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I'm the person JenniferRM mentioned. I'm also a physics guy, and got into studying/practicing hypnosis in ~2010/2011. I kinda moved on from "hypnosis" and drifted up the abstraction ladder, but still working on similar things and working on tying them together.

Anyway, here are my thoughts.

Suppose I really want her to be spinning clockwise in my mind. What might I do?

What worked for me is to focus on the foot alone and ignore the broader context so that I had a "clean slate" without "confirmatory experience" blocking my desired conclusion. When looking at the foot alone I experience it as oscillating rather than rotating (which I guess it technically is), and from there I can "release" it into whichever spin I intend by just kinda imagining that this is what's going on.

On the one hand, shifting intuitive models is surprisingly hard! You can’t necessarily just want to have a particular intuitive model, and voluntarily make that happen.

I actually disagree with this. It certainly seems hard, but the difficulty is largely illusory and pretty much disappears once you stop trying to walk through the wall and notice the front door.

The problem is that "wanting to have a particular model" isn't the thing that matters. You can want to have a particular model all you want, and you can even think the model is true all you want, but you're still talking about the statement itself not about the reality to which the statement refers. Even if you convince someone that their fear is irrational and they'd be better off not being scared, you've still only convinced them that their fear is irrational and they'd be better off not being scared. If you want to convince them that they are safe -- and therefore change their fear response itself -- then you need to convince them that they're safe. It's the difference between looking at yourself from the third person and judging whether your beliefs are correct or not, vs looking at the world from the first person and seeing what is there. If you want to change the third person perspective, then you can look at which models are desirable and why. If you want to change the first person models themselves, you have to look to the world and see what's there.

This doesn't really work with the spinning dancer because "Which way is the dancer spinning?" doesn't have an answer, but this is an artificial issue which doesn't exist in the real world. You still have to figure out "Is this safe enough to be worth doing?" and that's not always trivial, but the problem of "How do I change this irrational fear?" (for example) is. The answer is "By attending to the question of whether it is actually safe".

I don't deny that there's "skill" to it, but most of the skill IME is a meta skill of knowing what to even aim for rather than aiming well. Once you start attending to "Is it safe enough?", then when the answer is actually obvious the intuitive models just change. I can give a whole bunch of examples of this if you want, where people were stuck unable to change their responses and the problem just melts away with this redirection. Even stuff that you'd think would be resistant to change like physical pain can change essentially instantly. I've had it take as little as a single word.

Again we see that the subject is made to feel that his body is out of control, and becomes subject to a high-status person. Some hypnotists sit you down, ask you to stare upwards into their eyes and suggest that your eyelids are wanting to close—which works because looking upwards is tiring, and because staring up into a high-status person’s eyes makes you feel inferior.

This isn't exactly wrong, but I want to push back on the implication that this is the central or most important thing here.

The central thing, IMO, is a willingness to try on another person's worldview even though it clashes with your own. It doesn't require "inferiority"/"high status"/"control" except in the extremely minimal sense that they might know something important that you don't, and that seeing it for yourself might change your behavior. That alone will get you inhibition of all the normal stuff and an automatic (albeit tentative) acceptance of worldview-dissonant perspectives (e.g. name amnesia). It helps if the person has reason to respect and trust you which is kinda like "high status", but not really because it can just as easily happen with people on equal social standing in neutral contexts.

Similarly, hypnosis has very little to do with sleep and eye fatigue/closure is not the important part of eye contact. The important part of eye contact is that it's incredibly communicative. You can convey with eye contact things which you can't convey with words. "I see you". "Seeing you doesn't cause conflict in me". "I see you seeing me see you" and so on, to name a few. All the things you need to communicate to show someone that your perspective is safe and worthy of experiencing are best communicated with the eyes. And perhaps equally important it is a bid for attention, by holding your own.

So far, this isn’t a trance; I’m just describing a common social dynamic. Specifically, if I’m not in a hypnotic trance, the sequence of thoughts in the above might look like a three-step process:

[...]
i.e., in my intuitive model, first, the hypnotist exercises his free will with the intention of me standing; second, I (my homunculus) exercise my own free will with the intention of standing; and third, I actually stand. In this conceptualization, it’s my own free will / vitalistic force / wanting (§3.3.4) that causes me to stand. So this is not a trance.

It's important to note that while this self reflective narrative is indeed different in the way you describe, the underlying truth often is not. In the hypnosis literature this is known as "cold control theory", because it's the same control without the usual Higher Order Thoughts (HOT).

In "common social dynamics" we explain it as "I chose to", but what is actually happening a lot of the time is the speaker is exercising their free will through your body, and you're not objecting because it matches your narrative. The steps aren't actually in series, and you didn't choose to do it so much as you chose to not decline to do it.

These "higher order thoughts" do change some things, but turn out to be relatively unimportant and the better hypnotists usually don't bother too much with them and instead just address the object level. This is also why you get hypnotists writing books subtitled "there's no such thing as hypnosis" and stuff like that.

The short version is: If I have a tune in my head, then I’m very unlikely to simultaneously recall a memory of a different tune. Likewise, if I’m angry right now, then I’m less likely to recall past memories where I felt happy and forgiving, and vice-versa.

As far as I can tell, there are several different things going on with amnesia. I agree that this is one of them, and I'm not sure if I've seen anyone else notice this, so it's cool to see someone point it out.

The "null hypothesis", though, any time it comes to hypnosis is that it's all just response to suggestion. You "know" that being hypnotized involves amnesia, and you believe you're hypnotized, so you experience what you expect. There's an academic hypnosis researcher I talk to sometimes who doesn't even believe "hypnotic trance" is real in any fundamental sense and thinks that all the signs of trance are the result of suggestion.

I don't believe suggestion is all that's going on, but it really is sufficient for amnesia. The answer to Yudkowsky's old question of "Do we believe everything we're told?" [LW · GW] is indeed "Yes" -- if we don't preemptively push it away or actively remember to unbelieve later. Back when I was working this stuff out I did a fun experiment where I'd come up with an excuse to get people to not pre-emptively reject what I was about to say, then I'd suggest amnesia for this conversation and that they'd laugh when I scratch my nose, and then I'd distract them so that the suggestion could take effect before they had a chance to unbelieve it. The excuse was something like "I know this is ridiculous so I don't expect you to believe it, but hear me out and let me know if you understand" -- which is tricky because they think the fact that we "agreed" that they won't believe it means they actually aren't believing it when they say "I understand", even though the full statement is "I understand [that I will laugh when you scratch your nose and have no idea why"]. They still had awareness that this belief is wrong and would therefore act to stop themselves from acting on it, which is why the unexpected distraction was necessary in order to get their mind off of it long enough for it to work.
 

Ah, I think I see. Would it be fair to rephrase your question as: if we "re-rolled the dice" a week before the election, how likely was Trump to win?

My answer is probably between 90% and 95%. Basically the way Trump loses is to lose some of his supporters or have way more late deciders decide on Harris. That probably happens if Trump says something egregiously stupid or offensive (on the level of the Access Hollywood tape), or if some really bad news story about him comes out, but not otherwise.

Why do some mathematicians feel like mathematical objects are "really out there" in some metaphysically fundamental sense? For example, if you ask mathematicians whether ZFC + not Consistent(ZFC) is consistent, they will say "no, of course not!" But given ZFC is consistent, the statement is in fact consistent due to by Godel's second incompleteness theorem^[1]. Similarly, if we have the Peano axioms without induction, mathematicians will say that induction should be there, but in fact you cannot prove this fact from within Peano, and given induction mathematicians will say transfinite induction should be there.

I argue that an explanation could be from logical induction [? · GW]. In logical induction, fast but possibly wrong sub-processes bet with each other over whether different mathematical facts will be proven true or false by a slow but ground-truth formal system prover. Another example of backstops in learning. But one result of this is that the successful sub-processes are not selected very hard to give null results on unprovable statements, producing spurious generalization and the subjective feeling--as expressed by probabilities for propositions--that some impossible theorems are true.

Of course, the platonist can still claim that this logical induction stuff is very similar to bayesian updating in the sense that both tell you something about the world, even when you can't directly observe the relevant facts. If a photon exists your lightcone, there is no reason to stop believing the photon exists, even though there is no chance for you to ever encounter it again. Similarly, just because a statement is unprovable, doesn't mean its right for you to have no opinion on the subject, insofar as the simplest & best internal logical-induction market traders have strong beliefs on the subject, they may very well be picking up on something metaphysically fundamental. Its simply the simplest explanation consistent with the facts.

The story I read about why neighbor polling is supposed to correct for bias in specifically the last few presidential elections is that some people plan to vote for Trump, but are ashamed of this, and don't want to admit it to people who aren't verified Trump supporters. So if you ask them who they plan to vote for, they'll dissemble. But if you ask them who their neighbors are voting for, that gives them permission to share their true opinion non-attributively. 

I cannot explain the thoughts of others who have read this and chose not to comment.

I would've not commented had I not gone through a specific series of 'not heavily determined' mental motions.

First, I spent some time in the AI recent news rabbit hole, including an interview with Gwern wherein he spoke very beautifully about the importance of writing.

This prompted me to check back in on LessWrong, to see what people have been writing about recently. I then noticed your post, which I presumably only saw due to a low-karma-content-filter setting I'd disabled.

And this prompted me to think "maybe that's something I could do on LessWrong to dip my toes into the waters more - replying to extremely downvoted posts on the principle that there are likely people arguing in good faith and yet falling flat on LessWrong due to some difference in taste or misapprehension about what kind of community this is."

Note, I said: people arguing in good faith.

The tone of this post does not seem "good faith." At least, not at a glance.

Framing this with the language "legion of doom" is strange and feels extremely unhelpful for having a useful conversation about what is actually true in reality.

It calls to mind disclaimers in old General Semantics literature about "emotionally charged language" - stuff that pokes people in the primate instinct parts of their brain.

That would be my guess as to why this tone feels so compelling to you. It trips those wires in my head as well. It's fun being cheeky and combative - "debate me bro, my faction vs your faction, let's fight it out."

That doesn't help people actually figure out what's true in reality. It leads to a lot of wasted time running down chains of thought that have their roots in "I don't like those guys, I'm gonna destroy their arguments with my impeccable logic and then call them idiots" - which is different than thinking thoughts like "I'm curious about what is true here, and what's actually true in reality seems important and useful to know, I should try my best to figure out what that is."

What you've written here has a lot of flaws, but my guess is that this is the main one people here would want you to acknowledge or merely not repeat.

Don't use words like "legion of doom" - people who believe these specific things about AI are not actually a cult. People here will not debate you about this stuff if you taunt them by calling them a 'legion of doom.'

They will correctly recognize that this pattern-matches to an internet culture phenomenon of people going "debate me bro" - followed by a bunch of really low effort intellectual work, and a frustrating inability to admit mistakes or avoid annoying/uncomfortable tactics.

There may be people out there - I haven't met them - who believe that they are in a cult (and are happy about that) because they loudly say they agree with Eliezer about AI. They are, I think, wrong about agreeing with Eliezer. If they think this a cult, they have done an abysmal job understanding the message. They have "failed at reading comprehension." Those people are probably not on LessWrong. You may find them elsewhere, and you can have an unproductive debate with them on a different platform where unproductive debate is sometimes celebrated.

If you want to debate the object-level content of this article with me, a good start would be showing that the points I've made so far are well-taken, or give me an account of your worldview where actually the best policy is to say things like "I'm surprised the legion of doom is so quiet?"

Mostly I don't expect this to result in a productive conversation. I've skimmed your post and if I had it on paper I'd have underlined a lot of it with some "this is wrong/weird" color of ink and drawn "?" symbols in the margins. I wrote this on a whim, which is the reason the 'legion of doom' is quiet about this post - you aren't going to catch many people's whims with this quality of bait.

I didn't know about that. That sounds like fun!

Some people are more concerned about S-risk than extinction risk, and I certainly don't want to dismiss them or imply that their concerns are mistaken or invalid, but I just find it a lot less likely that the AI project will lead to massive human suffering than its leading to human extinction.

the public seems pretty bought-in on AI risk being a real issue and is interested in regulation.

There's a huge gulf between people's expressing concern about AI to pollsters and the kind of regulations and shutdowns that would actually avert extinction. The people (including the "safety" people) whose careers would be set back by many years if they had to find employment outside the AI field and the people who've invested a few hundred billion into AI are a powerful lobbying group in direction opposition to the members of the general public who tell pollsters they are concerned.

I don't actually know enough about the authoritarian countries (e.g., Russia, China, Iran) to predict with any confidence how likely they are to prevent their populations from contributing to human extinction through AI. I can't help but notice though that so far it is the US and the UK that have done the most so far to advance the AI project. Also, the government's deciding to shut down movements and technological trends is much more normalized and accepted in Russia, China and Iran than it is in the West, particularly the US.

I don't have any prescriptions really. I just think that the OP (titled "why the 2024 election matters, the AI risk case for Harris, & what you can do to help", currently standing at 23 points) is badly thought out and badly reasoned, and I wish I had called for readers to downvote it because its main effect on LW was probably to add some politics-mindkill without adding any useful insight.

So it doesn't make much sense to value emotions

I think this is a non sequitur. Everything you value can be described as just <dismissive reductionist description>, so the fact that emotions can too isn't a good argument against valuing them. And in this case, the dismissive reductionist description misses a crucial property: emotions are accompanied by (or identical with, depending on definitions) valenced qualia.

Emotions are hardwired stereotyped syndromes of hardwired blunt-force cognitive actions. E.g. fear makes your heart beat faster and puts an expression on your face and makes you consider negative outcomes more and maybe makes you pay attention to your surroundings. So it doesn't make much sense to value emotions, but emotions are good ways of telling that you value something; e.g. if you feel fear in response to X, probably X causes something you don't want, or if you feel happy when / after doing Y, probably Y causes / involves something you want.

That's a different question than the one I meant. Let me clarify:

Basically I was asking you what you think the probability is that Trump would win the election (as of a week before the election, since I think that matters) now that you know how the election turned out.

An analogous question would be the following:

Suppose I have two unfair coins. One coin is biased to land on heads 90% of the time (call it H-coin) and the other is biased to land on tails 90% of the times (T-coin). These two coins look the same to you on the outside. I choose one of the coins, then ask you how likely it is that the coin I chose will land on heads. You don't know whether the coin I'm holding is H-coin or T-coin, so you answer 50% (50%=0.5*.90=+0.5*0.10). I then flip the coin and it lands on heads. Now I ask you, knowing that the coin landed on heads, now how likely do you think it was that it would land on heads when I first tossed it? (I mean the same question by "Knowing how the election turned out, how likely do you think it was a week before the election that Trump would win?").

(Spoilers: I'd be interested in knowing your answer to this question before you read my comment on your "The value of a vote in the 2024 presidential election" EA Forum post that you linked to [EA(p) · GW(p)] to avoid getting biased by my answer/thoughts.)