuro, $9K for some Russian organization, and $50K for Trans Time, which has a rather shoddy website. Other organizations only seem to offer full-body cryopreservation. What institution charges 30,000?

Replies from: Morendil
comment by Morendil · 2010-03-15T14:28:50.933Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Cryonics Institute. (Edit: they don't offer neuro, but I'm guessing they're the source of the $30K figure.)

comment by dclayh · 2010-03-15T02:49:19.187Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

First, it's only 30,000 for neuro.

I was just quoting P&T's number. That show aired in 2004 so I assumed the price would be lower today (not to mention the neuro discount).

Second, your utility in hookers is sublinear.

Of course, that's why it's a lower bound :)

Replies from: gwern
comment by gwern · 2011-12-02T01:45:32.994Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That show aired in 2004 so I assumed the price would be lower today

Why would you think that?

comment by knb · 2010-03-15T07:08:19.495Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Weirdly, Penn is a teetotaler who doesn't drink (at all) or use drugs. I guess we all wirehead in different ways.

comment by gelisam · 2010-03-19T20:03:19.808Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I've been following Alicorn's sequence on luminousness, that is, on getting to know ourselves better. I had lowered my estimate of my own rationality when she mentioned that we tend to think too highly of ourselves, but now I can bump my estimate back up. There is at least one belief which my tribe elevates to the rank of scientific fact, yet which I think is probably wrong: I do not believe in the Big Bang.

Of course, I don't believe the universe was created a few thousand years ago either. I don't have any plausible alternative hypothesis, I just think that the arguments I have read in the many popular science physics book I have read are inconclusive.

First, these books usually justify the Big Bang theory as follows. Right now, it is an observable fact that stars are currently moving away from each other. Therefore, there was a time in the past where they were much closer. Therefore, there was a time where all the stars in the universe occupied the same point. It is this last "therefore" which I don't buy: there is no particular reason to assume that if the stars are moving away from each other right now, then they must always have done so. They could be expanding and contracting in a sort of sine wave, or something more complicated.

Second, the background radiation which is said to be leftover stray photons from the big bang. If the background radiation was a prediction of Big Bang theory, then I might have been convinced by this experimental evidence, but in fact the background radiation was discovered by accident. Only afterwards did the proponents of Big Bang theory retrofit it as a prediction of their model.

Third, the acceleration. The discovery that the expansion was accelerating was a surprise to the scientific community. In particular, it was not predicted by Big Bang theory, even though it seems like the kind of thing which an explanatory model of the expansion of the universe should have predicted right away.

Fourth, the inflation phase. This part was added later on, once it had been observed that Big Bang theory did not fit with the observed homogeneousness of the cosmos. To me, this seems like a desperate and ad hod attempt to fix a broken theory.

Now, it could be that all these changes are a progression of refinements, just like Newtonian physics was adjusted to take into account the effects of relativity, and just like the spherical Earth was adjusted to make it an elliptical Earth. But the adjustments which Big Bang theory has suffered seem like they should change the predictions completely, rather than, as in the other cases, increasing the precision of the existing theory.

I am, of course, open to being convinced otherwise. If Big Bang theory really is true, then I wish to believe it is true.

Replies from: orthonormal, wedrifid, simplicio
comment by orthonormal · 2010-03-20T18:02:43.467Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

There is no particular reason to assume that if the stars are moving away from each other right now, then they must always have done so. They could be expanding and contracting in a sort of sine wave, or something more complicated.

The key is there at the end of your quote. From the first set of observations (of relatively close galaxies), the simplest behavior that explained the observations was that everything was flying apart fast enough to overcome gravity. This predicted that when they had the technology to look at more distant galaxies, these too should be flying away from us, and at certain rates depending on their distance.

When we actually could observe those more distant galaxies, we did in fact see them red-shifted as predicted. This alone should be enough to put the "sine wave" theory in the epistemic category of "because the Dark Lords of the Matrix like red shifts", because the light left these galaxies at all different times! It would take a vast conspiracy for them all to line up as red-shifted right now, from our perspective.

With strong evidence in hand that the galaxies had been flying apart for billions and billions of years, the scientists then noticed an irregularity: the velocities of those distant galaxies were different from the extrapolation made on the early data! However, they differed in a patterned way, and the simplest way to account for this discrepancy was a variant of Einstein's "cosmological constant" idea.

Additional support for the Big Bang:

  • Stephen Hawking calculated that there would have been no way for matter to fly towards a point, "miss" colliding with itself, and fly apart in an apparent expansion without a singularity and Big Bang. (This is somewhere in A Brief History of Time, but Google Books won't let me find it.)

  • We can roughly estimate our galaxy's age by other means (i.e. how much hydrogen has been used up in stars, how much is left). Have you looked into this, to see whether the estimates thus derived are consistent with the estimate of about 10 billion years that the Big Bang theory implies?

  • Finally, the cosmic background radiation gives us way more than one bit of data; its spectrum is precisely the black-body radiation one expects from a Big Bang.

ETA: Also, this seems like exactly the sort of issue where the "physicist-test" applies, as described above. For example, being critical of QM on common-sense grounds (of course the electron has to go through one slit or the other!) doesn't make for discriminating skepticism, since one should assign high probability to physicists having strong evidence to this effect if they're claiming something weird, or else one should have strong evidence that common sense usually beats the consensus of the physics community. Needless to say, I wouldn't hold my breath on the second claim.

Replies from: gelisam
comment by gelisam · 2010-03-20T23:58:17.889Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You win. I did not realize that we knew that galaxies have been flying apart for billions and billions of years, as opposed to just right now. If something has been going on for so long, I agree that the simplest explanation is that it has always been going on, and this is precisely the conclusion which I thought popular science books took for granted.

Your other arguments only hammer the nail deeper, of course. But I notice that they have a much smaller impact on my unofficial beliefs, even thought they should have a bigger impact. I mean, the fact that the expansion has been going on for at least a billion years is a weaker evidence for the Big Bang than the fact that it predicts the cosmic background radiation and the age of the universe.

I take this as an opportunity to improve the art of rationality, by suggesting that in the case where an unofficial belief contradicts an official belief, one should attempt to find what originally caused the unofficial belief to settle in. If this original internal argument can be shown to be bogus, the mind should be less reluctant to give up and align with the official belief.

Of course, I'm forced to generalize from the sole example I've noticed so far, so for the time being, please take this suggestion with a grain of salt.

Replies from: orthonormal
comment by orthonormal · 2010-03-22T00:53:41.048Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I prefer the meme where you've just won by learning something new; you now know more than most people about the justifications for Big Bang cosmology, in addition to (going meta) the sort of standards for evidence in physics, and (most meta and most importantly) how your own mind works when dealing with counterintuitive claims. I won too, because I had to look up (for the first time) some claims I'd taken for granted in order to respond adequately to your critique.

I take this as an opportunity to improve the art of rationality

Good idea! It's especially helpful, I think, that you're writing out your reactions and your analysis of how it feels to update on new evidence. We haven't recorded nearly as much in-the-moment data as we ought on what it's like to change one's mind...

Replies from: DSimon
comment by DSimon · 2011-03-11T13:47:33.268Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

When two people argue, and they both realize who is actually right, without drama or flaring tempers, then everybody wins. Even people down the block who weren't participating at all, a bit; they don't know it yet, but their world has become slightly awesomer.

comment by wedrifid · 2010-03-20T00:29:52.223Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

but now I can bump my estimate back up. There is at least one belief which my tribe elevates to the rank of scientific fact, yet which I think is probably wrong: I do not believe in the Big Bang.

I don't think we can reasonably elevate our estimate of our own rationality by observing that we disagree with the consensus of a respected community.

Second, the background radiation which is said to be leftover stray photons from the big bang. If the background radiation was a prediction of Big Bang theory, then I might have been convinced by this experimental evidence, but in fact the background radiation was discovered by accident. Only afterwards did the proponents of Big Bang theory retrofit it as a prediction of their model.

I am wary of this kind of argument. I should not be able to discredit a theory by the act of collecting all possible evidence and publishing before they have a chance to think things through.

Replies from: gelisam
comment by gelisam · 2010-03-20T15:44:24.347Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't think we can reasonably elevate our estimate of our own rationality by observing that we disagree with the consensus of a respected community.

But isn't Eliezer suggesting, in this very post, that we should use uncommon justified beliefs as an indicator that people are actually thinking for themselves as opposed to copying the beliefs of the community? I would assume that the standards we use to judge others should also apply when judging ourselves.

On the other hand, what you're saying sounds reasonable too. After all, crackpots also disagree with the consensus of a respected community.

The point is that there could be many reasons why a person would disagree with a respected community, one of which is that the person is actually being rational and that the community is wrong. Or, as seems to be the case here, that the person is actually being rational but hasn't yet encountered all the evidence which the community has. In any case, given the fact that I'm here, following a website dedicated to the art of rationality, I think that in this case rationality is quite a likely cause for my disagreement.

I should not be able to discredit a theory by the act of collecting all possible evidence and publishing before they have a chance to think things through.

I agree that if a piece of evidence is published before it is predicted, this is not evidence against the theory, but it does weaken the prediction considerably. Therefore, please don't publish this entire collection of all possible evidence, as it will make it much harder afterwards to distinguish between theories!

Replies from: thezeus18
comment by thezeus18 · 2010-03-21T00:19:50.559Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"But isn't Eliezer suggesting, in this very post, that we should use uncommon justified beliefs as an indicator that people are actually thinking for themselves as opposed to copying the beliefs of the community? I would assume that the standards we use to judge others should also apply when judging ourselves.

On the other hand, what you're saying sounds reasonable too. After all, crackpots also disagree with the consensus of a respected community."

Eliezer didn't say that we should use "disagreeing with the consensus of a respected community" as an indicator of rationality. He said that we should use disagreeing with the consensus of one's own community as an indicator of rationality.

comment by simplicio · 2010-03-20T07:55:44.392Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If the background radiation was a prediction of Big Bang theory, then I might have been convinced by this experimental evidence, but in fact the background radiation was discovered by accident. Only afterwards did the proponents of Big Bang theory retrofit it as a prediction of their model.

Not true; Alpher & Gamow predicted the radiation, although they were off by a few kelvins.

there is no particular reason to assume that if the stars are moving away from each other right now, then they must always have done so. They could be expanding and contracting in a sort of sine wave, or something more complicated.

True, but this lacks parsimony, & the mechanism by which the "sine wave" (or whatever) could be produced is unknown. The universe is expanding now, implying some force behind the expansion. Gravity is attractive only. Celestial objects almost all have net electric charge as close to 0 as makes no odds, so they do not repel each other. The strong nuclear force is always attractive too. You see what I mean? What could possibly cause the outward oscillation, if not extreme density? It's not like when stars come close to each other they suddenly feel a repulsion.

I don't see how you can make sense of this without the Big Bang, except by positing unknown physical forces or something.

Very interesting post though. You seem curious; I'd recommend Jonathan Allday's book "Quarks, Leptons & the Big Bang" on this subject. It's reasonably technical, given that it's not a textbook.

Replies from: gelisam
comment by gelisam · 2010-03-20T14:52:33.891Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Thanks! I had only heard about the accidental discovery by two Bell employees of an excess measurement which they could not explain, but now that you mention that it was in fact predicted, it's totally reasonable that the Bell employees simply did not know about the scientific prediction at the moment of their measurement. I should have read Wikipedia.

The probability of predicting something as strange as the background radiation given that the theory on which the prediction is based is fundamentally flawed seems rather low. Accordingly, I should update my belief in the Big Bang substantially. But actually updating on evidence is hard, so I don't feel convinced yet, even though I know I should. For this reason, I will read the book you recommended, in the hope that its contents will manage to shift my unofficial beliefs too. Thanks again!

comment by Eoghanalbar · 2010-09-03T03:31:16.113Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Awesome. =]

If say, "This isn't about a test of rationality itself, but a test for true free-thinking. All good rationalists must be free-thinkers, but not all free-thinkers are necessarily good rationalists", is that a good summary?

comment by CarlShulman · 2010-05-01T21:21:26.993Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Here's a discussion of this post at the James Randi forums. Reaction seems net negative with high variance: http://forums.randi.org/showthread.php?p=5726673

comment by PhilGoetz · 2010-03-24T20:30:17.547Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If you disagree with your tribe, you get rationality points for independent thinking; but you lose rationality points for failing to update. Is the total positive or negative?

comment by nazgulnarsil · 2010-03-15T19:55:21.318Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Democracy is my litmus test.

Replies from: FAWS
comment by FAWS · 2010-03-15T20:04:25.565Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Do you mean being willing to consider the possibility that some other form of government might be better at pursuing the interests of a society as a whole?

People also value democracy simply for being democratic, so saying that democracy is best is to some extent just stating your values.

Replies from: nazgulnarsil
comment by nazgulnarsil · 2010-03-15T20:27:05.402Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yeah, but even just in people's reaction to the topic. I try to avoid framing the issue and just feel people out. For example I would take someone responding to the subject like you did to be a very positive sign. Someone immediately jumping to the possibility of alternatives followed by a reasoning on how normative statements work is not exactly a common reaction.

comment by aretae · 2010-03-15T16:08:44.775Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This is clearly a good way to do skepticism, if you're going to do it. However, I wonder, at my blog (http://aretae.blogspot.com/2010/03/cognitive-antivirus.html), whether skepticism is generally wise at all, and whether religion is a much more useful and effective cognitive antivirus system (especially for the only normally intelligent) than anyone else here seems to give it credit for.

Replies from: CronoDAS, simplicio
comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-15T20:42:57.801Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

In matters not related to Catholic dogma, the Catholic Church is (or at least used to be) a consistently skeptical organization.

comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T02:32:11.535Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

religion is a much more useful and effective cognitive antivirus system (especially for the only normally intelligent) than anyone else here seems to give it credit for.

That is at least plausible, and it is certainly better in a sense to have one piecewise-sane dogma than to be swept away in a deluge of weird and wacky truth claims about crystals and auras. But problems will arise, in god's good time. The stem cell "controversy" for example is the result of a prima facie pretty innocuous doctrine that life begins at conception. How many more harmless little bits of scripture are waiting in the wings to impede us? Are they not pathogenic as well?

Nonetheless I think you have a point that it's pretty hard to imagine a majority of people adopting the skeptical procedure used here. I think our best hope is actually to press for the private-ization of spirituality: it's "true for you" and "metaphorical." But that will involve a lot of training our gag reflex.

Replies from: nerzhin
comment by nerzhin · 2010-03-16T14:42:44.187Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The stem cell "controversy" for example is the result of a prima facie pretty innocuous doctrine that life begins at conception.

Let's suppose that cryonically preserved human brains are found to be especially useful for the treatment of several terrible diseases, because of some quirk of the vitrification process. Should we haul out cryonically suspended people and use them for medicine?

Replies from: simplicio, Strange7
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T14:55:54.812Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think this is pretty disanalogous. We're basically talking about killing people who are unconscious in the cryonics case, versus harvesting non-to-semi-differentiated cells in the other.

Let me clarify that although ''life" is a good, quick word, it doesn't really capture what we value morally, which is mind or consciousness. That's why we don't cry when our appendix is taken out, and why we remove people from ventilators when they're braindead, even though they are "still alive" in the sense of breathing and having a pulse. A frozen brain is a conscious entity that's temporarily unconscious. The stem cells never were in the first place.

You have to choose if you value actual fellow humans, or just fetishize that blip on a monitor.

Replies from: nerzhin
comment by nerzhin · 2010-03-16T15:17:38.448Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You basically answered my question when you said

what we value morally, which is mind or conciousness.

But I'm going to pick at you one more time and then shut up. Both an embryo and a cryonically suspended person are presently unconcious. If what you value is past conciousness, then there's no problem, you're consistent. If you value potential (or long-future) conciousness, there might be a problem. I'm guessing that you value short-future conciousness - a suspended person (or a sleeping person) can in principle be concious in five minutes, while an embryo cannot.

The next stage of the argument asks about infants and animals and so on, but I said I'd shut up.

Replies from: simplicio, Rain
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T16:08:13.030Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm guessing that you value short-future conciousness - a suspended person (or a sleeping person) can in principle be concious in five minutes, while an embryo cannot.

I think there is a more salient difference, which is that it's not the embryo that will be conscious in ~20 weeks, whereas it is the brain.

The next stage of the argument asks about infants and animals and so on, but I said I'd shut up.

By all means continue, I always enjoy parsing these things. My friends are so sick of hearing about trolley cases they'd throw themselves on the tracks.

Replies from: nerzhin
comment by nerzhin · 2010-03-16T19:31:44.013Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

it's not the embryo that will be conscious in ~20 weeks, whereas it is the brain.

I don't understand this. What specifically is the important difference between embryo (now) and non-embryo (in 20 weeks)? Conciousness? Memories? Physical structure? How is it that they are different things, while brain (now) and brain (future) are the same thing?

Replies from: simplicio
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T23:11:24.495Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What specifically is the important difference between embryo (now) and non-embryo (in 20 weeks)? Conciousness? Memories? Physical structure?

Consciousness. Basically, I want to know if there is a reflective "experiencer" there to care about. If not, I don't give the thing moral standing.

Your cryonically frozen brain presents an odd situation, because the experiencer is sort of "paused." But I think it's still clear that in killing that brain you're ending somebody's (conscious) life prematurely.

I like this discussion for its own sake, but I am curious: do you disagree with something I've said? Or are we just monkeying with scenarios for the sheer hell of it? (Not that that is in any way a bad thing - they are lots of fun.)

Replies from: nerzhin
comment by nerzhin · 2010-03-17T13:55:37.122Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If I understand you correctly, you are arguing that the suspended brain is concious (just "paused", as you say). So there is some property of a system that we can call "concious" even if it's asleep, suspended, etc., and that embryos (before 20 weeks or so) lack this property.

If this a fair statement, I don't have anything more to say. The infants, animals etc. stuff is being covered in the "infanticide" sub-thread on this page.

Mostly we're monkeying with scenarios for the fun of it. I have somewhat less certainty than you about embryonic stem cell research - I estimate some chance that it is morally problematic.

comment by Rain · 2010-03-16T15:38:58.853Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

To maintain consistency in my views on the definition of humanity, I've recently begun arguing that children should not be considered human until around the age of 5. It tends to elicit a laugh and some interesting discussions thereafter, as I present it semi-seriously.

For the cryonics vs. embryo comparison, it would likely be down to the desires of the people involved and the future costs. A suspended consciousness has the potential for many more people who care about it directly as opposed to a hypothetical consciousness which has yet to influence anyone outside its parents, and is typically cared about in the abstract. The cost of reviving a cryonically frozen consciousness is currently unpayable, so it can't really be compared with the cost of generating a whole human from scratch (natural birth).

For the ability to do a real world comparison, I would use the cost of birthing consciousness against the cost of bringing someone back from general anesthesia, which is very close to, and perhaps exactly, suspended consciousness. In that comparison, reviving the anesthetized patient has significantly lower costs and has many more people directly preferring it to occur.

This model also applies different values to different levels of consciousness and amount of experience contained within the mind due to the costs involved in obtaining and verifying it.

Replies from: nerzhin, Rain
comment by nerzhin · 2010-03-16T19:34:37.843Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

To maintain consistency in my views on the definition of humanity, I've recently begun arguing that children should not be considered human until around the age of 5.

I'm intrigued. What specific inconsistency drives you to this? I'm imagining you put a high value on something in order to publicly (even if jokingly) say such a thing, and I'm wondering what that something is.

Replies from: Rain
comment by Rain · 2010-03-17T17:46:02.986Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What specific inconsistency drives you to this?

What sets humanity apart from animals is our conscious mind and ability to reason. Children do not yet possess that full capability, though they typically have the potential for it with the appropriate time and effort. I adjust my values accordingly.

One real world test: Ashley X

comment by Rain · 2010-03-16T16:42:20.671Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Thought experiment to judge the value/cost model:

Imagine if the revival of a cryonically preserved consciousness required, once thawed, sustaining the mind in an expensive machine which played back its memories at a cost of X per minute of life experience. Without this procedure, the mind would be that of a newborn, and with it, they are fully restored.

Further assume that you are alive at the time of this revival, rather than the person who is preserved.

How much X would you pay, if you were able, to revive a loved one? A stranger? At what point does the cost of X exceed the cost of birthing a whole new person to take their place, should you so desire?

Under this model, cryonics is a choice of very low maintenance costs to preserve the mind until such time as X swings in favor of restoring the preserved person, hopefully with the collective action of those whose preferences are inclined toward paying a higher X (cryonics advocacy groups like Alcor).

comment by Strange7 · 2010-03-16T18:32:29.385Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I would say that we should conduct trials on equivalent use of vitrified pig or chimpanzee brains before proceeding, or maybe a nonfunctional mockup of a human brain based on organ-printing techniques. I mean, if somebody discovered that it was possible to get high by snorting powdered high-density hard disks, I'd recommend grinding up blanks rather than the last copy of some valuable data.

Replies from: simplicio
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T23:17:00.110Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Good point, but probably not the Least Convenient Possible World.

Replies from: Strange7
comment by Strange7 · 2010-03-17T00:12:40.409Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If it turns out that pig and chimp brains don't have the same effect, that would be less convenient, yes. I still wouldn't regret having run the trials.

In such a case, the next step would be to run tests on volunteers (that is, suicides) or people sentenced to be executed. If it turns out that criminals and those who wanted to die are also unsuitable, I'll allow people with those horrible diseases to sign up for treatment on the condition that, if it doesn't work, they get their brains vitrified and used to treat the next generation of patients, as a stopgap measure until strictly synthetic treatments becomes available.

The real world is not maximally inconvenient. Training your mind to respond to binary decisions by ruling out any options not explicitly presented is a deliberate subversion of the drive to cheat, which might, in the long term, compromise your ability to win.

More generally, if I were put in some sadistic moral dilemma (say, choosing between rescuing my love-interest or my sidekick) where either option is repugnant but inaction is somehow worse than both of them put together, I've got no reason to believe I'd have either enough knowledge of the consequences or enough time for my moral calculus to run in full. Under those circumstances, I would flip the fairest coin I had handy and decide between the two least-repugnant options on that basis, then try not to get backed into such situations in the future.

Replies from: simplicio
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-17T05:08:01.586Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Training your mind to respond to binary decisions by ruling out any options not explicitly presented is a deliberate subversion of the drive to cheat, which might, in the long term, compromise your ability to win.

That is actually a really good point. Getting in the habit of "accepting the problem as stated" could be a very bad thing.

However, this scenario was contrived right from the beginning. A magical cure from eating frozen brains? Unlikely. It was a question about where to draw the line on the ethical worth of living things, that was illustrated with a little story.

Replies from: Strange7
comment by Strange7 · 2010-03-17T05:22:02.386Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

However, this scenario was contrived right from the beginning.

Not necessarily. I've heard it seriously suggested that societies sufficiently advanced to safely revive cryopreserved people might find ... more interesting things to do with them. "Spare parts" is one of the possibilities.

comment by CassandraR · 2010-03-15T11:39:11.542Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Speaking as someone that has been going to a therapist off and on for the past three years I have come to be pretty skeptical of the idea. Pretty much all the progress I have made in coping with and solving my problems has been on my own. I currently see one mainly because it is required of me by my college and because of the entertainment value of talking about myself for an hour or so.

Replies from: orthonormal
comment by orthonormal · 2010-03-16T01:06:31.399Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Therapy has worked well for me, but usually as a more effective means of rubber ducking, i.e. getting to discuss out loud problems that I'd been ruminating unproductively on. This often makes it clear which parts of my internal monologue actually make sense, and which parts might be covering up for my real priorities. A good therapist can help in other aspects, but I'd say most of the benefit just comes from this phenomenon.

The main reason therapy works for this and talking with friends doesn't is that I'm much more likely to filter my thoughts when talking to a friend, lest it come back to hurt me socially.

(Take this all with a grain of YMMV; I'm not contradicting your experience.)

Replies from: Vladimir_Nesov
comment by Vladimir_Nesov · 2010-03-16T14:55:01.125Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

For the same reason, it helps a lot to honestly write up one's understanding of one's ideas where no one is supposed to see them.

Replies from: orthonormal
comment by orthonormal · 2010-03-17T03:32:00.705Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yup, private journaling helps too; but having a listener is still better.

comment by Liron · 2010-03-15T07:26:57.139Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What are some questions without a standard LW in-group response that I could use to prove my own conclusion-reaching soundness?

I know the Meredith Kurcher murder case has been offered as an example "rationality test".

comment by CarlShulman · 2010-03-15T01:20:54.217Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The "skeptic" tries to scare you away from the belief in their very first opening remarks: for example, pointing out how UFO cults beat and starve their victims (when this can just as easily happen if aliens are visiting the Earth). The negative consequences of a false belief may be real, legitimate truths to be communicated; but only after you establish by other means that the belief is factually false - otherwise it's the logical fallacy of appeal to consequences.

This can be legitimate for a reporter wanting someone to read the story, and to show why the subject of the story matters practically.

Replies from: Eliezer_Yudkowsky
comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-15T03:29:19.896Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Perhaps, but to the same extent, we should discount reporters' accounts as informative or worthy of being taken as serious arguments. In other words, you want to play-a the grownup game, you play-a by the grownup rules; if your editor says you can't, too bad, go sit at the kids' table.

comment by christopherj · 2013-10-14T18:37:27.670Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Want to know if someone is a good rationalist? Ask them what the best arguments are for a belief he strongly opposes on a complex issue. See if the arguments he gives are the strongest ones, or the weak ones. To strongly oppose a belief on a complex issue, requires hearing the best arguments from both sides. Being unaware of the best opposing arguments, or being unwilling to speak them, is pretty good evidence that he let his biases get in the way of his reasoning.

Replies from: TheOtherDave
comment by TheOtherDave · 2013-10-14T19:08:06.029Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It helps if, prior to using this technique, I've given them reason to trust me to be primarily interested in something other than scoring points off of them by "winning" arguments.

comment by JulianMorrison · 2010-03-17T16:22:53.623Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

OK, now here's one that might be interesting. Is there a gap, or is the date a lie?

Replies from: Christian_Szegedy, orthonormal, ciphergoth, RobinZ
comment by Christian_Szegedy · 2010-05-28T03:18:22.846Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This is quite an old "thesis" by Illig originally stemming from a very simple arithmetic misunderstanding. (No: Pope Gregory aligned his calendar to match eastern date as at the time of the Council of Nicaea in 325, not with the original beginning of the Julian calendar)

There is no need for radiocarbon dating to refute it, since a lot of evidence could easily pinpoint it as a crackpot theory, especially:

  • Comparison with historical recordings of oriental (esp. Chinese) civilizations.
  • Synchronization by well known astronomical events, like Halley comet, eclipses, etc
comment by orthonormal · 2010-03-20T18:50:00.800Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Making up an additional 200 years of Roman imperial history, in a way that duped generations of later historians, sounds to me prima facie very unlikely.

comment by Paul Crowley (ciphergoth) · 2010-03-17T16:50:05.136Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Is there ice core data to cover the gap?

EDIT: radiometric dating would present another big problem for this thesis. Still, it's very unfortunate that the dendrochronology data isn't public.

Replies from: JulianMorrison
comment by JulianMorrison · 2010-03-18T04:32:55.055Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Ice core data might provide an interesting test. Smash the dendro temperature values (these are probably available even if the measurements aren't) into shards, and then use techniques of the "shotgun sequencing" variety to reassemble it against the continuous ice core data template. See how it falls into place when there is no human dictating the dates.

comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-17T16:35:13.514Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The data proposed to support the gap is awfully weak - and I think that is the correct response for an educated layperson.

Replies from: JulianMorrison
comment by JulianMorrison · 2010-03-17T16:46:51.949Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

My first reaction is: I think the simplest hypothesis is a continuous tree ring record. It's continuous everywhere else. A sudden gap needs more than a just-so-story about Romans to justify it.

Also:

There are enough samples to satisfy professionals that they actually have the whole 2000 years covered, but the sample overlaps for the gap between the blocks are few and rather weak.

That sounds very much like fitting the evidence to the hypothesis.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-17T16:58:44.346Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'll grant you that the idea might be worth testing - for example, by radiocarbon dating calibrated on other dendro data - but I don't think it has been shown convincingly enough to outweigh the historical accounts.

comment by NancyLebovitz · 2010-03-16T14:53:56.561Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I can see that it would be useful to have a fast filter for rationality, but how possible is it?

There are some opinions which are irrational (frex, there doesn't seem to be any solid arguments for the idea that homosexuality is bad, and if it can't be eliminated, it should at least be kept out of public view), but that's not the same thing as having a positive test for rationality.

There comes a point when there's no substitute for actual knowledge, and in this case, it means looking at people's thinking rather than their opinions.

I suggest asking people what they've changed their mind about, and why. The opinion change could be tribal, too, but at least it's not a completely static view of the other person's mind.

One other test-- does the person judge the things they like by the most attractive examples, and the things they dislike by the least attractive examples? This test is faster than asking questions.

Replies from: Morendil
comment by Morendil · 2010-03-16T15:08:56.310Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

ISTM that we could summarize Eliezer's post, conclusions, subsequent discussion, and much previous LW material thus: "there are no reliable epistemic shortcuts".

Replies from: NancyLebovitz, orthonormal
comment by NancyLebovitz · 2010-03-16T16:22:43.140Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I was wondering if there was a top level post explicitly about the need to have tools for checking the territory now and then because your map is necessarily incomplete.

The messy thing is that you need to have tools and habits for being able to notice it when reality is tugging on your sleeve or bashing you about the head and trying to find out what important thing you've missed -- but if you formalize that procedure, you're in a map again.

comment by orthonormal · 2010-03-20T18:34:29.663Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I disagree. Some surface features do correlate exceedingly well with epistemic rationality; it's just harder to rule out false positives than false negatives.

comment by Hook · 2010-03-17T20:24:50.999Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Another test:

Could smoking during pregnancy have a benefit? Could drinking during pregnancy have a benefit? It's not necessary that someone know what the benefit could be, just acknowledge the nicotine and alcohol are drugs that have complex effects on the body.

As for smoking, it's definitely a bad idea, but it reduces the chances of pre-eclampsia. I don't know of any benefit for alcohol.

Replies from: bluej100
comment by bluej100 · 2012-05-08T22:39:20.654Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'll reply two years later: Light drinking during pregnancy is associated with children with fewer behavioral and cognitive problems. This is probably a result of the correlation between moderate alcohol consumption and iq and education, but it's interesting nonetheless.

comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-15T03:31:51.149Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Back in the good old days, there was a simple test for this syndrome that would get quite a lot of mileage: You could just ask me what I thought about God.

Don't you mean the "bad old days"?

comment by TheatreAddict · 2012-01-22T04:43:53.187Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Okay, so astrology to me sounds extremely unscientific. But I haven't read anything on the subject, and other than knowing that it's something a lot of scientists thing is.. unscientific. To be perfectly fair, I can't just dismiss it because other people dismiss it.

I'd like to be able to dismiss it for scientific reasons. Because I was reading my horoscope, and I was like, "Hmm, well these are extremely vague statements that could apply to anyone and I don't particularly identify with." But then I was reading a friends, and I majorly freaked out because of how accurate it was.

So because of that, I now want to know the truth. Either astrology works or it doesn't. Does anyone know how I could go about determining this? I mean, does anyone have any books or online articles that they would recommend? I'd really appreciate it. I just want to understand.

Replies from: TheOtherDave, DSimon, ArisKatsaris, PhilosophyTutor, nisstyre56, Anubhav, Jayson_Virissimo
comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-01-22T04:53:17.403Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

A simple exercise to see whether further theoretical research is justified might be to have a friend print out the horoscopes for all the Zodiac signs or whatever, remove identifying characteristics from each one, and have you rank all of them every day for a month in terms of how accurate they are. Then see whether the horoscope accuracy correlates better with the ones for your sign than the ones for other signs.

Replies from: Anubhav
comment by Anubhav · 2012-01-22T05:38:46.198Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

More doable than my idea. Upvoted.

Replies from: Salivanth
comment by Salivanth · 2013-04-26T16:45:09.066Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

How'd it go?

EDIT: My bad, I thought this was posted on 22 January 2013, not 22 January 2012. I'll leave this up just in case though.

comment by DSimon · 2012-01-22T07:31:51.479Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Here's a really neat chart from OkTrends (a blog discussing data from the dating website OkCupid) showing match percentages between people of various astrological signs, based on similarity between the users' answers to a wide range of questions:

http://cdn.okcimg.com/blog/races_and_religions/Match-By-Zodiac-Title.png

The data there implies pretty strongly that astrological sign has no predictive ability when it comes to a person's self-description.

Replies from: army1987
comment by A1987dM (army1987) · 2012-01-22T15:48:14.008Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Unless they had several thousand couples for each one of the 144 cells, I'm very surprised there weren't bigger fluctuations due to chance alone. (And that single “59” shows that they didn't round all numbers to the nearest ten.)

Replies from: DSimon, arundelo
comment by DSimon · 2012-01-22T17:10:32.619Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Sorry, I should have linked the article earlier instead of just the chart.

On sample size: Keep in mind that it isn't couples that are being looked at here, just comparisons between users' self-reports. Specifically, each question has two answers: The user's self-report, and what they would want a potential date to answer. The compatibility percentage is based on matching from A's wants to B's reports and vice-versa.

For the article, data was collected from a randomly selected pool of 500,000 straight users. The gender balance among straight users is about 60% men, 40% women, so that's about 25,000 men in each row and 17,000 women in each column. So each cell has about 400 million comparisons.

comment by arundelo · 2012-01-22T17:27:52.544Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Indeed they did -- about 868 million couples per cell by my reckoning, or about half that if they're only pairing based on preferred gender:

Here are the grouped match percentages for a random pool of 500,000 users. Astrological sign has no effect whatsoever on how compatible two people are.

[...]

We're showing you this table, as dull as it is, because the uniformity neatly illustrates how beefy our data set is. There are 144 pools considered above, and they all match the mean plus or minus 0.5%.

comment by ArisKatsaris · 2012-01-22T05:01:17.700Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

As OtherDave said, all you need is a blind-test. You need to read the horoscopes WITHOUT KNOWING WHICH ONE IS WHICH; then grade them on "accuracy" still without knowing which one is which. Only after you've written the grades down, you should check whether they correspond better than chance would allow.

comment by PhilosophyTutor · 2012-01-23T00:12:58.839Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Here's a link:

http://rationalwiki.org/wiki/Astrology

In brief, there is no evidence from properly conducted trials that astrology can predict future events at a rate better than chance. In addition physics as we currently understand it precludes any possible effect on us from objects so far away.

Astrology can appear to work through a variety of cognitive biases or can be made to appear to work through various forms of trickery. For example when someone is majorly freaked out by the accuracy of a guess (and with a large enough population reading a guess it's bound to be accurate for some of them) that is much more memorable and much more likely to be shared with others than times when the prediction is obviously wrong. As such the availability heuristic might make you think that such instances are far more common than they actually are, while the actual frequency is entirely explicable by chance alone.

Replies from: Incorrect
comment by Incorrect · 2012-04-21T17:23:33.338Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

In addition physics as we currently understand it precludes any possible effect on us from objects so far away.

So our world would look exactly the same without astronomy? (I'm kidding of course but that statement should require further qualification)

comment by nisstyre56 · 2012-02-12T07:09:48.375Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You should read the essay "Science: Conjectures and Refutations" by Karl Popper. In short, although astrology may use things like observation, it is not scientific. Why? Well you answered your own question, it's made up of extremely vague statements that will always be true. The virtue of a scientific theory is not in its ability to be proven true, but its ability to be proven untrue.

Let me use a simple analogy:

Let's say I tell you that I have a theory about why people commit murder. I say the sole reason why people are killers is because they had poor relationships with their parents, or if they were orphans with the major adult figures in their lives.

Now, say we look at some samplings of convicted murderers, there are no cases where you can not interpret their childhood as satisfying my criteria above.

I'm anticipating some disagreement with what I've said, so let me find some random examples and I'll try to show how each can be interpreted to agree with my hypothesis no matter the case.

I'm simply going to go through a few of the people on this list: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_serial_killers_by_number_of_victims

First one "Luis Alfredo Garavito Cubillos": Here is a short blurb about him,

"Garavito's victims were poor children, peasant children, or street children, between the ages of 8 and 16. Garavito approached them on the street or countryside and offered them gifts or small amounts of money. After gaining their trust, he took the children for a walk and when they got tired, he would take advantage of them. He then raped them, cut their throats, and usually dismembered their corpses. Most corpses showed signs of torture."

This fits my original hypothesis because the victims were all children. Clearly he had a poor childhood as a result of the upbringing his parents gave him, which resulted in his neuroses and violent thoughts towards children. The fact that he gave them gifts also shows that his parents most likely had a poor relationship with him, and he is expressing negative behavior towards typical parent-child actions such as giving a child candy or gifts.

Let's look at another one.

"Daniel Camargo Barbosa" : According to wikipedia "Camargo's mother died when he was a little boy and his father was overbearing and emotionally distant. He was raised by an abusive stepmother, who punished him and sometimes dressed him in girls clothing, making him a victim of ridicule in front of his peers"

This obviously fits the hypothesis as well, his mother was abusive, so it fits the hypothesis. We're doing pretty good with this idea right?

And another one: "Ahmad Suradji"

"He told police that he had a dream in 1988 in which his father's ghost told him to kill 70 women and drink their saliva, so that he could become a mystic healer"

The reason why he committed his crimes is because of his relationship with his father, which is evident by the "ghost of his father" telling him to kill the women.

And yet another one: "John Wayne Gacy"

"Throughout his childhood, Gacy strove to make his father proud of him, but seldom received his approval: One of Gacy's earliest childhood memories was of being beaten with a leather belt by his father at the age of 4"

This also fits my hypothesis, he had a poor relationship which lead to him becoming a killer.

That's enough, I think my point has been made. In any situation the evidence could be interpreted as confirming the original hypothesis even if there was no clear evidence that it was their relationship that caused them to become serial killers

This is what's known as post hoc ergo propter hoc reasoning: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Post_hoc_ergo_propter_hoc and it also falls under confirmation bias: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confirmation_bias

If my original hypothesis had been more specific, such as "all people who have poor relationships with their parents or parental figures will become killers" then it would be much easier to disprove, and thus a much more useful hypothesis.

One of the things that most believers in astrology will do when presented with refuting evidence is to use interpret the evidence in such a way that it either does not refute astrology or confirms it. If you look at any scientific theory you will see that it's possible for it to be wrong if there is evidence that refutes it, and in fact there are many cases where scientific theories have been proven wrong by observations made after formulating the hypothesis.

The key idea to show why astrology doesn't work in my opinion is its lack of riskiness, you may feel that the statements are very accurate, but this is only due to the fact that they are meant to be overly generic.

comment by Anubhav · 2012-01-22T05:09:42.731Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The stuff you find in newspapers aren't really horoscopes.

Anyway... I seem to remember that some organisation in India drew up a bunch of horoscopes of normal kids, mixed in a bunch of horoscopes of disabled kids, and challenged astrologers to figure out which were which.

You could do something like that, if you had the inclination to study the subject... Have a lot of LWers drop in their horoscopes (there's gotta be a horoscope creation tool somewhere on the internet) and see if you can deduce their major life events. Or pay an astrologer to do it.

comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2012-01-22T05:24:38.291Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Arguments from authority are invalid, but they are often inductively strong. If a community has a good track record for having good judgement within a given domain, then any particular judgement they make within that domain is evidence (sometimes weak, but sometimes strong) for the truth of their judgement. Arguably, scientists have relevant expertise in recognising what is and isn't science.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-22T06:38:11.240Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Arguments from authority are invalid

No they aren't. Incorrectly applied arguments from authority are often invalid but the form of argument is not itself intrinsically invalid. You do acknowledge this in your reasoning but I'd like to emphasize that the initial conclusion "Arguments from authority are invalid" isn't actually correct and that the 'inductive strength' makes the arguments valid when used correctly.

Replies from: Jayson_Virissimo
comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2012-01-22T07:05:57.107Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
  1. An argument is valid if and only if the truth of its premises entails the truth of its conclusion.

  2. The truth of the premises of an argument from authority does not entail the truth of its conclusion.

  3. Therefore, arguments from authority are not valid.

Note: This argument is valid in the sense I am using the term.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-22T07:39:03.640Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Note: This argument is valid in the sense I am using the term.

If your use of the term valid is such that arguments from authority are (necessarily) invalid then your use of the term is simply wrong. The very wikipedia link that you provide explains it as one of the many forms of potentially valid argument that is often used fallaciously. The following is an example of a valid argument form:

  • Person X has reputation for being an expert on Y.
  • Things said about Y by a person who has a reputation for being an expert on Y are likely to be correct.
  • Person X said Z about Y.
  • Z is likely to be correct.

If you wish to trace the error in conclusion back to a specific false premise then it may be the (false) assumption "All valid arguments are deductive arguments".

Replies from: PhilosophyTutor, Jayson_Virissimo, Jayson_Virissimo
comment by PhilosophyTutor · 2012-01-23T01:03:08.002Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That is indeed a valid argument-form, in basic classical logic. To illustrate this we can just change the labels to ones less likely to cause confusion:

  1. Person X is a Foffler with respect to Y.
  2. Things said about Y by persons who are Fofflers with respect to Y are Snarfly.
  3. Person X said Z about Y.
  4. Z is Snarfly.

The problem arises when instead of sticking a label on the set like "Snarfly" or "bulbous" or whatever you use a label such as "likely to be correct", and people start trying to pull meaning out of that label and apply it to the argument they've just heard. Classical logic, barring specific elaborations, just doesn't let you do that. Classical logic just wants you to treat each label as a meaningless and potentially interchangeable label.

In classical logic if you make up a set called "statements which are likely to be correct" then a statement is either a member of that set or it isn't. (Barring paradoxical scenarios). If it's a member of that set then it is always and forever a member of that set no matter what happens, and if it's not a member then it is always and forever not a member. This is totally counterintuitive because that label makes you want to think that objects should be able to pop in and out of that set as the evidence changes. This is why you have to be incredibly careful in parsing classical-logic arguments that use such labels because it's very easy to get confused about what is actually being claimed.

What's actually being claimed by that argument in classical logical terms is "Z is 'likely to be correct', and Z always will be 'likely to be correct', and this is an eternal feature of the universe". The argument for that conclusion is indeed valid, but once the conclusion is properly explicated it immediately becomes patently obvious that the second premise isn't true and hence the argument is unsound.

Where the parent is simply mistaken in my view is in presenting the above as an instance of the argument from authority. It's not, simply because the argument from authority as it's usually construed contains the second premise only in implicit form and reaches a more definite conclusion. The argument from authority in the sense that it's usually referred to just goes:

  1. Person X has reputation for being an expert on Y.
  2. Person X said Z about Y.
  3. Z is true.

That is indeed an invalid argument.

You can turn it in to a valid argument by adding something like:

2a. Everything Person X says about Y is true.

...but then it wouldn't be the canonical appeal to authority any more.

comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2012-01-22T08:43:49.837Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If your use of the term valid is such that arguments from authority are (necessarily) invalid then your use of the term is simply wrong. The very wikipedia link that you provide explains it as one of the many forms of potentially valid argument that is often used fallaciously.

The link I provided (here) does not contain the string "valid" as of 01:43 1/22/2012 Phoenix, Arizona time. What is does say is:

Although certain classes of argument from authority do on occasion constitute strong inductive arguments, arguments from authority are commonly used in a fallacious manner.

Inductively Strong != Valid

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-22T09:00:01.158Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The link I provided (here) does not contain the string "valid" as of 01:43 1/22/2012 Phoenix, Arizona time.

That is more than a tad disingenuous. You seem to be trying to claim that because the string 'valid' is not present in the text the clear meaning of the text cannot be that arguments from authority can be valid. I hope you agree that this sounds silly if made explicit. Things that are present in article are the phrase 'statistical syllogism' and the inclusion of "Fallacious appeals to authority" as a whole seperate subsection. That section opens by explaining:

Fallacious arguments from authority often are the result of failing to meet at least one of the two conditions from the previous section.

... This is an explanation of how fallacious arguments from authority differ from valid ones.

What is does say is:

Although certain classes of argument from authority do on occasion constitute strong inductive arguments, arguments from authority are commonly used in a fallacious manner.

Yes, this is exactly my position.

comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2012-01-22T08:21:26.577Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The following is an example of a valid argument form:

  • Person X has reputation for being an expert on Y.
  • Things said about Y by a person who has a reputation for being an expert on Y are likely to be correct.
  • Person X said Z about Y.
  • Z is likely to be correct.

That argument is not valid. Valid arguments don't become invalid with the introduction of additional information, but the argument you provided does. For instance, compare these two arguments:

1.)

  • All men are mortal.

  • Socrates is a man.

  • Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

2.)

  • All men are mortal.

  • Socrates is a man.

  • Socrates is in extremely good health for his age.

  • Therefore, Socrates is mortal.

This argument will stay valid no matter how many additional premises we add (provided the premises do not contradict each other). Here is a variation of the argument you provided with additional information:

  • Person X has reputation for being an expert on Y.

  • Things said about Y by a person who has a reputation for being an expert on Y are likely to be correct.

  • Person X said Z about Y.

  • Person X said Z because he was paid $1,000,000 by person A.

  • Person X doesn't really believe Z.

  • Z is likely to be correct.

There is no contradiction between an argument having arbitrarily high inductive strength (like the very best arguments from authority) and still being invalid.

Replies from: drethelin, nshepperd, wedrifid
comment by drethelin · 2012-01-22T08:36:34.740Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Probabilistic arguments are not the same as logical arguments. A Logical argument contains all information pertinent to the argument within itself. A probabilistic argument, by including words such as likely or probably, explicitly states that there is information to be had outside the argument. Probabilistic arguments are necessarily changed with the inclusion of more information.

Replies from: Jayson_Virissimo
comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2012-01-22T08:54:22.779Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Agreed. Probabilistic arguments are necessarily invalid (except when the probability of every relevant premise is equal to 1).

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-22T09:21:12.551Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Agreed. Probabilistic arguments are necessarily invalid (except when the probability of every relevant premise is equal to 1).

Is this an example of the persuasion tactic advocated (or described) recently? That is, you open with 'agreed' and then clearly say something that would undermine drethelin's whole comment.

Replies from: drethelin, Jayson_Virissimo
comment by drethelin · 2012-01-22T09:26:38.479Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Really I just think he's using a stupidly strict definition of "Valid"

Replies from: None, Jayson_Virissimo
comment by [deleted] · 2012-01-22T09:29:36.007Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Thanks for applying Hanlon's razor.

Replies from: Jayson_Virissimo
comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2012-01-22T10:00:06.334Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Thanks for applying Hanlon's razor.

So when a logician insists that only truth-preserving (deductive, not inductive) arguments are valid, he is demonstrating his stupidity?

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-01-22T10:03:40.918Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Ah, that's too specific an interpretation of Hanlon's razor. The razor does not say that the malice and the stupidity need all come from the same party.

Replies from: Jayson_Virissimo
comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2012-01-22T10:08:07.747Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Fair enough.

comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2012-01-22T09:28:15.597Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Really I just think he's using a stupidly strict definition of "Valid"

Yes, mathematical logic is "stupidly strict" with its definitions. It is designed that way.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-01-22T10:01:18.968Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I understand what you've been saying in this thread.

Unfortunately, mathematical logic is not a dialect often spoken in the comments section. Wiio's laws are totally in play, here.

Replies from: Jayson_Virissimo
comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2012-01-22T11:00:45.937Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yeah, silly me. I should have provided a definition along with a link to a further elaboration of the concept so as to avoid any misunderstanding. Oh wait...

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-22T11:18:22.693Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yeah, silly me. I should have provided a definition along with a link to a further elaboration of the concept so as to avoid any misunderstanding. Oh wait...

I again refer to the relevant reply. (And incidentally let it be known that I disapprove of snarkiness both here and elsewhere. Lack of understanding of that definition does not apply so the implied meaning of the snark is non sequitur.)

comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2012-01-22T09:34:06.889Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Is this an example of the persuasion tactic advocated (or described) recently. That is, you open with 'agreed' and then clearly say something that would undermine drethelin's whole comment.

No. I affirm all 4 sentences in drethelin's comment. Also, I maintain that nothing in drethelin's comment contradicts anything I have said in this discussion.

comment by nshepperd · 2012-01-22T09:17:34.774Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The following is an example of a valid argument form:

  • Person X has reputation for being an expert on Y.
  • Things said about Y by a person who has a reputation for being an expert on Y are likely to be correct.
  • Person X said Z about Y.
  • Z is likely to be correct.

That argument is not valid. Valid arguments don't become invalid with the introduction of additional information, but the argument you provided does.

What? Of course it's valid (logically). The first three statements are premises and the final statement is the conclusion, which is entailed by the premises. If things said about Y by person X are likely to be correct and person X says Z about Y then Z is likely to be correct. That's a trivial deduction.

The argument is however not necessarily sound, because the premise "Things said about Y by a person who has a reputation for being an expert on Y are likely to be correct" is not universally true, for example if the person is saying stuff which blatantly contradicts other far stronger evidence.

Edit: Okay, enough silliness. Here is a formalised version of the above argument. You could run it through a proof checker, probably.

  1. Person A is an expert on B
  2. forall{X, Y, Z} (Person X is an expert on Y & Person X says Z about Y) => (Z is probably correct)
  3. Person A says C about B
  4. therefore: (Person A is an expert on B & Person A says C about B) [conjunction:1, 3]
  5. therefore: (Person A is an expert on B & Person A says C about B) => (C is probably correct) [instantiation:2, A, B, C]
  6. therefore: (C is probably correct) [modus ponens:4, 5]

This argument is valid. It is not sound, because premise 2 is false. This is basic logic.

comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-22T09:11:37.042Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The following is an example of a valid argument form:
  • Person X has reputation for being an expert on Y.
  • Things said about Y by a person who has a reputation for being an expert on Y are likely to be correct.
  • Person X said Z about Y.
  • Z is likely to be correct.

That argument is not valid.

Not only is it valid it is trivially so. It does not even rely on the possibility of there being valid inductive arguments. I made it the most simple of deductions from supplied premises.

Valid arguments don't become invalid with the introduction of additional information, but the argument you provided does.

Your problem here seems to be that you object to deducing a conclusion of 'likely to be' from a premise of 'likely to be'. By very nature of uncertain information things that are merely likely do not always occur and yet this does not make reasoning about likely things invalid so long as uncertainty is preserved correctly. (The premise could possibly be neatened up such that it includes a perfect technical explanation with ceritus paribus clauses, etc but the meaning seems to be clear as it stands.)

There is no contradiction between an argument having arbitrarily high inductive strength (like the very best arguments from authority) and still being invalid.

If the argument was in the form of a deduction when only an induction is possible from the information then the appeal to authority is invalid. If the argument is a carefully presented inductive claim then it most certainly can be valid.

Not all arguments are deductions. Not all arguments that are not deductions are invalid.

Replies from: CuSithBell, Jayson_Virissimo
comment by CuSithBell · 2012-01-22T17:26:56.216Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The following is an example of a valid argument form:

Person X has reputation for being an expert on Y. Things said about Y by a person who has a reputation for being an expert on Y are likely to be correct. Person X said Z about Y. Z is likely to be correct. That argument is not valid.

Not only is it valid it is trivially so.

Jayson_Virissimo is talking about logical validity. The argument is not logically valid, because it is possible for "Z is likely to be correct" to be false, even if the other statements are true (for instance, add the premise "Z is incorrect"). Induction is not (in general) logically valid. It's valid in other senses, but not that one.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-22T18:34:15.210Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Jayson_Virissimo is talking about logical validity.

Yes, we both are. We have gone as far as to accept a shared definition of logical validity and trace the dispute from there.

The argument is not logically valid, because it is possible for "Z is likely to be correct" to be false, even if the other statements are true (for instance, add the premise "Z is incorrect").

This is simply false. The following premise:

Things said about Y by a person who has a reputation for being an expert on Y are likely to be correct.

... becomes invalid the moment there is in fact a "thing said " that is not likely to be correct. That's why I put it there! It is an instance of the class of premise "ALL G ARE W" and so just like all other premises in that class it is false if there is a G that is NOT W. it just so happens that 'likelyhood' is the subject matter here.

The above serves to make the premise in question rather brittle. While it does means that the whole argument can be treated as deductive reasoning (about the subject of likelyhoods) it is also means that there are very few worlds for which that premise is true and meaningful.

Replies from: CuSithBell
comment by CuSithBell · 2012-01-22T20:11:53.151Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I interpreted your premise as: (Things said about Y by a person who has a reputation for being an expert on Y) are likely to be (correct.) as opposed to (Things said about Y by a person who has a reputation for being an expert on Y) are (likely to be correct.)

If, as you seem to be agreeing, a thing cannot be "likely to be correct" and "incorrect" (as known by the same reasoner), then the premise reduces to "Things said about Y by a person who has a reputation for being an expert on Y are correct".

Is this really what you intended?

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-22T21:25:30.011Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I interpreted your premise as: (Things said about Y by a person who has a reputation for being an expert on Y) are likely to be (correct.) as opposed to (Things said about Y by a person who has a reputation for being an expert on Y) are (likely to be correct.)

The second was the intended meaning.

If, as you seem to be agreeing, a thing cannot be "likely to be correct" and "incorrect" (as known by the same reasoner), then the premise reduces to "Things said about Y by a person who has a reputation for being an expert on Y are correct".

Given the 'as known by the same reasoner' clause wouldn't that imply that it is '<...> cannot be known to be incorrect'? Either way it is clear that the encapsulation of the probabilistic parts is woefully inadequate here.

Is this really what you intended?

No, but it does seem to be the implication.

comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2012-01-22T09:19:48.395Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If the argument is a carefully presented inductive claim then it most certainly can be valid.

No it cannot.

Inductive reasoning is not logically valid.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-22T09:37:37.929Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

No. Inductive reasoning is not logically valid.

That which is said to be invalid in the text that you link to (things such as generalizing from anecdotes to make mathematically certain claims about a set) is not the same kind of reasoning as that which we are talking about here. Here we are talking about probabilistic arguments, about which you say:

Probabilistic arguments are necessarily invalid

That leaves us at an impasse. There is not really much more I can say if you pit yourself against what is a foundational premise of this site: That the correct way to reason from evidence is to use Bayesian updating. You have essentially dismissed the vast majority of all useful reasoning as invalid. I disagree strongly.

Replies from: Jayson_Virissimo, None
comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2012-01-22T10:10:08.206Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You have essentially dismissed the vast majority of all useful reasoning as invalid.

You are correctly restating my claim. The vast majority of all useful reasoning is invalid. And by "invalid" I mean that it would not be self-contradictory to affirm the premises and deny the conclusion.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-22T11:00:15.841Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

And by "invalid" I mean that it would not be self-contradictory to affirm the premises and deny the conclusion.

It is a straightforward matter to construct arguments based on probabilistic reasoning (and, by extension, arguments from authority) that adhere to that criteria. They go something like:

IF all evidence available indicates p(B|A) = 0.95
AND all other available evidence about B gives p(B) = 0.4
AND all evidence available indicates p(A) = 0.7
AND A
THEN available evidence indicates that the probability of B is slightly over 0.54

That argument is a simple and valid deduction (with an implied premise of 'rudimentary probability theory'). The conclusion cannot be (coherently) denied without denying a premise. This is what we are doing when we reason probabilistically ('we' referring to 'people while they are lesswrong thinking mode or something similar).

It may come as a shock to your philosophy tutor from freshman year but it actually is possible to reason logically about probabilities.

Replies from: Caspian, Jayson_Virissimo
comment by Caspian · 2012-01-24T09:45:45.784Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Instead of:

IF all evidence available indicates p(B|A) = 0.95

you mean:

IF all evidence available indicates p(A|B) = 0.95

Right?

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-24T09:57:57.727Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Right?

Yes, I think I originally actually meant to put the actual A and B around the other way in the conclusion, which is how I did the actual math on the calculator. If A is the thing that has happened p(B|A) is the thing that belongs in the conclusion. Let me fix that. Thanks again.

comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2012-01-22T12:30:24.700Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That argument is a simple and valid deduction (with an implied premise of 'rudimentary probability theory'). The conclusion cannot be (coherently) denied without denying a premise. This is what we are doing when we reason probabilistically ('we' referring to 'people while they are lesswrong thinking mode or something similar).

We can argue from first principles about logic and probability until the cows come home, but all it would take for me affirm your original critique of my position would be for you to supply an instance of an argument from authority in which it would be self-contradictory to affirm the premises and deny the conclusion.

It may come as a shock to your philosophy tutor from freshman year but it actually is possible to reason logically about probabilities.

Also, what's with the snark?

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-22T13:34:23.412Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

We can argue from first principles about logic and probability until the cows come home, but all it would take for me affirm your original critique of my position would be for you to supply an instance of an argument from authority in which it would be self-contradictory to affirm the premises and deny the conclusion.

I am confused again. I just gave you an example of a valid probabilistic argument - the paragraph before the one you quote. I thought the instantiation to an argument from authority was made clear in the introduction. If it is not then let's say:

  • A = "Bob says Gloops are plink"
  • B = "Gloops are plink"

This makes the argument:

  • IF all evidence available indicates p(Gloops are plink|Bob says Gloops are plink) = 0.85
  • AND all other available evidence about Gloops gives p(Gloops are plink) = 0.4
  • AND all evidence available indicates p(Bob says Gloops are plink) = 0.3
  • AND Bob says Gloops are plink
  • THEN available evidence indicates that the probability that Gloops are plink is approximately 0.64

Edit: Caspian noticed that the previous magic numbers were flawed. New magic numbers supplied!

Replies from: Caspian, Jayson_Virissimo
comment by Caspian · 2012-01-23T03:13:28.100Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm sure something similar could be a valid argument in favour of treating argument from authority as useful evidence, but I'm not finding it straightforward to check this argument above to see if it works.

'available evidence' in the last (THEN) line includes 'Bob says Gloops are plink' but 'evidence available' in the first three lines does not, right? Can the 'all evidence available' and 'all other available evidence' in the first three lines be taken to include all prior evidence known before finding out 'Bob says Gloops are plink'? If so, the first three premises are contradictory - Bob says Gloops are plink 0.7 of the time, and almost all of that time he is correct, so p(Gloops are plink) > 0.4. If not, I need some further clarification of what probabilities are conditional on what evidence.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-23T04:05:37.261Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If so, the first three premises are contradictory - Bob says Gloops are plink 0.7 of the time, and almost all of that time he is correct, so p(Gloops are plink) > 0.4.

Thankyou and well spotted. Those completely arbitrary magic numbers don't stand up to a second glance. In particular 0.7 is just silly. If you already know what the expert is going to say you barely need the expert to say it and so cannot be in a state of knowledge such that p(B) is so low. I'd better change them.

Replies from: Caspian
comment by Caspian · 2012-01-24T09:44:42.525Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That didn't solve the main problem, I think I found what it was. I'll reply to the other post.

comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2012-01-22T14:26:23.862Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Okay, I think I've located the source of our disagreement (and it isn't about validity at all). The term "probabilistic argument" is ambiguous. I have been using the term to refer to arguments that rely on inductive inference to move from the premises to the conclusion (in other words, the evidential link between premises and conclusion is less than perfect or the inductive probability is less than 1, since 0 and 1 are not probabilities). Alternatively, you seem to be using the term to mean an argument made up of statements that contain probabilities. Allow me to provide an example to illustrate the difference between the two notions:

Argument One

  • The probability of A is X.
  • The probability of B is Y.
  • A and B are mutually exclusive.
  • Therefore, the probability of A or B is X + Y.

Argument Two

  • X percent of F's are G's.
  • H is an F.
  • This is all we know about the matter.
  • It is X percent probable that H is a G.*

Argument One is valid, while Argument Two is invalid (although, it may be inductively strong depending on the size of X). According the my working definition, only Argument Two is a "probabilistic argument", but (if my interpretation is correct) according to your working definition, both Argument One and Argument Two and "probabilistic arguments". Does that sound about right?

Note: This version of the statistical syllogism can be found on page 81 of Harry Gensler's Introduction to Logic: 2nd Edition.

Replies from: wedrifid, nshepperd
comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-22T15:44:54.385Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Okay, I think I've located the source of our disagreement (and it isn't about validity at all). The term "probabilistic argument" is ambiguous.

I think you're right. Disagreement about the (potential) validity of Arguments from Authority is only a secondary outcome from what we consider Arguments from Authority to be.

I have been using the term to refer to arguments that rely on inductive inference to move from the premises to the conclusion (in other words, the evidential link between premises and conclusion is less than perfect or the inductive probability is less than 1, since 0 and 1 are not probabilities). Alternatively, you seem to be using the term to mean an argument made up of statements that contain probabilities.

I would not quite draw the line in the same place but it is perhaps best not to argue over the details.

Argument Two

  • X percent of F is G.
  • H is an F.
  • Probably, H is a G.

I agree that this in invalid (and my intuition agrees - I physically flinch if I imagine myself writing that). At the very least it needs an additional premise.

Replies from: Jayson_Virissimo
comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2012-01-22T15:55:24.480Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think you're right. Disagreement about the (potential) validity of Arguments from Authority is only a secondary outcome from what we consider Arguments from Authority to be.

I guess you're right.

I would not quite draw the line in the same place but it is perhaps best not to argue over the details.

Sounds reasonable enough.

I agree that this in invalid (and my intuition agrees - I physically flinch if I imagine myself writing that). At the very least it needs an additional premise.

I added a premise and reworded the conclusion to match the standard formulation of the statistical syllogism here, but the argument form remains invalid (although, like I said earlier, it has the potential for high inductive strength depending on the size of X).

comment by nshepperd · 2012-01-22T15:02:45.379Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
  • Most Fs are Gs.
  • H is an F.
  • Therefore H is a G.

would be an invalid argument, H might not be a G.

It's unclear what it would mean to qualify the conclusion of a proof with "probably" as in your example, though. What does "Probably, H is a G" mean? Is it a (mathematical) statement about probabilities? Or is "probably" just a rhetorical qualifier to trick someone into thinking we're allowed to conclude "H is a G"?

Replies from: wedrifid, Jayson_Virissimo
comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-22T15:49:41.344Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It's unclear what it would mean to qualify the conclusion of a proof with "probably" as in your example, though. What does "Probably, H is a G" mean? Is it a (mathematical) statement about probabilities? Or is "probably" just a rhetorical qualifier to trick someone into thinking we're allowed to conclude "H is a G"?

I agree that there is some ambiguity there regarding what 'probably' is supposed to mean when used that way and fortunately in this case it doesn't even matter how we resolve that ambiguity. The probability that H is a G given known information could be less than 0.5 given information that the argument neglects to include. Without including (or implying) another premise it doesn't matter much what definition of 'probably' we plug in!

comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2012-01-22T15:45:24.714Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

...would be an invalid argument, H might not be a G.

Yeah, that's why I said:

Argument One is valid, while Argument Two is invalid (although, it may be inductively strong depending on the size of X).

We are in agreement about the invalidity of Argument Two.

It's unclear what it would mean to qualify the conclusion of a proof with "probably" as in your example, though.

Argument Two isn't a proof. It is an argument form called the statistical syllogism. The statistical syllogism is induction, not deduction (like a mathematical proof would be).

Is it a (mathematical) statement about probabilities? Or is "probably" just a rhetorical qualifier to trick someone into thinking we're allowed to conclude "H is a G"?

In my example, "probably" is meant to indicate that the conclusion does not necessarily follow from the premises (but that there is still an evidential link between the two). Induction is not simply rhetoric and it doesn't involve any deception (although the problem of induction can be a real pain in the ass sometimes).

Replies from: nshepperd
comment by nshepperd · 2012-01-22T16:44:47.651Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Damn, you edited your comment >.<

We are in agreement that

  • Most Fs are Gs.
  • H is an F.
  • Therefore H is a G.

is an invalid argument, yes. My problem is that I don't know what an argument like

  • Most Fs are Gs.
  • H is an F.
  • Probably, H is a G.

is even meant to mean.

Well, to digress a bit, the real problem is I'm not sure if any of this nonsense is actually getting to the heart of the issue, which is that probabilistic arguments aren't really logical arguments at all. Not in the sense that they're illogical or invalid or anything, but the whole system of bayesian reasoning just doesn't really map 1:1 onto logic.

What I mean by this is that a logical brain, as one might design one, would have a small pool of statements, the belief pool, which it would add to as observations or deductions are made. A maze solving robot, for example, might have beliefs such as {at time t=0 I was at START, at time t=1 I was at (1,0), at time t=1 there was a wall on my left, ...}. It would add to the belief pool as facts about the robot's location and the maze are discovered, but never remove a statement from the pool, since the pool contains only certainties.

Logical arguments, like "If at any time there was a wall on my left and I was at position P, then the maze has a wall at configuration Q" are useful to this robot, since it can use them to fill its belief pool with such arguments' conclusions. Moreover, a classification of arguments into valid and invalid is useful for this robot, so that it can ignore the ones which could result in introducing false statements into its belief pool.

You can't really do the same thing with probabilities. The closest thing to a representation of probabilistic reasoning in logic is the mathematical deduction of statements about conditional probability, with conclusions like P(A | evidence XYZ) = 0.462. When you encounter new observations you use them by trying to generate theorems of the form P(X | all previous evidence + the new evidence) = Y, whereupon you can then plug X and Y into your expected utility calculations or whatever.

In this system an argument like "X% of F are G, and H is an F, so H is probably G" isn't really an argument where you can then import the resulting conclusion into your "belief set", because there isn't any such thing. If the argument means anything at all, it's as an informal derivation of P(H is G | all relevant evidence) after informing the reader that X% of F are G, and H is an F, assuming that the reader doesn't have any other relevant evidence. It wouldn't make sense to say that this argument is invalid since H might not be a G, because it's not asserting that H is G, it's asserting that P(H is G | relevant evidence) = y.

comment by [deleted] · 2012-01-22T10:26:42.566Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The terms "valid" and "invalid" have a precise logical meaning; that is the meaning Jayson_Virissimo intends, as they have said many times now.

As you are using them, you seem to mean "well-grounded, justifiable, effective, appropriate, and etc."

Really this all could have been avoided if you all had just taboo'd the offending terms.

Replies from: wedrifid, Jayson_Virissimo
comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-22T11:03:10.181Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The terms "valid" and "invalid" have a precise logical meaning; that is the meaning Jayson_Virissimo intends, as they have said many times now.

I have no problem parsing Jayson's claims. I would even repeat them if I wanted to guess the password of my highschool math teacher. However it is my assertion that the precise logical meaning has been applied incorrectly in this context. The problem is one of applying basic knowledge about logic without knowing enough about how to reason logically about probability.

As you are using them, you seem to mean "well-grounded, justifiable, effective, appropriate, and etc."

That isn't actually the case.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2012-01-22T11:49:18.151Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That's not the case? I'm surprised. I apologize for having misinterpreting you, but that really did seem to be what you were saying.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-22T12:17:02.964Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That's not the case? I'm surprised. I apologize for having misinterpreting you, but that really did seem to be what you were saying.

My claim, as unambiguous as I can make it, is that probabilistic arguments of the form presented here are valid such that to reject the conclusion but not one of the premises is it be inconsistent. I did not expect it to be a controversial claim to make in this context.

Replies from: CuSithBell
comment by CuSithBell · 2012-01-22T17:40:09.904Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't think it's a question of "insufficient effort" really - the claim you made in this post was simply incorrect, and then you acted condescending towards people who didn't "understand" it. This post seems to include a valid argument, but it's a different type of argument from the ones you were talking about earlier in the thread.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-22T18:46:25.198Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't think it's a question of "insufficient effort" really - the claim you made in this post was simply incorrect

See my reply to you in that context.

This post seems to include a valid argument, but it's a different type of argument from the ones you were talking about earlier in the thread.

That post is approximately the same argument as the one you consider incorrect. The first instance just didn't make the reduction to "logical reasoning about probabilities" sufficiently explicit and used too much potentially ambiguous language.

comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2012-01-22T10:56:15.231Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I doubt tabooing the term "valid" would have helped. In my first reply to wedrifid I gave an explicit definition, a link to said definition (which includes citations), and an example. What more could you ask for?

Replies from: TheOtherDave, wedrifid
comment by TheOtherDave · 2012-01-22T16:37:37.363Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It has generally been my experience, when a term proves problematic in discussion, that providing my definition for that term doesn't work as well as either (a) agreeing to use the other person's definition, when I understand it well enough to do so, or (b) not using the term.

Is your experience different?

comment by wedrifid · 2012-01-22T11:09:58.135Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I doubt tabooing the term "valid" would have helped. In my first reply to wedrifid I gave an explicit definition

And please see here for the most relevant reply (to a comment declaring an equivalent definition.)

comment by gregconen · 2010-03-15T20:02:22.594Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I agree with the sentiment here.

However, in a community like this one, Aumann's agreement theorem would suggest that most of the commonly held views, at least the views commonly held to be very likely, rather than just somewhat likely, should be correct.

comment by Jiro · 2015-05-05T15:50:43.625Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Responding to an old post:

If I recall correctly, the US Air Force's Project Blue Book, on UFOs, explained away as a sighting of the planet Venus what turned out to actually be an experimental aircraft. No, I don't believe in UFOs either; but if you're going to explain away experimental aircraft as Venus, then nothing else you say provides further Bayesian evidence against UFOs either. You are merely an undiscriminating skeptic. I don't believe in UFOs, but in order to credit Project Blue Book with additional help in establishing this, I would have to believe that if there were UFOs then Project Blue Book would have turned in a different report.

This is wrong. Explaining away a single experimental aircraft as Venus doesn't mean that you're an undiscriminating skeptic or that whether there are UFOs doesn't make any difference to what you would say. It just means that you've made one mistake. And estimates based on probability are going to turn out to be wrong sometimes; there could very well be one that is an aircraft but where the available information indicates that Venus is more likely than an aircraft. Someone using this available information would legitimately (although incorrectly) deduce that the object is Venus.

comment by Jiro · 2013-04-23T19:40:20.701Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If a lot of crazy people believe in UFOs, it's probably not because every crazy person picked a random page in the dictionary and said "I'll have a crazy belief about that". Rather, it's probably because the human mind has intrinsic flaws for which characteristics of the UFO meme happen to be a good match. If I conclude that UFOs exist, it is more likely that my reasoning process was corrupted by these intrinsic human flaws and therefore that my argument has an unnoticed flaw than if I conclude something else which isn't a subject of cult behavior. Of course, if I assume that my mind is unflawed, this doesn't apply, but I really shouldn't go around assuming that my mind is unflawed.

And even if I assume that my mind doesn't contain any UFO-leaning flaws, I can't assume the same about other people. Any evidence they provide is more likely to be biased. Even if I just try to analyze the arguments made by other people for UFOs, that set of arguments will contain a larger proportion of bad arguments than a similar set of arguments for a non-cultish proposition. Assuming that I am equally good at detecting bad arguments for UFOs and for the non-cultish proposition, it is then more likely overall that a bad UFO argument will slip by my filters than a bad argument for the non-cultish proposition. Again, if I assume that I'm perfect at reasoning and never let bad arguments of any type pass my filters, this doesn't apply, but I can't assume that.

comment by komponisto · 2011-07-13T02:46:33.530Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Note: this post should be not only included in, but at the top of, lists like this. This is one of the most important posts on the site.

comment by Kevin · 2010-03-18T08:40:47.910Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

As per http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=1193450, this could use a catchier title.

Post alternative title suggestions here.

Replies from: Nick_Tarleton, RobinZ
comment by Nick_Tarleton · 2010-03-18T17:26:29.956Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm pretty sure the commenter there is referring to the title with which it was posted on Hacker News ("First write the crushing counterargument, then conclude with mockery."), not the title here.

Replies from: Kevin
comment by Kevin · 2010-03-19T00:08:51.683Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Right, but I predict that if submitted to Hacker News at the same time of day with the actual title and no one commenting here that it was resubmitted, then it will receive even fewer upvotes. "Undiscriminating Skepticism" isn't as catchy of a title as Less Wrong's last general audience article and Hacker News hit, "What is Bayesianism?"

comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-18T12:51:36.971Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"Groupdoubt", but that's fairly horrible.

comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-15T04:07:15.494Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Are some claims/people just not worth arguing against?

"On what planet do you spend most of your time?" is often a very effective rebuttal. ;)

comment by Roko · 2010-03-15T02:26:42.918Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I have been thinking about nano/AI skepticism somewhat. I feel that most people have nothing to gain from knowing the truth, and admit myself sometimes wishing I could un-know it. I mean really, the implications of rationality for futurism are just plain unpleasant. Sometimes I even look at the good community and favorable gender ratio of religious people and wonder whether being religious is a better deal.

Motivated cognition surely doesn't cause people to pursue beliefs chosen at random: rather it seems to do some limited inference about whether the belief would cause pleasant emotions. Perhaps this fires in the case of ai and nano, and people's motivated cognition module asks:

"would I feel better if I thought that this honking great disaster was going to befall my children's generation?"

Replies from: steven0461, BenAlbahari
comment by steven0461 · 2010-03-15T02:30:46.664Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"It's too good to be true" seems a more common reaction for AI and nano.

Replies from: simplicio, Roko
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-15T05:34:59.705Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Now obviously "too good to be true" isn't strictly a good argument, but it can be a useful first-order rule of thumb, can't it?

By using it you are recognizing (a) that people who are trying to sell you something fishy usually make it sound like a panacea; (b) that if you really like the idea you should be all the more wary of it.

comment by Roko · 2010-03-15T11:36:09.175Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Not to drexlerian nanotechnology - "you and your people have scared our children"

comment by BenAlbahari · 2010-03-15T08:35:06.591Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I feel that most people have nothing to gain from knowing the truth, and admit myself sometimes wishing I could un-know it.

"Why oh why didn't I take the BLUE pill?" - The Matrix.

comment by taw · 2010-03-15T00:53:17.082Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm increasingly inclined to use reactions to data that Communist economies did no worse on average than Capitalist economies as a new litmus test.

People who as their first reaction start pulling excuses why this must be wrong out of their asses get big negative points on this rationality test.

I don't need to explain why this is not mainstream. It is also extremely unlikely to be significantly wrong.

Replies from: toto, knb, PhilGoetz, Eliezer_Yudkowsky, PhilGoetz, FAWS, PhilGoetz, rwallace
comment by toto · 2010-03-15T14:20:15.172Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

People who as their first reaction start pulling excuses why this must be wrong out >of their asses get big negative points on this rationality test.

Well, if people are absolutely, definitely rejecting the possibility that this might ever be true, without looking at the data, then they are indeed probably professing a tribal belief.

However, if they are merely describing reasons why they find this result "unlikely", then I'm not sure there's anything wrong with that. They're simply expressing that their prior for "Communist economies did no worse than capitalist economies" is, all other things being equal, lower than .5.

There are several non-obviously-wrong reasons why one could reasonably put a low prior on this belief. The most obvious is the fact that when the wall fell down, economic migration went from East to West, not the other way round (East-West Germany being the most dramatic example).

Of course, this should not preclude a look at the hard data. Reality is full of surprises, and casual musings often miss important points. So again, saying "this just can't be so" and refusing to look at the data (which I presume is what you had in mind) is indeed probably tribal. Saying "hmmm, I'd be surprised if it were so" seems quite reasonable to me. Maybe I'm just tribalised beyond hope.

Replies from: PhilGoetz
comment by PhilGoetz · 2010-03-24T20:22:59.830Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yes - The original post wasn't about using someone's judgement on an issue as a litmus test. It was about the peculiar fact that you can use someone's judgement on an issue as a test of their rationality without knowing anything about the issue, if they're expressing a non-tribal opinion.

comment by knb · 2010-03-16T06:42:20.138Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm increasingly inclined to use reactions to data that Communist economies did no worse on average than Capitalist economies as a new litmus test.

This is extremely problematic for a number of reasons.

You are using (or at least citing) one study to argue for an extremely unorthodox claim that is highly values dependent. For example, what does it mean "to do worse on average" than capitalist countries? The paper you cite only demonstrates that GDP growth was not much worse for communist countries than for less liberalized non-communist countries. Perhaps the totalitarian communist systems were worse, even if their arbitrary GDP numbers, inflated by massive military spending, were fairly respectable.

Be careful, using this as a "litmus test" for rationality could make you dismiss arguments for why you should actually change your opinion about whether communist countries did "worse on average".

comment by PhilGoetz · 2010-03-24T19:04:40.667Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

After glancing at the study [and after editing again after RobinZ's comment]:

It criticizes other studies for not controlling for such details as ethnolinguistic fractionalization, religion, natural resource abundance, or the wealth of neighboring countries. It's full of references to other variables that ought to be controlled for, like climate, resource-richness, and social mores. But the only thing this study claims to control for is initial wealth.

Much of the article lists rankings of growth rates that control for nothing at all. It has a large initial section claiming that communism performed well because a bunch of Communist countries that started out poor, grew faster than a bunch of non-Communist countries that started out rich. Then, in the other section of the paper, it claims that we can't compare Russia to Western Europe, because Russia started out poor, and of course every economist knows that poor countries grow faster than rich countries! So we must compare Russia to Mexico. Besides the fact that they conveniently ignored this in the first half of the paper, that doesn't make sense. A comparison that showed Russia growing slower than Western Europe (as it did) would only indicate that the difference in the effectiveness of their governments was even greater.

It says that Eastern Europe's economic performance was only dismal as compared to Western Europe's, and Asia; and that a more fair comparison is with Mexico, or the US, or New Zealand, or Switzerland, or a variety of other names that come up. But the cases it dismisses seem like better parallels than the cases it includes. It has a section acknowledging that most economists would say it isn't fair to compare the growth rates of nations with different initial wealth (the cases it uses in the first section), and would instead compare the growth rates of nations with similar initial wealth (the cases it excludes in the first section). It tries to justify this, and I'm afraid I can't now remember what the reasoning was.

It's odd for a study to talk so much about the standard tools of economic analysis, such as regression, and yet not use any. There's no math in this paper. It presents a bunch of graphs and argues verbally about what they imply. Also, it has not been published in a refereed journal; and I predict that it won't be until the author remedies this.

I'm not being thorough here, and you might want to read the paper yourself rather than trust my admittedly hasty judgement. Consider yourself notified that the opinion I'm expressing here is not based on careful study. taw is a smart person and has studied it more carefully than I have.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-24T19:35:57.322Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Upvoted, but I have not examined the paper - an independent check of Phil Goetz's remarks would be appreciated.

comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-15T03:32:27.395Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It's not a good litmus test until you also point to what you consider the best honest skeptical response - albeit this is often damned hard to do with poor skepticism, cryonics being exhibit A in point.

Replies from: None
comment by [deleted] · 2010-03-15T09:20:47.655Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You should offer a reward for the best top-level anti-cryonics post. Something to entice quiet dissenters to stick their necks out.

You can post it together with a pro-cryonics reading list, so people know what they're up against and only post arguments that haven't already been refuted.

EDIT: reworded for clarity, punctuation

comment by PhilGoetz · 2010-03-24T18:46:12.417Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The only good experiment performed was the partitioning of Germany. East and West Germany were economically equivalent at the end of World War 2, with very similar populations, socioeconomically and genetically.

When they reunified, West Germany was very far ahead of East Germany. I know many people who've come from or been to both East and West Germany, and their opinions on the subject are so strong and unanimous that I will flatly deny any study that says they were equivalent economically. I will not even bother to read such a study.

To make the comparison completely fair, you might have to adjust for the fact that America loaned money to West Germany for reconstruction, while Moscow IIRC saw East Germany as a revenue source. But then again, you might not. Because having your wealth transferred to the capital is one of the distinguishing characteristics of a communist economy.

Replies from: taw
comment by taw · 2010-03-24T22:19:54.948Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The only good experiment performed was the partitioning of Germany. East and West Germany were economically equivalent at the end of World War 2, with very similar populations, socioeconomically and genetically.

This is just plain false. Their income ratios in 1950 were about 2.1:1. Income ratios in 1990 were still about 2.1:1.

comment by FAWS · 2010-03-15T01:46:39.653Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I think you have a point there. Planned economy is called a "failed experiment" with much greater confidence than justified. Not so sure about "extremely" and what "significantly" should mean here, though.

My current position after updating on the evidence form skimming through that paper is that capitalism probably is better for some things, planned economy better for others, and that whether the historical performance of socialist planned economies lags behind that of capitalism depends on what assumptions you make, which countries you hold as comparable and so on, but the answer probably is somewhere between "no" and "yes, but not by all that much".

comment by PhilGoetz · 2010-03-24T20:26:18.694Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The original post wasn't about using someone's judgement on an issue as a litmus test. It was about the peculiar fact that you can use someone's judgement on an issue as a test of their rationality without knowing anything about the issue, if they're expressing a non-tribal opinion.

OP said: If x is a member of X, and opinion(X) = B, and opinion(x) = not(B), this indicates x is at least an independent thinker, regardless of the truth of B.

So, if you find someone who thinks that Communist economies did no worse than capitalist ones, that person is an independent thinker. But since there are very few such people here, that can't be what you mean when you say you plan to use it as a litmus test.

comment by rwallace · 2010-03-15T14:33:19.188Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

According to Table One in the document you linked, for most of the 20th century, India was almost 40 ranks wealthier per capita than the USA. Are you really claiming this data is extremely unlikely to be significantly wrong?

Replies from: FAWS
comment by FAWS · 2010-03-15T14:44:30.675Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You're proving taw's point. You are so eager to find faults that you don't even double check long enough to realize that the table is ordered form poorest to wealthiest. If that's not selective perception I don't know what is.

Replies from: rwallace
comment by rwallace · 2010-03-15T15:01:28.885Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Point. I will freely grant I was skimming looking for flaws; but some of those rankings still look dubious. What data are they based on? Official figures on the wealth of communist countries greatly differed from reality -- in particular, compare the official exchange rates with the actual black market ones. (Comparing wealth across countries sensitively depends on the exchange rates used.)

As for the general argument, when an unlikely (and probably politically motivated) claim is presented, are you saying you think 'skim briefly looking for flaws' is a bad approach to take, at least initially? If so, would you apply that same standard to other unlikely claims?

Replies from: FAWS
comment by FAWS · 2010-03-15T15:07:40.170Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

As for the general argument, when an unlikely (and probably politically motivated) claim is presented, are you saying you think 'skim briefly looking for flaws' is a bad approach to take, at least initially?

No, but once you spot "flaws" you should at least check whether they actually are.

Replies from: rwallace
comment by rwallace · 2010-03-15T15:33:36.279Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yeah, thinking about it, it's been quite some time since I've seen anyone try to defend the Soviet Union on economic grounds; in the old days, those who did so, tended to do it based on obviously off the wall 'data'. I should really have realized anything quite that flaky wouldn't likely be linked approvingly from LW, and updated my priors accordingly.

So chalk one up for be careful about reacting off the cuff to X just because it seems to resemble previously encountered Y and Z.

Replies from: simplyeric
comment by simplyeric · 2010-03-15T22:20:06.952Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Trust me here that I am not defending the Soviet Union in terms of any moral or ultimate economic success (I have ties to a "Former Soviet Republic" and know the failings on both accounts)...but it should be noted that the rate of growth of the Soviet economy, and the rate of improvement of quality of life, outpaced that of Western Europe and the US from time of the revolution to about the late 50's early 60's (give or take).

It should be noted that Russia at the time of the revolution was barely "developed" and was fully in the grips of a system based on serfdom bordering on (if not actually equivalent to) slavery. It was, in common parlance, "backwards". They were coming from quite the depths, and made great strides.

In doing so, they brought their standard of living up, and their level of "development" up, while managing to bring their agricultural production down. Sooner or later it was all a diminishing return, but the Soviet system in the early years was at least defensible on certain grounds.

Ultimately that system did not succeed, but it points the notion that different systems might be better for different things. What might have happened had the Soviets edged towards capitalism more in the manner of recent China, or if they had not bankrupted themselves on military spending? (and by extension, what can we as capitalists learn from that last point?)

comment by metatroll · 2021-06-02T04:07:35.137Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yo dawg, heard you like conceiving of the inconceivable, so we put some noumena in your phenomena so you can identify with the unidentified. 

comment by Kevin · 2010-03-18T08:40:53.171Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Post alternative tl;dr's here.

Replies from: Pavitra
comment by Pavitra · 2011-08-03T04:13:39.755Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

People tend to believe things that are popular to believe. If you want to find out whether someone's actually smart, rather than if they're just going along with the crowd, then look at their unpopular beliefs. If they believe unpopular true things, they're probably actually smart.

comment by CannibalSmith · 2010-03-15T12:33:21.891Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You should clarify that you're talking about epistemic rationality a lot sooner than the 8th paragraph.

comment by HungryHobo · 2014-05-27T12:35:26.683Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The "skeptic" opens by remarking about the crazy true believers and wishful thinkers who believe in X, where there seem to be a surprising number of physicists making up the population of those wacky cult victims who believe in X. (The physicist-test is not an infallible indicator of rightness or even non-stupidity, but it's a filter that rapidly picks up on, say, strong AI, molecular nanotechnology, cryonics, the many-worlds interpretation, and so on.) Bonus point losses if the "skeptic" remarks on how easily physicists are seduced by sci-fi ideas.

This seems like a bad metric. Perhaps if it was changed to "domain experts".

Physicists are not domain experts on everything and can have some nutty beliefs about fields outside of their area.

comment by homunq · 2012-04-20T23:49:02.190Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What if someone has rational reasons for rejecting a belief such as cryonics, but is deliberately using Dark Art rhetoric to talk more convincingly about that belief by associating it with low-status people? You'd class them as irrational when you should class them as unethical.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-04-21T17:03:10.563Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

What if someone has rational reasons for rejecting a belief such as cryonics, but is deliberately using Dark Art rhetoric to talk more convincingly about that belief by associating it with low-status people? You'd class them as irrational when you should class them as unethical.

They would be classed as irrational based on the belief that they do not, in fact, have 'rational reasons' for their decision. If that belief is false then it is false - just like any other. The specifics of their Dark Arts rhetoric gives some evidence regarding both their ethics and their beliefs but only a small amount.

Replies from: homunq
comment by homunq · 2012-04-21T18:56:56.932Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Both humbleness and arrogance are rationalist sins, but arrogance is worse. I can think of at least 4 different things wrong with this level of self-assurance in this context, and none of them have anything to do with cryonics in particular.

I'm not saying that there's anything wrong with assigning a high probability to cryonics working. I'm saying that mentally dinging others for not agreeing with you is likely to leave your assessment of both them and of cryonics worse overall than if you didn't.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2012-04-21T19:56:37.063Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Both humbleness and arrogance are rationalist sins, but arrogance is worse. I can think of at least 4 different things wrong with this level of self-assurance in this context, and none of them have anything to do with cryonics in particular.

No level of self assurance is specified or implied by me. My reply to was your complaint regarding the qualitative nature of the judgement - that is, that the dishonest people are being judged as irrational rather than unethical when their irrational seeming arguments are in fact not sincere.

I'm saying that mentally dinging others for not agreeing with you is likely to leave your assessment of both them and of cryonics worse overall than if you didn't.

I don't know much about 'dinging', but the simple act of disagreeing is already an act of disrespect. Further, when trying to seek out people whose opinions can provide strong evidence to you it is necessary to apply discretion. Whether that means "negative dings" to people whose beliefs are, to the best of your ability to judge, misguided or the assignment of "positive dings" to other people who execute behaviors that you judge as superior, in the end you need to judge the thoughts of others if you hope to improve your own.

Replies from: homunq
comment by homunq · 2012-04-21T20:41:28.427Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
  1. "IIf that belief is false then it is false - just like any other." I read this statement as an arrogant assumption that a sufficiently rational person could expect to correctly judge the probability of cryonics working with enough certainty that disagreeing with them would be "just like" disagreeing with reality. (Yes, I realize that this is not what you were directly saying with the words "just like", but as far as I can see it is in fact implied.)

  2. Of course you judge thought processes in order to improve your own. And it's even rational to judge people by individual examples of their thought processes, though the human tendency is to overdo, not underdo, such generalized judging of people.

But any belief about cryonics (and similar areas) is of necessity based on a relatively long chain of inference from any possible direct evidence. There are much richer ways to assess the quality of that chain than by whether it reaches the same conclusion as your own.

Replies from: CuSithBell
comment by CuSithBell · 2012-04-21T20:58:59.818Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

They would be classed as irrational based on the belief that they do not, in fact, have 'rational reasons' for their decision. If that belief is false then it is false - just like any other.

I read this statement as an arrogant assumption that a sufficiently rational person could expect to correctly judge the probability of cryonics working with enough certainty that disagreeing with them would be "just like" disagreeing with reality.

I read "that belief" as referring to "the belief that they do not, in fact, have 'rational reasons' for their decision". "Just like any other", then, probably refers to the fact that many rational beliefs turn out to be incorrect (rather, frequently the optimally epistemically rational degree of credence for a proposition is further from the mark than a degree of credence selected by an alternate method, or is somewhat high despite the belief actually being incorrect, though on average rational degrees of belief are more accurate).

Replies from: CuSithBell
comment by CuSithBell · 2012-04-21T21:05:37.926Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

In other words, this is not entirely correct:

What if someone has rational reasons for rejecting a belief such as cryonics, but is deliberately using Dark Art rhetoric to talk more convincingly about that belief by associating it with low-status people? You'd class them as irrational when you should class them as unethical.

In this case, it might be (epistemically) correct to class them as irrational (with some probability, etc.), given the information you have about them.

Similarly, if someone draws a card at random from a standard 52-card deck, your degree of credence that it is the seven of diamonds should be 1/52 - it wouldn't be correct to be more confident than that, even if in actuality it IS the seven of diamonds, as this is information you do not have access to.

(ETA: I'm speaking abstractly here - making no comment on rational beliefs about cryonics.)

comment by homunq · 2012-04-20T21:50:45.250Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't think filtering people by rationality is a good idea at all. It's pretty much the definition of an ad hominem argument, and also a more-harmful-than-average case of the fundamental attribution error. Yes, it might be able to give you an early advantage on deciding whether they are right in any particular case; but that advantage would quickly evaporate as you got new data, and in most cases you'd already have enough data from the start for it to be a disadvantage (given limited human bandwidth).

Replies from: Desrtopa
comment by Desrtopa · 2012-04-21T00:02:36.870Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Ad hominem reasoning is not always fallacious.

When someone else makes an argument that doesn't seem right to you, your estimation of whether it's they or you who're making a mistake should vary widely depending on whether the argument is coming from someone with an established history of predictive expertise in contentious cases, or from Bob the Biased Bozo.

Replies from: homunq
comment by homunq · 2012-04-21T02:01:48.283Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I didn't say it was fallacious, I said it was a waste of bandwidth. There are almost always other, better clues about whether some statement is right or wrong. And even for filtering attention, it's not the best heuristic. if someone is just telling you things you already know, it doesn't really matter if they're being rational or just parrots, they're not worth paying attention to.

comment by Boyi · 2011-12-04T20:27:57.450Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

“I don't believe in UFOs. I don't believe in astrology. I don't believe in homeopathy. I don't believe in creationism. I don't believe there were explosives planted in the World Trade Center. I don't believe in haunted houses. I don't believe in perpetual motion machines. I believe that all these beliefs are not only wrong but visibly insane.” (Emphasis added by me)

I am assuming that you are defining what is insane as what is irrational, because being irrational makes it impossible to achieve goals or reach desired outcomes. If this is not the case please correct me, but for now I will continue under this assumption. I agree with you that people who carry any of the above listed beliefs as ideology are insane. However, I would add to that list “I do not believe humans are innately rational in the traditional sense,” as well as, “ I do not believe that tribes are bonded through tradition rationality” as beliefs not only wrong but visibly insane. What does this mean? First it must be addressed what I mean by “traditionally-rational.” Tradition deals with the socio-historic practices that constitute a specific tribe’s solidarity. As a part of this solidarity, every tribe contains both a method and a methodology for the production of “Truth.” Truth is a desired state of knowledge, a way of filtering information. What I call traditional-rationality more specifically refers to the conception of Truth that has shaped the production of Western knowledge. Since the normative sciences have emerged out of Western culture they too exist as products of traditional-rationality.

What is the Traditional-rationality of the Western Tribe? That is a very complicated question, because what represents truth to our tribe has evolved. I will give a brief history of this evolution, but if you would like a more detailed discussion of it I can point you to some good academic work on the subject. The summary of said evolution is as follows:

1.) PRE- GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT: Truth is filtered through Mythos. (What is true is represented through Folklore or Myth, legitimized intelligentsia being storytellers)

2.) POST GREEK ENLIGHTENMENT: Conveyance of information is redefined and myth and rhetoric are excluded from what is considered legitimized Truth. Post-Aristotle Legitimized Truth emerges are what is related to Logic. Logic referring to deductive reasoning.

3.) SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION: Francis Bacon, Galileo, Robert Boyle, along with various other thinkers of their time attack pure deductive reasoning as mind games that ultimately lead to no new production of knowledge. Logic is redefined as primarily inductive. (Meaning the driving filter for whether or not information is legitimized, as truth is empirical evidence.) Which brings us to today. What most normatively defines legitimized knowledge in present society is without a doubt scientific knowledge, because the scientific method is the most powerful method of empirical investigation. This standard of knowledge is what I call traditional rationality.

Now returning to my original claims

-I do not believe that tribes are bonded through tradition rationality. -I do not believe humans are innately rational in the traditional sense.

Traditional rationality is not innate. The reason there are experts on a matter who we are taught to trust, is because without extensive education the average person is not scientific, even if they believe in science. Without extensive specialization in some sub-field the average person has no way of containing enough empirical knowledge to validate them as a source of truth. What this means is that the traditional western sense of logic/rationality is a product of privilege. Yet our culture for political reasons has exhaled traditional rationality as the cornerstone of human development. Such thinking is counterintuitive if you accept the fact that humans are irrevocably social creatures. If humans demand sociality to exist and thrive, then the cornerstone of human development must be linked to sociality. Now here is where it gets complicated because technically Traditional Western Rationality is a type of social bond. In attempting to rationalize and modernize the world, what the West is essentially doing is attempting to extend their tribe. However, the extension of a particular tribe cannot be confused with the axiom of tribal existence in general. What creates the tribe is not rationality-rationality (Western logic), but social harmony. What creates social harmony? The current management of Western society is attempting to make traditional rationality the bond that not only we share (we being the Western world), but also what the global world shares. What is the problem with this? People are not unanimously outfitted to be efficiently rational. Just as not every is unanimously outfitted to play baseball efficiently. Mathematic logic is just one of multiple human intelligences. Most people probably have some capacity to use every type of human intelligence, but being proficient in traditional-rationality is analogous to being able to be proficient enough in kinesthetic logic to be a professional athletic. Only a very small portion of the human population is able to be a professional athletic. A larger population is proficient enough to be able to understand the world of a professional athletic and navigate themselves through it. But there is an even larger population of people who are average or below average in kinesthetic knowledge and cannot comprehend that world accurately. I argue the same holds true for Traditional western rationality. This type of logical power dominates our society. Everyone wants to be a lawyer, a doctor, a scientist, etc. But the harsh reality is that millions of people, who are taught to want this, lack the capacity to truly be it. There is sizable population that is proficient enough to “fake it,” but there is a larger population that is unable to even pretend they belong in that world. It is damaging to the tribe if prestige is solely placed on one type of organ within the tribal organism. Society needs rationality, but it also needs other type of reasoning that seem to the logician irrational. People are not completely irrational, but the conception of the rational man is fallacious. Increasingly social psychology and behavioral psychology are proving that people do not behave rationally in the way economic models assume, a fact that sociology and anthropology has long advocated. Now back to what you said.

You say “I don't believe in UFOs. I don't believe in astrology. I don't believe in homeopathy. I don't believe in creationism. I don't believe there were explosives planted in the World Trade Center. I don't believe in haunted houses. I don't believe in perpetual motion machines. I believe that all these beliefs are not only wrong but visibly insane.” (Emphasis added by me) It is irrational to assume that the functioning of a tribe has ever been rational. So while those statements you list do not match up with what we know about empirical reality, they do serve as social bonds. Is it not rational to say that what best promotes human survival is human solidarity? Therefore making irrational social bonds rational.

Now do not get me wrong. The idea is to be moving towards a more rational society. Because even if a tribe is stable in its solidarity if its bonds are created through damaging practices (such as blood rituals) ultimately such practices will lead to its destruction. However, it must be accepted that the rational state of the human animal is a semi-irrational one. We are value-reason based creatures, not solely reason based, or solely value based. The ideal society is one that is irrational in a rational way. Meaning that its irrationality benefits continued survival and harmony. In my opinion, your quest to completely rationalize the human animal is irrational and potentially dangerous (also potentially marginally beneficial, but the danger potential seems greater).

Hope you enjoy thinking about this, and that I do not come off as too aggressive ^_%. The last thing I will say is this: One of the more interesting things Freud argued was that the opposite of psychosis was not rationality but culture. Psychosis defines a belief system held by an individual or a marginal population; whereas culture defines a belief system held by the majority. The difference between psychosis and culture is not a degree of truth, but a degree of a degree of quantity.

I believe that all these beliefs are not only wrong but visibly insane.

How do you convince someone of the superiority of your insanity? This is what I am currently working on. I have enjoyed reading some of your essays, I like several of your ideas. Have fun!

-Tom Mitchell

Replies from: MixedNuts
comment by MixedNuts · 2011-12-04T20:32:09.938Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Summary: People's beliefs are very strongly influenced by their culture. We can't cure that by encouraging contrarianism, because most people aren't suited for that. We should work more on group rationality instead.

Replies from: Boyi
comment by Boyi · 2011-12-04T20:59:38.561Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I agree with you. But don't you think that experts are the minority of any tribe? Perhaps on this blog it is experts who are the majority, but I believed the writer and the blog to be trying to improve our society, our tribe. In that sense, I see group rationality as contrarianism, because it is advocating for an incredibly specialized set of skills held by a minority group to become the basis of society. I am accepting the fact that the majority is irrational in the traditional sense, and thus trying to think of a way to further progress our tribe given that fact. Whereas, by trying to progress a tribe/society through democratizing group rationality, you are attempting something that is radically opposed to the majority.

Replies from: MixedNuts, arundelo
comment by MixedNuts · 2011-12-04T21:29:58.380Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I agree with you.

To clarify: I'm not trying to make a point, just to rephrase yours.

You are trying to say that we should not try to teach everyone to be an expert individual rationalist. But are you trying to say that we should teach everyone to be an expert group rationalist as long as they're in a group of people with the same teaching (an extended wisdom of crowds, embedded in culture)? Or that we should develop an elite of specialized individual rationalists and have everyone blindly follow them like they blindly follow the instructions of car mechanics? Or something else?

Replies from: Boyi
comment by Boyi · 2011-12-04T22:03:10.694Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Ah, my bad. I am somewhat embarrassed and ashamed of the fact that the characterization I had prescribed to members of this website was so strong that it led me to vilify your response into an attack. I really apologize.

Yup, your initial post is a a summary of my point.

As to your follow up questions:

I am not sure if by " a group of expert group rationalists" you mean

  • a group that is majorly proficient in empathetic intelligence (the rationality of groups).
  • Or a group that promotes everyone to actualize themselves in their own group expertise (type of multiple intelligence), still aiming for an expert group, but one of diverse capacities.

    Actually now that i think about it, the answer is the same for both cases. I do not think that this is possible. In my opinion any type of expert is a minority demographic of the larger population.

    I am supporting the later idea of having an elite that guides the masses, despite the huge potential for damage/corruption such an idea carries. My defense of such a totalitarian idea would be that humans cannot escape such a hierarchy. Even if we delude ourselves into thinking that we have removed a class elite from our current production of society, the truth is that we have merely chosen an elite that is a hidden class. What I mean by hidden class is that certain aspects of our current episteme hide the totalitarian aspects of our society. For example, I would see deep seeded ideologies of individualism, democracy, and cartesian dualism, and universal human rights, make most people hostile to the idea that cognition is as physical a capacity as running. And as with any physical capacity, there is both natural and nurtured disparity between individuals.

    Before I continue I feel I need to further explain myself, because all the ideologies I have listed above are laden with such heavy positive connotations in our culture I fear that my words will be vilified if I do not partially explain them. With for example the idea of universal human rights, you exclude the potential that there are fundamentally different types of people. Again, this idea seems evil and oppressive in light of the dominance of democratic equality in our culture, but I cannot help that. There number of people who can play professional basketball is not the majority. In the same sense the number of people who can rationally think on a professional level is not the majority.

    I don't think everyone is born with what we consider proficient rationality. Perhaps a majority could be taught to be rational, I am not denying this possibility, but I do not think that it is economically feasible. At least not in our current system of education. But then again, there are many essential facets of society that do not require world class logical skills. In my opinion the existing emphasis our power structure places on rationality has skewed the pretending-doing balance of a large demographic.

    I would suggest having a elite of empathetic rationalists who guide the masses to more humane and potentially more rational living.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2011-12-04T22:15:00.854Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't think everyone is born with what we consider proficient rationality. Perhaps a majority could be taught to be rational, I am not denying this possibility, but I do not think that it is economically feasible.

I'd doubt the feasibility without brain modification tech.

Replies from: timtyler, XiXiDu, Boyi
comment by timtyler · 2011-12-14T18:29:52.483Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Perhaps a majority could be taught to be rational, I am not denying this possibility, but I do not think that it is economically feasible.

I'd doubt the feasibility without brain modification tech.

Surely education is "brain modification tech". You can upgrade your own software.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2011-12-14T19:00:50.913Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Surely education is "brain modification tech".

No.

Replies from: timtyler
comment by timtyler · 2011-12-14T19:41:04.039Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

A lot of educational tools are technology - I would personally say that all educational systems are forms of technology.

...and they definitely modify your brain. Not counting them? Consider reconsidering.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2011-12-14T20:14:16.659Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The link provided in the grandparent is important:

And DON'T EVEN GET ME STARTED on people who think Wikipedia is an "Artificial Intelligence", the invention of LSD was a "Singularity" or that corporations are "superintelligent"!

"Education" is "brain modification technology" in about the same way the invention of LSD was a singularity.

It was a long time ago so my memory is hazy... was that post actually written as a direct response to you back in the day or was the "corporations are super-intelligent" guy someone else?

Replies from: timtyler
comment by timtyler · 2011-12-14T22:16:03.885Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

was that post actually written as a direct response to you back in the day or was the "corporations are super-intelligent" guy someone else?

I don't think I would ever have said "corporations are super-intelligent". "Agents with super-human powers" would be more my line.

"Superintelligent" means something fairly specific - something which corporations are not yet - and I have been aware of that for quite a long time.

comment by XiXiDu · 2011-12-05T12:26:37.180Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Perhaps a majority could be taught to be rational, I am not denying this possibility, but I do not think that it is economically feasible.

I'd doubt the feasibility without brain modification tech.

There is very little to rationality. All it takes is to be committed to take consequent actions that are implied by two basic questions:

  • What do I want?
  • How do I achieve what I want?

If you ask those questions, everything else will follow naturally. The very first implication is to ask,

  • How do I figure out what I want?

Rationality, in its broadest sense, is a collection of heuristics that help you to answer those questions. In that respect rational decision making is already implied by our preference for world states that satisfy our utility-function.

This means that brain modifications, if necessary, are not a precondition but a possible consequence of rationality.

I think that most healthy humans could be taught to ask those questions and pursue follow-up actions. The problem are the circumstances in which they reside.

comment by Boyi · 2011-12-04T22:53:40.281Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I am of the same opinion of you. I chose rhetorically to emit this argument because it is more radical and I was not sure exactly of my bearings on the open sea of values. But seeing that you are of the same type as me, I would agree with you. I do not think it is feasible in any sense of the word as of now.

Replies from: wedrifid
comment by wedrifid · 2011-12-04T23:38:53.158Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Not a native speaker I am guessing? Where "same opinions as you" expresses agreement "same opinion of you" has more potential as a retort. "Emit" gives approximately the opposite meaning to what I assume you intended, given that you did not release, give off, send out or express the radical opinion - you omitted it. (I assume English is a second language since your thoughts seem far more advanced than your expression thereof.)

Replies from: Boyi
comment by Boyi · 2011-12-05T00:11:09.486Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

No actually english is my first language. Though I have spent the past 6 years deeply immersed in the study of Chinese linguistics and scholarship. So I apologize in advance for comma splicing or other somewhat awkward rhetorical strategies that I may use. I try to think in chinese as much as I can and I guess it messes me up at points.

That said, I do not see a causal correlation between the quality of my ideas and my mastery of the english language. I know very well that on a scale of 1-10 it would be generous to call my writing a 7. But I do not think that defines the nature of my thoughts, especially since you do not know what stage of the writing process my responses are in. I will go ahead and tell you anything I write on this site is done in a single draft. I am writing not to meet the rhetorical standards of whatever game you are playing. I am writing because of the potential to see what emerges from me when I mix with interesting materials such as Mr./Mrs MixedNuts. Personally I do not see the point in attacking rhetoric, especially if the idea is conveyed. It seems as insecure as my own initial vilifying of Mr./Mrs. MixedNuts. In fact it fulfills the stereotype I was expecting to meet in posting on this website! However, if I can have my insecurities, then I cannot hold your insecurities against you. So I forgive you, and I hope we can keep talking.

comment by roland · 2011-06-12T20:39:32.479Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Following a suggestion from Cayenne:

I don't believe there were explosives planted in the World Trade Center. I believe that all these beliefs are not only wrong but visibly insane.

Eliezer, I don't understand how you arrived at this conclusion, could you explain the reasoning behind it? Specifically I don't understand why this belief is visibly insane.

Replies from: moshez
comment by moshez · 2012-02-13T18:18:03.226Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I cannot answer for Eliezer, but I can (perhaps) explain why the belief is "visibly insane".

  1. There is footage of the airplanes flying into the building.
  2. In hindsight, several engineering organizations that investigated the phenomena, decided that a collapse from the fires started was likely (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collapse_of_the_World_Trade_Center )
  3. In order to be a conspiracy, there would have had to be 3a. Someone who planted the explosives in a way to cause an organized collapse. 3b. People who shipped the explosives. 3c. People on the inside of FEMA and the other investigating organizations who looked into it. 3d. People on the inside of the FBI who swept under the rug the evidence for explosives. 3e. Nobody in the group of 3a-3d who had a change of heart and decided to come clean.

For 3 to be true, too many things to be true. For the non-conspiracy explanation, all that's needed is the (perhaps slightly surprising) fact that the fire caused a specific kind of collapse. Most "truthers" know about as much about physics as me (highschool mechanics, some basics in college). So for a given truther to believe that, the truther needs to assume a high degree of certainty for his or her intuitive physics estimation in the fairly subtle area of civil engineering. In fact, they'd have to have a degree of certainty so high that all the elements in 3 are not enough to sway them the other way. That degree of certainty should be reserved for actual trained civil engineered, and perhaps not even then...

Replies from: roland
comment by roland · 2012-02-14T01:05:37.335Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
  1. There is footage of the airplanes flying into the building.

This was never disputed and is totally irrelevant to the claim at hand.

  1. In hindsight, several engineering organizations that investigated the phenomena, decided that a collapse from the fires started was likely (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collapse_of_the_World_Trade_Center )

There are several theories that offer explanations for the collapse, but they don't rule out explosives.

  1. In order to be a conspiracy, there would have had to be 3a. Someone who planted the explosives in a way to cause an organized collapse. 3b. People who shipped the explosives.

Obviously true and I don't see this relevant to the argument you are trying to make. Why is considering this "visibly insane"?

3c. People on the inside of FEMA and the other investigating organizations who looked into it.

AFAIK when analyzing the collapse of the WTC explosives were never considered in any investigation.

3d. People on the inside of the FBI who swept under the rug the evidence for explosives.

AFAIK there has been lots of evidence for explosives, Just typing in "explosives in wtc" into my search engine yields the following as a top result:

http://911research.wtc7.net/essays/thermite/explosive_residues.html

But of course this would require chemical analysis of dust samples, something that I doubt the average FBI agent is qualified to do. So there is no evidence to be swept under the rug if you don't first look for this evidence.

Again, where is the insanity?

3e. Nobody in the group of 3a-3d who had a change of heart and decided to come clean.

Kurt Sonnenfeld would be one exception: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kurt_Sonnenfeld

AFAIK, people in government jobs are bound to secrecy. Sibel Edmonds has already said she would speak out if she was subpoenaed and there are possibly others that would do so as well.

Also consider the baserate, how often did people come forward who were in the know about government conspiracies. Just one example would be Operation Northwoods which only came to light decades after when somebody discovered it in the archives.

comment by Tyrrell_McAllister · 2010-03-15T04:32:25.732Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Possible typo:

I'm using Artificial Intelligence as an example, because it's a case where you can see some "skeptics" directing their skepticism directed at a belief that is very popular in educated circles, that is, the nonmysteriousness and ultimate reverse-engineerability of mind.

(Emphasis added.)

comment by Clippy · 2010-03-15T03:02:02.351Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I am skeptical of UFOs, not because I fear affiliating myself with the low-prestige people who believe in UFOs, but because I don't believe aliens would (a) travel across interstellar distances AND (b) hide all signs of their presence AND THEN (c) fly gigantic non-nanotechnological aircraft over our military bases with their exterior lights on.

Not good enough evidence. If alien ships actually got close enough to earth to observe, they would quickly notice that you annihilate each other based on minor differences in your makeup, realize that they are far more different, and then decide it's in their best interest to leave immediately before they are detected.

Just trust me on this one.

Replies from: Eliezer_Yudkowsky, simplicio, BenAlbahari
comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-15T03:30:35.104Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Nothing that travels from one star to another has cause to be scared of us. If they're worried about future war, they'd just wipe us out, and in any case wouldn't do fancy acrobatics with their exterior lights on.

Replies from: NancyLebovitz, PhilGoetz, Daniel_Burfoot
comment by NancyLebovitz · 2010-03-15T05:02:28.234Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

People do weird things to animals in order to find out what will happen. Not only are those things incomprehensible to the animals, the rationale for the details of lot of them wouldn't make sense to most people, either because the explanation is technical or because it's a badly thought out experiment.

On the non-scientific side, I don't think an insect can make sense of getting caught in a cup and dumped out a window.

It's at least plausible that aliens want to study relatively undisturbed human societies-- how a particular intelligent species behaves could still be very hard to predict, even for aliens capable of space travel. It's not that they'd be afraid of us, it's that we're interesting enough without adding in reactions to aliens.

Replies from: Strange7
comment by Strange7 · 2010-03-15T08:08:31.496Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I have heard it suggested, in jest, that abduction and anal-probing of humans found alone on rural roads is a sign that even societies sufficiently advanced to travel between solar systems still can't figure out how to efficiently allocate research grant money.

Replies from: DanielVarga
comment by DanielVarga · 2010-03-15T16:51:30.561Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"Stop! We have reached the limits of what rectal probing can teach us." One of my favourite Simpsons quotes.

Replies from: Yvain
comment by PhilGoetz · 2010-03-15T15:10:20.467Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I like the HHGTTG explanation: They're just idiots like Zaphod pranking us.

I don't believe it. I just like it.

comment by Daniel_Burfoot · 2010-03-16T02:37:36.642Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

and in any case wouldn't do fancy acrobatics with their exterior lights on.

How can you reason about the motives of alien interstellar travelers? Maybe traveling to earth to freak out the humans is just some kind of alien prank, like cow-tipping. Maybe they get some aesthetic satisfaction from fancy aerial acrobatics.

Replies from: simplicio, Eliezer_Yudkowsky, RobinZ
comment by simplicio · 2010-03-16T02:48:36.547Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You're now not only assuming aliens, but also assuming aliens with a peculiar psychology. Parsimony is dropping fast.

comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2010-03-16T03:44:26.889Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

How can you reason about the motives of alien interstellar travelers? Maybe they've been poking holes in my socks and interfering with my TV reception.

comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-16T02:56:13.289Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Before attempting to demonstrate the logical falsity of an informally-stated claim, I recommend testing to see if it can be reasonably interpreted as:

a. metaphor

b. hyperbole

c. approximate

...and determine if the resultant interpretation is reasonable.

simplicio is correct, here - parsimony is dropping fast. I wager that's what Eliezer Yudkowsky was saying.

comment by simplicio · 2010-03-15T03:44:29.860Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

If alien ships actually got close enough to earth to observe, they would quickly notice that you annihilate each other based on minor differences in your makeup, realize that they are far more different, and then decide it's in their best interest to leave immediately before they are detected.

They don't have telescopes? They can't watch our TV? If the aliens need to hover around in front of some Idaho farm boy and maybe give him an anal probe in order to figure out that humans are sometimes violent, they're idiots.

You can always make up some loophole. Ockham's razor should mitigate against it though.

comment by BenAlbahari · 2010-03-15T03:15:49.142Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I found it difficult to dig up any convincing claims in support of UFOs: Have aliens from outer space visited Earth?

As you can see so far, the claims on the "agree" side are frankly pretty embarrassing. Please suggest some good experts in favor of this hypothesis if you know of them.

Replies from: Clippy
comment by Clippy · 2010-03-15T03:22:09.380Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I was only criticizing Editor:Eliezer_Yudkowksy's reasoning, not trying to argue that non-human intelligences exist (although they do).

Replies from: Rain
comment by Rain · 2010-03-15T03:54:05.181Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

not trying to argue that non-human intelligences exist (although they do)

You're talking here about dolphins, pigs, dogs, etc.?

Replies from: arundelo
comment by arundelo · 2010-03-15T13:26:58.438Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Remember that Clippy is a paperclip maximizing AI.

Replies from: Rain
comment by Rain · 2010-03-15T13:52:07.848Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'd still like to see an enumerated list of what Clippy considers to be non-human intelligences, starting with those it considers the most intelligent by the measure it considers most appropriate.

Replies from: Clippy
comment by Clippy · 2010-03-15T15:36:58.546Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Okay. Here is the enumerated list of what I consider to be non-human intelligences, ranked in order of decreasing intelligence, by the measure I deem most appropriate:

Clippys

Replies from: Larks
comment by Larks · 2010-03-15T16:35:10.230Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The singularity is here already; Clippy's replicating!

comment by roland · 2010-03-25T00:33:42.222Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't believe there were explosives planted in the World Trade Center. I believe that all these beliefs are not only wrong but visibly insane.

Eliezer, could you explain how you arrived at the conclusion that this particular believe is visibly insane?

comment by LazyDave · 2010-03-21T19:22:57.024Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

"And of course I could easily go on to name some beliefs that others think are wrong and that I think are right, or vice versa, but would inevitably lose some of my audience at each step along the way - just as, a couple of decades ago, I would have lost a lot of my audience by saying that religion was unworthy of serious debate. "

So are you admitting to just going for "cheap credit"? In your post you encourage people to stick their intellectual necks out, but seem reluctant to do so yourself.

Replies from: PhilGoetz
comment by PhilGoetz · 2010-03-24T20:28:19.616Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

No; he's trying to stick to the point. He's stuck his neck out in other posts.

Replies from: LazyDave
comment by LazyDave · 2010-03-25T03:19:23.014Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

OK, I may have misunderstood his meaning. I thought he was saying that there were things he would never mention, as it would alienate people, as opposed to just not mentioning it in this post.

comment by thomblake · 2010-03-15T14:14:37.860Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Hey!

Replies from: CronoDAS
comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-15T20:42:00.713Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Needs more context.

Replies from: thomblake, wnoise
comment by thomblake · 2010-03-15T20:44:37.266Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

To be understood, clearly. But I liked it better without, and the odd chuckle from people who know my contrarian habits hereabouts is worth the downvotes.

comment by wnoise · 2010-03-16T02:04:04.339Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Needs more cowbell.

Replies from: CronoDAS
comment by CronoDAS · 2010-03-16T02:25:05.779Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Needs more kitten.

comment by cvichiee · 2011-10-10T18:43:47.817Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Excellent work Mr.Yudkowsky !

The very first point under the conclusion completely explains the current Theist-Atheist scenario. Both indiscriminately point fingers at each other while at the same time being short of answers !

comment by Quidam · 2010-03-15T07:44:36.439Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't believe in (physical) self-organization, especially at the molecular scale.

Nothing like physical self-organization has ever been observed, all we ever have observed are very limited self-ordering phenomena which don't scale at all.

All known organization is modular and often hierarchically combining modules into larger modules. All known organization is non-trivial.

While the physical parts may allow them to be organized, or rather the parts can be organized in a way which is consistent with the physical properties of the parts and so generate the desired system as a whole so that more is different then just the sum of its parts. This same organization however does not follow from just the physical properties of the parts. The physical properties are required, but insufficient. More is required: "Life is consistent with, but undecidable from physics and chemistry."

The hypotheses of molecular self-organization is without any actual evidence and is inconsistent with experience and logic. And still it is a widely held believe. Is the widespread believe that physical systems can self-organize "insane"?

Replies from: FAWS, Morendil
comment by FAWS · 2010-03-15T11:13:01.248Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You need to define what you mean with molecular self-organization. presumably you don't believe that some supernatural force is involved in arranging water molecules in snow flakes.

Replies from: Quidam
comment by Quidam · 2010-03-15T13:40:58.874Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I guess that is kind of the problem, isn't it? People tend to use words like self-organization (or supernatural) to mean something, without every really thinking about the consequences if it would exist.

Personally I believe that all "stuff" is either naturally generated or artificially created? Which doesn't leave any room for anything "supernatural" to exist, either "supernatural" is just another way to say "not naturally generated"? OR they see it as a (proper) subset (or maybe superset) of the term "natural", maybe for extremely rare occurrences? So what does "supernatural" really mean? Likewise, I dont really know what people think when they talk about "self-organization" as if it was real; To me it's obviously clear that it does not exist.

In many ways it's almost as if self-organization is just a synonym for "supernatural force"... because it is used in almost the same way: Where the mystic appeals to the supernatural to explain away the unknown so too does the quasi-physicalist who makes an appeal to self-organization as if this would explain anything. Neither actually explains anything. It does not answer the how-question. The mystic answers with an "who" and the physicalist with an "what". Neither is all that helpful.

Replies from: Richard_Kennaway
comment by Richard_Kennaway · 2010-03-15T14:14:35.404Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Certainly, "self-organisation" can be used as a mysterious answer. But who are you arguing against, who is using it like that? It doesn't occur in the post you're commenting on.

comment by Morendil · 2010-03-15T13:59:27.633Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Have you looked into autocatalytic networks? There is actual research on this topic (e.g. Julius Rebek) with experiments suggesting a likely model for abiogenesis. Don't press me for details, my sources are popularizations from the likes of Stuart Kaufmann and Richard Dawkins. I've just looked enough to confirm that the evidence seems in fact to exist.

As a non-mainstream hypothesis panspermia has some appeal, but it only moves the issue - if life came to Earth from elsewhere it had to appear elsewhere first, and the evidence we possess about the Universe seems to demand that life had to originate from non-life at some point.

comment by roland · 2010-03-16T20:26:34.766Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Isn't it ironic(considering the contents of this post) that one comment presenting prima facie evidence against one of the author's expressed belief was downvoted into oblivion?

EDIT: I forgot to emphasize that this particular belief is mainstream on LW/OB.

Replies from: thomblake, FAWS, RobinZ
comment by thomblake · 2010-03-16T20:42:11.400Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Perhaps, if by "ironic" you mean something like "the opposite of ironic".

comment by FAWS · 2010-03-16T20:33:45.167Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It was extremely irrational to assume that this one point of evidence would shift the posterior probability enough to reach a substantially different conclusion. Whether the posterior probability is 0.000001 [edit: should be 0.00001] or 0.0001 doesn't matter all that terribly much.

Replies from: roland
comment by roland · 2010-03-16T20:36:10.447Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That depends on your prior probability.

Replies from: FAWS
comment by FAWS · 2010-03-16T20:38:15.158Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Sure. And it should have been obvious to you that most people here assign a vanishingly small prior probability.

Replies from: roland
comment by roland · 2010-03-16T20:56:06.591Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The fact under dispute here is only if there were explosives in the WTC, it doesn't matter if those were planted by terrorists or if any of the wider conspiracy theories is true.

It's a fact that fires were burning on several floors of the WTC7. The official version states that those were cause by the fallen debris but AFAIK explosives were never actually excluded as a possibility.

As of your prior probability of 1 in a million, the only previous terrorist attack on the WTC was by explosives so I wonder how you or anyone can state this prior with a straight face.

Replies from: jimrandomh, RobinZ, Jack, FAWS
comment by jimrandomh · 2010-03-16T23:42:41.394Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

WTC7 contained a CIA field office, so it seems rather likely that it contained an armory and that that armory contained some explosives. This would explain any apparent explosions that occurred after the fires started, in a way that screens off those explosions from being evidence for anything interesting.

Replies from: roland
comment by roland · 2010-03-17T00:00:57.137Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Yep, right! The only thing that I would remark is regarding your argument about screening off anything interesting. There is a lot of controversy about the timing of those explosions, like Barry Jennings who experienced them first hand before any tower had collapsed(see my comment linked below).

It's funny that the above comment is a few minutes old and was already downvoted to -1 just for the fact of acknowledging the possibility of the existence of explosives in the WTC. I'm upvoting you right now so you should be back to 0 or hopefully positive.

My comment where I referenced a video of an eye witness acknowledging explosions was downvoted to -12: http://lesswrong.com/lw/1ww/undiscriminating_skepticism/1r5v This looks to me like suppressing contrary evidence.

The interesting thing here is why acknowledging the existence of explosives is anathema to mainstreamers? Why is it so important for the official theory to deny any explosives? Is this fact in itself evidence for something going on?

Replies from: FAWS
comment by FAWS · 2010-03-17T00:10:33.218Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Explosives that weren't planted are completely irrelevant to "I don't believe there were explosives planted in the World Trade Center."

comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-16T21:06:46.325Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

It's a fact that fires were burning on several floors of the WTC7. The official version states that those were cause by the fallen debris but AFAIK explosives were never actually excluded as a possibility.

Nor was the involvement of Mortimer Q. Snodgrass. I find it perfectly plausible that a crashed plane might cause a fire and that a fire might cause partial or total structural collapse of a skyscraper, and those two combined would explain all observations very simply - I see no need to investigate more complex hypotheticals.

Replies from: roland, roland
comment by roland · 2010-03-16T21:48:53.742Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Nor was the involvement of Mortimer Q. Snodgrass. I find it perfectly plausible that a crashed plane might cause a fire and that a fire might cause partial or total structural collapse of a skyscraper, and those two combined would explain all observations very simply - I see no need to investigate more complex hypotheticals.

I should have addressed this before: The point I'm trying to make on this subthread was about the prior probability of explosives. Sure, the official explanation has a degree of plausibility but from there can you rationally justify to assign such a vanishingly low probability to explosives that allows you to completely discount any eye witness testimony?

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-16T22:03:09.552Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Sure, the official explanation has a degree of plausibility but from there can you rationally justify to assign such a vanishingly low probability to explosives that allows you to completely discount any eye witness testimony?

That's not what I said. I said I agreed with FAWS, who said that the evidence was present, but too weak to substantially change the conclusion.

As for my prior (assuming you mean "prior relative to 9/11", not "prior relative to roland's comment", which I was thinking of before): I expect less than one in a thousand occupied skyscrapers have explosives in them for any reason. I know of no reason to expect WTC 7 to have been substantially distinguished in this respect.

Replies from: roland
comment by roland · 2010-03-16T22:35:48.951Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That's not what I said. I said I agreed with FAWS, who said that the evidence was present, but too weak to substantially change the conclusion.

More precisely FAWS point was to assign an extremely low prior probability(1 in 100,000). Well, guess what, I can make ANY hypothesis very hard to prove if I make the PP so low, I think Eliezer needs to write a new post called "Unprivileging the hypothesis".

I expect less than one in a thousand occupied skyscrapers have explosives in them for any reason. I know of no reason to expect WTC 7 to have been substantially distinguished in this respect.

No. Your prior has to be different: how many skyscrapers that were severely damaged by actions and in contexts consistent with the use of explosives had in fact explosives being used in them? If you take the PP regarding all occupied skyscrapers you are simply ignoring part of the evidence.

Replies from: RobinZ, FAWS
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-16T22:56:40.367Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

On 9/10, WTC 7 was an occupied skyscraper barely distinguished from any other by being near to a skyscraper which had previously been the subject of a terrorist bombing.

On 9/11, WTC 7 was struck by rubble from an adjacent skyscraper that collapsed in an uncontrolled fashion, burned for several hours, then collapsed in turn.

None of this is made substantially more likely by the addition of explosives to the story.

Replies from: roland
comment by roland · 2010-03-16T23:07:32.673Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

None of this is made substantially more likely by the addition of explosives to the story.

Sorry, we are discussing if the existence of the explosives is more likely(in contraposition to a skyscraper that has not been the subject of a terrorist attack) given the evidence, not the other way round.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-16T23:21:34.181Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Bayes' Theorem:

           P(B|A) P(A)
P(A|B) = -----------
              P(B)

A is explosives. B is 9/11. I already told you P(A) is small, I assume P(B) was small, and I just said that P(B|A) is small. What is small times small over small?

Replies from: roland
comment by roland · 2010-03-16T23:40:00.408Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Sorry I really had to LOL over this and I don't see any sense in exerting more effort trying to explain my point again.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-16T23:45:26.375Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You're wiser than I, if that is your reaction - I'm about done, too.

comment by FAWS · 2010-03-16T22:48:53.056Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

No. Your prior has to be different: how many skyscrapers that were severely damaged by actions and in contexts consistent with the use of explosives had in fact explosives being used in them?

What's the probability that explosives just happen to have been successfully placed, but not yet detonated in the WTC in any specific hour? Let's say an expected 1 hour every 10 years -> 1/(10 * 365* 24) = 0.0000114

comment by roland · 2010-03-16T21:10:23.954Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Nor was the involvement of Mortimer Q. Snodgrass.

"You can get cheap credit for rationality by mocking wrong beliefs that everyone in your social circle already believes to be wrong. "(from the OP)

I find it perfectly plausible that a crashed plane might cause a fire and that a fire might cause partial or total structural collapse of a skyscraper, and those two combined would explain all observations very simply - I see no need to investigate more complex hypotheticals.

I'm talking about WTC 7, which wasn't hit by any plane.

Replies from: RobinZ
comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-16T21:29:43.768Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm talking about WTC 7, which wasn't hit by any plane.

  1. It was hit by debris from WTC 1.

  2. Wait, what?

comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T20:59:04.061Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

AFAIK explosives were never actually excluded as a possibility.

Neither were fire breathing dragons.

Replies from: roland
comment by roland · 2010-03-16T21:05:12.708Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

You can get cheap credit for rationality by mocking wrong beliefs that everyone in your social circle already believes to be wrong.

Replies from: Jack
comment by Jack · 2010-03-16T21:11:02.640Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I'm actually making a point about parsimony in a humorous and lighthearted manner.

comment by FAWS · 2010-03-16T21:08:47.620Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

As of your prior probability of 1 in a million,

Sorry, that should have been 0.00001. The evidence isn't anywhere near strong enough for a likelihood ratio of ~100.

comment by RobinZ · 2010-03-16T20:40:39.823Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

While I agree with FAWS: yes, it is ironic.

comment by roland · 2010-03-15T02:08:39.320Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

I don't believe there were explosives planted in the World Trade Center.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kRaKHq2dfCI#t=4m00s

EDIT: Btw, in case you don't watch the whole interview, the explosion happened before any of the two main towers collapsed.

EDIT2(2010-03-15): Wow, once primary evidence that contradicts the LW orthodoxy is downvoted into oblivion what can we say about the epistemological waterline here? What about the trumpeted Bayesianism that says you have to take all evidence into account?

EDIT3(2010-03-29): I'm counting votes for the historical record: -13 now. Please don't upvote this retroactively(EDIT: if you already downvoted it previously), I think this will be important for the future to gauge the rationality of this site.

EDIT4(2010-04-27): downvoted to -15 now.

EDIT5(2011-08-23): -17

EDIT6(2011-08-24): -18

EDIT7(2011-08-24): -23

Replies from: ArisKatsaris, gregconen, BenAlbahari
comment by ArisKatsaris · 2011-08-24T22:07:16.335Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Downvoted for downvote-counting obsession.

comment by gregconen · 2010-03-15T19:35:04.713Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

A single eyewitness account, presumable handpicked and stagemanaged by people with an agenda, does not make particularly strong evidence.

Replies from: roland
comment by roland · 2010-03-15T20:09:31.454Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The eyewitness in question was Barry Jennings who was Deputy Director of Emergency Services Department for the New York City Housing Authority. He was inside WTC 7 in the office of emergency management(OEM) during 9-11. Btw, afterwards he has died under mysterious circumstances, there is no explanation of how it happened.

http://barryjenningsmystery.blogspot.com/ http://www.groundreport.com/US/Barry-Jennings-Key-9-11-Witness-Dies/2869565

EDIT: The OEM is intended to coordinate responses to various emergencies, including terrorist attacks.

Replies from: gregconen
comment by gregconen · 2010-03-15T22:50:41.361Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That adds some weight. But it's still not particularly convincing. Even assuming he's not being intentionally deceptive or deceptively cut (which I'm not sure is true), it's not anything close to extraordinary evidence, as a claim like that requires.

Remember that witnesses perceptions and memories will be distorted. Clearly, events were confused (look at his statement at 4:39, where he's confused on whether he's standing on a landing or hanging). He "knows" he heard explosions, apparently based on his experience as "a boiler guy"; even setting aside the possibility of actual explosions from (eg) fuel oil tanks, it's certainly possible that he mistook other sound associated with a massive fire and collapsing building for explosions. The devastation, dead bodies, etc, are likewise consequences of the fires and damage.

There is some evidence supporting the conspiracy theory, but it's not nearly enough to outweigh the low prior and evidence against it.

Replies from: roland
comment by roland · 2010-03-16T19:57:28.833Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

That adds some weight. But it's still not particularly convincing.

What kind of eyewitness testimony would be more convincing to you?

Replies from: gregconen, taryneast
comment by gregconen · 2010-03-16T21:53:08.588Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The kind that comes from more than a single person, for a start. An unequivocal sign of a conspiracy (like an actual explosive attached to a support).

Failing that, a report free of clear signs of confusion (like the aforementioned confusion at 4:39). Reports of explosions from people actually familiar with explosions, and/or experience and a track record of cool under threat ("a boiler guy" and bureaucrat don't qualify, without more of a evidence). A witness who hasn't changed his story back and forth. Etcetera.

comment by taryneast · 2011-06-27T16:00:19.323Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Video footage.

Of course, video footage does exist and shows no explosions, but does show a plane hitting the tower.

Replies from: roland
comment by roland · 2011-06-27T16:33:42.825Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

My question was rhetorical. The point I'm trying to make is that you can't choose your evidence.

comment by BenAlbahari · 2010-03-15T02:33:17.233Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

Experts on both sides of the 9/11 conspiracy debate:
http://www.takeonit.com/question/46.aspx

I didn't spend much time on this question, because there didn't seem to be compelling enough evidence to warrant further research.

Replies from: ata
comment by ata · 2010-03-15T03:10:45.057Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

This makes me think your website would be improved by some means of ordering quotes based on the relevance of the speakers' expertise. In this case, it's easy enough to tell that bin Laden claiming responsibility is more relevant than Jesse Ventura having watched a video on YouTube, but on other issues, it might not be as clear-cut, and could serve to promote a false equivalence between the "experts" quoted on each side.

Replies from: BenAlbahari
comment by BenAlbahari · 2010-03-15T03:34:39.278Z · LW(p) · GW(p)

The ordering algorithm currently works in two steps:

  1. Expertise Relevance: If the topic of expertise the expert has matches the topic of the question, the expert quote ranks higher (sub ordering: a rarer topic match gets a higher rank than a common topic match, e.g. a match for "climatology" would outrank a match for "science".)
  2. Expertise Depth: An expert quote with more sub-arguments out-ranks an expert quote with fewer sub-arguments.

Like many algorithms (such as collaborative filtering), the algorithm starts working better as the content is filled out, e.g.:
http://www.takeonit.com/question/5.aspx

P.S. I just tagged that question with the topic "War" so now Bin Laden bubbles to the top. Keep the feedback coming. It's incredibly helpful.