LessWrong 2.0 Reader

One thing we're worried about is cases where the haplotypes have the small additive effects rather than individual SNPs, and you get an unpredictable (potentially deleterious) effect if you edit to a rare haplotype even if all SNPs involved are common.

This is a point of uncertainty that bothered me when I was doing a similar analysis a while ago. GWAS data is possibly good enough to estimate causal effects of haplotypes, but that's not enough information to do single base edits. To have reasonable confidence of getting the predicted effect, it'd be necessary to to make all the edits to transform the original haplotype into a different haplotype.

And unlike with distant variants where additive effects dominate, it'd make sense if non-additive effects are strong locally, since the variants are near each other. Whether this is actually true in reality is way beyond my knowledge, though.

Thanks for the reply, I broadly agree with your points here. I agree we should pronably eventually try to do trades across logical counter-factuals. Decreasing logical risk is one good framing for that, but in general, there are just positive trades to be made.

However, I think you are still underestimating how hard it might be to strike these deals. "Be kind to other existing agents" is a natural idea to us, but it's still unclear to me if it's something you should assign hogh probability to as a preference of logically counter-factual beings. Sure, there is enough room for humans and mosquitos, but if you relax 'agent' and 'existing', suddenly there is not enough room for everyone. You can argue that "be kind to existing agents" is plausibly a relatively short description length statement, so it will be among the first guesses of the AI and will allocate at least some fraction of the universe to it. But once trading across logical counter-factuals, I'm not sure you can trust things like description length. Maybe in the logical counter-factual universe, they assign higher value/probability to longer instead of shortet statements, but the measure still ends up to 1, because math works differently.

Similarly, you argue that loving torture is probably rare, based on evolutionary grounds. But logically counter-factual beings weren't necessarily born through evolution. I have no idea how we should determine the dstribution of logicsl counter-factuals, and I don't know what fraction enjoys torture in that distribution.

Altogether, I agree logical trade is eventually worth trying, but it will be very hard and confusing and I see a decent chance that it basically won't work at all.

There's a minor error in the formula giving the cross entropy: you need a minus sign on the RHS so that it reads E[- log P[X|M_2] | M_2]

The preceding text is "Of course, we could be wrong about the distribution - we could use a code optimized for a model M2 which is different from the “true” model M1. In this case, the average number of bits used will be"

It's hard for me to respect a Safety-ish org so obviously wrong about the most important factors of their chosen topic. 

I won't judge a random celebrity for expecting e.g. very long timelines but an AI research center? I'm sure they are very cool people but come on.

As in ultimately more people are likely to like their condition and agree (comparably more) with the AI's decisions while having roughly equal rights.

If you can’t provide a few unambiguous examples of the dilemma in the post that actually happened in the real world, I’m less likely to take your post seriously.

Might be worth thinking more and then coming up with examples.

I consider you to be basically agreeing with me for 90% of what I intended and your disagreements for the other 10% to be the best written of any so far, and basically valid in all the places I'm not replying to it. I still have a few objections:

What if my highest value is getting a pretty girl with a country-sized dowry, while having not betrayed the Truth? ... In short, no, Rationality absolutely can be about both Winning and about The Truth.

 I agree the utility function isn't up for grabs and that that is a coherent set of values to have, but I have this criticism that I want to make that I feel I don't have the right language to make. Maybe you can help me. I want to call that utility function perverse. The kind of utilityfunction that an entity is probably mistaken to imagine itself as having.

For any particular situation you might find yourself in, for any particular sequence of actions you might do in that situation, there is a possible utilityfunction you could be said to have such that the sequence of actions is the rational behaviour of a perfect omniscient utility maximiser. If nothing else, pick the exact sequence of events that will result, declare that your utility function is +100 for that sequence of events and 0 for anything else, and then declare yourself a supremely efficient rationalist.

Actually doing that would be a mistake. It wouldn't be making you better. This is not a way to succeed at your goals, this is a way to observe what you're inclined to do anyway and paint the target around it. Your utility function (fake or otherwise) is supposed to describe stuff you actually want. Why would you want specifically that in particular?

I think the stronger version of Rationality is the version that phrases it as about getting the things you want, whatever those things might be. In that sense, if The Truth is merely a value, you should carefully segment it in your brain out from your practice of rationality: Your rationality is about mirroring the mathematical structure best suited for obtaining goals, and then to whatever degree you value The Truth above its normal instrumental value is something you buy where it's cheapest like all your other values. Mixing the two makes both worse, you pollute your concept of rational behaviour with a love of the truth (and therefore, for example, are biased towards imagining that other people who display rationality are probably honest, or other people who display honesty are probably rational) and you damage your ability to pursue the truth by not putting in the values category where it belongs where it will lead you to try to cheaply buy more of it.

Of course maybe you're just the kind of guy who really loves mixing his value for The Truth in with his rationality into a weird soup. That'd explain your actiosn without making you a walking violation of any kind of mathematical law, it'd just be a really weird thing for you to innately want.

I am still trying to find a better way to phrase this argument such that someone might find it persuasive of something, because I don't expect this phrasing to work.

I say and write things^[3] [LW · GW] because I consider those things to be true, relevant, and at least somewhat important. That by itself is very often (possibly usually) sufficient for a thing to be useful in a general sense (i.e., I think that the world is better for me having said it, which necessarily involves the world being better for the people in it). Whether the specific person to whom the thing is nominally or factually addressed will be better off as a result of what I said or wrote is not my concern in any way other than that.

I think I meant something subtly different that what you've taken that part to mean. I think you understand that, f other people noticed a pattern that everything you said was false, irrelevant, or unimportant, they would eventually stop bothering to listen when you talk, and this would mean you'd lose the ability to get other people to know things, which is a useful ability to have. This is basically my position! Whether the specific person you address is better off in each specific case isn't materal because you aren't trying to always make them better off, you're just trying to avoid being seen as someone who predictibly doesn't make them better off. I agree that calculating the full expected consequences to every person of every thing you say isn't necessary for this purpose.

No, this is a terrible idea. Do not do this. Act consequentialism does not work. ... Look, this is going to sound fatuous, but there really isn’t any better general rule than this: you should only lie when doing so is the right thing to do.

I agree that Act Consequentialism doesn't really work. I was trying to be a Rule consequentialist instead wben I wrote the above rule. I agree that that sounds fatuous, but I think the immediate feeling is pointing at a valid retort: You haven't operationalized this position into a decision process that a person can actually do (or even pretend to do).

I took great effort to try to right down my policy as something explicit in terms a person could try to do (even though I am willing to admit it is not really correct mostly because finite agent problems), because a person can't be a real Rule Consequentialist without actually having a Rule. What is the rule for "Only lie when doing so is the right thing to do"? It sounds like an instruction to pass the act to my rightness calculator, but if I program that rule into my rightness calculator, and then give it any input, it gets into an infinite loop. I have an Act Consequentialist rightness calculator as a backup, but if I pass the rule "only lie when doing so is the right thing to do" into that as a backup I'm just right back at doing act consequentialism.

If you can write down a better rule for when to lie the than what I've put above (that is also better than the "never" or "only by coming up with galaxy-brained ways it technically isn't lying" or Eliezer's meta-honesty idea that I've read before) I'd consider you to have (possibly) won this issue, but that's the real price of entry. It's not enough to point out the flaws where all my rules don't work, you have to produce rules that work better.

re 2: Now that you mention it, I realized sharpening can be easily outsourced. My mistake.

re 1: I don't see it, buying pre-chopped onions is simply not equivalent to having a freshly chopped onion and some vegetables cannot be bought pre-cut. While cutting isn't a bottleneck for most people I had this chain in mind: (no cutting skills) -> (cooking takes more time and is less pleasant) -> (Less willingness to try new or complex recipes).

(Also, if you don't have proper technique, you're at a higher risk of cutting yourself. In that respect, it's like free climbing / using safety ropes)

re 3: I had self-experiments in general in mind (people run self-experiments, without knowing statistics, or even gathering data), but it did not occur to me that not all self-experiments are QS (probably most aren't). As written you are, of course, correct.

There are a number of ways that the US seems to have better values than the CCP, by my lights, but it seems incredibly strange to claim the US values being egalitarian, and social equality or harmony more.

Rule of law, fostering diversity, encouraging human excellence? Sure, there you would have an argument. But egalitarian?

Disagree with

• Cooking / cutting vegetables (also other things)
• Cutting vegetables / sharpening knives
• QS experiments / knowing statistics

The first two is pretty much like sketch / making pencils and paper, and the third one is absolutely essential and not a skill than you can not have