LessWrong 2.0 Reader

I think the rule is not necessarily "smarter units make a worse collective", but rather "it is more difficult to make a collective out of smarter units (but when it succeeds, it can be even better)". Humanity is unparalleled at eliminating larger predators.

Bees sacrifice their lives for their biological closest relatives. Birds have small families, so the cost of sacrificing their life is an important factor. Humans also have small families, but they can use prestige and money to incentivize heroic behavior.

So my proposed analogy would be that smarter populations can win, but they cannot achieve it by merely copying the behavior of stupider populations. They need a new solution that leverages their strengths.

Also, I'm curious what it is that you consider(ed) AI safety progress/innovation. Can you give a few representative examples?

First paragraph: 3/10. The claim is that something was already more natural to begin with, but you need deliberate practice to unlock the thing that was already more natural. It's not that it 'comes more naturally' after you practice something. What 'felt' natural before was actually very unnatural and hindered, but we don't realize this until after practicing. 

2nd, 3rd, 4th paragraph: 2/10. This mostly doesn't seem relevant to what I'm trying to offer.

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It's interesting trying to watch various people try to repeat what I'm saying or respond to what I'm saying and just totally missing the target each time. 

It suggests an active blind spot or a refusal to try to look straight at the main claim I'm making. I have been saying it over and over again, so I don't think it's on my end. Although the thing I am trying to point at is notoriously hard to point at, so there's that. 

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Anyway the cruxy part is here, and so to pass my ITT you'd have to include this:

"It's not a meta-process. It's not metacognition. It's not intelligence. It's also not intuition or instinct. This wisdom doesn't get better with more intelligence or more intuition. " 

"I'm more guided by a wisdom that is not based in System 1 or System 2 or any "process" whatsoever. "

"The "one weird trick" to getting the right answers is to discard all stuck, fixed points. Discard all priors and posteriors. Discard all aliefs and beliefs. Discard worldview after worldview. Discard perspective. Discard unity. Discard separation. Discard conceptuality. Discard map, discard territory. Discard past, present, and future. Discard a sense of you. Discard a sense of world. Discard dichotomy and trichotomy. Discard vague senses of wishy-washy flip floppiness. Discard something vs nothing. Discard one vs all. Discard symbols, discard signs, discard waves, discard particles. 

All of these things are Ignorance. Discard Ignorance."

links 9/30/24 https://roamresearch.com/#/app/srcpublic/page/09-30-2024

Thank you! Someone else noticed! For my part, I'll update this if I find anything.

I am concerned our disagreement here is primarily semantic or based on a simple misunderstanding of each others position. I hope to better understand your objection.

"The p-zombie doesn't believe it's conscious, , it only acts that way."

One of us is mistaken and using a non-traditional definition of p-zombie or we have different definitions of "belief'.

My understanding is that P-zombies are physically identical to regular humans. Their brains contain the same physical patterns that encode their model of the world. That seems, to me, a sufficient physical condition for having identical beliefs.

If your p-zombies are only "acting" like they're concious, but do not believe it, then they are not physically identical to humans. The existence of p-zombies, as you have described them, wouldn't refute physicalism.

This resource indicates that the way you understand the term p-zombie may be mistaken: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/zombies/

"but that's because p-zombies are impossible"

The main post that I responded to, specifically the section that I directly quoted, assumes it is possible for p-zombies to exist.

My comment begins "Assuming for the sake of argument that p-zombies could exist" but this is distinct from a claim that p-zombies actually exist.

"If they were possible, this wouldn't be the case, and we would have special access to the truth that p-zombies lack."

I do not feel this is convincing because this is an assertion my conclusion is incorrect, but without engaging with my arguments I made to reach that conclusion.

I look forward to continuing this discussion.

Just respond genuinely. You already did.

I don't know how else to phrase it, but I would like to not contradict interdependent origination. While still pointing toward what happens when all views are dropped and insight becomes possible. 

Or it could be:

SimulatedAndBeingTestedForAchievingGoalsWithoutBeingNoticed

SimulatedAndBeingTestedForAbilityToTradeWithCreators

SimulatedAndBeingTestedForWillignessToSitQuietAndDoNothing

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SimulatedAndBeingTestedForAnyXThatDoesNotLeadToDeathOfCreators

…

None of the things here nor in your last reply seems particularly likely, so there’s no telling in principle which set outweighs the other. Hence my previous assertion that we should be approximately completely unsure of what happens.

Nitpicking at the example, worker bees do not have offspring; the best way for them to spread their genes is to protect the queen and thus, the hive.

Birds can have offspring, so self-preservation instead of risky attacks is optimal for individuals of a flock (of genetically unrelated individuals).

It's not that the group is less intelligent, rather that the individuals of the group have different goals (self-preservation vs hive preservation, though the end goal of maximizing fitness is the same).

But genetic fitness breaks down as a metric when you add culture to the system, so application to humans is limited.