LessWrong 2.0 Reader

Thanks for making this!

I found it a challenge to deduce strategies over many plays, rather than following the advice "not intended to be replayed". The first playthrough was pretty much meaningless for me, especially given the knowledge that both time and history could affect the results. I just viewed it as one step of information gathering for the real game.

The suboptimal zones weren't obviously suboptimal from a single pass, even Dragon Lake that always yields nothing. For all I knew, it could have yielded 5000 food with quite a low probability (and still be always optimal), or lesser amounts of food at specific combinations of time and day, or only when matching some rule based on the previous results of foraging in other zones.

After many runs I did settle on a strategy, and mentally scored myself by looking at the source to see whether there was anything that I should have spotted but didn't. As it happened, my final strategy was almost optimal though I stayed on the rats for a few more hours than ideal.

Curated!^[1] This thinks through a specific threat model with future AIs, and how to concretely mitigate it. I don't have a strong opinion on whether it works, but I really want to encourage more concrete analysis of this sort.

1. ^{^}

   "Curated", a term which here means "This just got emailed to 30,000 people, of whom typically half open the email, and it gets shown at the top of the frontpage to anyone who hasn't read it for ~1 week."

I'd missed that, thank you for pointing that out.

If "expected" effectively means what you're saying is that you're being offered a bet that is good by definition, that even at 50/50 odds, you take the bet, I suppose that's true. If the bet is static for a second flip, it wouldn't be a good deal, but if it dynamically altered such that it was once again a good bet by definition, I suppose you keep taking the bet.

If you're engaging with the uncertainty that people are bad at evaluating things like "expected utility" then at least some of the point is that our naive intuitions are probably missing some of the math, and costs, and the bet is likely a bad bet.

If I was trying to give credence to that second possibility, I'd say that the word "expected" is now doing a bunch of hidden heavy lifting in the payoff structure, and you don't really know what lifting it's doing.

I might as well check out the panel discussion. I didn't know about it.

I think I listened to the Hotz debate. The highlight of that one was when Hotz implied that he was using an LLM to drive a car, Yudkowsky freaks out a bit, and Hotz clarifies that he means the architecture for his learning algorithm is basically the same as an LLM.

I suspect the Destiny discussion is qualitatively similar to the Dwarkesh one.

At this point, maybe I should just read old MIRI papers.

Ok, I'm agreeing in principle to make the same bet as with RatsWrongAboutUAP.

("I commit to paying up if I agree there's a >0.4 probability something non-mundane happened in a UFO/UAP case, or if there's overwhelming consensus to that effect and my probability is >0.1.")

Thank you for clarifying. I appreciate and point out as relevant the fact that Legg-Hutter includes in it's definition "for all environments (ie action:observation mappings)". I can now say I agree with your "heresy" with a high credence for the cases where compute budgets are not ludicrously small relative to I/O scale, and the utility function is not trivial. I'm a bit weirded out by the environment space being conditional on a fixed hardware variable (namely, I/O) in this operationalization, but whathever.

And I’m not even mentioning the strange sexual dynamics

Is this a joke? I'm confused.

I asked GPT4o to perform a web search for podcast appearances by Yudkowsky. It dug up these two lists (apparently, autogenerated from scrapped data). When I asked it to base use these lists as a starting point to look for high quality debates and after some further elicitation and wrangling, the best we could find was this moderated panel discussion featuring Yudkowsky, Liv Boeree, and Joscha Bach. There's also the Yudkowsky v/s George Hotz debate on Lex Fridman, and the time Yudkowsky debated AI risk with the streamer and political commentaror known as Destiny. I have watched none of the three debates I just mentioned; but I know that Hotz is a heavily vibes-based (rather than object-level-based) thinker, and that Destiny has no background in AI risk, but has good epistemics. I think he probably offered reasonable-at-first-approximation-yet-mostly-uninformed pushback.

EDIT: Upon looking a bit more at the Destiny-Yudkowsky discussion, i may have unwittingly misrepresented it a bit. It occurred during Manifest, and was billed as a debate. ChatGPT says Destiny's skepticism was rather active, and did not budge much.

• Perhaps Legg-Hutter intelligence.
• I'm not sure how much the goal matters - probably the details depend on the utility function you want to optimize. I think you can do about as well as possible by carving out a utility function module and designing the rest uniformly to pursue the objectives of that module. But perhaps this comes at a fairly significant cost (i.e. you'd need a somewhat larger computer to get the same performance if you insist on doing it this way).
• ...And yes, there does exist a computer program which is remarkably good at just chess and nothing else, but that's not the kind of thing I'm talking about here.
• Yes, the I/O channels should be fixed along with the hardware.