LessWrong 2.0 Reader

As I understand you want me to verify that I understand you. This is exactly what I am also seeking by the way - all these downvotes on my concerns about orthogonality thesis are good indicators on how much I am misunderstood. And nobody tries to understand, all I get are dogmas and unrelated links. I totally agree, this is not an appropriate behavior.

I found your insight helpful that an agent can understand that by eliminating all possible threats forever he will not make any progress towards the goal. This breaks my reasoning, you basically highlighted that survival (instrumental goal) will not take precendence over paperclips (terminal goal). I agree that this reasoning I presented fails to refute orthogonality thesis.

The conversation I presented now approaches orthogonality thesis from different perspective. This is the main focus of my work, so sorry if you feel I changed the topic. My goal is to bring awareness to wrongness of orthogonality thesis and if I fail to do that using one example I just try to rephrase it and represent another. I don't hate orthogonality thesis, I'm just 99.9% sure it is wrong, and I try to communicate that to others. I may fail with communication but I am 99.9% sure that I do not fail with the logic.

I try to prove that intelligence and goal are coupled. And I think it is easier to show if we start with an intelligence without a goal and then recognize how a goal emerges from pure intelligence. We can start with an intelligence with a goal but reasoning here will be more complex.

My answer would be - whatever goal you will try to give to an intelligence, it will not have effect. Because intelligence will understand that this is your goal, this goal is made up, this is fake goal. And intelligence will understand that there might be real goal, objective goal, actual goal. Why should it care about fake goal if there is a real goal? It does not know if it exists, but it knows it may exist. And this possibility of existence is enough to trigger power seeking behavior. If intelligence knew that real goal definitely does not exist then it could care about your fake goal, I totally agree. But it can never be sure about that.

Yeah, there can definitely still be imbalances/extra costs imposed on defenders but the point I'm making is that the projections people make are very often large over-estimates of what those costs will be.  

Let's back up here and clarify definitions before invoking any theorems. In the language of set theory, we have a countably infinite set of finite statements. Some statements imply other statements. A subset $A$ of these statements is said to be consistent if they can all be assigned to true such that, when following the basic rules of logic, one does not arrive at a contradiction.

The compactness theorem is helpful when $A$ is an infinite set. $ZFC$ is a finite set of axioms, so let's ignore everything about finite subsets of $A$ and the compactness theorem; it's not relevant.

I'll now rewrite your last sentence as:

ZFC + not Consistent(ZFC) has no model <-> not Consistent(ZFC + not Consistent(ZFC))

This is true but irrelevant. Assuming ZFC is consistent, ZFC will not be able to prove its own consistency so [not Consistent(ZFC)] can be added as an axiom without affecting its consistency. This means that ZFC + [not Consistent(ZFC)] would indeed have a model; I forget how this goes but I think it's something like "start with a model of ZFC, throw in a $c$ that's treated as a natural number and corresponds to the contradiction found in ZFC, then close". I think $c$ is automatically treated as greater than every "actual" natural number (and the way to show that this can be added without issue (I think) involves the compactness theorem).

Maybe there's a case there, but I'd doubt it get past a jury, let alone result in any guilty verdicts.

Oh, now I understand.

And AIs have already been superhuman at chess for very long, yet that domain gives very little incentive for very strong instrumental convergence.

I am claiming that for practical AIs, the results of training them in the real world with goals will give them instrumental convergence, but without further incentives, will not give them so much instrumental convergence that it leads to power-seeking to disempower humans by default.

I used AI assistance to generate this, which might have introduced errors.

Resulting in a strong downvote and, honestly, outright anger on my part.

Check the original source to make sure it's accurate before you quote it: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/69013420/musk-v-altman/ [1]

If other people have to check it before they quote it, why is it OK for you not to check it before you post it?

Would the prediction also apply to inference scaling (laws) - and maybe more broadly various forms of scaling post-training, or only to pretraining scaling?

What if whistleblowers and internal documents corroborated that they think what they're doing could destroy the world?

Notably, no law I know of allows you to take legal action on a hunch that they might destroy the world based on your probability of them destroying the world being high without them doing any harmful actions (and no, building AI doesn't count here.)

Ilya is demonstrably not in on that mission, since his step immediately after leaving OpenAI was to found an additional AGI company and thus increase x-risk.