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Specifically, the point is that evolution's approach to alignment is very different and much worse than what we can do, so the evolution model doesn't suggest concern, since we are doing something very, very different and way better than what evolution did to align AIs.

Coming back to this point, Steven Byrnes has written a response [LW(p) · GW(p)] as to why he is pessimistic about the claim that we would do better than evolution, because we are doing something different:

Optimist type 2: They make the §5.1.3 argument that our methods are better than Ev’s, because we’re engineering the AI’s explicit desires in a more direct way. And the explicit desire is corrigibility / obedience. And then they also make the §5.1.2 argument that “AIs solving specific technical problems that the human wants them to solve” will not undermine those explicit motivations, despite the (1-3) loop running freely with minimal supervision, because the (1-3) loop will work in vaguely intuitive and predictable ways on the object-level technical question.

My pessimistic response has three parts: First, the idea that a full-fledged (1-3) loop will not undermine corrigibility / obedience is as yet untested and at least open to question (as I wrote in §5.1.2). Second, my expectation is that some training and/or algorithm change will happen between now and “AIs that really have the full (1-3) triad”, and that change may well make it less true that we are directly engineering the AI’s explicit desires in the first place—for example, see o1 is a bad idea. Third, what are the “specific technical problems that the human wants the AI to solve”??

Do you think he has a point?

Well, in this world:

1. AI didn't just kill everyone 5% of the way through the story

2. IMO, the characters in this story basically get the opportunity to reflect on what is good for them before taking each additional step. (they maybe feel some pressure to Keep Up With The Joneses, re: AI assisted thinking. But, that pressure isn't super crazy strong. Like the character's boss isn't strongly implying that if they don't take these upgrades they lose their job.)

3. Even if you think the way the characters are making their choices here are more dystopian and they were dragged along a current of change that was maybe bad and maybe even literally destroyed their minds, the beings that end up existing at the end seem to value many of the things I value, and seem to be pretty good at coordinating at scale about how to make good choices both individually and collectively. (like, if you think they basically foolishly died, the thing that replaces them could have been much worse). ((I don't think that they foolishly died, but, the argument about that probably doesn't fit in this margin well)

However bad you think this outcome is societally, I think it could have been much worse – a rushed panic to adopt each new technology immediately, it could be the case that the earth gets converted to computronium quickly (even decided via recent-posthumans) and people who don't adopt AI tech are either killed or uploaded against their will. (You might think this happened in this story offscreen, which is maybe reasonable. I think it's implied pretty strongly that it didn't)

This article [LW · GW] seems to have found a big weakness of untrusted monitoring:

Synthetic inputs auditing is trivially defeated if the checker AI can distinguish synthetic inputs from real ones, as it could then always answer truthfully on the synthetic inputs to pass auditing, then collude with the generator on real inputs.

To create useful synthetic inputs, either the blue team must be able to match the generator's style well enough to consistently fool the checker, or it must be able to redact the generator's output to the point where the checker has no identifying details to distinguish inputs. The former seems impractical, since faking the inputs at that level of verisimilitude would require the blue team to have significant understanding of the AI's inner workings, at which point there are probably more directly usable alignment strategies. The latter seems difficult, as by the protocol's definition, the AI is working on problems/solutions that humans cannot easily understand, but effective redaction requires humans to understand the content of the solution to some extent.

Overall, I think this represents a significant flaw in the untrusted monitoring protocol.

Do you think that this weakness can be somehow circumvented? If not, do you think it is as fatal (to untrusted monitoring protocol) as the author of the article seems to think?

Re: Ayahuasca from the ACX survey having effects like

^[1]There's a cluster of subcultures that consistently drift toward philosophical idealist metaphysics (consciousness, not matter or math, as fundamental to reality): McKenna-style psychonauts, Silicon Valley Buddhist circles, neo-occultist movements, certain transhumanist branches, quantum consciousness theorists, and various New Age spirituality scenes. While these communities seem superficially different, they share a striking tendency to reject materialism in favor of mind-first metaphysics.

The common factor connecting them? These are all communities where psychedelic use is notably prevalent. This isn't coincidental.

There's a plausible mechanistic explanation: Psychedelics disrupt the Default Mode Network and adjusting a bunch of other neural parameters. When these break down, the experience of physical reality (your predictive processing simulation) gets fuzzy and mailable while consciousness remains vivid and present. This creates a powerful intuition that consciousness must be more fundamental than matter. Conscious experience is more fundamental/stable than perception of the material world, which many people conflate with the material world itself.

The fun part? This very intuition - that consciousness is primary and matter secondary - is itself being produced by ingesting a chemical which alters physical brain mechanisms. We're watching neural circuitry create metaphysical intuitions in real-time.

This suggests something profound about metaphysics itself: Our basic intuitions about what's fundamental to reality (whether materialist OR idealist) might be more about human neural architecture than about ultimate reality. It's like a TV malfunctioning in a way that produces the message "TV isn't real, only signals are real!"

This doesn't definitively prove idealism wrong, but it should make us deeply suspicious of metaphysical intuitions that feel like direct insight - they might just be showing us the structure of our own cognitive machinery.

1. ^{^}

   Claude assisted writing, ideas from me and edited by me.

There's been a widespread assumption that training reasoning models like o1 or r1 can only yield improvements on tasks with an objective metric of correctness, like math or coding. See this essay, for example, which seems to take as a given that the only way to improve LLM performance on fuzzy tasks like creative writing or business advice is to train larger models.

This assumption confused me, because we already know how to train models to optimize for subjective human preferences. We figured out a long time ago that we can train a reward model to emulate human feedback and use RLHF to get a model that optimizes this reward. AI labs could just plug this into the reward for their reasoning models, reinforcing the reasoning traces leading to responses that obtain higher reward. This seemed to me like a really obvious next step.

Well, it turns out that DeepSeek r1 actually does this. From their paper:

2.3.4. Reinforcement Learning for all Scenarios

To further align the model with human preferences, we implement a secondary reinforcement learning stage aimed at improving the model’s helpfulness and harmlessness while simultaneously refining its reasoning capabilities. Specifically, we train the model using a combination of reward signals and diverse prompt distributions. For reasoning data, we adhere to the methodology outlined in DeepSeek-R1-Zero, which utilizes rule-based rewards to guide the learning process in math, code, and logical reasoning domains. For general data, we resort to reward models to capture human preferences in complex and nuanced scenarios. We build upon the DeepSeek-V3 pipeline and adopt a similar distribution of preference pairs and training prompts. For helpfulness, we focus exclusively on the final summary, ensuring that the assessment emphasizes the utility and relevance of the response to the user while minimizing interference with the underlying reasoning process. For harmlessness, we evaluate the entire response of the model, including both the reasoning process and the summary, to identify and mitigate any potential risks, biases, or harmful content that may arise during the generation process. Ultimately, the integration of reward signals and diverse data distributions enables us to train a model that excels in reasoning while prioritizing helpfulness and harmlessness.

This checks out to me. I've already noticed that r1 feels significantly better than other models at creative writing, which is probably due to this human preference training. While o1 was no better at creative writing than other models, this might just mean that OpenAI didn't prioritize training o1 on human preferences. My Manifold market currently puts a 65% chance on chain-of-thought training outperforming traditional LLMs by 2026, and it should probably be higher at this point.

We need to adjust our thinking around reasoning models - there's no strong reason to expect that future models will be much worse at tasks with fuzzy success criteria.

Adapted from my previously-posted question [LW · GW], after cubefox [LW · GW] pointed out that DeepSeek is already using RLHF.

If you want to understand why a model, any model, did something, you presumably want a verbal explanation of its reasoning, a chain of thought. E.g. why AlphaGo made its famous unexpected move 37. That's not just true for language models.

I think this is correct, but doesn't seem to note the broader trend towards human disempowerment in favor of bureaucratic and corporate systems, which this gradual disempowerment would continue, and hence elides or ignores why AI risk is distinct.

I think it's actually not any less true of o1/r1.

I think I’ll duck out of this discussion because I don’t actually believe that o1/r1 will lead to full-fledged (1-3) loops and AGI, so it’s hard for me to clearly picture that scenario and engage with its consequences.

I don't think AI taste should play a role in AI help solving the value alignment problem. If we had any sense (which sometimes we do once problems are right in our faces), we'd be asking the AI "so what happens if we use this alignment approach/goal?" and then using our own taste, not asking it things like "tell us what to do with our future". We could certainly ask for input and there are ways that could go wrong. But I mostly hope for AGI help in the technical part of solving stable value alignment.

Hmm. But the AI has a ton of wiggle room to make things seem good or bad depending on how things are presented and framed, right? (This old Stuart Armstrong post [LW · GW] is a bit relevant.) If I ask “what will happen if we do X”, the AI can answer in a way that puts things in a positive light, or a negative light. If the good understanding lives in the AI and the good taste lives in the human, then it seems to me that nobody is at the wheel. The AI taste is determining what gets communicated to the human and how, right? What’s relevant vs irrelevant? What analogies are getting at what deeply matters versus what analogies are superficial? All these questions are value-laden, but they are prerequisites to the AI communicating its understanding to the human. Remember, the AI is doing the (1-3) thing to autonomously develop a new idiosyncratic superhuman understanding of AI and philosophy and society and so on, by assumption. Thus, AI-human communication is much harder and different than we’re used to today, and presumably requires its own planning and intention on the part of the AI.

…Unless you’re actually in the §5.1.1 camp where the AI is helping clarify and brainstorm but is working shoulder-to-(virtual) shoulder, and the human basically knows everything the AI knows. I.e., like how people use foundation models today. If so, that’s fine, no complaints. I’m happy for people to use foundation models in a similar way that they do today, as they work on the big problem of how to make future more powerful AIs that run on something closer to ambitious value learning or CEV as opposed to corrigibility / obedience.

Sorry if I’m misunderstanding or being stupid, this is an area where I feel some uncertainty.  :)

Related:

https://x.com/mkurman88/status/1885042970447015941

https://x.com/WenhuChen/status/1885060597500567562