I agree that I wouldn't want to lean on the sweet-spot-by-default version of this, and I agree that the example is less strong than I thought it was. I still think there might be safety gains to be had from blocking higher level reflection if you can do it without damaging lower level reflection. I don't think that requires a task where the AI doesn't try and fail and re-evaluate - it just requires that the re-evalution never climbs above a certain level in the stack.
There's such a thing as being pathologically persistent, and such a thing as being pathologically flaky. It doesn't seem too hard to train a model that will be pathologically persistent in some domains while remaining functional in others. A lot of my current uncertainty is bound up in how robust these boundaries are going to have to be.
tsvibt on Daniel Kokotajlo's Shortformwe've checked for various forms of funny business and our tools would notice if it was happening.
I think it's a high bar due to the nearest unblocked strategy problem and alienness.
I agree that when AGI R&D starts to 2x or 5x due to AI automating much of the process, that's when we need the slowdown/pause)
If you start stopping proliferation when you're a year away from some runaway thing, then everyone has the tech that's one year away from the thing. That makes it more impossible that no one will do the remaining research, compared to if the tech everyone has is 5 or 20 years away from the thing.
linch on Survival without dignityThere's also a comic series with explicitly this premise, unfortunately this is a major plot point so revealing it will be a spoiler:
martin-randall on Abstractions are not NaturalI appreciate the brevity of the title as it stands. It's normal for a title to summarize the thesis of a post or paper and this is also standard practice on LessWrong. For example:
The introductory paragraphs sufficiently described the epistemic status of the author for my purposes. Overall, I found the post easier to engage with because it made its arguments without hedging.
jenniferrm on Jan_Kulveit's ShortformI already think that "the entire shape of the zeitgeist in America" is downstream of non-trivial efforts by more than one state actor. Those links explain documented cases of China and Russia both trying to foment race war in the US, but I could pull links for other subdimensions of culture (in science, around the second amendment, and in other areas) where this has been happening since roughly 2014.
My personal response is to reiterate over and over in public that there should be a coherent response by the governance systems of free people, so that, for example, TikTok should either (1) be owned by human people who themselves have free speech rights and rights to a jury trial, or else (2) should be shut down by the USG via taxes, withdrawal of corporate legal protections, etc...
...and also I just track actual specific people, and what they have personally seen and inferred and probably want and so on, in order to build a model of the world from "second hand info".
I've met you personally, Jan, at a conference, and you seemed friendly and weird and like you had original thoughts based on original seeing, and so even if you were on the payroll of the Russians somehow... (which to me clear I don't think you are) ....hey: Cyborgs [AF · GW]! Neat idea! Maybe true. Maybe not. Maybe useful. Maybe not.
Whether or not your cyborg ideas are good or bad can be screened off [LW · GW] from whether or not you're on the payroll of a hostile state actor. Basically, attending primarily to local validity [LW · GW] is basically always possible, and nearly always helpful :-)
charlie-steiner on Flipping Out: The Cosmic Coinflip Thought Experiment Is Bad PhilosophyI think you can do some steelmanning of the anti-flippers with something like Lara Buchak's arguments on risk and rationality. Then you'd be replacing the vague "the utility maximizing policy seems bad" argument with a more concrete "I want to do population ethics over the multiverse" argument.
martin-randall on Abstractions are not NaturalI appreciate the clarity of the pixel game as a concrete thought experiment. Its clarity makes it easier for me to see where I disagree with your understanding of the Natural Abstraction Hypothesis.
The Natural Abstraction Hypothesis is about the abstractions available in Nature, that is to say, the environment. So we have to decide where to draw the boundary around Nature. Options:
In the Cartesian frame, none of "top half", "bottom half", "outer rim", and "middle square" are all Unnatural Abstractions, because they're not in Nature, they're in the utility functions.
In the Hybrid and Embedded frames, when System A is playing the game, then "top half" and "bottom half" are Natural Abstractions, but "outer rim" and "middle square" are not. The opposite is true when System B is playing the game.
Let's make this a multi-player game, and have both systems playing on the same board. In that case all of "top half", "bottom half", "outer rim", and "middle square" are Natural Abstractions. We expect system A to learn "outer rim" and "middle square" as it needs to predict the actions of system B, at least given sufficient learning capabilities. I think this is a clean counter-example to your claim:
david-matolcsi on Jan_Kulveit's ShortformTwo systems require similar utility functions in order to converge on similar abstractions.
I'm from Hungary that is probably politically the closest to Russia among Central European countries, but I don't really know of any significant figure who turned out to be a Russian asset, or any event that seemed like a Russian intelligence operation. (Apart from one of our far-right politicians in the EU Parliament being a Russian spy, which was a really funny event, but its not like the guy was significantly shaping the national conversation or anything, I don't think many have heard of him before his cover was blown.) What are prominent examples in Czechia or other Central European countries, of Russian assets or operations?
james-lucassen on Evaluating Stability of Unreflective AlignmentI want to flag this as an assumption that isn't obvious. If this were true for the problems we care about, we could solve them by employing a lot of humans.
humans provides a pretty strong intuitive counterexample
Yup not obvious. I do in fact think a lot more humans would be helpful. But I also agree that my mental picture of "transformative human level research assistant" relies heavily on serial speedup, and I can't immediately picture a version that feels similarly transformative without speedup. Maybe evhub or Ethan Perez or one of the folks running a thousand research threads at once would disagree.
kvmanthinking on A map of Bay Area memespaceyeah, the moment i looked at the big diagram my brain sort of pleasantly overheated