LessWrong 2.0 Reader

I would have concerns about suitably generic, flexible and sensitive humanoid robots, yes.

Currently we basically don't have any datasets where it's labelled what orca says what. When I listen to recordings, I cannot distinguish voices, though idk it's possible that people who listened a lot more can. I think just unsupervised voice clustering would probably not work very accurately. I'd guess it's probably possible to get data on who said what by using an array of hydrophones to infer the location of the sound, but we need very accurate position inference because different orcas are often just 1-10m distance from each other, and for this we might need to get/infer decent estimates of how water temperature varies by depth, and generally there have not yet been attempts to get high precision through this method. (It's definitely harder in water than in air.)

Yeah basically I initially also had rough thoughts into this direction, but I think the create-and-teach language way is probably a lot faster.

I think the earth species project is trying to use AI to decode animal communication, though they don't focus on orcas in particular, but many species including e.g. beluga whales. Didn't look into it a lot but seems possible I could do sth like this in a smarter and more promising way, but probably still would take long.

Is-ought confabulation Means-ends confabulation Scope sensitivity Fundamental attribution error Attribute substitution Ambiguity aversion Reasoning from consequences

Yeah, I am not even sure what was the point of the article. What is the thing we are supposed to update about? Writing in a different style, or changing our opinions (about what exactly?), or finding completely new topics to talk about so that we are not boring the article author, or...?

From my experience they're getting pretty good, depends on the social but IG reels or YT can keep me entertained with nothing-content for hours

The argument presented by Aaronson is that, since it would take as much computation to convert the rock/waterfall computation into a usable computation as it would be to just do the usable computation directly, the rock/waterfall isn't really doing the computation.

I find this argument rather convincing, as we are talking about a possible internal property here, and not about the external relation with the rest of the world (which we already agree is rather useless).

(I've since found https://www.lesswrong.com/rationality, [? · GW] which does the job.)

As with OP, I strongly recommend Aaronson, who explains why waterfalls aren't doing computation in ways that refute the rock example you discuss: https://www.scottaaronson.com/papers/philos.pdf

I agree with that. I think that the general ick that I get from the dialogue is the presumption and general tone of Bryce. Thanks for clarifying!

You seem to fundamentally misunderstand computation, in ways similar to Searle. I can't engage deeply, but recommend Scott Aaronson's primer on computational complexity: https://www.scottaaronson.com/papers/philos.pdf