Rationality Quotes October 2013
post by A1987dM (army1987) · 2013-10-05T21:02:36.127Z · LW · GW · Legacy · 315 commentsContents
315 comments
Another month has passed and here is a new rationality quotes thread. The usual rules are:
- Please post all quotes separately, so that they can be upvoted or downvoted separately. (If they are strongly related, reply to your own comments. If strongly ordered, then go ahead and post them together.)
- Do not quote yourself.
- Do not quote from Less Wrong itself, HPMoR, Eliezer Yudkowsky, or Robin Hanson. If you'd like to revive an old quote from one of those sources, please do so here.
- No more than 5 quotes per person per monthly thread, please.
315 comments
Comments sorted by top scores.
comment by Mestroyer · 2013-10-05T06:20:28.495Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The market doesn't give a shit how hard you worked. Users just want your software to do what they need, and you get a zero otherwise. That is one of the most distinctive differences between school and the real world: there is no reward for putting in a good effort. In fact, the whole concept of a "good effort" is a fake idea adults invented to encourage kids. It is not found in nature.
--Paul Graham (When I saw this quote, I thought it had to have been posted before, but googling turned up nothing.)
Replies from: Jiro, hankx7787, CoffeeStain, DanielLC, army1987↑ comment by Jiro · 2013-10-05T17:28:22.162Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I disagree with this quote. In the real world, many things are't all or nothing. The equivalent of a good effort isn't not producing any software, it's producing software that's marginally worse than the best software you could produce. That software will sell marginally less well than the best software you could produce, and produce marginally less profit, but it will still sell.
Replies from: Mestroyer↑ comment by Mestroyer · 2013-10-05T17:36:10.207Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
This doesn't say software is all-or-nothing. Not producing the best software you can gets you money only if it (to some extent) still does what the customer needs. Besides misinformed customers, if it doesn't do what the customer needs, you do get nothing. If it is not-quite-perfect, it's the result that gets you your not-quite-what-it-could-have-been profit. Not the effort.
↑ comment by hankx7787 · 2013-10-27T14:28:27.152Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Completely wrong.
As a software engineer at a company with way too much work to go around, I can tell you that making a "good effort" goes a long way. 90% of the time you don't have to "make it work or get a zero". As long as you are showing progress you can generally keep the client happy (or at least not firing you) as you get things done, even if you are missing deadlines. And this seems very much normal to me. I'm not sure where in the market you have to "make it work or get a zero". I'm not even convinced that exists.
Replies from: Mestroyer, Grant, Eugine_Nier↑ comment by Eugine_Nier · 2013-10-27T20:48:59.277Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
As long as you are showing progress you can generally keep the client happy (or at least not firing you) as you get things done,
But eventually you do have to make sure that things are done and work.
↑ comment by CoffeeStain · 2013-10-08T07:44:08.901Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The closest you can come to getting an actual "A for effort" is through creating cultural content, such as a Kickstarter project or starting a band. You'll get extra success when people see that you're interested in what you're doing, over and beyond as an indicator that what you'll produce is otherwise of quality. People want to be part of something that is being cared for, and in some cases would prefer it to lazily created perfection.
I'd still call it though an "A for signalling effort."
↑ comment by DanielLC · 2013-10-05T21:57:43.398Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
A good effort doesn't result in valuable software, but it could result in you learning to program better, increasing your human capital.
Replies from: wiresnips↑ comment by wiresnips · 2013-10-05T22:38:09.281Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
That's not necessarily false, but it's a dangerous thing to say to yourself. Mostly when I find myself thinking it, I've just wasted a great deal of time, and I'm trying to convince myself that it wasn't really wasted. It's easy to tell myself, hard to verify, and more pleasant than thinking my time-investment was for nothing.
Replies from: DanielLC↑ comment by DanielLC · 2013-10-05T22:51:42.678Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
It sure seems like a step up from when your time is really wasted, and you spent it all playing on the computer.
Replies from: Armok_GoB↑ comment by Armok_GoB · 2013-10-07T00:39:56.178Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
It's a continuum. I certainly wouldn't call a time when you're having fun and training your reflexes or pattern matching ability wasted. Or sleep. Or even sitting around anywhere where you can think stuff and meditate. The only wasted time is the one spent in to much pain to even think.
↑ comment by A1987dM (army1987) · 2013-10-05T18:39:56.919Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Mmm, no, whether you like it or not people who live off rent-seeking do exist.
Replies from: RolfAndreassen↑ comment by RolfAndreassen · 2013-10-06T04:10:42.513Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
True, but no obviously opposed to the quote. Rents are not a reward for a good effort.
comment by Nomad · 2013-10-05T16:20:03.442Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Replies from: Nomad, dthuntWe often like to think of World War II as a triumph of freedom over totalitarianism. We conveniently forget that the Soviet Union was also one of the winners.
↑ comment by Nomad · 2013-10-05T16:22:44.148Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
From the same article:
Replies from: VaniverI do it because it's good for the brain. To do good work you need a brain that can go anywhere. And you especially need a brain that's in the habit of going where it's not supposed to.
↑ comment by Vaniver · 2013-10-06T07:48:58.077Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Also worthwhile from it:
Especially if you hear yourself using them. It's not just the mob you need to learn to watch from a distance. You need to be able to watch your own thoughts from a distance.
("them" refers to labels like "x-ist" or "y-ic" used to tar positions by association, rather than demonstrating their falsity.)
↑ comment by dthunt · 2013-10-16T14:16:46.903Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I'm not sure I'd call Russia winner in this war. It seems like having been unlucky enough to have been involved is already some flavor of losing.
I respect the insight though, that Team A, characterized by quality a, defeating Team B, characterized by quality b, is not a story of a beats b, especially when you're wrong in the first place about Team A not also being characterized (in part) by quality b.
I liken this kind of talk to "fall of the Roman Empire" talk - modern humans have an eerie tendency to try to explain the past in ways that support their current viewpoints, and wilfully ignore evidence that tells them their explanations are not very fit.
Replies from: DanArmak↑ comment by DanArmak · 2013-10-29T17:40:59.452Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
It seems like having been unlucky enough to have been involved is already some flavor of losing.
So you're saying it had no winners? That doesn't seem right. We need a word to for the huge difference in outcome between Germany and the USSR.
Also, the USSR and the US both gained a lot from the war on net - territory, military power, international political power, domestic control. If Stalin had been offered in 1939 the choice between WW2 (knowing the eventual outcome) and eternal peace while Germany conquered the rest of Europe, he would have likely chosen war. The same goes for the US.
comment by jsbennett86 · 2013-10-03T05:07:22.078Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Him: We can't go back. We don't understand everything yet.
Her: "Everything" is a little ambitious. We barely understand anything.
Him: Yeah. But that's what the first part of understanding everything looks like.
Randall Munroe - Time
Replies from: Alejandro1↑ comment by Alejandro1 · 2013-10-03T13:48:39.553Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Followed by:
Replies from: SengachiHim: We walked along the sea for days and we didn't learn anything. Up here we're learning lots.
Her: We haven't learned why the sea rose.
Him: But maybe we were never going to.
Him: There's food and water here. I don't want to go all the way back down, walk along the sea for a few more days, then have to turn around.
Him: Maybe the sea is too big to understand. We can't answer every question.
Her: No, But I think we can answer any question.
↑ comment by Sengachi · 2013-10-21T12:28:40.733Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
That last part is the most important.
Replies from: JiroWe can't answer every question.
No, but I think we can answer any question.
↑ comment by Jiro · 2013-10-21T14:51:57.352Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Cool, what is an accurate proof of P=NP?
Replies from: Baughn↑ comment by Baughn · 2013-11-06T21:48:36.393Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Is there a finite proof for or against? If so, we will most likely find it.
Is there a finite proof that there is no such proof? That would be weird and unfortunate, but then the answer is "Mu".
Is there an infinite proof? Well, um. In this case I'd probably argue that the proof doesn't matter, and you can't tell anyway.
comment by Stabilizer · 2013-10-03T21:15:52.483Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
A majority of life's errors are caused by forgetting what one is really trying to do.
-Charlie Munger
Replies from: snafoo, savageorange↑ comment by savageorange · 2013-10-14T11:08:07.423Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
On reflection, 'forgetting' is the wrong word here.
We don't default to being definite about anything, least of all our aims. Clear awareness has to be built and maintained, not merely uncovered.
comment by pewpewlasergun · 2013-10-03T06:06:56.211Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
“Whenever serious and competent people need to get things done in the real world, all considerations of tradition and protocol fly out the window.”
Neal Stephenson - "Quicksilver"
Replies from: None, James_Miller, Daniel_Burfoot, player_03↑ comment by [deleted] · 2013-10-04T01:47:52.935Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Whenever a group of subcompetent people get together to do something, they assume they are competent enough to throw tradition and protocol out the window...
Replies from: James_Miller↑ comment by James_Miller · 2013-10-04T03:15:19.849Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Well designed traditions and protocols will contain elements that cause most subcompetent people to not want to throw them out.
Replies from: player_03↑ comment by player_03 · 2013-10-06T04:01:31.905Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Well designed traditions and protocols will contain elements that cause most competent people to not want to throw them out.
Replies from: James_Miller↑ comment by James_Miller · 2013-10-06T17:47:15.069Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
No. If an organization contains sub-competent people, it should take this into account when designing traditions and protocols.
Replies from: scav, Moss_Piglet↑ comment by Moss_Piglet · 2013-10-06T17:53:36.023Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
If an organization contains sub-competent people, it's traditions and protocols need to ensure those people are quickly and reliably thrown out themselves.
Replies from: Viliam_Bur, Eugine_Nier↑ comment by Viliam_Bur · 2013-10-16T09:08:59.416Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Therefore, a reliable method for evaluating competency needs to be part of the traditions and protocols. Otherwise it's just a question of time...
↑ comment by Eugine_Nier · 2013-10-06T18:07:44.579Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Not necessarily, sub-competent people can still be useful, e.g., unskilled labor is a thing.
Replies from: Moss_Piglet↑ comment by Moss_Piglet · 2013-10-06T18:37:27.960Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Unskilled and sub-competent are not synonyms in this context; even a ditch-digger can be competent, it just means they dig quickly regularly and with a minimum of fuss. And not arbitrarily throwing out protocols for momentary convenience is a matter of both maintaining regularity and minimizing fuss, so I shouldn't have to worry about the ditch-digging committee making a mess of things so long as they all have their heads screwed on straight.
↑ comment by James_Miller · 2013-10-04T03:07:24.754Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I suspect that many traditions and protocols promote competent decision making. Do you think that, say, the U.S. military would do better in Afghanistan if President Obama issued an order declaring "when in battle ignore all considerations of tradition and protocol"? Group coordination is hard, organizations put a huge amount of effort into it, and traditions and protocols often reflect their best practices.
Replies from: Costanza, Stabilizer↑ comment by Costanza · 2013-10-08T20:51:23.155Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
"The Navy is a master plan designed by geniuses for execution by idiots. If you're not an idiot, but find yourself in the Navy, you can only operate well by pretending to be one." -Herman Wouk, The Caine Mutiny
Replies from: Omegaile↑ comment by Stabilizer · 2013-10-04T18:46:20.276Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Yes, the quote is best modified to: "Whenever a small group of competent people..."
↑ comment by Daniel_Burfoot · 2013-10-06T17:58:01.423Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
What strikes me most about this quote is how well Stephenson understands the psychology of his audience.
↑ comment by player_03 · 2013-10-06T03:59:56.814Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Having just listened to much of the Ethical Injunctions sequence (as a podcast courtesy of George Thomas), I'm not so sure about this one. There are reasons for serious, competent people to follow ethical rules, even when they need to get things done in the real world.
Ethics aren't quite the same as tradition and protocol, but even so, sometimes all three of those things exist for good reasons.
comment by Eugine_Nier · 2013-10-04T02:53:15.046Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
the mass of an object never seems to change: a spinning top has the same weight as a still one. So a “law” was invented: mass is constant, independent of speed. That “law” is now found to be incorrect. Mass is found to increase with velocity, but appreciable increases require velocities near that of light. A true law is: if an object moves with a speed of less than one hundred miles a second the mass is constant to within one part in a million. In some such approximate form this is a correct law. So in practice one might think that the new law makes no significant difference. Well, yes and no. For ordinary speeds we can certainly forget it and use the simple constant-mass law as a good approximation. But for high speeds we are wrong, and the higher the speed, the more wrong we are.
Finally, and most interesting, philosophically we are completely wrong with the approximate law. Our entire picture of the world has to be altered even though the mass changes only by a little bit. This is a very peculiar thing about the philosophy, or the ideas, behind the laws. Even a very small effect sometimes requires profound changes in our ideas.
Richard Feynman Lectures on Physics
comment by RolfAndreassen · 2013-10-03T05:29:05.483Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
"I didn't go spiralling down. Because there is no abyss. There is no yawning chasm waiting to swallow us up, when we learn that there is no god, that we're animals like any other animal, that the universe has no purpose, that our souls are made of the same stuff as water and sand."
I said, "There are two thousand cultists on this island who believe otherwise."
Michael shrugged. "What do you expect from moral flat-Earthers, if not fear of falling?"
-- Greg Egan, "Distress".
comment by Eugine_Nier · 2013-10-04T02:56:50.743Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Replies from: JackVYou can't trust your intuitions [in this domain]. I'm going to give you a set of rules here that will get you through this process if anything will. At certain moments you'll be tempted to ignore them. So rule number zero is: these rules exist for a reason. You wouldn't need a rule to keep you going in one direction if there weren't powerful forces pushing you in another.
↑ comment by JackV · 2013-10-04T06:59:49.426Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Note: this isn't always right. Anyone giving advice is going to SAY it's true and non-obvious even if it isn't. "Don't fall into temptation" etc etc. But that essay was talking about mistakes which he'd personally often empirically observed and proposed counter-actions to, and he obviously could describe it in much more detail if necessary.
comment by Alejandro1 · 2013-10-03T13:53:00.662Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
header: funtime activity: casually accusing people of machiavellianism.
man: i’m hungry. we should buy lunch.
woman: OH, so you’re saying THE END JUSTIFIES THE MEANS?
--Zack Weinersmith, SMBC rejected ideas
Replies from: monsterzero↑ comment by monsterzero · 2013-10-10T02:39:47.677Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
boss: what’s your greatest weakness?
guy: i’m bad at giving rhymed answers to questions.
I am so stealing that for my next job interview.
comment by Eugine_Nier · 2013-10-04T02:37:33.516Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
IF you can keep your head when all about you
Are losing theirs and blaming it on you,
If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you,
But make allowance for their doubting too;
If you can wait and not be tired by waiting,
Or being lied about, don't deal in lies,
Or being hated, don't give way to hating,
And yet don't look too good, nor talk too wise:If you can dream - and not make dreams your master;
If you can think - and not make thoughts your aim;
If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster
And treat those two impostors just the same;
If you can bear to hear the truth you've spoken
Twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools,
Or watch the things you gave your life to, broken,
And stoop and build 'em up with worn-out tools:If you can make one heap of all your winnings
And risk it on one turn of pitch-and-toss,
And lose, and start again at your beginnings
And never breathe a word about your loss;
If you can force your heart and nerve and sinew
To serve your turn long after they are gone,
And so hold on when there is nothing in you
Except the Will which says to them: 'Hold on!'If you can talk with crowds and keep your virtue,
Or walk with Kings - nor lose the common touch,
If neither foes nor loving friends can hurt you,
If all men count with you, but none too much;
If you can fill the unforgiving minute
With sixty seconds' worth of distance run,
Yours is the Earth and everything that's in it,
And - which is more - you'll be a Man, my son!
If--, by Rudyard Kipling
comment by CronoDAS · 2013-10-06T01:30:37.556Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
You can't build a reputation on what you are going to do.
-- Henry Ford
Replies from: wedrifid, AndHisHorse↑ comment by wedrifid · 2013-10-06T08:12:45.242Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
You can't build a reputation on what you are going to do.
I wonder if that is true. I suspect a sufficiently competent personal marketer would be able to pull it off. Of course, it may be just as easy for them to build an equally positive reputation from absolutely nothing.
Replies from: Omegaile↑ comment by AndHisHorse · 2013-10-09T13:38:17.138Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
It may, however, be possible to build a reputation on what you are preparing to do.
comment by ChristianKl · 2013-10-03T10:45:21.397Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
A number of isolated facts does not produce a science any more than a heap of bricks produces a house.
Alfred Korzybski - Science and Sanity Page 55
Replies from: RolfAndreassen, pragmatist↑ comment by RolfAndreassen · 2013-10-03T15:45:33.148Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
While this is true, it's often the case that you have to start by collecting the isolated facts, just as you'd start building a house by buying some number of bricks.
Replies from: Lumifer↑ comment by Lumifer · 2013-10-03T16:00:39.560Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Arguably you'd start building a house by deciding what kind of house do you want and then making architectural plans and drawings...
Replies from: mwengler, None↑ comment by mwengler · 2013-10-04T17:01:34.565Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Arguably, an early step in building a brick house will consist of gathering a bunch of bricks together. Arguably, that was obvious enough in the earlier comment to not benefit from correction.
Replies from: Luke_A_Somers↑ comment by Luke_A_Somers · 2013-10-15T15:42:02.391Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The original quote was sufficiently meta that I think Lumifer's point stands.
Replies from: mwengler↑ comment by mwengler · 2013-10-15T17:42:02.427Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Please name a science (not math, not philosophy) that did NOT start as a bunch of bricks.
We don't have to ignore the real world when we go meta, do we?
Replies from: Lumifer↑ comment by Lumifer · 2013-10-15T19:27:57.219Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Science is a way, a method -- it neither started as, nor is a collection of facts.
The world is full of bricks/facts -- they are everywhere you look and the problem is not finding some, but finding the ones you need. And to figure out which ones you need you require some plans and ideas about how to go about things.
Replies from: mwengler↑ comment by mwengler · 2013-10-16T12:48:18.461Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
So while you are there staring at your navel, trying to come up with a plan in the complete absence of any knowledge of the world, some other guy is fascinated by a smoking stump left over from a lightning strike and screwing around with it a bit discovers fire.
Science is a human activity that arose from human activity and stayed around and was refined because it filled human needs. Scientific method did not arise from a plan it arose from contemplation of piles of facts. Chemistry and physics arose from different contemplations of different piles of facts.
You need to look at the world full of bricks and facts to have some idea how you are going to go about triage, you don't figure out how to triage facts until you know a bunch.
↑ comment by pragmatist · 2013-10-07T07:33:05.713Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Sure, but who claims/acts as if isolated facts do produce a science? This seems to be taking down a strawman.
Also, the analogy is misleading. A heap of bricks arranged in the right way with the right sorts of mutual connectors does produce a house. However, even an appropriately arranged and connected set of facts does not produce a science. At best, it produces a theory, which is a product of a science, but not a science itself. Science is more akin to architecture than to a house.
Replies from: kamerlingh, Richard_Kennaway↑ comment by kamerlingh · 2013-10-07T19:38:09.815Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Sure, but who claims/acts as if isolated facts do produce a science?
Science classes, especially before high school level, are often taught as though science is just a collection facts about trees or dinosaurs or whatever. Anyone who hasn't had the benefit of a good science program in their school might continue to think that science is just experiments to generate facts.
↑ comment by Richard_Kennaway · 2013-10-07T11:20:55.843Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Sure, but who claims/acts as if isolated facts do produce a science? This seems to be taking down a strawman.
Korzybski is not here arguing against anything, but making an exposition. I won't type in the whole passage (which is only a Google search away anyway), but the quotation is from the beginning of chapter 4, entitled "On Structure", which is the first chapter of the second section of Science and Sanity, entitled "General on Structure". The first section, of three chapters, was introductory, an overture. He begins the main opera by drawing attention to two clear trends in the development of science: the increasing reliance on experiments, and the increase of verbal rigour. "The second tendency has an importance equal to that of the first; a number of isolated facts does not produce a science any more than a heap of bricks produces a house. The isolated facts must be put in order and brought into mutual structural relations in the form of some theory. Then, only, do we have a science."
comment by Panic_Lobster · 2013-10-10T05:35:03.068Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The reason that testability is not enough is that prediction is not, and cannot be, the purpose of science. Consider an audience watching a conjuring trick. The problem facing them has much the same logic as a scientific problem. Although in nature there is no conjurer trying to deceive us intentionally, we can be mystified in both cases for essentially the same reason: appearances are not self-explanatory. If the explanation of a conjuring trick were evident in its appearance, there would be no trick. If the explanations of physical phenomena were evident in their appearance, empiricism would be true and there would be no need for science as we know it. The problem is not to predict the trick's appearance. I may, for instance predict that if a conjurer seems to place various balls under various cups, those cups will later appear to be empty; and I may predict that if the conjurer appears to saw someone in half, that person will later appear on stage unharmed. Those are testable predictions. I may experience many conjuring shows and see my predictions vindicated every time. But that does not even address, let alone solve, the problem of how the trick works. Solving it requires an explanation: a statement of the reality which accounts for the trick's appearance.
David Deutsch, The Beginning of Infinity
Replies from: Lumifer, IlyaShpitser, shminux↑ comment by Lumifer · 2013-10-16T16:29:45.670Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I disagree with Deutsch, I think prediction is much more important to science than he makes it out to be.
The issue is the questions (about the future) you ask. Deutsch says
I may, for instance predict that if a conjurer seems to place various balls under various cups, those cups will later appear to be empty; and I may predict that if the conjurer appears to saw someone in half, that person will later appear on stage unharmed. Those are testable predictions.
and, of course, that is true, but these are "uninteresting" questions to ask. Let me ask for different predictions: please predict what will happen to the balls if the cups are transparent. Please predict what will happen to the person being sawed in half if we take away three sides of the box he's in.
Given the proper questions one will have to understand "how the trick works" to produce correct forecasts.
Science is about predictions, provided you ask to predict the right thing.
Replies from: Vaniver, IlyaShpitser↑ comment by Vaniver · 2013-10-16T17:23:35.976Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I disagree with Deutsch, I think prediction is much more important to science than he makes it out to be.
Deutsch's point (made in greater length in the book) is that predictions are lower level than the true target of science- explanations- not that they aren't valuable. One of the main ways to test explanations is to get predictions from them, and then check out the predictions, and getting too many predictions wrong is fatal for an explanation.
Your example of "interesting" predictions highlights his point: the explanation of how the trick work can readily generate a prediction of what would happen if the cups were transparent, but the prediction that the cups would later be empty does not readily generate a prediction of what would happen if the cups were transparent. By focusing directly on explanations, he makes it obvious which predictions are the interesting ones. Indeed, I'd even speculate that someone who didn't have and couldn't acquire the concept of explanations would have trouble grasping the idea that some predictions are more 'interesting' than others and that there's a reliable way to determine which predictions those are.
Replies from: Lumifer↑ comment by Lumifer · 2013-10-16T17:58:06.807Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
By focusing directly on explanations, he makes it obvious which predictions are the interesting ones. Indeed, I'd even speculate that someone who didn't have and couldn't acquire the concept of explanations would have trouble grasping the idea that some predictions are more 'interesting' than others and that there's a reliable way to determine which predictions those are.
Oh, I don't think so. If you're a medieval farmer, a prediction of the optimal time to plant is of extreme interest to you regardless of what kind of explanation is behind it. The Ptolemaic epicycles produced good predictions of much interest for a long time even though the explanation behind them was wrong.
Think about it this way: would you rather have a good prediction without an explanation or would you rather have an explanation that is unable to make successful predictions?
However I acknowledge that this is a "what's more important -- the chicken or the egg?" discussion :-)
Replies from: Vaniver↑ comment by Vaniver · 2013-10-16T18:36:21.687Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
If you're a medieval farmer, a prediction of the optimal time to plant is of extreme interest to you regardless of what kind of explanation is behind it.
I believe we have switched uses of the word "interesting."
Think about it this way: would you rather have a good prediction without an explanation or would you rather have an explanation that is unable to make successful predictions?
This comparison, to me, maps on to "Would you rather have bricks that aren't arranged as a house, or a house made out of nothing?" Well, it's better to have the bricks than not, but the usefulness of a house depends on what it is made from, and a house made from nothing is useless (and very possibly harmful, if it prevents me from seeking out superior shelter).
That's what I meant by 'lower level'- a prediction is related to an explanation like a brick is related to a house. The statement "construction is about houses" does not mean that construction is not about bricks- but it does mean a focus on bricks for bricks' sake is not construction.
Replies from: Lumifer↑ comment by Lumifer · 2013-10-16T19:09:19.991Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I believe we have switched uses of the word "interesting."
Not really, but it's my fault for not specifying better that I used "interesting" in the meaning elongated towards "useful" and not towards "fucking awesome".
a prediction is related to an explanation like a brick is related to a house
Well, not the mapping for me. I view predictions as useful/consumable/what-you-actually-want/end result and I view explanations as a machine for generating predictions. So the image in my head is that you have a box with a hopper and a lever, you put the inputs into the hopper, pull the lever, and a prediction pops out.
Now sometimes that box is black and you don't know what's inside and how it works. This is a big minus because you trust the predictions less (as you should) and because your ability to manipulate the outcome by twiddling with the inputs is limited. However note that you can still empirically verify whether the (past) predictions are any good just fine.
Sometimes the box is transparent and you see all the pushrods and gears and whatnot inside. You can trace how inputs get converted to outputs and your ability to manipulate the outcome is much greater. You still have to empirically test your predictions, though.
And sometime the box is semi-transparent so that you see some outlines and maybe a few parts, the rest is fuzzy and uncertain.
Replies from: Vaniver↑ comment by Vaniver · 2013-10-16T21:41:26.629Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Well, not the mapping for me.
Yeah, it's not a very good one- the other one I was thinking of was "financial stability" and "money in your pocket", which better captures that the interactions go both ways- if you're financially stable, a symptom of that is that you can get money to put into your pocket, but you can have money in your pocket without being financially stable. But the issue here is it does make sense to think about financial stability when you have no money, whereas it doesn't make sense to think of a house made out of nothing- and I want an explanation which makes no predictions to not make sense. (Or maybe not- the null explanation of "I know nothing and acknowledge that I know nothing" might be worthwhile to explicitly include.)
Maybe it is better to just look at it as levels of 'methodological abstraction'- a prediction is a fortune cookie, an explanation is a box that generates fortune cookies, science is a process that generates boxes that generate fortune cookies.
↑ comment by IlyaShpitser · 2013-10-17T19:15:19.787Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Science is about predictions, provided you ask to predict the right thing.
This might be relevant (on the distinction between prediction and explanation):
http://amturing.acm.org/vp/pearl_2658896.cfm
starting at time point 20:34.
↑ comment by IlyaShpitser · 2013-10-16T15:07:36.793Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
"Testability" is not precisely defined, but most people agree that it can involve RCTs. That is to "test" something can mean "to give some causal account (explanation)."
↑ comment by Shmi (shminux) · 2013-10-10T07:06:58.107Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Wow, I didn't realize how far gone Deutsch is.
comment by Panic_Lobster · 2013-10-08T03:14:54.785Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
When philosophers use a word—"knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name"—and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home?—What we do is to bring words back from their metaphysical to their everyday use. You say to me: "You understand this expression, don't you? Well then—I am using it in the sense you are familiar with."— As if the sense were an atmosphere accompanying the word, which it carried with it into every kind of application.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 116-117
Replies from: PrometheanFaun↑ comment by PrometheanFaun · 2013-10-10T04:36:44.588Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Since English isn't Sound and like 90% of English words simply don't have real definitions, I'm not sure I want to tangle with this guy's work. It's either going to be tenuous logic with an exploration in equivocation, or a baffling/impressive display of linguistics. Which was it?
Replies from: mwengler, somervta↑ comment by mwengler · 2013-10-16T15:37:56.558Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Since English isn't Sound and like 90% of English words simply don't have real definitions, I'm not sure I want to tangle with this guy's work.
Well he did write it in German.
Replies from: PrometheanFaun↑ comment by PrometheanFaun · 2013-10-17T04:01:54.650Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I've heard German is bad too. Probably In the very same philosophy of logic class where I heard the name Wittgenstein and was told about his work but which I have completely failed to retain any memory of.
↑ comment by somervta · 2013-10-10T05:48:47.554Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Philosophical Investigations is closer to the latter. (There's a big difference between Late and Early Wittgenstein - basically two completely different authors)
Replies from: Panic_Lobster↑ comment by Panic_Lobster · 2013-10-10T05:58:21.925Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
There is also a fair bit of continuity between the two--he retains one of the main theses of his earlier work: that much of our confusion about so called 'philosophical problems' is caused by people abusing language.
comment by fezziwig · 2013-10-27T18:33:21.110Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
[Death] does not add up. All you can say is that: no. No, these books do not balance. Not even in Newtonian terms. The only terms in which they make sense are Darwin’s, and no one wants to go there. There are no protagonists in Darwin, and everybody wants to be a protagonist.
John Dolan, of all people.
Replies from: Ritalincomment by James_Miller · 2013-10-03T14:11:45.567Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Because of the way evolution operates, the mind consists of many, many parts, and these parts have many different functions. Because they're designed to do different things, they don't always work in perfect harmony.
Why Everyone Else Is A Hypocrite, by Robert Kurzban, p. 6.
comment by Shmi (shminux) · 2013-10-23T17:16:07.863Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The CS people screamed that the problem was NP-hard, computationally intractable, etc. But we didn't know what any of that meant, so we got it working.
A reply to the request in The Register for programmers to share their experiences working on computationally intractable tasks.
Replies from: Vaniver↑ comment by Vaniver · 2013-10-23T23:59:23.771Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
For the particular problem that comment is discussing (automatic code generation), I suspect that the CS people were describing about a general automatic code generation problem, and the engineers solved a relaxation to that problem which was not in fact intractable.
In general, I don't know how much I like the P-NP distinction. I hear from people who have been in the metaheuristics field for a while that until that became common knowledge, it was basically impossible to get a heuristic published (because you couldn't provably find the optimal solution). But it seems like that distinction leads to an uncanny valley of ignorance, where a lot of people avoid problems that are NP hard instead of looking in their neighborhood for problems that admit polynomial-time algorithms. (For example, instead of "find a tour that is not inferior to any other tour" use "find a good tour" for the TSP.)
Replies from: shminux↑ comment by Shmi (shminux) · 2013-10-24T00:07:47.340Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Right, I wanted to mention in the original comment that good-enough solutions to NP-hard problems are not, in fact, NP-hard to find. This is, of course, well known. But it detracts from the impact of the quote, so I left it out.
comment by monsterzero · 2013-10-04T22:08:56.459Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Human consciousness isn't optimized for anything, except maybe helping feral hominids survive in the wild.
-Charles Stross, "Rule 34"
Replies from: DanielLC↑ comment by DanielLC · 2013-10-05T22:05:04.254Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I'm guessing that's not referring to rule 34 of the internet.
Why maybe? Evolution is clearly an optimization process, which optimizes for something along the lines of survival in the wild.
Replies from: RolfAndreassen, Kyre, FiftyTwo, somervta↑ comment by RolfAndreassen · 2013-10-06T04:12:35.175Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
You are mistaken, it is referring to the rule 34 of the Internet.
Replies from: bbleeker↑ comment by Sabiola (bbleeker) · 2013-10-06T08:39:14.239Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The title of the book refers to the internet rule, but I don't think the quote does.
comment by James_Miller · 2013-10-03T14:15:59.781Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Replies from: wedrifid, Nornagest, ChristianKl, LumiferIt is entirely reasonable to believe that Obamacare is terrible policy that will hurt more people than it helps. Your inability to grasp that anyone has this belief does not mean that everyone who disagrees with you is a venal, amoral wretch; it means that you have been blinded by confirmation bias and your own lack of empathy...
Similarly, it is entirely reasonable to believe that Obamacare is good policy that will help more people than it hurts. The fact that you think otherwise does not mean that the law’s supporters are too stupid to be allowed near sharp objects. It means that they are valuing different things -- expanded coverage over innovation, for instance -- or else that their assessment of the probability that various things will go wrong is different from yours.
↑ comment by wedrifid · 2013-10-03T19:13:41.992Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The fact that you think otherwise does not mean that the law’s supporters are too stupid to be allowed near sharp objects. It means that they are valuing different things -- expanded coverage over innovation, for instance -- or else that their assessment of the probability that various things will go wrong is different from yours.
Either of those two things can be sufficient to make it advisable to prevent access to sharp objects. While the language sounds nicer, "valuing different things" and "assessment that various things will go wrong is different" would seem to incorporate "evil" and "stupid" quite comfortably.
Replies from: TheOtherDave, mwengler↑ comment by TheOtherDave · 2013-10-03T19:58:11.545Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
IME, the latter are subsets of the former, and therefore require more evidence to pick out reliably.
Replies from: mwengler↑ comment by mwengler · 2013-10-04T16:47:02.812Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
IME, the latter are subsets of the former, and therefore require more evidence to pick out reliably.
I don't think they are subsets. I think the latter are value/emotion laden terms which promote confrontation with the evil and stupid, and a "go Raiders" kind of team spirit with those on whose side one finds herself. The former are relatively value free descriptions of how different sides of the question occur, and as such are appropriate if you are trying to advance rational understanding.
The teams the Raiders play against are not actually evil, even if you are a Raiders fan and use violent and hostile language. They are just other teams.
Replies from: TheOtherDave↑ comment by TheOtherDave · 2013-10-04T19:59:34.758Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Yes, "evil" and "stupid" are value-laden terms.
Yes, they are emotion-laden terms.
Yes, they are often used for no other reason than tribal signaling.
Agreed, the Raiders' opponents (football, right?) are not evil.
I can't tell if you're actually claiming that there are no evil or stupid people in the world.
You don't say it explicitly, but it seems to me an implicit assertion in the fact that you chose to make the statements you did.
If you are, I disagree with you about that.
As for being subsets... evil people value different things than I, but not everyone who values different things than I is evil. Stupid people make different assessments that various things will go wrong than I do, but not everyone who does that is stupid.
Replies from: Jayson_Virissimo↑ comment by Jayson_Virissimo · 2013-10-08T04:53:40.074Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Agreed, the Raiders' opponents (football, right?) are not evil.
Whoa, hey! Let's not be hasty.
↑ comment by mwengler · 2013-10-04T16:43:44.922Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
"valuing different things" and "assessment that various things will go wrong is different" would seem to incorporate "evil" and "stupid" quite comfortably.
So both work. But they have such different effects on the person you are debating with, and for most of us, they have a different effect on ourselves and how we see reality. Choose the "evil" and "stupid" labels, and you close off rational discussion, or at least you do your part in closing it off, you may well have help from the other people in the discussion.
If the goal of policy debate is to settle on good policies, you do not want to choose the "evil" and "stupid" labels.
Replies from: wedrifid↑ comment by wedrifid · 2013-10-04T22:31:58.277Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
So both work. But they have such different effects on the person you are debating with, and for most of us, they have a different effect on ourselves and how we see reality. Choose the "evil" and "stupid" labels, and you close off rational discussion, or at least you do your part in closing it off, you may well have help from the other people in the discussion.
The problem that I am alluding to is that the quote attempts to persuade via an implicit false dichotomy and also subtly equivocates between the concepts "don't use excessively judgemental language" and "do not exercise judgement" for the purpose of catchy persuasiveness.
While this quote is an interesting quote, and one that argues for a position I probably approve of, it is not an especially rational quote. The reasoning is not especially impressive. It's also far too free with "it is entirely reasonable to believe". That usage relies on and conveys a norm that actively sacrifices epistemic rationality for the purpose of signalling egalitarian 'level headed' attitudes.
Replies from: mwengler↑ comment by mwengler · 2013-10-04T23:37:14.157Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The quote gets straight to the point about how many many MANY people treat the debate between Obamacare and not-Obamacare. I have personally heard and read writers on BOTH sides accusing the opposite side of obvious and blistering stupidity, in fact I have seen both stated just today. I have been accused of immorality because of my position in this debate and have wanted to accuse those I argued against of immorality. The quote addresses a very real situation that brings out the irrational in us, that in my opinion, helps us all to be "more wrong."
Meanwhile, only someone who has succumbed to the partisanship, which in my opinion is easy to succumb to, would be unable to recognize the intelligence and general competence of those they disagree with. Neither Michelle Bachman nor Barack Obama would benefit at all from being kept away from sharp instruments, yet that is the kind of language this question brings out even on a board dedicated to making us "less wrong."
For these reasons I think the quote is right on target, where the target is encouraging people to choose to be more rational about something which is virtually a basilisk in its ability to bring out the irrational in people.
Replies from: wedrifid↑ comment by wedrifid · 2013-10-05T02:39:07.333Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
how many many MANY people treat the debate between Obamacare and not-Obamacare
I wouldn't know, beyond my expectation that the behaviour patterns match the political behaviour I expect of humans. I would certainly expect some of the humans to execute the behaviours that the author of the quote opposes.
I understand that there is a government shutdown in the US prompted by political conflict over a proposed healthcare-related redistribution of wealth. Neither of these things are especially familiar to me. Coming from one of the countries with publicly funded universal health care it is a little harder to see what the fuss is about.
The US government shutdown was something of a surprise when my facebook started talking about it. If the analogous situation occurs here ('supply' is repeatedly blocked) it triggers a double dissolution and everyone gets sent back to the polling booths to elect some politicians who can make a functioning government. I can at least imagine (and predict) that when the legislative process has resulted in a stand-off with a touch of brinkmanship the polarization on the issue would become more pronounced and the 'other side' would accused of additional immorality for not submitting this side's power play as they clearly ought to. (Did that last addition happen by the way? I have more or less assumed that it would but my curiosity seeks calibration.)
To reiterate, I don't disagree with the motivation of the author of the quote. I can also see the value of using details of the quote for their persuasive purpose with a political-but-redeemable target audience. It remains irrational political rhetoric but it is at least political rhetoric that is a level or two closer to the surface.
For these reasons I think the quote is right on target, where the target is encouraging people to choose to be more rational about something which is virtually a basilisk in its ability to bring out the irrational in people.
At very best it can be said to be advocating a new irrationality that is both less irrational and more palatable than the one being opposed. I suppose encouraging people to believe "Pi = 3" is an improvement over them continuing to believe "Pi = 4"... it's approximately 6 times less wrong! I still wouldn't call it exemplary mathematics.
Replies from: TheOtherDave↑ comment by TheOtherDave · 2013-10-05T04:14:13.438Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
the polarization on the issue would become more pronounced and the 'other side' would accused of additional immorality for not submitting this side's power play as they clearly ought to. (Did that last addition happen by the way? I have more or less assumed that it would but my curiosity seeks calibration.)
If the polarization has become more pronounced, I haven't noticed, but I'm not really sure what that would even look like at this point. But, yes, there's a lot of the predictable "this situation is your fault for refusing to accept the conditions we've set for relaxing this situation!" going on.
Replies from: DysgraphicProgrammer, Eugine_Nier↑ comment by DysgraphicProgrammer · 2013-10-07T14:53:41.139Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I suspect that for this situation to develop as it has, polarization must be very near saturation in the first place.
↑ comment by Eugine_Nier · 2013-10-05T05:59:57.102Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
There's even we're not going to let you relax the situation until we get what we want, i.e., the Republican controlled house has been passing bills to fund parts of the government, e.g., national parks, medical research and the Democratic controlled senate is refusing to consider them. Furthermore, the president has been closing things even when it would cost less to keep them open, even going so far as to order privately run parks that lease government land to close.
↑ comment by Nornagest · 2013-10-03T20:42:59.928Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Confirmation bias is an odd choice. I think I can see where she's coming from -- people assume members of their respective political outgroups to be inherently malicious, and form their judgments of specific actions accordingly -- but the assumption of malice does all the work there.
Hostile attribution bias seems like a better fit to me, maybe with a dash of outgroup homogenity.
↑ comment by ChristianKl · 2013-10-03T17:21:35.868Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
It means that they are valuing different things -- expanded coverage over innovation
In what way does expanding coverage reduces innovation? If anything more coverage means a bigger market for innovations.
Replies from: mwengler, James_Miller↑ comment by mwengler · 2013-10-04T16:51:37.654Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I suspect innovation gets shifted more than it gets reduced, and there are forces pushing innovation up.
To the extent Obamacare subsidizes medicine more than it is already subsidized, and if it has a net cost > 0, then it does, it should encourage innovation. Some of the shift and/or additional innovation will be how to game the system more effectively, which is presumably a low-value outcome for society. But some of it will be how to provide care that this system will pay for, perhaps more innovation towards the afflictions of those who will gain access to medical care that did not previously have as much access, and so on.
If it shifts money away from drug makers, but it puts in more money on net, then there is lower innovation on the drug side and higher innovation where the new profits are to be made.
Replies from: Eugine_Nier↑ comment by Eugine_Nier · 2013-10-05T03:46:53.287Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
To the extent Obamacare subsidizes medicine more than it is already subsidized, and if it has a net cost > 0, then it does, it should encourage innovation.
This will only happen if being innovative is favored by the subsidies and the people deciding who gets subsidies can tell improvements apart from change for the sake of change.
↑ comment by James_Miller · 2013-10-03T18:24:12.353Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
By lowering prices for drugs, for example, more people can afford them but pharmaceutical firms have lower profit incentives to find new drugs. The medical device tax, furthermore, will help fund Obama care but also reduce incentives to develop new medical devices.
Replies from: Estarlio, ChristianKl, DysgraphicProgrammer↑ comment by Estarlio · 2013-10-13T14:54:08.440Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Depends on the price elasticity of demand. If you widen the access to the thing by lowering the price, it's possible that you might make more profit than someone who has fewer customers who they make a lot more profit per customer off of.
Replies from: Eugine_Nier↑ comment by Eugine_Nier · 2013-10-14T00:12:45.452Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
In situations where this is the case, the company in question doesn't need to be ordered by the government to do this.
Replies from: Estarlio↑ comment by Estarlio · 2013-10-14T20:06:47.545Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Setting a price isn't necessarily a decision made with respects to the interests of one company. Not knowing precisely how the marketing groups for medical goods in the US are set up, beyond that they're pretty abusive, I don't care to argue that one way or the other though.
↑ comment by ChristianKl · 2013-10-04T09:41:10.704Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Expanding coverage and lowering prices are two different issues.
You can be in favor of one and not the other.
Big Pharma was in favor of Obamacare. The made a deal. Obama didn't choose to implement effective price cutting policies such as allowing reimportation of drugs. Then Big Pharma spend millions for advertisements to promote Obamacare.
Replies from: James_Miller↑ comment by James_Miller · 2013-10-04T12:42:53.336Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Big Pharma was in favor of Obamacare
Two possible reasons:
(1) Blackmail--Obamacare harmed them, but big Pharma was told by Democrats that if they didn't support it the Democrats would pass something that harmed them even more. The medical device industry didn't support Obamacare and as a result they got hit with a special tax in the final bill.
(2) Reduced competition--Obamacare makes it harder for other firms to enter the pharmaceutical industry.
Replies from: ChristianKl↑ comment by ChristianKl · 2013-10-04T13:32:05.787Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
As far as the medical device tax goes, I agree that it's worth repealing it.
In total it's however zero sum for spending on healthcare. The tax pays for tax rabates for health insurance. Money payed into the health insurance system gets spend on medicial expenditures.
Replies from: Eugine_Nier↑ comment by Eugine_Nier · 2013-10-05T03:48:44.101Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Note: spending on healthcare =/= improvements in health
Replies from: ChristianKl↑ comment by ChristianKl · 2013-10-05T10:21:47.224Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I don't claim it does.
↑ comment by DysgraphicProgrammer · 2013-10-04T15:00:58.048Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
You assume that money is the only reason for people to to develop new medical devices. People could also do so because it helps people. Because the technology is awesome. Any number of other reasons. There is ample evidence that creative workers are DE-incentivized by money.
If money IS the only incentive, then reduced profits on device A might cause them to expand by developing device B.
Replies from: James_Miller, Moss_Piglet↑ comment by James_Miller · 2013-10-04T18:04:50.167Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Money isn't the only incentive but it is an important one especially for publicly traded companies. You need lots of money to develop and test new medical devices.
There is ample evidence that creative workers are DE-incentivized by money.
If this were true then companies that succeed in producing new, creative high tech products would pay their most creative employees very little. We don't observe this.
Replies from: CronoDAS↑ comment by CronoDAS · 2013-10-06T01:35:08.183Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
If this were true then companies that succeed in producing new, creative high tech products would pay their most creative employees very little. We don't observe this.
Have you seen the music industry recently? ;)
[/not sure if serious]
↑ comment by James_Miller · 2013-10-06T01:53:33.546Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
It was serious, but see this.
Replies from: CronoDAS↑ comment by CronoDAS · 2013-10-06T02:52:11.520Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I meant that I wasn't sure if I was being serious or not.
The people who make the most money in the music industry aren't necessarily the ones doing the best creative work. For one, "ability to sell records" is imperfectly correlated with music quality, the people that are most visible might not even be all that responsible for the music in the first place, and the revenues from sales can end up distributed in all different ways. There might be composers writing songs that turn into hits when other people perform them who end up getting paid peanuts for doing it. I just don't know.
↑ comment by Moss_Piglet · 2013-10-04T16:31:54.435Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
You assume that money is the only reason for people to to develop new medical devices. People could also do so because it helps people. Because the technology is awesome. Any number of other reasons.
There are only limited resources available, including the creativity and time of engineers, and we need a way to allocate them over our (virtually) unlimited needs. If we're not going to use a market to make those sorts of decisions, what should we do?
It may seem heartless to pass over a drug which could 'only' save a few thousand lives, but even if you can't put a dollar price on human life there's still an opportunity cost in other lives which could be saved by using medical resources more effectively. A functioning healthcare market ought to look something like triage; people who gain the most benefit from medical attention will receive prompt and effective service, while some people are unfortunately going to have to be turned away.
↑ comment by Lumifer · 2013-10-03T15:04:51.464Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
While true, people who are too stupid to be allowed near sharp objects have preferences and make choices that are not quite random. It is often (but not always) the case that given several alternatives, one can reliably predict towards which one most stupid people will gravitate.
Replies from: scav↑ comment by scav · 2013-10-07T11:36:07.549Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Citation, or at least a clear example, needed. I can probably construct two policy alternatives, and predict which will be attractive to people who identify with a given political tribe. Then I suppose I get to call one of those options the "stupid" one based on my own value system.
Please tell me that isn't the sort of thing you mean.
I have met people with what I consider to be very irrational political views (in that they are little more than clusters of rote debating points never subjected to analysis). Outside of the well-worn habitual responses their politics would dictate they regurgitate, I have no idea how they would choose on an issue they had never encountered before.
Maybe stupidly (because they aren't in the habit of reflective thought), but maybe less so (because without a knee-jerk political reaction ready to hand, they might take a few seconds to think).
I will go so far as to agree that in too many cases, simple answers will be favoured over complex questions, and instant gratification will be favoured over longer-term advantage.
Replies from: Lumifer↑ comment by Lumifer · 2013-10-07T15:07:45.470Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Please tell me that isn't the sort of thing you mean.
Your wish is my command! No, that isn't the sort of thing I meant.
I meant this quite literally and without a preference for the Magenta party or the Cyan party. Given two alternatives and the way they are presented in the popular media, it is often (but not always) possible to predict the preferences of the low-IQ crowd. The end.
That issue is different from political tribalism.
Having said that, I haven't run any reasonably controlled experiments so at this point it's just my opinion without data to support it.
Replies from: EHeller, scav↑ comment by EHeller · 2013-10-08T17:28:18.898Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Given two alternatives and the way they are presented in the popular media, it is often (but not always) possible to predict the preferences of the low-IQ crowd.
This is the exact opposite of what I've observed in various true-lift models I've done for various purposes. Lower IQ tends to correlate more with lower-informedness, and low information voters are highly susceptible to noise, which makes predicting them a pain. Things like the order of the names on the ballot can have an effect on their vote.
Generally, higher information voters are much easier to predict, especially if you have any indications of their voting history.
↑ comment by scav · 2013-10-08T08:07:12.598Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Depressing but plausible :(
I suspect "the way they are presented in the popular media" is crafted with that in mind.
Replies from: Lumifer↑ comment by Lumifer · 2013-10-08T17:16:55.638Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The whole well-established and rather large field of marketing is preoccupied with predicting and manipulating the preferences of people.
There doesn't seem to be much difference between persuading people to buy a particular brand of shampoo and persuading people to support a particular political issue (or vote for a particular candidate).
comment by JQuinton · 2013-10-22T16:29:25.635Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Consider how hard it is to change yourself and you'll realize how much harder it is to change someone else
- Anonymous quote from Facebook
↑ comment by Shmi (shminux) · 2013-10-22T23:41:22.947Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Replies from: Eugine_Nier, JQuinton, linkhyrule5Once upon a time, an evil witch transformed a prince into a frog, telling him that only the kiss of a princess could restore him to his proper form. But although he searched around the world, he could find no princess who was willing to kiss a hideous little frog. Finally, he went to the Wise Wizard. “Gender is a social construct,” said the Wise Wizard. “Just declare your gender identity to be female, then kiss yourself on the hand or something.” So the frog did that, returned to human form, and ruled the land for many years as a wise and benevolent queen.
Moral: Ability to self-modify is just ridiculously powerful.
↑ comment by Eugine_Nier · 2013-10-25T04:22:51.956Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Assuming the spell was keyed on "gender identity" and not any more objective aspect of gender/sex.
Replies from: fubarobfusco↑ comment by fubarobfusco · 2013-11-01T02:48:30.917Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Well, being a princess is socially constructed more than one way!
↑ comment by JQuinton · 2013-10-23T16:42:23.454Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Powerful doesn't mean easy.
Replies from: shminux↑ comment by Shmi (shminux) · 2013-10-23T17:57:47.800Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Most certainly it doesn't. I just wanted to add some positive spin to your quote.
↑ comment by linkhyrule5 · 2013-10-25T05:36:11.932Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Pretty sure this is a repeat, but not sure from where.
comment by anandjeyahar · 2013-10-16T21:44:53.785Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Mu means "no thing." Like "quality" it points outside the process of dualistic discrimination. Mu simply says, "no class: not one, not zero, not yes, not no." It states that the context of the question is such that a yes and a no answer is in error and should not be given. "Unask the question" is what it says.
.... [Somewhere later]
That Mu exists in the natural world investigated by science is evident. […] The dualistic mind tends to think of Mu occurrences in nature as a kind of contextual cheating, or irrelevance, but Mu is found through all scientific investigation, and nature doesn't cheat, and nature's answers are never irrelevant. It's a great mistake, a kind of dishonesty to sweep nature's Mu answers under the carpet. […]
When your answer to a test is indeterminate it means one of two things: that your test procedures aren't doing what you think they are or that your understanding of the context of the question needs to be enlarged. Check your tests and restudy the question. Don't throw away those Mu answers! They're every bit as vital as the yes and no answers. They're more vital. They're the ones you grow on.
--- Robert M Pirsig (Zen and the art of motorcycle maintenance.
Replies from: shminux, Vaniver↑ comment by Shmi (shminux) · 2013-10-17T18:36:42.193Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
That Mu exists in the natural world investigated by science is evident.
That's a bad way of phrasing it. "Mu" is about maps, not territories. What is "evident" is that some models do not result in testable predictions (answerable questions). The rest of the quote is pretty good.
Replies from: anandjeyahar↑ comment by anandjeyahar · 2013-10-19T09:59:59.802Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Agreed. I always skimmed over that claim and never wondered why. The map vs territory analogy makes a lot of sense. After all the 'Mu' is an answer to a question. And the question is based on some map of the territory. Thanks for triggering that series of clicks in my mind. :)
↑ comment by Vaniver · 2013-10-16T22:00:24.918Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
You only need one > character at the beginning of a paragraph (but you do need another one at the beginning of the next paragraph). If you'd like to have a quote as many lines, you need to make each its own paragraph by hitting return twice in between lines of text.
comment by WalterL · 2013-10-08T05:30:58.130Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
“For the sin of the idolater is not that he worships stone, but that he worships one stone over others.”
-Scott Bakker
This is actually just a chapter opener in a fantasy story, but I like it as a sort of short hand for the de-mystifying rainbows sequence. Everything is connected and that's ok.
Replies from: Baughncomment by anandjeyahar · 2013-10-21T16:23:19.877Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The hedgehog and the Fox: Hedgehogs "know one big thing" and have a theory about the world; they account for particular events within a coherent framework, bristle with impatience toward those who don't see things their way, and are confident in their forecasts. They are also especially reluctant to admit error. For hedgehogs, a failed prediction is almost always "off only on timing" or "very nearly right". They are opinionated and clear, which is exactly what television producers love to see on programs. Two hedgehogs on different sides of an issue, each attacking the idiotic ideas of the adversary, make for a good show. Foxes, by contrast, are complex thinkers. They don't believe that one big thing drives the march of history (for example they are unlikely to accept the view that Ronald Reagan single-handedly ended the cold war by standing tall against the Soviet Union). Instead the foxes recognize that reality emerges from interactions of many different agents and forces, including blind luck, often producing large and unpredictable outcomes.
~ Daniel Kahneman (Thinking, fast and slow)
Replies from: shminux, lmm↑ comment by Shmi (shminux) · 2013-10-21T17:01:56.125Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
for example they are unlikely to accept the view that Ronald Reagan single-handedly ended the cold war by standing tall against the Soviet Union
Fox News: brought to you by a bunch of Hedgehogs.
Replies from: Lumifer↑ comment by Lumifer · 2013-10-21T17:41:47.704Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
All TV reporting is hedgehog-style: nuance is too confusing for the common people.
Replies from: shminux↑ comment by Shmi (shminux) · 2013-10-21T18:00:49.719Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Woosh
↑ comment by lmm · 2013-10-30T04:11:53.345Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Is the animal metaphor helpful? I don't think of either stereotype when I hear "fox" or "hedgehog". For that matter, is the dichotomy real?
Replies from: pragmatist↑ comment by pragmatist · 2013-10-30T09:49:03.862Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The metaphor comes from an essay by Isaiah Berlin, who in turn got it from an ancient Greek poet. You're right that the metaphor doesn't match our animal stereotypes, but it has become pretty entrenched.
Replies from: anandjeyahar↑ comment by anandjeyahar · 2013-10-31T07:18:42.143Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Agree the animal metaphor doesn't help very well. I have some stereotype for fox (cunningness, slyness, trickster etc...), but draw a blank for hedgehog.
As to whether the dichotomy is real, well I think it's a useful model to question one's judgement. A better question would be is it more useful than say "system1 vs system2 " model (or pick another model.).
comment by Shmi (shminux) · 2013-10-07T22:23:11.282Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
If you find yourself with mind control powers and tempted to do something evil, you can probably get more of what you want by working on yourself and being good.
jimmy, the resident non-evil cognitive engineer.
comment by Eugine_Nier · 2013-10-05T04:59:37.468Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Nullius in verba. (On the words of no one.)
Motto of the Royal Society.
Replies from: Stabilizer↑ comment by Stabilizer · 2013-10-05T22:53:42.575Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I prefer the translation: "Take no one's word for it."
Replies from: Eugine_Nier↑ comment by Eugine_Nier · 2013-10-06T05:21:16.936Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Same here, I just decided to go with the most literal one.
comment by NancyLebovitz · 2013-10-03T09:39:24.303Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Replies from: NectaneboUmm…well this is going to sound silly, but I was actually not terribly well-trained as a scientist in college; I was much more of the social science type, so I actually never took any chemistry or physics in college and don't have a very good fundamental grounding. So I am easily panicked in my science and I think thus I can easily imagine more readily than most people in my position how somebody else can be. I think sort of pedagogically where that came about: during grad school I wound up in a grad school that didn’t have an undergraduate college—it was just a research institute—so we didn't have to do the TAing stuff that grad students do here, and thought that was probably a bad thing sort of professionally, so I figured out a way to sneak off and moonlight, I was in New York at a place called The New School for Social Research, where they kind of hired me to moonlight on the side, and it like totally violated my fellowship and I had to like sneak off out the back way from my university and stuff. And right around time there was this fashion institute in New York called Parsons School of Design that had just lost their academic accreditation—which it turned out to be, like, decades after that probably should have happened—and they decided, they went out and like shut out all their tenured non-design faculty and they forced their students to go over to The New School to take their courses. And there was a science requirement and I was like offered one of the two science courses at the New School, so I would get these classes full of these unbelievably hostile, phobic, teeny-bopper textile designers, and this forced an enormous pressure to be clear, and to have a good sense as to when people are about to go berserk with too many terms and stuff and like when you have to stop and give an anecdote or metaphor or something, so I think in retrospect it was actually very good training. I know every one of those people is now a chief of neurosurgery at a major medical center.
↑ comment by Nectanebo · 2013-10-03T18:26:13.307Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I read that whole quote twice through and even thought about it for a few minutes as well, but I have no idea what I'm supposed to get out of it. Could anyone help me out?
Replies from: TheOtherDave, NancyLebovitz↑ comment by TheOtherDave · 2013-10-03T18:28:38.180Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
"Clear communication is good"?
Replies from: Eugine_Nier↑ comment by Eugine_Nier · 2013-10-04T02:29:51.979Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
And yet the quote fails to communicate clearly.
Replies from: simplicio, TheOtherDave↑ comment by simplicio · 2013-10-07T21:01:44.241Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
That's because the transcriber has done a very poor job of going from speech to text. If you quote somebody, you should delete the Likes and Ums, add commas and periods, etc. (With the added constraint of not knowingly changing meanings.)
I would be highly annoyed if I were transcribed thus.
↑ comment by TheOtherDave · 2013-10-04T02:58:05.540Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Ironic, ain't it?
↑ comment by NancyLebovitz · 2013-10-03T18:27:49.592Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Writing for the general public is hard.
Intrinsic motivation matters.
comment by Eugine_Nier · 2013-10-05T06:39:08.818Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
But history always moves in a progressive direction.
We know this because history always gets rewritten to attribute all the progressive notions that failed to other people.
comment by Nomad · 2013-10-09T12:28:26.035Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
At first James thought they were joking because, "You know, Hidden Object Games". But then, after a moment, James realised they were absolutely right. Why hadn't we done a show on Hidden Object Games?
Extra Credits react to their surprise.
Replies from: gwerncomment by Mestroyer · 2013-10-04T22:39:38.242Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
One of my professors, in a lecture covering compulsory cache misses and prefetching:
Well... the engineers won't give up that easily, just because you called it "compulsory." The competitors are climbing on Moore's Law Ladder, we better do something!
Unrelated to the rationality content of this quote, he thinks Moore's Law is a self-fulfilling prophecy, because how fast chip manufacturing improves depends on how hard engineers work, which depends on how hard they think their competition will work, which is an interesting idea that I hadn't heard before him.
Replies from: ShardPhoenix↑ comment by ShardPhoenix · 2013-10-06T01:25:35.655Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The interesting part of Moore's Law is the fact that it's even possible. If there was a Moore's Law for the speed of motor vehicles it would soon fail regardless of how hard anyone tried to make it true.
Replies from: army1987, maia↑ comment by A1987dM (army1987) · 2013-10-06T22:40:48.623Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
That's because we're already at to the limits. There was a Moore's Law for the speed of transatlantic ships for about two centuries, and one for transatlantic flights for about half a century. (And I kind-of doubt Moore's Law will last for much longer.)
EDIT: though if you measure them in doubling times rather than in years, I agree that those for vehicles weren't anywhere near as impressive.
↑ comment by maia · 2013-10-07T20:13:15.578Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
It's possible for a while, anyway; we're already reaching certain physical limits, and I suspect Moore's Law in the sense of shrinking silicon transistor sizes will be over in the near-ish future (order ~10 years).
It may just be that we started much further away from the optimum in this case than we did with things like motor vehicles (where there are fairly low limitations based on safety and human reaction times).
comment by jsbennett86 · 2013-10-16T19:07:24.595Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Replies from: gwernSometimes I think that I'm surrounded by idiots everywhere. Then I remind myself that that's exactly what an idiot would think.
comment by Panic_Lobster · 2013-10-10T05:17:51.446Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
What makes a mind powerful--indeed, what makes a mind conscious--is not what it is made of, or how big it is, but what it can do. Can it concentrate? Can it be distracted? Can it recall earlier events? Can it keep track of several different things at once? Which features of its own current activities can it notice or monitor? When such questions as these are answered, we will know everything we need to know about those minds in order to answer the morally important questions. These answers will capture everything we want to know about the concept of consciousness, except the idea of whether, as one author has recently said, "the mental lights would be out" in such a creature. But that is just a bad idea--in spite of its popularity. (...) For suppose that we have answered all the other questions about the mind of some creature, and now some philosophers claim that we still don't know the answer to that all-important question, Is the mental light on--yes or no? Why would either answer be important? We are owed an answer to this question, before we need to take their question seriously.
Daniel Dennet, Kinds of Minds
comment by Eugine_Nier · 2013-10-05T07:17:31.571Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Replies from: Dorikka, ChristianKlMoral courage doesn't reside in "doing good" so much as in fighting the bad.
↑ comment by Dorikka · 2013-10-05T20:16:48.216Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I think he got it backwards? :P
Replies from: simplicio↑ comment by simplicio · 2013-10-07T17:16:59.547Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I think I more or less agree with Taleb, so I will try to make it more plausible.
- Doing good is hard (cf Givewell. "Famine? Let's send free food! Oops, we bankrupted local food producers. Oh well, our hearts were in the right place.")
- Consider the infinite Platonic set of Interventions (in an economy, person... whatever). Throw a dart inside that set - are you more likely to hit a useful intervention, or a useless/harmful one?
- Further problem: a lot of harmful or useless interventions LOOK useful, or are useful for some parties but very harmful for the rest of us.
- Further problem: many harmful interventions are harmful on a truly spectacular scale, even - or especially - if they are really popular and seem really beneficial and are totally going to change the world for the better. (Fat tails.)
- Further problem: humans love power, and a great way to get power is via some grand intervention. The people in charge of such an intervention probably don't have skin in the game, so they aren't incentivized to care very much about REALLY getting it right.
This suggests the HEURISTIC that there is more to be gained from stopping people shooting themselves (or each other) in the foot than there is from promoting people's happiness.
I'm pretty sure Taleb would agree it is only a heuristic, and that bednets are a legitimate counterexample & are in fact pretty great.
Replies from: army1987↑ comment by A1987dM (army1987) · 2013-10-08T05:01:38.955Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Sure. I just think that “fighting the bad” looks like a very unclear way to put that out of context.
↑ comment by ChristianKl · 2013-10-06T18:23:36.077Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
You could read it as saying that fighting people from building UFAI is more important than getting FAI theory right and bringing betnets to Africa.
comment by NancyLebovitz · 2013-10-15T13:03:59.353Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I never am really satisfied that I understand anything; because, understand it well as I may, my comprehension can only be an infinitesimal fraction of all I want to understand about the many connections and relations which occur to me, how the matter in question was first thought of or arrived at, etc., etc
comment by Ritalin · 2013-10-10T12:02:09.899Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
In all our eons, we've seen continents frozen and the sun blotted out by ash—and we're still here. A decade after K-Day, and we're still here. I've never believed in the end times. We are mankind. Our footprints are on the moon. When the last trumpet sounds and the beast rises from the pit—we will kill it!
Stacker Pentecost, Pacific Rim: Tales from Year Zero
Replies from: arundelo↑ comment by arundelo · 2013-10-10T13:01:17.035Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
This use of bold lettering to show spoken emphasis is nonstandard in most contexts, but it is standard in comics and I would kind of like to see it come into broader use.
(Also: s/contients/continents/
.)
↑ comment by Ritalin · 2013-10-10T14:31:01.153Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
It is, in fact, from comics. Another nonstandard habit is the frequent use of italics I've picked up from Eliezer Yudkowsky, along with other writing habits that would be qualified as "passionate" by some and "histrionic" by others. I myself find it quite practical in properly conveying emotional intensity.
Replies from: kalium, Eliezer_Yudkowsky, Swimmer963↑ comment by kalium · 2013-10-11T06:07:25.071Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
There's only a certain amount of emphasis to go around. The more things you italicize, the less important each italicized word seems, and then when something's really important it doesn't stand out. It's like swearing---if I swear every time I spill a glass of water, then it loses its effect and when I drop a hammer on my toe there is nothing I can think of that will express the strength of my feelings.
In comics, the difference in weight between bold and standard is much less than in typical fonts. I think it works well in comics but here it makes me read things out of order in a distracting way.
Replies from: Multiheaded, Ritalin, ChristianKl↑ comment by Multiheaded · 2013-10-11T12:13:40.105Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
There's only a certain amount of emphasis to go around. The more things you italicize, the less important each italicized word seems, and then when something's really important it doesn't stand out.
I keep trying to tell my mom exactly this, every time we need to design some kind of print materials for the family business. She just doesn't get that emphasis is about the relative share of a reader's attention to different parts within a text, a positional good of sorts.
↑ comment by Ritalin · 2013-10-12T13:25:29.113Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Oh, I keep getting that argument and I disagree completely. Swearing does not add nor substract emphasis; it is punctuation, placeholder words that might as well be onomatopeias. For an example of a character who swears constantly and still manages to highlight quite well differences in emotional intensity, I would suggest you look at Malcolm Tucker from british political satire The Thick Of It. For another who never swears yet also conveys utter fury, anger, frustration, pain, and so on impeccably, I would suggest having a look at any of the latest Doctors from Doctor Who. An angry David Tennant is a frightening frightening sight to behold. In the case of the hammer on your toe, I believe a heartfelt ARGH! does the trick nicely, with an extra hiss afterwards is you feel like it.
Replies from: kalium, Wes_W, Luke_A_Somers↑ comment by kalium · 2013-10-12T20:49:11.884Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I personally find that part of the relief from swearing comes from breaking a taboo, and that this weakens over time. But perhaps watching The Thick Of It will reveal to me a more sustainable way.
As for italics, in the limit case where everything is in italics you surely would not conclude that THE WHOLE THING IS EXTRA SUPER IMPORTANT. So there's some crossover point; we just disagree on where it is. I believe my view is common at least for more formal (book-type) writing.
Replies from: Ritalin↑ comment by Ritalin · 2013-10-13T13:46:21.857Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
You don't need to study the entire population to extrapolate a result. Here's a [ http://tvtropes.org/pmwiki/pmwiki.php/Quotes/TheThickOfIt ]representative sample .
↑ comment by Wes_W · 2013-10-18T19:44:44.505Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Swearing does not add nor substract emphasis; it is punctuation, placeholder words that might as well be onomatopeias.
At least for my own speech, profanity is primarily a way to add emphasis. This seems to also be true for a significant fraction of the people I've known.
Of course, profanity is not the only available source of emphasis. There are still lots of ways to convey emphasis with the level of profanity held constant.
There's absolute emphasis ("Listen up, because I will only say this once" draws extra attention to the entire statement that follows), and relative emphasis (the word "constantly" in "...a character who swears constantly and still..." is emphasized more than its neighbors, regardless of the level of passion it is read with). You can get someone to pay more attention in general, but attention paid to one thing is still attention not paid to something else.
Replies from: Ritalin↑ comment by Ritalin · 2013-10-19T12:00:03.622Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Again, it depends on how the things relate to each other. Example: you are kissing your beloved. The heat, the smell, the touch, the beat, the movement... can you really say that focusing your attention on any of those elements means you'll lose sight of all the others? Example: a movie scene. If the music, the visuals, the dialogue, all support and underline each other, focusing on one will not make you pay less attention to the rest.
Key word: synergy.
↑ comment by Luke_A_Somers · 2013-10-15T16:02:09.847Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I suppose this is scoped to the statement "if I swear every time I spill a glass of water, then it loses its effect and when I drop a hammer on my toe there is nothing I can think of that will express the strength of my feelings?"
Because the overall point that emphasis must be conserved stands quite well.
Replies from: Ritalin↑ comment by Ritalin · 2013-10-18T16:49:41.655Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Not really. Watch any opera or musical, listen to any speech; there's enough emphasis around to go on for hours and days, as long as you keep it varied and well-executed.
Heck, just marathon Gurren Lagann and tell me when you actually think the emphasis wears thin. My bet is, never.
Replies from: Luke_A_Somers, gwern↑ comment by Luke_A_Somers · 2013-10-18T19:11:58.341Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
In all of your examples, there are down times. Even Lagann.
Replies from: Ritalin↑ comment by Ritalin · 2013-10-19T17:25:27.330Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I never said there never need to be any down times, I said there was no such thing as conservation of emphasis. Even in Lagann, the down times were tense, emotional affairs; at their lightest, they were deeply contemplative; that is hardly a lack of intensity.
Replies from: Luke_A_Somers↑ comment by Luke_A_Somers · 2013-10-20T17:37:45.580Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
On second thoughts, there is no particular minimum to emphasis, so it clearly isn't conserved. There is an issue of diminishing returns.
Replies from: Ritalin↑ comment by ChristianKl · 2013-10-14T01:46:33.781Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Is there some research that investigates the effect in a more detailed fashion?
↑ comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2013-10-10T17:41:03.542Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I've been deitalicizing a bit lately.
Replies from: Ritalin↑ comment by Ritalin · 2013-10-10T18:09:40.625Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
We all grow old, don't we?
Nostalgic note: I remember back when I used to resent you for calling religion 'insanity'. Nowadays, I find it costs me strenuous effort to summon the very memory of a mindset where I could see it as anything but.
Replies from: Sengachi, Viliam_Bur↑ comment by Sengachi · 2013-10-21T12:42:35.932Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
There was a time when I was very rude to religious people because I thought that made me wise. Then there was a time when I was very polite because I thought equity in consideration was wise.
Now I'm just curt because I have science to do and no time to deal with fools.
Replies from: Lumifer↑ comment by Viliam_Bur · 2013-10-16T10:52:54.121Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Similar here. I used to have some respect for the views of religious people, but it becomes more and more difficult to understand the way of thinking "some savages thousands of years ago had an imaginary invisible friend (usually telling them to kill everyone else), and despite all the knowledge and experience we have now, we should treat this invisible friend as a serious source of knowledge and morality (of course, avoiding those parts that are just too absurd and pretending they never happened)".
But I guess that's just human mind as usual. The more time I spend with people who believe in the fantasy land, the less silly the fantasy land seems. The more I think about what we know about reality, the more crazy it seems when someone comes and says, essentially, "but my invisible friend says so and so".
Now I wonder if I spend enough time without reading LessWrong and came back, which parts of LessWrong would seem crazy. -- I am not saying the situation is the same; I was impressed by LessWrong when I saw it for the first time; with religion I had to have religious friends for years just to move it from the "total craziness" category to "worth considering" category. But it is still possible that some parts of LessWrong would seem crazy.
↑ comment by Swimmer963 (Miranda Dixon-Luinenburg) (Swimmer963) · 2013-10-10T21:41:02.772Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I've actually just broken an italics-using habit when writing fiction. I used to use italics all the time for emphasis and making it clearer how the text would sound if read out loud (it felt clearer to me, at least.) A reader commented that the software I used to convert my MS Word draft to an epub converted all italics to bold, and that he found it disruptive, and had tried mentally reading the lines with and without the bold and having the emphasis didn't seem to make anything clearer. I used select-all on my MS Word document and removed all the italics in order to make him a new epub. Rereading scenes later, it turned out that my friend was right, and the lack of italics hardly seemed to make a difference. Now I don't use them period. (Once I stopped using italics constantly, it felt odd to use them occasionally.)
Replies from: Ritalin↑ comment by Ritalin · 2013-10-12T13:48:46.697Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Italics are not a matter of clarity, they are more like a poor man's musical annotations. While it is often said that punctuation is a matter of placing pauses where you would if you spoke the sentence out loud, I believe that this is false; when reading out loud for an audience, whether it be a conference, a speech, a narration, one finds oneself placing pauses and emphasis in places where it would be awkward to do so by italics, bolds, points, commas, colons, semicolons, or m-dashes. Sure, when one is sufficiently attuned to a culture, to its turns of phrase and the ways people habitually emphasize things, one can use wording and phrasing to suggest the right way of reading. Being an amateur actor, I had to work with a scriptwriter who deliberately avoided doing that. You wouldn't believe how hard it was to give it emotional consisntency and proper flow; one practically had to build the character from scratch!
Replies from: TheOtherDave↑ comment by TheOtherDave · 2013-10-12T14:17:56.085Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
As an amateur director, part of my process with every play is to type up the script, stripping out all the stage directions and line-reading notes, precisely because I want to build the characters from scratch. But I do typically put in my own notes for the benefit of my actors who don't wish to do so (while encouraging them to ignore those notes and try different things if they feel right)
comment by Shmi (shminux) · 2013-10-09T15:21:31.281Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
If you agree that God wouldn't have a human-like personality and human-like needs and ambitions, you end up with a God who is indistinguishable from the sum of the laws of physics.
Scott Adams arguing that "that human personalities are nothing but weaknesses and defects that we romanticize" and that God would have no weaknesses and therefore no personality.
Since the local idea of a superintelligence implies that a foomed AGI would have no human weaknesses (and likely a goal system that is so incomprehensible to humans as to be indistinguishable from no goal system at all), this would imply that we would not notice a superintelligence if it were staring us in the face, provided it decided to keep humans around. There are some obvious flaws in his speculation, however. But the post is still well worth reading.
Replies from: Viliam_Bur, mwengler↑ comment by Viliam_Bur · 2013-10-16T12:03:28.986Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
goal system that is so incomprehensible to humans as to be indistinguishable from no goal system at all
No, "incomprehensible" doesn't imply "invisible". That's like saying that impersonal laws of physics are indistinguishable from having no laws of physics at all. Gravity is impersonal, yet it is personally observable.
In a similar way, we could observe an appearance of mountains of paperclips, even if we had no clue about why the AGI is doing that (assuming we would still exist and had an access to the AGI's code and data).
we would not notice a superintelligence if it were staring us in the face, provided it decided to keep humans around
Provided it decided to keep humans around in their original environment. Otherwise we would notice a change in the environment, even if we couldn't discover its cause.
↑ comment by mwengler · 2013-10-16T13:23:12.892Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Science of Mind hypothesizes a god with no personality. While this god goes much less far beyond the laws of physics, it goes a bit beyond them in that the hypothesis is of an infinite intelligence underlying the universe, of which human intelligences are a part or manifestation, like a drop of water in the ocean. For me, this leads me to the idea that there may be laws of consciousness that are part of the laws of physics, but which we just haven't figured out yet, just as radiation and quarks and so on were all there long before they were investigated well enough to have their laws categorized. When I attended such a "church," I referred to it as my atheist church. The pastor seemed a little uncomfortable with this, but contained himself.
The idea that personality is weaknesses and defects, I think is wrong. It seems more like a mental illness than a hypothesis to me. But there seems some useful content. Personality is part of how we manage a very finite model of a very large world. We need to do this to be effective because our minds are finite. And so Adams is right that an infinite intelligence, an intelligence whose horsepower had not run out before it comprehended the entire universe, would not need a model of the universe which was less complex than the universe itself.
WHen I attended this "church," I conceived the Universe as a gigantic intelligence, running a simulation of the universe. In fact it seems that it must be conceived this way, or rather that it can be. How does the electric field KNOW to evolve the way it does? The universe in some sense has been built to produce that result, just as we might build a specialized computer to simulate the electric field if we wanted a very fast highly detailed simulation. The universe has been built exactly as complex as it needs to be to simulate all the laws of physics, but no more complex. And all it does is simulate them. We are Hanson's ems, except it is not only our minds that are emulated, it is everything about us.
comment by anandjeyahar · 2013-10-03T10:54:25.245Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
To function as a Human being, you are forced to accept a minimum level of deception in your life. The more complex and challenging your life the higher this minimum. At any given level of moral and intellectual development, there is an associated minimum level of deception in your life. If you aren't deceiving others, you are likely deceiving yourself. Or you're in denial
You can only lower the level of deception in your life through further intellectual and moral development. In other words, you have to earn higher levels of truth in your life.
--- VGRao (Be Slightly evil)
Replies from: Viliam_Bur, anandjeyahar, mwengler↑ comment by Viliam_Bur · 2013-10-03T12:25:24.127Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I can't find a specific meaning in this. What does "accept deception" mean: to lie to others, to pretend inability to see through specific lies of others, or to just be generally aware that more information on average contains more false information without know specifically which parts are false?
↑ comment by anandjeyahar · 2013-10-03T14:32:15.135Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Ok May be that misses context. Further down in the text he categories 5 types of deception:
- Outright lying and fabrication of evidence
- Misdirection
- Withholding of information
- Equivocation or sharing information in ambiguous ways
- Not-correcting others.
Hope that helps
Replies from: Lumifer, JQuinton↑ comment by Lumifer · 2013-10-04T18:37:24.229Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Replies from: savageorangeNot-correcting others.
↑ comment by savageorange · 2013-10-09T00:45:24.274Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Being wrong on the internet is vastly more impersonal than being wrong in person, as it were. The urge to correct is similar in both cases, but in the in-person case you can suffer clear consequences from others' wrong beliefs (eg. if they are family). There's some overlap with #3 -- consider the common case of the presumption that you are heterosexual and cisgender.
There are also people who say things they know are wrong in order to see what you're made of, if you're a pushover or not. Unlike the online equivalent (trolling), ignoring them is often not effective.
It seems pretty clear to me that not-correcting others can be a self-deceiving behaviour, at minimum.
↑ comment by JQuinton · 2013-10-25T18:12:49.173Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Not-correcting others.
This reminds me of a previous rationality quote:
Being right too soon is socially unacceptable.
↑ comment by mwengler · 2013-10-04T16:59:55.809Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Fascinating, very interesting. It seems clear enough that public morality is a scheme to make more powerful the collective efforts of humans at the expense of their individual interests. Studies show smarter people take morality less seriously and tolerate more personal hypocrisy, which is what you would suppose would happen if the moral system is just another part of the environment which the organism must learn to exploit with the talents it has. It is important that we not be seen to be too immoral, but the smarter you are, the more room you have for deviance without detection.
To paraphrase another old quote: Telling the truth to Imperial Storm Troopers is no virtue. Lying to Imperial Storm Troopers is no vice. (My apologies for not using evil characters from Harry Potter, I am not familiar with the œuvre.)
Replies from: Lumifercomment by Panic_Lobster · 2013-10-12T01:21:25.244Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The needs of the many...outweigh...the needs of the few."
-Mr Spock, Star Trek II: The Wrath of Khan
comment by anandjeyahar · 2013-10-22T11:13:18.935Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
In a less regular, or low-validity, environment, the heuristics of judgement are invoked. System 1 is often able to produce quick answers to difficult questions by substitution, creating coherence where there is none. The question that is answered is not the one that was intended, but the answer is produced quickly and may be sufficiently plausible to pass the lax and lenient review of System 2. You may want to forecast the commercial future of a company, for example, and believe that this is what you are judging, while in fact your evaluation is dominated by your impressions of the energy and competence of its current executives. Because substitution occurs automatically, you often do not know the origin of a judgement that you (your System 2) endorse and adopt. If it is the only one that comes to mind, it may be subjectively undistinguishable from valid judgements that you make with expert confidence. This is why subjective confidence is not a good diagnostic of accuracy: judgements that answer the wrong question can also be made with high confidence.
~Daniel Kahneman (Thinking fast and slow)
comment by Vaniver · 2013-10-14T21:10:47.136Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The love of complexity without reductionism makes art; the love of complexity with reductionism makes science.
--E.O. Wilson
Replies from: CoffeeStain, Estarlio, mwengler↑ comment by CoffeeStain · 2013-10-14T23:49:56.630Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Whenever I have a philosophical conversation with an artist, invariably we end up talking about reductionism, with the artist insisting that if they give up on some irreducible notion, they feel their art will suffer. I've heard, from some of the world's best artists, notions ranging from "magic" to "perfection" to "muse" to "God."
It seems similar to the notion of free will, where the human algorithm must always insist it is capable of thinking about itself on level higher. The artist must always think of his art one level higher, and try to tap unintentional sources of inspiration. Nonreductionist views of either are confusions about how an algorithm feels on the inside.
Replies from: Ishaan, anandjeyahar↑ comment by Ishaan · 2013-10-15T00:04:16.996Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I don't think that this is an artist problem- I think this is a human problem, which a few scientists and philosophers have been forced to overcome in pursuit of truth.
their art will suffer
Too many people have straw-vulcan notions of reductionism. (tvtropes warning)
↑ comment by anandjeyahar · 2013-10-16T21:55:11.009Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I've heard, from some of the world's best artists, notions ranging from "magic" to "perfection" to "muse" to "God."
Elizabeth Gilbert presents a reasonably practical justification for the use of such a concept. See [here] (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=86x-u-tz0MA). Warning: TED talk and generous use of "reasonable"
↑ comment by Estarlio · 2013-10-15T11:34:25.643Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
What about artists who think that reducing things to their bare essentials is the essence of art? Or styles like - well, broadly speaking, anime (or caricatures in general) - that are based on the emphasis of certain basic forms? Or writers like Eric Hoffer - "Wordiness is a sickness of American writing. Too many words dilute and blur ideas. [...] If you have nothing to say and want badly to say it, then all the words in all the dictionaries will not suffice." ?
Replies from: Vaniver↑ comment by Vaniver · 2013-10-15T16:09:34.400Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
It's worth noting that Wilson's comment is A->B, C->D, not A=B, C=D.
What about artists who think that reducing things to their bare essentials is the essence of art?
Does that sound like a love of complexity to you?
Replies from: Estarlio↑ comment by Estarlio · 2013-10-16T12:36:58.586Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
It's worth noting that Wilson's comment is A->B, C->D, not A=B, C=D.
Yeah, I know. It's just not clear that you have to love complexity and not like reductionism to get art. It's not A <-> B.
If it's not A <-> B then it's A -> B but even that seems sketchy. Lots of people love spouting, sketching, whatever, complex nonsense without doing anything I'd describe as art.
Of course, it'd help in this situation to be able to point at art - but the whole thought seems very muddled and imprecise, and the issues seems far from the blank assertion it's presented as.
Does that sound like a love of complexity to you?
No.
↑ comment by mwengler · 2013-10-16T12:53:36.763Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I don't think it is complexity that makes art. I think it is emotion/feeling. Emotion/feeling may look like complexity to the rational mind because it does arise from a complex system which can be figured out bit by bit by the rational mind. But the essence of art is not to love anything that is complex and hard for the rational mind to figure out, but rather to focus on the feelings produced, the gestalt, the irrational, emotional connections and reactions.
comment by Stabilizer · 2013-10-03T21:08:08.738Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
A heroine needs a more supple courage. She must negotiate: with her emotions, with her adversaries, with her family, with hypocrisies. But not, if she can help it, with her ambition.
comment by rule_and_line · 2013-10-15T19:32:10.420Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken.
-- Oliver Cromwell
Previously posted two years ago. I'm curious if some things bear repeating. Is there any accepted timeframe for duplicates?
Replies from: Vaniver, Richard_Kennaway, Risto_Saarelma↑ comment by Vaniver · 2013-10-15T20:35:10.202Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Is there any accepted timeframe for duplicates?
Currently, no. It seems worthwhile to keep old quotes visible, but I suspect that would be better accomplished by automatically generating a database of rationality quotes from these threads (like DanielVarga's best of collections), and then displaying a random one on each LW page with frequency related to the number of upvotes they received, say. I don't think that duplicating quotes in quote threads is a good idea, because this focuses effort on finding new quotes and material to incorporate into a growing body of knowledge rather than rehashing previously found knowledge.
Replies from: rule_and_line↑ comment by rule_and_line · 2013-10-16T22:21:39.642Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I endorse (with the possibly-expected caveat about Wilson score ranking).
Unfortunately, I can't (don't know how to?) hack the LW backend. Is that something I can look into?
Replies from: Vaniver↑ comment by Richard_Kennaway · 2013-10-16T14:31:14.094Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I'm not keen on this one. It has a sensible reading as an injunction to keep the support of one's prior wide, and if that is what one is reminded of by the maxim, that is fine. But too often I see in everyday discourse people saying "you've made your mind up!" as a criticism. The argument becomes a bodyguard to support a belief that has no other support.
Some Wikipedia scholarship indicates that the real situation behind the quote is unpromising for a clear moral about rationality. Cromwell made this appeal on the occasion of the Scots proclaiming Charles II their king instead of accepting Cromwell's rule. Being rebuffed, he conquered them, and it appears from this biography, p184ff that he would have had an easier job of it had he not taken the time to first invite their surrender. On the other hand, the Scots handcapped themselves by too strict an attention to the religious correctness of their generals and soldiers, at the expense of numbers in the field, and might even have benefitted from the lesser fervour that Cromwell suggested to them.
↑ comment by Risto_Saarelma · 2013-10-16T16:21:01.388Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
in the bowels of Christ
Does this idiom make sense to native English speakers?
Replies from: wedrifid, Vaniver, Manfred↑ comment by wedrifid · 2013-10-16T17:24:53.295Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Does this idiom make sense to native English speakers?
Not especially. I sort of skip over it and the meaning "probably some shoddy translation of something that means to convey emphasis" appears in my head without me bothering to notice the words.
↑ comment by Vaniver · 2013-10-16T16:31:38.896Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Does this idiom make sense to native English speakers?
It's archaic. The modern variant would be like "Please, for goodness's sake, consider that you could be mistaken," or "Please, for fuck's sake", or "Please, for the love of God," or so on.
Replies from: Risto_Saarelma↑ comment by Risto_Saarelma · 2013-10-16T16:41:07.670Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Yes, but do people actually read it as that without looking it up, instead of just thinking of the quite different modern meaning?
Replies from: Nornagest, Vaniver, wedrifid↑ comment by Nornagest · 2013-10-16T18:39:00.901Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I read it as a flowery, archaic way of saying something along the lines of "in the name of God", without needing to map it away from a modern meaning, so that's one data point for you. I don't recall hearing the phrase elsewhere, but there are lots of religious invocations along similar lines from various eras, and I may unconsciously be drawing an inference between them.
(My favorite might be "God's teeth!", although that conveys shock rather than supplication.)
Replies from: simplicio↑ comment by simplicio · 2014-01-22T15:24:13.039Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
In Henry V, Shakespeare has the Duke of Exeter say:
Therefore in fierce tempest is he coming,
In thunder and in earthquake, like a Jove,
That if requiring fail, he will compel;
And bids you, in the bowels of the Lord,
Deliver up the crown; and to take mercy
On the poor souls for whom this hungry war
Opens his vasty jaws...
So it seems to have been a fairly common idiom in 17th C English.
↑ comment by Vaniver · 2013-10-16T17:16:54.459Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Yes, but do people actually read it as that without looking it up, instead of just thinking of the quite different modern meaning?
When I say the quote I use "in the bowels of Christ" and go directly to the concept/emotion I believe Cromwell wanted to evoke without going through another phrase first. But I have far more familiarity with English works written in Cromwell's time than the average person, so I can't say. (Similarly, "beseech" is a word rarely used undeliberately in modern times, but I don't feel a need to translate it.)
↑ comment by wedrifid · 2013-10-16T17:26:45.034Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Yes, but do people actually read it as that without looking it up, instead of just thinking of the quite different modern meaning?
There is a modern meaning? Once you drew attention to it above it occurred to me that the closest literal interpretation would be to "Holy Shit!" but that's not a euphamism I've ever actually heard...
comment by aarongertler · 2013-10-06T03:51:33.045Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
“By poet, I mean that farmer who plows his field with a plow that differs, however little, from the plow he inherited from his father, in order that someone will come after him to give the new plow a new name; I mean that gardener who breeds an orange flower and plants it between a red flower and a yellow flower, in order that someone will come after him to give the new flower a new name; or that weaver who produces on his loom patterns and designs that differ from those his neighbors weave, in order that someone will give his fabric a new name. By poet, I mean the sailor who hoists a third sail on a ship that has only two, or the builder who builds a house with two doors and two windows among houses built with one door and one window, or the dyer who mixes colors that no one before him has mixed, in order to produce a new color for someone who arrives later on to give the ship of the language a new sail, the house a new window, and the garment a new color.”
-Khalil Gibran, quoted in Reza Aslan's "Tablet and Pen"
Replies from: wedrifid, tut↑ comment by wedrifid · 2013-10-06T08:17:44.647Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
By poet I would mean someone who writes poems.
Replies from: aarongertler, Eliezer_Yudkowsky↑ comment by aarongertler · 2013-10-09T14:40:14.369Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Eh, probably. But given how we normally think about poetry and Middle Eastern culture, at least in Khalil Gibran's era (1900-1930), it's nice to see someone from that background talking about how awesome it is to build better boats. I like finding hints of modernism in unexpected places.
↑ comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2013-10-07T06:27:10.077Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
You can't call them 'inventors' though, because that's not as high-status as 'poet'.
Replies from: wedrifid, Baughn↑ comment by wedrifid · 2013-10-07T06:46:44.041Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
You can't call them 'inventors' though, because that's not as high-status as 'poet'.
It isn't? That's... broken.
Replies from: Eliezer_Yudkowsky↑ comment by Eliezer Yudkowsky (Eliezer_Yudkowsky) · 2013-10-07T17:26:25.112Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Yes, that was my attempted point.
Replies from: wedrifidcomment by Ben Pace (Benito) · 2013-10-06T13:22:10.337Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
"That which can be destroyed by the truth should be." - P. C. Hodgell
Love survives the truth.
Sam Harris
(I am aware that the first would be inappropriate alone, but I felt it provided the correct setup for the Sam Harris, which he said at the Festival of Dangerous Idea in the questions)
Added: The context of Harris was a questioner asking 'If contra-causal free will doesn't exist, then do our decisions to love people not exist?' Harris was saying his argument forced us to give up false beliefs and the false emotions that followed from them (hatred), but our belief that love exists is still correct.
Replies from: Desrtopa, wedrifid↑ comment by Desrtopa · 2013-10-06T14:16:29.338Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
So why specifically does hatred not survive when love does?
Replies from: Benito, mwengler↑ comment by Ben Pace (Benito) · 2013-10-06T14:34:08.691Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Er, well, you should listen to the talk. I was going to summarise it, but it's a really great talk, and I'm preparing a LessWrong post on it (although I've been thinking of doing that for about a year).
The general idea that I thought was relevant though, was the idea of stripping away all false beliefs and emotions, and that love is still a part of the world.
Replies from: Desrtopa↑ comment by Desrtopa · 2013-10-06T15:06:38.111Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Is there a transcript anywhere? I can read much more quickly than I can listen, and the talk is pretty long.
I have to say that I'm skeptical though, that hatred would inherently be any more "false" than love.
Replies from: lukeprog, MixedNuts, Benito↑ comment by Ben Pace (Benito) · 2013-10-06T19:47:04.382Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I'm afraid I know of no transcript. I would recommend the talk.
↑ comment by wedrifid · 2013-10-06T13:47:41.803Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Love survives the truth.
This seems false. Love survives (and should survive) some truths but not others. There are some things that people can do which will cause other people to stop loving them. Revealing the truth about such things will tend to kill love.
Replies from: Benito↑ comment by Ben Pace (Benito) · 2013-10-06T14:01:39.365Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Yeah, I added a note explaining the context of his words.
comment by ColonelMustard · 2013-10-07T02:27:20.793Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Great damage is usually caused by those who are too scrupulous to do small harm.
Replies from: Desrtopacomment by Zack_M_Davis · 2013-10-05T02:41:03.925Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
This Darwin, whoever he was, who had designed mankind for no better fate than to wail and weep and war and die, obviously was a villain, and enemy, someone as evil as the Venom Queen of Venus, who poisoned all her lovers. He was the one who stopped the future from coming.
Some of his friends said you had to prick your finger with a pin to make the oath valid; and boys of particular boldness used a rusty pin, as if daring the Jihad plague to strike. Menelaus knew that was all nonsense: it was the willpower that decided oaths, nothing else. No pin would be as sharp as what he felt beating in his angry young heart.
This Darwin pretty sure had clout, if he could do all this stuff. Could be, he was some bigwig from Houston. Mom had also mentioned Malthus. Obviously his henchman.
Or maybe he was a guy long dead, since it sounded like he did his dirt long ago, and meddled with the gene-stuff, like those tragic transhumanist experiments the library had told him about. But it did not matter if Darwin was alive, or dead, or long dead.
Didn't matter: because he vowed to defeat Darwin, somehow. Some-day.
---Count to a Trillion by John C. Wright
Replies from: gwern, Nomad↑ comment by gwern · 2013-10-05T17:20:53.405Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
This Darwin, whoever he was, who had designed mankind for no better fate than to wail and weep and war and die, obviously was a villain, and enemy, someone as evil as the Venom Queen of Venus, who poisoned all her lovers. He was the one who stopped the future from coming...Mom had also mentioned Malthus....Or maybe he was a guy long dead, since it sounded like he did his dirt long ago, and meddled with the gene-stuff, like those tragic transhumanist experiments the library had told him about.
I'd note this novel was published long after Wright had his heart attack, hallucinated the Virgin Mary/Jesus/God/others, and converted to Catholicism.
Replies from: Richard_Kennaway↑ comment by Richard_Kennaway · 2013-10-06T06:10:15.286Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The point of the quote stands. For that matter, apart from the times that Wright specifically talks about religious doctrine, he seems to have much the same views on other things and be much the same person as before his conversion, at least judging from his blog. (It starts in March 2003; he reports his conversion as a recent event in December 2003.)
If you read his conversion story, it is clear that to say "oh well, something went wrong with his brain" is facile. He had been moving in that direction for many years. He writes of himself before that episode:
To my surprise and alarm, I found that, step by step, logic drove me to conclusions no modern philosophy shared, but only this ancient and (as I saw it then) corrupt and superstitious foolery called the Church. Each time I followed the argument fearlessly where it lead, it kept leading me, one remorseless rational step at a time, to a position the Church had been maintaining for more than a thousand years. That haunted me.
As indeed it drove C.S. Lewis before him. I note that Lewis, Chesterton, and, for that matter, Wright enjoy a certain popularity at LessWrong, all of them having been frequently quoted with approval. People have also talked of the practical usefulness of spiritual exercises, and the concept of sin.
As I said on an earlier occasion, Lewis is laughing in his grave; and perhaps Wright will get the last laugh long before his.
Might i suggest a sweepstake on the date of the first long-time member of LW to announce their religious conversion? Personally I remain an unbeliever, but who can foretell their own future?
Replies from: gwern, Jiro, pianoforte611, JQuinton, Jiro, pianoforte611↑ comment by gwern · 2013-10-06T22:13:19.809Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The point of the quote stands.
My objection here is not to the 'willpower yay!' bit, but to the multiple political digs interspersed in it, which substantially reduce the value of the quote for me, and I thought people were not noticing.
If you read his conversion story, it is clear that to say "oh well, something went wrong with his brain" is facile. He had been moving in that direction for many years. He writes of himself before that episode:
I am skeptical of his account. Everything is obvious in retrospect, and when someone is writing their conversion story, superimposing a 'journey to Catholicism' is easy. Just cherrypick.
He says he beat friends in arguments and showed their argument were bad? So what? I have beaten other LWers in arguments and show their understanding poor many times over the years, but if tomorrow I suffer brain damage and start worshipping Allah, it would be very easy for me to write 'despite being a frequent writer at transhumanist websites, I was nevertheless drifting away and routinely showing that my fellow transhumanists were horribly comically wrong about every basic point of philosophy, ethics and logic'; all it requires is a change of perspective.
We can see this hindsight on display right now in discussions of Silk Road. All over the place people are saying that the FBI knew who Ulbricht was from the start since there was a connection from his email address to an early mention of Silk Road, and how easy it would have been to de-anonymize Dread Pirate Roberts. Plausible... until we remember that no one in the world actually managed this despite intense interest by many people and organizations in SR, that if we had noticed the connection we had no good reason to believe that altoid/Ulbricht hadn't heard about SR through the Hidden Wiki or another discussion forum we simply didn't have access to or on a page that had linkrotted, that the indictments indicate that the FBI only managed to make the link much later after assigning someone fulltime to sift all Internet traces, and we're still not clear on whether they were sure DPR==Ulbricht until as late as June 2013.
(Assuming you believe that he's recounting the facts basically right. I believe Wright when he writes about his heart attack and hallucination as the reason for the conversion because it's a shockingly embarrassing way to convert, which invites even believers to write him off as believing due to neurological problems, and this has to be obvious to him; but that doesn't apply to his claims of having been tending toward Catholicism for years before.)
↑ comment by Jiro · 2013-10-06T09:50:53.552Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Oh, and something else to add: religious believers have this tendency to not understand that rationalists don't use quotes as arguments from authority. They quote people's words because the words make sense independently of the person. People who are "frequently quoted with approval" are quoted because they have frequently said things that make sense, not because anything they say is automatically right; if they shift to sayng things that don't make sense, the fact that they have been frequently quoted in the past won't carry over.
Replies from: tut↑ comment by pianoforte611 · 2013-10-16T13:15:04.309Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Too lazy to address this comment. Luckily Scott Alexander has done so in delightful detail: http://slatestarcodex.com/2013/06/17/the-what-youd-implicitly-heard-before-telling-thing/ Tldr, the idea that Christianity is is more likely to be true because it is old and some of its ideas match our vocabulary and aesthetics is unconvincing because it is the very fact that it is old (and pervasive) that its vocabulary matches some of our ideas and intuitions. Its hard for a system to survive that long being completely wrong on every count. Pointing to things that the belief system got right is not very interesting. (Scott argues this case much better than I just did)
Also too late on the conversion thing, Leah Libresco converted to Catholicism some time ago.
Replies from: Richard_Kennaway↑ comment by Richard_Kennaway · 2013-10-16T15:02:37.953Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Just to be clear beyond my closing aside that I remain an unbeliever, I am not defending Wright's (or Lewis's, or Chesterton's) argument here against anything but the knockdown that "oh well, something went wrong with his brain". Nor do I agree with Gwern's attribution of Wright's account of his pre-conversion self to hindsight bias, or "hindsight bias" becomes a universal counterargument against every account of past events.
More generally, one person's priors are not an argument against another's posteriors.
↑ comment by JQuinton · 2013-10-07T15:50:38.704Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Might i suggest a sweepstake on the date of the first long-time member of LW to announce their religious conversion?
I'm pretty sure that's already happened.
Replies from: shminux↑ comment by Shmi (shminux) · 2013-10-07T17:21:11.575Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
See the last entry here.
↑ comment by Jiro · 2013-10-06T09:37:08.265Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Just reading your own link, his "challenge" is something whose irrationality almost anyone here could see a mile off, and if he actually thought that that challenge made any sense, he must have had a second brain malfunction that led him to make the challenge before he had the one that happened after the challenge. (Or more realistically, I'd say he had an emotional breakdown first, then made the challenge, then had a physical brain malfunction.)
He also doesn't seem to understand the objections people gave to him. At the top of that very link he quotes someone asking why particularly Christianity since it seems so petty. His later reaction (after the brain malfunction) is "if science discovered tomorrow that the universe was half its apparent age, and estimated the stars as half their current number, would the belief in God somehow be twice as credible in your eyes?" Of course, to the extent that his God would seem less petty in a smaller universe, all the alternatives would seem less petty too.
It's also an incredible coincidence for a rational conversion (but not so incredible for a brain malfunction) that the religion he picked was one that was only a short distance, if at all, from the one predominant in his society and his upbringing. Why don't people in Christian societies ever ask God for a sign, get one, and turn into devout Muslims?
Replies from: Viliam_Bur, Eugine_Nier↑ comment by Viliam_Bur · 2013-10-16T12:17:18.005Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
if science discovered tomorrow that the universe was half its apparent age, and estimated the stars as half their current number, would the belief in God somehow be twice as credible in your eyes?
I am not saying twice credible, but it would be more credible. If science reduced the age of universe once, it may do it again, and who knows... there is a tiny chance it could go down to 6000 years.
More generally, smaller reliability of science would increase the probability that some intelligent agent is acting in the universe.
Problem is, increasing the probability from 0.0001 to 0.0002 is not the same thing as converting.
Replies from: Jiro↑ comment by Jiro · 2013-10-16T14:28:34.015Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The argument he was replying to was not about probability, but about pettiness. People could not accept that Christianity contains certain ideas that are petty in contrast to the scope of the universe. He then asked if a smaller universe would make them think Christianity is less petty. To which my reply would be that since Christianity was being compared to rival religions, any rivals would become less petty by a similar factor, so Christianity would still not improve comparatively.
↑ comment by Eugine_Nier · 2013-10-08T01:37:55.153Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Why don't people in Christian societies ever ask God for a sign, get one, and turn into devout Muslims?
What hypothesis are you trying to refute with this question?
Edit: If it's the rational conversion hypothesis, note that people also are more likely to rationally convert to positions they've been exposed to, even in domains far away from religion. If it's the Catholicism is true hypothesis, this would not be surprising.
Replies from: Jiro↑ comment by Jiro · 2013-10-08T15:44:46.706Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
If it's the rational conversion hypothesis, then while people are more likely to rationally convert to positions they've been exposed to, it doesn't seem to me that they are enough more likely to explain the way conversions actually work. Furthermore, he supposedly got an experience directly from God. It wasn't a rational conversion in the sense of having been deduced from things he already knew, it was a new experience, and I wouldn't expect such things to be correlated with cultural context in the same way that ordinary rational conversions are. God can easily send Catholic experiences to Muslims and Muslim experiences to Catholics after all. Brain malfunctions, on the other hand, would be correlated with cultural context.
If it's the Catholiicism is true hypothesis, then this example would be unsurprising, but other examples involving other religions would be even more surprising than they are now.
↑ comment by pianoforte611 · 2013-10-16T13:04:22.901Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Leah Libresco?
↑ comment by Nomad · 2013-10-05T16:14:50.093Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I'm not convinced the whole thing is a decent rationality quote, as part of it seems to be Menelaus surrendering to the idea that "because Darwin discovered Natural Selection, he endorsed it".
On the other hand, "Some of his friends said you had to prick your finger with a pin to make the oath valid; and boys of particular boldness used a rusty pin, as if daring the Jihad plague to strike. Menelaus knew that was all nonsense: it was the willpower that decided oaths, nothing else. No pin would be as sharp as what he felt beating in his angry young heart." is brilliant: both understanding the inclination to irrationality, and also emphasising that rationality can be strengthened by emotion.
Replies from: Richard_Kennaway↑ comment by Richard_Kennaway · 2013-10-08T07:44:53.656Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I'm not convinced the whole thing is a decent rationality quote, as part of it seems to be Menelaus surrendering to the idea that "because Darwin discovered Natural Selection, he endorsed it".
It appears to me that within the story, his knowledge of exactly who Darwin was has been greatly garbled by the processes of history. That's just a detail of the setting. My reading of Menelaus' attitude to evolution is that he is expressing much the same idea as Eliezer's characterisation of it as a blind idiot god that we should overcome and replace.
comment by Dreaded_Anomaly · 2013-10-03T23:07:21.685Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Holden: Oh, my God!
Buffy: Oh, your God what?
Holden: Oh, well, you know, not my God, because I defy him and all of his works, but—Does he exist? Is there word on that, by the way?
Buffy: Nothing solid.
— "Buffy the Vampire Slayer" Season 7, Episode 7 "Conversations with Dead People"
comment by lharding · 2013-10-03T20:40:08.974Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
In the land of the blind, the one eyed man is king^Wa dangerous heretic^W^W^Wangry that no one cares about visual design.
[where ^W represents the EMACS "delete word" command and my annoyance at LW's lack of a strikethrough formatting option]
Replies from: somervta, None, sixes_and_sevens, shminux, shminux, lharding↑ comment by [deleted] · 2013-10-13T01:36:32.290Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
The standard digraph visualization for U+0008 BACKSPACE is ^H.
Replies from: fubarobfusco↑ comment by fubarobfusco · 2013-10-13T03:37:36.305Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Those aren't backspaces.
Replies from: None↑ comment by [deleted] · 2013-10-13T09:30:19.180Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I'll concede the point that I forgot the unicode hex code.
However, I have just now checked in Vim, less, wikipedia.org/wiki/Backspace#^H and The jargon file (text search for ^H).
Replies from: MugaSofer↑ comment by MugaSofer · 2013-10-13T15:48:19.981Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
No, those literally aren't backspaces. They're
the EMACS "delete word" command
according to the OP.
ETA: ... and according to the Wikipedia article you cited as well. So there's that.
↑ comment by sixes_and_sevens · 2013-10-05T16:01:35.598Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I've taken to using not very subtle subtext.
↑ comment by Shmi (shminux) · 2013-10-03T21:20:55.453Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Huh, I expected strikethrough to work like it does on Reddit, but alas...
Replies from: Eugine_Nier↑ comment by Eugine_Nier · 2013-10-04T02:35:03.866Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
Use this.
↑ comment by Shmi (shminux) · 2013-10-03T21:19:55.882Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
What lack of strikethrough formatting?
↑ comment by lharding · 2013-10-03T20:42:02.423Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I suppose modifying a proverb thus may count as quoting myself, in which case I offer to retract this one upon nonzero level of consensus that I've broken the rules.
Replies from: Oscar_Cunningham, army1987↑ comment by Oscar_Cunningham · 2013-10-03T21:14:28.148Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
I think you're breaking the rules.
↑ comment by A1987dM (army1987) · 2013-10-04T03:43:19.916Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
You could post that in the Best 15 Words thread instead.
comment by Become_Stronger · 2013-10-04T01:33:58.283Z · LW(p) · GW(p)
No discord,
Diminished crown,
Heaven and hell are both right here.
Translation,
Speculation,
They started a fire with our fear.
Analyze,
Remove folklore,
What's left of the pretty story?
Open mind,
Extract morals,
No reason to become the quarry.
Hard to fake a sinless state:
But keep a golden rule in mind.
We are dying,
We are falling,
But there's no reason why we can't rise.
While we're here, while we're here.
But there's no reason why we can't rise.
While we're here.